Fangman et al v. Genuine Title, LLC

Filing 429

MEMORANDUM ORDER granting 356 Settlement Counsels' Petition for Attorneys' Fees and Expenses in the requested amount of $82,139.52. Signed by Judge Richard D. Bennett on 1/10/2017. (bmhs, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
EDWARD J. AND VICKI
FANGMAN, et al.,

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Plaintiffs,
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v.

Civil Action No. RDB-14-0081
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GENUINE TITLE, LLC, et al.
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Defendants.
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MEMORANDUM ORDER
On December 16, 2016, this Court conducted a Final Fairness Hearing on the
Proposed Class Action Settlement (ECF No. 277-2) (“Settlement Agreement”) of all claims
asserted in this action against Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (“Chase”). Via Order
dated that same day (ECF No. 421), this Court granted final approval of the Settlement
Agreement, dismissed all claims against Chase, and approved the parties’ requested service
awards for Class Representatives Carol Shaw and Patricia Marshall in the amount of $3,500
each, including their settlement benefits1. See Order, ¶¶ 8, 9, 13, ECF No. 421. Final
Judgement has been entered in this case against Chase in “an amount2 necessary to fund
Settlement Benefits payable to [Chase] Class Members, in accordance with the Settlement
Agreement,” discussed infra. Id. at ¶¶ 11, 15. Still pending before this Court is Settlement
Pursuant to this Court’s Order, Class Representatives Carol Shaw and Patricia Marshall shall each receive
$3,500, including their settlement benefits, for a total award of $7,000. Pursuant to Paragraph 11 of the
Settlement Agreement, the difference between these service awards and their settlement benefits shall come
out of the funds awarded to Settlement Counsel. See also Mot. for Service Awards, p. 2, ECF No. 356.
2 Settlement Counsel have subsequently indicated to this Court that the value of the Chase Common Fund is
$328,558.08. See Correspondence, p. 1, ECF No. 422.
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Counsels’ Petition for Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses (ECF No. 356).

The parties’

submissions have been reviewed, and no additional hearing on the issue of attorneys’ fees
and expenses is necessary. See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2016). For the reasons stated
herein, the pending Settlement Counsels’ Petition for Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses (ECF
No. 356) is GRANTED in the requested amount of $82,139.52, an award equal to 25% of
the Chase Settlement Common Fund.3
BACKGROUND
In January of 2014, Plaintiffs Edward J. and Vicki Fangman brought this class action
against Defendant Genuine Title, LLC alleging, inter alia, violations of the Real Estate
Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”), 12 U.S.C. §§ 2607(a), (b)4. See Compl., ECF No. 2.
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (“Chase”) was named as a Defendant in the Second Amended
Complaint (ECF No. 138). An additional thirteen home mortgage lenders have also been
named as Defendants (collectively “Lender Defendants”) via the First and Second Amended
Complaints in this action. Attorneys Michael Paul Smith, Sarah Zadrozny, Timothy J.
Maloney, and Veronica Nannis of the law firms of Smith, Gildea & Schmidt, LLC (“SGS”)

Via Memorandum Order dated November 18, 2016 (ECF No. 411), this Court awarded Wells Fargo
Settlement Counsel attorneys’ fees and expenses in the amount of 15% of the Wells Fargo Settlement
Common Fund. For the reasons discussed in that Memorandum Order, a higher percentage of recovery
award would have been unreasonable, including Settlement Counsels’ requested 20% award. The Common
Fund in the Wells Fargo settlement was valued at $15,572,416.11, meaning that Settlement Counsels’ 15%
award totaled $2,335,862.42. A lodestar cross-check confirmed that the 15% award was appropriate. As
discussed infra, Chase Settlement Counsels’ requested award of 25% of the Chase Settlement Common Fund
is a reasonable award in the context of the Chase Settlement. A lodestar cross-check confirms that this is a
reasonable award. The lodestar multiplier for this award is only 2.35, well within the range of reasonable
multipliers previously established by this Court. See, e.g., Singleton v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC, 976 F. Supp. 2d 665,
689 (D. Md. 2013) (“Courts have generally held that lodestar multipliers falling between 2 and 4.5
demonstrate a reasonable attorneys’ fee.”).
4 Additionally, Plaintiffs alleged violations of Md. Code Ann., Real Prop. § 14-127 (“Section 14-127”) and the
Maryland Consumer Protection Act (“MCPA”), Md. Code Ann., Com. Law § 13-301. Those claims were
subsequently dismissed by this Court. See Orders, ECF Nos. 214, 281.
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2

and Joseph, Greenwald & Laake, P.A. (“JGL”) (hereinafter “Settlement Counsel”) have
represented all Plaintiffs, including the Chase Plaintiffs, throughout this litigation.
In prosecuting this case, Settlement Counsel have incurred significant expense and
have undergone significant investigation. For example, in July of 2013, Plaintiffs filed a
Petition for Emergency Appointment of a Receiver for the purpose of retrieving and
preserving the documents, books, and records of Genuine Title in the Circuit Court for
Baltimore County, Maryland.

That court granted the petition on July 30, 2014, and

Settlement Counsel were able to retrieve vast amounts of evidence from Genuine Title’s
records, including the identities of potential Chase Class Members. Additionally, Settlement
Counsel have subpoenaed records, documents, and testimony from a prior investigation into
Chase’s home mortgage lending practices conducted by the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau (“CFPB”) and the State of Maryland. See Fangman, et al. v. Genuine Title, LLC, et al.,
No. RDB-14-0081, 2016 WL 560483, at *2 (D. Md. Feb. 12, 2016). That investigation
involved similar allegations to those raised by the Plaintiffs in this action. In that case, Chase
ultimately agreed to a Stipulated Final Judgment and Order (the “Consent Decree”) with the
CFPB and the State, pursuant to which Chase agreed to refund certain settlement charges to
Chase borrowers.
Chase Filed a Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint on July 21, 2015
(ECF No. 170), to which Plaintiffs responded on September 4, 2015 (ECF No. 182).
However, the parties subsequently requested that this Court suspend consideration of
Chase’s Motion to Dismiss, pending settlement discussions (ECF No. 206). The parties filed
a Joint Motion to Preliminarily Approve Settlement on May 16, 2016 (ECF No. 277),
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attaching the Settlement Agreement as Exhibit A (ECF No. 277-2). This Court held a
Preliminary Fairness Hearing on June 1, 2016 and granted the parties’ Joint Motion via
Order dated that same date (ECF No. 286). This Court’s Order designated Michael Paul
Smith, Sarah Zadrozny, Timothy J. Maloney, and Veronica Nannis of the law firms of Smith,
Gildea & Schmidt, LLC (“SGS”) and Joseph, Greenwald & Laake, P.A. (“JGL”) as
Settlement Counsel.
The Settlement Agreement provides for the payment of the following benefits to the
Chase Class Members: “an amount equal to 120% the Section 1100 Charges that were paid
to [Genuine Title] (excluding Line 1108 title underwriter’s fees) as reflected on the member’s
final HUD-1 Settlement Statement for the member’s Chase loan.” Settlement Agreement, ¶
6.1, ECF No. 277-2. The settlement benefits are to be deposited into a Common Fund,
which Settlement Counsel has subsequently indicated will reach a total value of $328,558.08.
See Correspondence, p. 1, ECF No. 422.
With respect to attorneys’ fees and expenses, the Settlement Agreement provides that
Chase will pay attorneys’ fees and expenses “in addition to, not out of the Common Fund.”
Settlement Agreement, ¶ 12, ECF No. 277-2. The Settlement Agreement provides that
Settlement Counsel shall limit the amount of their requested attorneys’ fees and expenses to
an amount equal to 25% of the Common Fund. Id. The Agreement further provides that
Chase reserves the right to oppose any petition for attorneys’ fees and expenses that seeks
more than an aggregate award equal to 20% of the Common Fund. Id.
Under the terms of the Settlement Agreement, a notice plan was completed pursuant
to which all members of the Chase Class were informed of the Settlement Agreement’s
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terms, including the provisions for payment of attorneys’ fees and expenses. See Id. at ¶ 10.
No objections to the terms of the Settlement Agreement or requests for exclusion from the
settlement have been filed. On November 4, 2016, this Court conducted a Final Fairness
Hearing on the proposed settlement and granted final approval of the Settlement Agreement
that same day.
ANALYSIS
Settlement Counsel have requested an award of attorneys’ fees and expenses in the
amount of 25% of the Common Fund, or $82,139.52. Mot. for Attorneys’ Fees, p. 2, ECF
No. 356; Correspondence, p. 1, ECF No. 422. Pursuant to the terms of the Settlement
Agreement, $3,892.43 of that award will be paid to the Class Representatives—the difference
between their settlement benefits and $3,500 service awards previously awarded by this
Court. See Settlement Agreement, ¶ 11, ECF No. 277-2; Correspondence, p. 1, ECF No.
422. An additional $1,025.84 of that award will cover Settlement Counsels’ expenses.
Correspondence, p. 1, ECF No. 422. Accordingly, Settlement Counsel request a total of
$77,221.25 in attorneys’ fees alone. Id. Although Chase reserved the right to object to any
request for attorneys’ fees and expenses in excess of 20% of the Common Fund, Chase has
filed a Notice of Non-Opposition to Settlement Counsels’ pending motion (ECF No. 366).
Rule 23(h) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “[i]n a certified class
action, the court may award reasonable attorney’s fees and nontaxable costs that are
authorized by law or by the parties’ agreement.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h). Additionally, the Real
Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”) provides that “[i]n any private action brought
pursuant to this subsection, the court may award to the prevailing party the court costs of
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the action together with reasonable attorneys fees.” 12 U.S.C. § 2607(d)(5). As this Court
has previously noted, “[t]here are two primary methods of calculating attorneys’ fees: the
lodestar method and the ‘percentage of recovery’ method.” Whitaker v. Navy Fed. Credit
Union, No. RDB-09-2288, 2010 WL 3928616, at *4 (D. Md. Oct. 4, 2010). “The lodestar
method requires the multiplication of the number of hours worked by a reasonable hourly
rate, the product of which this Court can then adjust by employing a ‘multiplier.’ ” Id. “The
percentage of the recovery method involves an award based on a percentage of the class
recovery, set by the weighing of a number of factors by the court.” Id.
For the reasons explained in this Court’s prior Memorandum Opinion of November
18, 2016 (ECF No. 411), the “percentage of recovery” method shall be used to calculate
Settlement Counsels’ attorneys’ fees and expenses in this case. However, this Court will
cross-check the “percentage of recovery” analysis with a lodestar analysis. This Court has
previously recognized that “using the percentage of fund method and supplementing it with
the lodestar cross-check . . . take[s] advantage of the benefits of both methods.” Singleton v.
Domino’s Pizza, LLC, 976 F. Supp. 2d 665, 681 (D. Md. 2013) (quoting In re The Mills Corp.
Securities Litig., 265 F.R.D. 246, 261 (E.D. Va. 2009)).
A.

“Percentage of Recovery” Analysis

Although the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit “has not yet
identified factors for district courts to apply when using the ‘percentage of recovery’ method,
. . . District courts in this circuit have analyzed the following seven factors:”
(1) the results obtained for the class; (2) the quality, skill, and efficiency of the
attorneys involved; (3) the risk of nonpayment; (4) objections by members of
the class to the settlement terms and/or fees requested by counsel; (5) awards
in similar cases; (6) the complexity and duration of the case; and (7) public
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policy. [citing, e.g., The Kay Company v. Equitable Production Co., 749 F. Supp. 2d
455, 464 (S.D. W. Va. 2010)]. Importantly, “fee award reasonableness factors
‘need not be applied in a formulaic way’ because each case is different, ‘and in
certain cases, one factor may outweigh the rest.’ ” In re AT & T Corp., 455
F.3d 160, 166 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting In re Rite Aid Corp. Sec. Litig., 396 F.3d
294, 301 (3rd Cir. 2005)).
Singleton, 976 F. Supp. 2d at 682.
a.

Results Obtained for the Class

“ ‘[T]he most critical factor in calculating a reasonable fee award is the degree of
success obtained.’ ” Id. (quoting McKnight v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 14 F. App’x. 147, 149 (4th
Cir. 2001)). In this case, Settlement Counsel have secured a significant financial recovery for
the members of the Chase Class. As outlined supra, members of the Settlement Class will
directly receive more than 100% of the settlement charges paid to Genuine Title on their
loans, in addition to payments they have already received from Chase pursuant to its prior
settlement with the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”). Settlement Counsel
have indicated that the Common Fund is valued at a total of $328,558.08.

See

Correspondence, p. 1, ECF No. 422. Additionally, class members’ settlement benefits will
not be reduced by court-awarded attorneys’ fees and costs, Class Representatives’ service
awards, or by the costs of settlement administration or notice, which Chase has agreed to
pay separately.

Furthermore, as this Court observed in Singleton, “[t]he fact that no

objections have been filed further suggests that the result achieved is a desirable one.”
Singleton, 976 F. Supp. 2d at 683.
b.

Quality, Skill, and Efficiency of the Attorneys Involved

Settlement Counsel are experienced litigators who went to great lengths to prosecute
this action and obtained a quick and substantial settlement for the Chase Class. Lead
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Counsel, Mr. Michael Paul Smith, “has represented plaintiffs for 24 years and has tried over
50 cases in state and federal courts,” including numerous “complex civil cases in the areas of
commercial litigation, fraud and banking/real estate issues.” Mem. Supp. Mot., p. 14, ECF
No. 356-1. Mr. Smith and the law firm of Smith, Gildea & Schmidt, LLC have significant
experience preparing and trying complex civil cases, including Mosaic Lounge v. BCR, Case
No.: 03-C-14-00449, in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County and Possidente v. GBMC, Case
No. 03-C-10-003295, in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. Id. at 14-15.
The attorneys of Joseph, Greenwald & Laake, P.A. are also experienced plaintiffs’
counsel. Mr. Timothy Maloney “has represented plaintiffs for 30 years and has tried over
100 cases in state and federal courts.” Id. at 15. Mr. Maloney “regularly tries complex civil
cases in the areas of commercial litigation, fraud and constitutional violations” and has
served as plaintiffs’ counsel in several class action cases before this Court, including Robert J.
England, et al. v. Marriot International, Inc. et al., No. 8: 10-cv-01256-RWT, and In re Michelin
North America, Inc., PAX System Marketing & Sales Practice Litigation, No. 08:08-md-01911RWT. Id. at 15-16. Additionally, Ms. Veronica Nannis “has represented plaintiffs for 14
years and for the past 10 years has focused on complex fraud cases under the False Claims
Act.” Id. at 15.
In order to identify potential Chase Plaintiffs and class members, Settlement Counsel
went to great lengths to secure the records of the now-defunct Genuine Title, LLC. In July
of 2013, counsel filed a Petition for Emergency Appointment of a Receiver for the limited
purpose of retrieving and preserving the documents, books, and records of Genuine Title in
the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, Maryland. That court granted the petition on July
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30, 2014. The Receiver immediately seized records that Plaintiffs have alleged were
scheduled for destruction. Subsequently, Settlement Counsel have completed additional presuit and settlement discovery and fully briefed a response to Chase’s Motion to Dismiss.
The fact that the Chase Class obtained a quick settlement also speaks to Settlement
Counsels’ skill and efficiency. Chase was named as a Defendant in the Second Amended
Complaint in February of 2015, and this Court granted preliminary approval to the Chase
Settlement just over a year later on June 1, 2016. See Singleton, 976 F. Supp. 2d at 683 (“The
fact that settlement was reached relatively quickly—short of two years from the filing of the
complaint on July 1, 2011—further indicates the attorneys’ skills and efficiency.”).
c.

Risk of Nonpayment

“ ‘In determining the reasonableness of an attorneys’ fee award, courts consider the
relative risk involved in litigating the specific matter compared to the general risks incurred
by attorneys taking on class actions on a contingency basis.’ ” Singleton, 976 F. Supp. 2d at
683 (quoting Jones v. Dominion Res. Servs., Inc., 601 F. Supp. 2d 756, 762 (S.D.W. Va. 2009)).
“The risk undertaken by class counsel is evaluated by, among other things, the presence of
government action preceding the suit, the ease of proving claims and damages, and, if the
case resulted in settlement, the relative speed at which the case was settled.” Id.
Settlement Counsel correctly note that several courts have dismissed RESPA claims
against Chase in recent years. See, e.g., Perez v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 2016 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 24689 (D.N.J. Feb. 29, 2016) (Section 2607 claim); Hernandez v. J.P. Morgan Chase
Bank N.A., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 170076 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 21, 2015) (Section 2605 claim).
The fact that Settlement Counsel were able to achieve such a substantial settlement for the
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members of the Chase Class despite this looming uncertainty weighs in favor of granting
their requested award.

The fact that a government investigation into Chase’s lending

practices preceded this lawsuit decreases the risk of nonpayment. See, e.g., In re Cardinal
Health Inc. Sec. Litigations, 528 F. Supp. 2d 752, 768–69 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (finding that lower
fee was justified where “formal SEC investigation . . . paved the Class’s path to recovery in
this action.”). This Court has previously discussed this factor in calculating Settlement
Counsels’ attorneys’ fees in the Wells Fargo settlement.
dispositive.

However, this factor is not

As discussed infra, Settlement Counsels’ requested award as to the Chase

Settlement remains an appropriate award on the whole.
d.

Objections

As discussed supra, Chase Class members were notified of the proposed Settlement
Agreement, their expected recovery, and Settlement Counsels’ request for attorneys’ fees.
Particularly, a paragraph was included in the Notice (ECF No. 343) providing as follows:
8.

How will Class Counsel be paid?

Class Counsel will ask the Court to give final approval of the Settlement at the
Final Fairness Hearing, and will also ask the Court for an award of attorneys’
fees, costs, and expenses up to a maximum of 25% of the Settlement Benefits.
The Court will make the final decision as to the amounts to be paid to Class
Counsel at or after the Final Fairness Hearing. The attorneys’ fees and
expenses will be paid separately by Chase and will not reduce the amount paid
to the Settlement Class.
Notice, Ex. A, p. 5, ECF No. 343. No objections were filed. “The lack of objections tends
to show that at least from the class members’ perspective, the requested fee is reasonable for
the services provided and the benefits achieved by class counsel.” Singleton, 976 F. Supp. 2d

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at 684 (D. Md. 2013). “Nevertheless, the court must still determine the reasonableness of
the requested fee applying the remaining factors.” Id.
e.

Awards in Similar Cases

“Attorneys’ fees awarded under the ‘percentage of recovery’ method are generally
between twenty-five (25) percent and thirty (30) percent of the fund.” Singleton, 976 F. Supp.
2d at 684 (citing Manual for Complex Litigation (“MCL”), § 14.121). “Fees awarded under
‘the percentage-of-recovery’ method in settlements under $100 million have ranged from
15% to 40%.” Singleton, 976 F. Supp. 2d at 685 (citing Stoner v. CBA Information Services, 352
F. Supp. 2d 549, 553 (E.D. Pa. 2005)). This Court in the Singleton case found that a
percentage fee award of 25% fell “within the range of awards deemed fair and reasonable by
courts within the Fourth Circuit.” Id. at 685. Additionally, Settlement Counsel have cited
recent cases involving Chase in which courts have found percentage fee awards over 25% to
be reasonable. See Hightower v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174314
(C.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2015) (attorney fee award of approximately 30% of total settlement fund
awarded); Bova v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119368 (S.D. Cal. Oct.
14, 2011) (awarding fees of 30% paid from the Settlement Amount of $463,000). Therefore,
Settlement Counsels’ requested award of 25% of the Common Fund is a reasonable fee.
f.

The Complexity and Duration of the Litigation

“ ‘In evaluating the complexity and duration of the litigation, courts consider not only
the time between filing the complaint and reaching settlement, but also the amount of
motions practice prior to settlement, and the amount and nature of discovery.’ ” Singleton,
976 F. Supp. 2d at 686 (quoting Jones, 601 F. Supp. 2d at 761). As discussed supra, Settlement
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Counsel went to great lengths to identify potential Chase Class members and to obtain the
evidence necessary to prosecute this case, including retrieving records from Genuine Title’s
server. In order to maintain Genuine Title’s electronic database, Settlement Counsel have
indicated that they initially advanced approximately $20,000 and have advanced
approximately $4,000 per month to a technology provider. Mem. Supp. Mot., p. 28, ECF
No. 356-1. The length and duration of this case weigh in favor of granting Settlement
Counsels’ requested award.
g.

Public Policy

“ ‘The most frequent complaint surrounding class action fees is that they are
artificially high, with the result (among others) that plaintiffs’ lawyers receive too much of
the funds set aside to compensate victims.’ ” Singleton v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC, 976 F. Supp.
2d 665, 687 (D. Md. 2013) (quoting Report on Contingent Fees in Class Action Litigation,
25 Rev. Litig. 459, 466 (2006)). “Thus, in assessing the reasonableness of the requested
attorneys’ fees, the court must strike the appropriate balance between promoting the
important public policy that attorneys continue litigating class action cases that ‘vindicate
rights that might otherwise go unprotected,’ and perpetuating the public perception that
‘class action plaintiffs’ lawyers are overcompensated for the work that they do.’ ” Id.
(quoting Third Circuit Task Force Report, 208 F.R.D. 340, 342, 344 (Jan. 15, 2002)). This
case does not pose serious concerns with respect to public policy because no Chase Class
member has objected to Settlement Counsels’ requested attorneys’ fees, and Settlement
Counsels’ fees will not be deducted from class members’ benefits, but will be paid separately
by Chase. For the reasons discussed herein, Settlement Counsel’s requested award in the
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amount of 25% of the Common Fund, or $82,139.52, is a reasonable award. A lodestar
cross-check confirms that this is a reasonable figure.
B.

Lodestar Cross-Check

As discussed supra, Settlement Counsel have requested an award of 25% of the
common fund, now valued at $328,558.08.

See Correspondence, p. 1, ECF No. 422.

Accordingly, Settlement Counsels’ requested award of 25% of the Common Fund equates to
an award of $82,139.52. Pursuant to the parties’ Settlement Agreement, this amount will be
paid by Chase in addition to, and not out of, the Common Fund.

Additionally, the

difference between the Class Representatives’ service awards and settlement benefits will be
paid out of Settlement Counsels’ award, a deduction of $3,892.43.
Under the “lodestar” method, a district court identifies a reasonable fee award, or
lodestar award, by multiplying the reasonable hours expended by a reasonable hourly rate.
See Xiao–Yue Gu v. Hughes STX Corp., 127 F. Supp. 2d 751, 764 (D. Md. 2001). The court
may then adjust that award by employing a “multiplier.” See Whitaker, 2010 WL 3928616 at
*4. “The purpose of a lodestar cross-check is to determine whether a proposed fee award is
excessive relative to the hours reportedly worked by counsel, or whether the fee is within
some reasonable multiplier of the lodestar.” Singleton v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC, 976 F. Supp. 2d
665, 688 (D. Md. 2013) (citing In re Rite Aid Corp. Sec. Litig., 396 F.3d at 306). “Importantly,
‘where the lodestar fee is used as a mere cross-check to the percentage method of
determining reasonable attorneys’ fees, the hours documented by counsel need not be
exhaustively scrutinized by the district court.’ ” Id. (quoting In re Royal Ahold N.V. Sec. &
ERISA Litig., 461 F. Supp. 2d 383, 385 (D. Md. 2006)). “Courts have generally held that
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lodestar multipliers falling between 2 and 4.5 demonstrate a reasonable attorneys’ fee.”
Singleton, 976 F. Supp. 2d at 689 (citing Goldenberg v. Marriott PLP Corp., 33 F. Supp. 2d 434,
439 (D. Md. 1998)).
Here, Settlement Counsel Michael Paul Smith of the law firm Smith, Gildea &
Schmidt, LLC (“SGS”) and Veronica Nannis of the law firm Joseph, Greenwald & Laake,
P.A. (“JGL”) have each submitted affidavits documenting their firms’ respective fees and
expenses. See Smith Aff., ECF No. 422-1; Nannis Aff., ECF No. 422-2.
a.

Settlement Counsels’ Reported Fees and Expenses
i.

Smith, Gildea & Schmidt, LLC

Mr. Smith has indicated that his work on this case was billed at the rate of $475 per
hour, his associates Natalie Mayo, Lauren D. Benjamin, and Sarah Zadrozny’s time was
billed at the rate of $225 per hour, his associate Melissa English’s time was billed at the rate
of $350 per hour, and paralegals and law clerks’ time was billed at the rate of $150 per hour. 5
Smith Aff., ¶ 4, ECF No. 422-1.
From the opening of their file on this case through December 11, 2015, the date of
the conditional settlement with Chase, SGS has spent numerous hours “generally applicable
to all defendants” which, when multiplied at the rates referenced above, would yield
$393,540.00, of which $4,472.32 would represent Chase’s proportional share6 of the fees. Id.
at 5.

All hourly rates proposed by Settlement Counsel are reasonable under this Court’s “Guidelines Regarding Hourly
Rates.” See Local Rules Appendix B (D. Md. 2016).
6 According to Settlement Counsel, “Chase was approximately 1% of the total loans until Wells Fargo reached a
settlement and was approximately 2% of the total loans after Wells Fargo settled.” Correspondence, p. 1, ECF No. 422.
5

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Additionally, from the opening of the file through December 16, 2016, four days
prior to the date of Mr. Smith’s affidavit, SGS spent numerous hours “specific to Chase”
which, when multiplied by the rates referenced above, would yield $21,110.00. Accordingly,
SGS attributes a total of $25,582.32 in fees to Chase.
ii.

Joseph, Greenwald & Laake, P.A.

Ms. Nannis has indicated that firm shareholders Tim Maloney and Steve Pavsner’s
work on this case was billed at a rate of $475 per hour, her own work was billed at a rate of
$350 per hour, associates Tim Creed and Alyse Prawde’s work was billed at a rate of $225
per hour, and paralegal and law clerks’ time was billed at the rate of $150 per hour. Nannis
Aff., ¶ 4, ECF No. 422-2.
From the opening of their file on this case through December 11, 2015, the date of
the conditional settlement with Chase, JGL has spent numerous hours “generally applicable
to all defendants” which, when multiplied at the rates referenced above, would yield
$114,056.50, of which $1,653.81 represents Chase’s proportionate share of fees. Id. at 5.
Additionally, from the opening of the file through December 15, 2016, three days
before the date of Ms. Nannis’ affidavit, JGL spent numerous hours “specific to Chase”
which, when multiplied by the rates referenced above, would yield $5,580.00. Id. at ¶ 6.
Accordingly, JGL attributes a total of $7,233.81 in fees to Chase.
Therefore, Settlement Counsel attribute a total of $32,816.13 in fees to Chase. With
respect to costs and expenses, SGS has incurred an additional $340.15 in costs and JGL has
incurred an additional $685.69 in costs attributable to Chase for a total of $1,025.84. Id. at ¶
9; Smith Aff., ¶ 9, ECF No. 422-1.
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b.

Lodestar Cross-Check Multiplier

As discussed supra, Settlement Counsels’ requested award of 25% of the Common
Fund in fees and expenses equates to an award of $82,139.52. Subtracting $1,025.84 in
expenses and $3,892.43 in service awards yields $77,221.25—the total amount that
Settlement Counsel seek for fees alone. Accordingly, accepting a lodestar of $32,816.13, based
on Settlement Counsels’ affidavits discussed supra, Settlement Counsel are proposing a
lodestar cross-check multiplier of approximately 2.35, well within the range of reasonable
multipliers. As discussed supra, this Court has previously held that “lodestar multipliers
falling between 2 and 4.5 demonstrate a reasonable attorneys’ fee.” Singleton, 976 F. Supp. 2d
at 689 (citing Goldenberg v. Marriott PLP Corp., 33 F. Supp. 2d 434, 439 (D. Md. 1998)).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is this 10th day of January, 2017, ORDERED that:
1.

Settlement Counsels’ Petition for Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses (ECF No. 356) is
GRANTED in the requested amount of $82,139.52, an award equal to 25% of the
Chase Settlement Common Fund;

2.

Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement (ECF No. 277-2) Chase shall pay Settlement
Counsel attorneys’ fees and expenses in the amount of $82,139.52 in addition to, not
out of, the Common Fund. Payment shall be remitted by check jointly payable to
Settlement Counsel within ninety (90) days of this Order;

3.

The difference between the settlement benefits and service awards, totaling $3,500
each, previously awarded to Class Representatives Carol Shaw and Patricia Marshall,
shall be paid out of the funds awarded to Settlement Counsel; and

4.

The Clerk of this Court transmit a copy of this Memorandum Order to Counsel.
___/s/____________________
Richard D. Bennett
United States District Judge
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