Foster et al v. Vignola et al

Filing 28

LETTER MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting 11 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim; granting 21 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim; Frederick Bealefeld and Mayor and City Council of Baltimore terminated. Signed by Judge George Levi Russell, III on 8/7/14. (ca2s, Deputy Clerk)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
Chambers of
George L. Russell, III
United States District Judge

101 West Lombard Street
Baltimore, Maryland 21201
410-962-4055

August 7, 2014
MEMORANDUM TO COUNSEL RE:

Thomas Robert Foster, et al. v. Officer
Carmine Vignola, et al.
Civil Action No. GLR-13-3758

Dear Counsel:
Pending before the Court are Defendants Mayor and City Council of Baltimore (the “City”), and
Former Baltimore Police Commissioner Frederick Bealefeld, III’s (“Commissioner Bealefeld”)
respective Motions to Dismiss. (ECF Nos. 11, 21). Plaintiffs, Thomas Robert Foster, Jr., and two
immediate family members,1 are suing Officers Thomas E. Wilson, Keith Gladstone, Carmine Vignola,
and Gregory Fisher (collectively, the “Officer Defendants”), the City, and former Commissioner
Bealefeld, for civil and constitutional violations stemming from a false arrest, falsified sworn statement
of probable cause, and an illegal search of Plaintiffs’ home. Having reviewed the pleadings and
supporting documents, the Court finds no hearing necessary. See Local Rule 105.6 (D.Md. 2014). For
the reasons outlined below, the Motions will be granted.
The Plaintiffs’ residence is a two story, brick, single-family detached home that is equipped with
surveillance cameras covering the front exterior entrance. On the afternoon of May 24, 2012, the
surveillance camera in front of the Plaintiffs’ home captured Foster, Jr. exit the front door and drive off
in his personal vehicle. A few minutes later, Foster, Jr. was arrested by Wilson and Fisher a few blocks
from his home. Upon taking Foster, Jr. into custody, Wilson allegedly employed excessive and
unreasonable force against him by striking Foster, Jr. in the face while he was handcuffed. Additionally,
Plaintiffs allege that after arresting Foster, Jr., the Officer Defendants entered Plaintiffs’ home without a
warrant and began searching the premises. During the search, the Officer Defendants allegedly
restricted Surina Foster’s movement, and threatened to place criminal charges against her.
Contemporaneous to these events, Wilson applied to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City for a
search and seizure warrant. According to a detailed sworn statement of probable cause, Wilson claims
to have observed Foster, Jr. carrying a black drawstring bag purportedly containing CDS and related
paraphernalia when he exited his home on May 24. Review of the surveillance video, however,
revealed that Foster, Jr. was not carrying a black bag or any similar item when he exited his home. The
Office of the State’s Attorney declined to prosecute Foster, Jr. The false assertions made by Wilson,
however, resulted in a criminal indictment and subsequent incarceration of Foster, Jr. totaling 197 days.
On December 12, 2013, Plaintiffs filed a three-count Complaint. (ECF No. 1). Counts I and II
pertain solely to the individual Officer Defendants. Count III alleges constitutional violations asserted
under § 1983 against former Commissioner Bealefeld and the City. The City moved to dismiss the
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The family-member Plaintiffs include Foster, Jr.’s father, Thomas Darnell Foster, and sister,
Surina C. Foster.

Complaint against it on April 7, 2014. (ECF No. 11). Former Commissioner Bealefeld moved to
dismiss the Complaint against him on May 13, 2014. (ECF No. 21). Plaintiffs filed a joint response on
May 30, 2014. (ECF No. 25). Former Commissioner Bealefeld filed a Reply on June 12, 2014 (ECF
No. 26), and the City filed a Reply on June 16, 2014 (ECF No. 27). Defendants’ Motions present two
prevailing issues. The first is whether the City sufficiently controls the Baltimore Police Department
(“BPD”) to be subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) for constitutional violations by
Baltimore police officers. The second is whether the Complaint pleads sufficient facts to state a
plausible § 1983 claim against former Commissioner Bealefeld in his individual and official capacities.
To survive a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion, the complaint must allege enough
facts to state a plausible claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible when “the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the Court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Legal conclusions or conclusory
statements do not suffice and are not entitled to the assumption of truth. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 555).
Thus, the Court “must determine whether it is plausible that the factual allegations in the
complaint are enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Monroe v. City of
Charlottesville, 579 F.3d 380, 386 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Andrew v. Clark, 561 F.3d 261, 266 (4th Cir.
2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted). And in doing so, the Court must examine the complaint as a
whole, consider the factual allegations in the complaint as true, and construe the factual allegations in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 268 (1994); Lambeth v. Bd.
of Comm’rs of Davidson Cnty., 407 F.3d 266, 268 (4th Cir. 2005) (citing Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.
232, 236 (1974)).
First, the City asks the Court to dismiss the Complaint against it because it lacks sufficient
control over the BPD to be liable under § 1983 for the conduct of Baltimore police officers. The Court
agrees and will dismiss the claims against the City.
The precedent set by the Supreme Court of the United States in Monell v. Department of Social
Services of the City of New York allows plaintiffs to sue the City under § 1983 for the unconstitutional
conduct of its employees. 436 U.S. 658 (1978). The threshold question to be decided, therefore, is
whether Baltimore police officers are City employees.
Under Maryland law, the BPD is a state agency.2 Mayor & City Council of Balt. v. Clark, 944
A.2d 1122, 1131 (Md. 2008); Balt. Police Dep’t v. Cherkes, 780 A.2d 410, 428 (Md.Ct.Spec.App.
2001); Clea v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 541 A.2d 1303, 1306 (Md. 1988), superseded by statute,
Md. Code Ann., State Gov’t § 12-101(a) (West 2014), as recognized in D’Aoust v. Diamond, 36 A.3d
941 (Md. 2012). The unique relationship between the City and the BPD confuses the issue of whether
Baltimore police officers are City employees. The issue is further confused by a dichotomy of cases
addressing whether the City sufficiently controls the BPD for § 1983 purposes. In the Estate of
Anderson v. Strohman, however, this Court recently declined to follow the line of cases concluding that
the City could be liable under § 1983 for Baltimore police officer conduct because those cases appeared
to merge the § 1983 municipal liability question with an Eleventh Amendment analysis. --- F.Supp.2d --, No. GLR-13-3167, 2014 WL 1153785, *3-*6 (D.Md. Mar. 19, 2014). The Court concluded “based
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Because many earlier cases discuss the unique relationship between the City and BPD at
length, the Court will not belabor the point here. For a more detailed discussion, see Clark, 944 A.2d at
1128–31.
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on governing Maryland and federal law, that a § 1983 claim cannot be brought against the City for
Baltimore police officer conduct because it does not sufficiently control the BPD and cannot be
considered to employ Baltimore police officers.” Strohman, 2014 WL 1153785, at *6. Accordingly, the
Court will dismiss the Complaint against the City.
Next, the Court will also dismiss the Complaint against former Commissioner Bealefeld in his
individual and official capacities because Plaintiffs fail to plead the basic elements necessary for the
Court to impose supervisory liability under § 1983.
Plaintiffs do not plead any facts demonstrating that former Commissioner Bealefeld took any
affirmative action or inaction related to the arrest, confinement, or prosecution of Foster, Jr., but allege
former Commissioner Bealefeld “developed a ‘quota’ policy or custom with regard to acts of illegality
committed by officers, including defendant Wilson, against civilians which encouraged the individual
defendants in this case to believe that they could violate the constitutional rights of plaintiffs with
impunity and with the explicit or tacit approval of [Commissioner] Bealefeld . . . .” (Compl. ¶ 47).
It is well established that the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in § 1983 claims.
Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766, 782 (4th Cir. 2004) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 691). Liability of
supervisory officials “is not based on ordinary principles of respondeat superior, but rather is premised
on ‘a recognition that supervisory indifference or tacit authorization of subordinates’ misconduct may be
a causative factor in the constitutional injuries they inflict on those committed to their care.’” Baynard
v. Malone, 268 F.3d 228, 235 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 372 (4th Cir.
1984)). Supervisory liability under § 1983 must be supported with evidence that:
(1) the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that his subordinate was
engaged in conduct that posed a pervasive and unreasonable risk of constitutional injury
to citizens like the plaintiff; (2) the supervisor’s response to the knowledge was so
inadequate as to show deliberate indifference to, or tacit authorization of, the alleged
offensive practices; and (3) there was an affirmative causal link between the
supervisor’s inaction and the particular constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff.
Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).
Further, suing a public employee in his official capacity is tantamount to suing directly the
government agency for which he works. See Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471-72 (1985). A plaintiff
seeking to impose liability on a municipality under § 1983 must “identify a municipal ‘policy’ or
‘custom’ that caused the plaintiff’s injury.” Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty., Okl. v. Brown, 520
U.S. 397, 403 (1997). Identifying a specific “policy” “ensures that a municipality is held liable only for
those deprivations resulting from the decisions of its duly constituted legislative body or of those
officials whose acts may fairly be said to be those of the municipality.” Id. at 403-04 (citing Monell,
436 U.S. at 694). “Similarly, an act performed pursuant to a ‘custom’ that has not been formally
approved by an appropriate decisionmaker may fairly subject a municipality to liability on the theory
that the relevant practice is so widespread as to have the force of law.” Id. at 404 (citing Monell, 436
U.S. at 690-91).
Here, Plaintiffs do not plead facts detailing the alleged policy of “quotas,” or how the alleged
quota system led to the false arrest of Foster, Jr. Plaintiffs merely assert that despite former
Commissioner Bealefeld’s knowledge of Wilson’s misconduct, including but not limited to, falsifying
affidavits, conducting illegal searches, employing the use of excessive force, making illegal arrests,
falsely imprisoning, and otherwise violating the constitutional rights of persons in the City of Baltimore,
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he failed to properly investigate, supervise, train, and discipline Wilson, from which a “tacit
authorization” of that misconduct can be inferred. (Compl. ¶¶ 45-46). Where the basis of municipal
liability under § 1983 rests on the agency’s failure to investigate, supervise, train, and discipline,
however, a plaintiff must similarly demonstrate “deliberate indifference,” on the part of the decision
maker, to rights of persons with whom police come into contact. City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489
U.S. 378, 388 (1989).
The deliberate indifference standard requires a showing that a decision-maker had notice of a
pattern of wide-spread abuse but failed to take remedial steps to address the abuse. See Wellington v.
Daniels, 717 F.2d 932, 936 (4th Cir. 1983) (“Generally, a failure to supervise gives rise to § 1983
liability, however, only in those situations in which there is a history of widespread abuse. Only then
may knowledge be imputed to the supervisory personnel.”); see also Harris, 489 U.S. at 399-400
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“To infer the existence of a city policy from the
isolated misconduct of a single, low-level officer, and then to hold the city liable on the basis of that
policy, would amount to permitting precisely the theory of strict respondeat superior liability rejected in
Monell.” (quoting Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 831 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part))) (internal quotation marks omitted); Patzner v. Burkett, 779 F.2d 1363, 1367
(8th Cir. 1985) (“[A] municipality may be liable [under § 1983] if it had notice of prior misbehavior by
its officers and failed to take remedial steps amounting to deliberate indifference to the offensive acts.”).
Plaintiffs allege, however, only a single isolated incident of a similar violation in which Wilson
provided false testimony in a 2003 suppression hearing in the matter of United States v. Mason Weaver,
Case No. 02-CR-00491-AMD (D.Md. 2002). (Compl. ¶ 34).
Further, in their Response in Opposition to the Motions to Dismiss, Plaintiffs concede that the
BPD conducted an administrative investigation into the 2003 allegations of misconduct against Wilson.
As a result of that investigation, Wilson lost five days of paid leave and was required to attend
additional training on search warrant writing. (Pls.’ Resp. Opp’n Defs.’ Mots. Dismiss 8, ECF No. 25).
Thus, Plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged a history of wide-spread abuse or pattern of violations from
which a “tacit authorization” by former Commissioner Bealefeld can be inferred. Accordingly, the
claims against former Commissioner Bealefeld in his individual and official capacities will be
dismissed.

For the foregoing reasons, the City and former Commissioner Bealefeld’s respective Motions
to Dismiss, (ECF Nos. 11, 21), are GRANTED. Count III of the Complaint is dismissed. Despite the
informal nature of this Memorandum, it shall constitute an Order of the Court and the Clerk is
directed to docket it accordingly and terminate the City and former Commissioner Bealefeld from this
case.

Very truly yours,
/s/
_______________________
George L. Russell, III
United States District Judge

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