Fangman et al v. Genuine Title, LLC
Filing
469
MEMORANDUM ORDER granting 455 Settlement Counsels' 455 Petition for Attorneys' Fees and Expenses in the reduced amount of $330,433.62. Signed by Judge Richard D. Bennett on 6/7/2017. (bmhs, Deputy Clerk)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
EDWARD J. AND VICKI
FANGMAN, et al.,
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Plaintiffs,
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v.
Civil Action No. RDB-14-0081
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GENUINE TITLE, LLC, et al.
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Defendants.
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MEMORANDUM ORDER
On May 31, 2017, this Court conducted a Final Fairness Hearing on the Proposed
Class Action Settlements of all claims asserted in this action against Defendants E Mortgage
Management, LLC (“E Mortgage Settlement”) (ECF No. 394-2) and E Properties, LLC (“E
Properties Settlement”) (ECF No. 394-3) (collectively “Settlement Agreements”). Via Order
dated that same day (ECF No. 468), this Court granted final approval of the Settlement
Agreements, dismissed all claims against Defendants E Mortgage and E Properties, and
approved the parties’ requested service awards for Class Representatives Bertha & Alvin
Cole; Preston & Beatrice Johnson; Ann & Gerald Jones; and Tinna & John Mahoney in the
amount of $5,000 per married couple, inclusive of settlement benefits, for a total of
$20,000.1 See Order, ¶¶ 10, 11, 16, ECF No. 468. Final Judgement has been entered in this
Pursuant to Paragraph 12 of the E Mortgage Settlement and Paragraph 11 of the E Properties Settlement,
the difference between these service awards and the settlement benefits “shall be paid from, and not in
addition to, any attorneys’ fees awarded” to Class Counsel.
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case against E Mortgage and E Properties in “the amounts2 necessary to fund Settlement
Benefits payable to [E Mortgage and E Properties] Class Members, in accordance with the .
. . Settlement Agreement[s].” Id., ¶¶ 13, 14, 19. Still pending before this Court is Settlement
Counsels’ Petition for Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses (ECF No. 455). This Court heard
argument on the issue of attorneys’ fees and expenses at the conclusion of the May 31, 2017
Final Fairness Hearing, and no additional hearing is necessary. See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md.
2016).
For the reasons stated herein, the pending Settlement Counsels’ Petition for
Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses (ECF No. 455) is GRANTED in the reduced amount of
$330,433.62, an award equal to 20% of the maximum settlement value for both Settlement
Agreements.3
BACKGROUND
In January of 2014, Plaintiffs Edward J. and Vicki Fangman brought this class action
against Defendant Genuine Title, LLC alleging, inter alia, violations of the Real Estate
Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”), 12 U.S.C. §§ 2607(a), (b)4. See Compl., ECF No. 2.
E Mortgage Management, LLC (“E Mortgage”) was first named as a Defendant in the
Amended Complaint (ECF No. 47), filed in January of 2015.5 An additional thirteen home
mortgage lenders have also been named as Defendants (collectively “Lender Defendants”)
Settlement Counsel have subsequently indicated to this Court that, “[t]he maximum settlement benefits
under the Common Fund, based on counsel’s calculations, equal $1,652,168.08.” Mem. Supp. Mot. for
Att’ys’ Fees, p. 26, ECF No. 455-1.
3 Via Memorandum Orders dated November 18, 2016 (ECF No. 411) and January 10, 2017 (ECF No. 429)
this Court has previously awarded Wells Fargo and JPMorgan Chase Settlement Counsel attorneys’ fees and
expenses in the amounts of 15% and 25%, respectively, of the Common Funds in those settlements.
4 Additionally, Plaintiffs alleged violations of Md. Code Ann., Real Prop. § 14-127 (“Section 14-127”) and the
Maryland Consumer Protection Act (“MCPA”), Md. Code Ann., Com. Law § 13-301. Those claims were
subsequently dismissed by this Court. See Orders, ECF Nos. 214, 281.
5 Defendant E Properties, LLC (“E Properties”) was added as a Defendant for settlement purposes only at
the time of this Court’s Preliminary Fairness Hearing. See Order Joining E Properties, ECF No. 409.
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via the First and Second Amended Complaints in this action. Attorneys Michael Paul Smith,
Sarah Zadrozny, Timothy J. Maloney, and Veronica Nannis of the law firms of Smith,
Gildea & Schmidt, LLC (“SGS”) and Joseph, Greenwald & Laake, P.A. (“JGL”) (hereinafter
“Settlement Counsel”) have represented all Plaintiffs, including the E Mortgage and E
Properties Plaintiffs, throughout this litigation.
In prosecuting this case, Settlement Counsel have incurred significant expense and
have undergone significant investigation. For example, in July of 2013, Plaintiffs filed a
Petition for Emergency Appointment of a Receiver for the purpose of retrieving and
preserving the documents, books, and records of Genuine Title in the Circuit Court for
Baltimore County, Maryland.
That court granted the petition on July 30, 2014, and
Settlement Counsel were able to retrieve vast amounts of evidence from Genuine Title’s
records, including the identities of E Mortgage and E Properties Class Members.
While several of the Lender Defendants filed motions to dismiss the Second
Amended Complaint in July of 2015, E Mortgage sought an early mediation before
Magistrate Judge Timothy Sullivan of this Court. E Mortgage did not participate in briefing
the motions to dismiss and, at E Mortgage’s request, this Court stayed all deadlines in this
case with respect to E Mortgage on July 20, 2015, pending completion of the mediation. See
Stay Order, ECF No. 160. Although E Mortgage later joined the already fully-briefed
motions to dismiss of the remaining Lender Defendants when resolution efforts temporarily
stalled in October of 2015, it did so via a brief memorandum (ECF No. 203-1), adopting
many of the arguments previously raised by the other Lender Defendants.
Plaintiffs
responded with a 2-page filing (ECF No. 209) stating only that “[t]here are no new
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arguments made in the E Mortgage Motion that have not already been fully briefed and
argued by other defendants,” and incorporating their previously filed opposition briefs.
The E Mortgage Settlement Agreement provides for the payment of the following
benefits to the E Mortgage Class Members: for Subclass 1 members, an award equal to
220% the Section 1100 Charges that were paid to Genuine Title (excluding title underwriter’s
fees) as reflected on the member’s HUD-1 Settlement Statement; and for qualifying Subclass
2 members, an award equal to 50% of the Section 1100 Charges that were paid to Genuine
Title (excluding title underwriter’s fees) as reflected on the member’s HUD-1 Settlement
Statement. E Mortgage Settlement Agreement, ¶ 6.1, ECF No. 394-2. The E Properties
Settlement Agreement provides for the payment of the following benefits to members of the
E Properties Class: an award equal to 160% the Section 1100 Charges that were paid to
Genuine Title (excluding title underwriter’s fees) as reflected on the member’s HUD-1
Settlement Statement. E Properties Settlement Agreement, ¶ 6.1, ECF No. 394-3. The
settlement benefits for all settlement classes are to be deposited into a Common Fund,
which Settlement Counsel have subsequently indicated will reach a maximum value of
$1,652,168.08. Mem. Supp. Mot., p. 26, ECF No. 455-1.
With respect to attorneys’ fees and expenses, both Settlement Agreements provide
that the settling Defendants will pay attorneys’ fees and expenses “in addition to, not out of
the Common Fund.”
E Mortgage Settlement Agreement, ¶ 13, ECF No. 394-2; E
Properties Settlement Agreement, ¶ 12, ECF No. 394-3. The Settlement Agreements further
provide that Settlement Counsel shall limit the amount of their requested attorneys’ fees and
expenses to an amount equal to 25% of the maximum settlement value.
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Id.
The
Agreements further provide that the Defendants reserve the right to oppose any petition for
attorneys’ fees and expenses that seeks more than an aggregate award equal to 20% of the
Common Fund. Id.
Under the terms of the Settlement Agreements, notice plans were completed
pursuant to which all members of the E Mortgage and E Properties classes were informed of
the Settlement Agreement terms, including the provisions for payment of attorneys’ fees and
expenses.
No objections to the terms of the Settlement Agreements or requests for
exclusion from the settlements have been filed. On May 31, 2017, this Court conducted a
Final Fairness Hearing on the proposed settlements and granted final approval of the
Settlement Agreements that same day.
ANALYSIS
Settlement Counsel have requested an award of attorneys’ fees and expenses in the
amount of 25% of the full potential settlement value for both settlements, or $413,042.02.
Mem. Supp. Mot., p. 26, ECF No. 455-1.
Pursuant to the terms of the Settlement
Agreement, $13,135.96 of that award will be paid to the Class Representatives—the
difference between their settlement benefits and $5,000 service awards, per married couple,
previously awarded by this Court. Id. An additional $13,843.23 of that award will cover
Settlement Counsels’ expenses. Id. Accordingly, Settlement Counsel request a total of
$386,062.83 in attorneys’ fees alone. Id. Defendants E Mortgage and E Properties object to
any award in excess of 20% of the Common Fund, or $330,433.62.
Rule 23(h) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “[i]n a certified class
action, the court may award reasonable attorney’s fees and nontaxable costs that are
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authorized by law or by the parties’ agreement.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h). Additionally, the Real
Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”) provides that “[i]n any private action brought
pursuant to this subsection, the court may award to the prevailing party the court costs of
the action together with reasonable attorneys fees.” 12 U.S.C. § 2607(d)(5). As this Court
has previously noted, “[t]here are two primary methods of calculating attorneys’ fees: the
lodestar method and the ‘percentage of recovery’ method.” Whitaker v. Navy Fed. Credit
Union, No. RDB-09-2288, 2010 WL 3928616, at *4 (D. Md. Oct. 4, 2010). “The lodestar
method requires the multiplication of the number of hours worked by a reasonable hourly
rate, the product of which this Court can then adjust by employing a ‘multiplier.’ ” Id. “The
percentage of the recovery method involves an award based on a percentage of the class
recovery, set by the weighing of a number of factors by the court.” Id.
For the reasons explained in this Court’s prior Memorandum Order of November 18,
2016 (ECF No. 411), the “percentage of recovery” method shall be used to calculate
Settlement Counsels’ attorneys’ fees and expenses in this case. However, this Court will
cross-check the “percentage of recovery” analysis with a lodestar analysis. This Court has
previously recognized that “using the percentage of fund method and supplementing it with
the lodestar cross-check . . . take[s] advantage of the benefits of both methods.” Singleton v.
Domino’s Pizza, LLC, 976 F. Supp. 2d 665, 681 (D. Md. 2013) (quoting In re The Mills Corp.
Securities Litig., 265 F.R.D. 246, 261 (E.D. Va. 2009)).
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A.
“Percentage of Recovery” Analysis
Although the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit “has not yet
identified factors for district courts to apply when using the ‘percentage of recovery’ method,
. . . District courts in this circuit have analyzed the following seven factors:”
(1) the results obtained for the class; (2) the quality, skill, and efficiency of the
attorneys involved; (3) the risk of nonpayment; (4) objections by members of
the class to the settlement terms and/or fees requested by counsel; (5) awards
in similar cases; (6) the complexity and duration of the case; and (7) public
policy. [citing, e.g., The Kay Company v. Equitable Production Co., 749 F. Supp. 2d
455, 464 (S.D. W. Va. 2010)]. Importantly, “fee award reasonableness factors
‘need not be applied in a formulaic way’ because each case is different, ‘and in
certain cases, one factor may outweigh the rest.’ ” In re AT & T Corp., 455
F.3d 160, 166 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting In re Rite Aid Corp. Sec. Litig., 396 F.3d
294, 301 (3rd Cir. 2005)).
Singleton, 976 F. Supp. 2d at 682.
a.
Results Obtained for the Class
“ ‘[T]he most critical factor in calculating a reasonable fee award is the degree of
success obtained.’ ” Id. (quoting McKnight v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 14 F. App’x. 147, 149 (4th
Cir. 2001)). In this case, Settlement Counsel have secured a significant financial recovery for
the members of the E Mortgage and E Properties Classes. As outlined supra, members of E
Mortgage Settlement Subclass 1 will receive 220% of the settlement charges paid to Genuine
Title on their loans; members of E Mortgage Settlement Subclass 2 will receive 50% of the
settlement charges paid to Genuine Title on their loans; and members of the E Properties
Settlement Class will receive 160% of the settlement charges paid to Genuine Title.
Settlement Counsel have indicated to this Court that, “[t]he maximum settlement
benefits under the Common Fund, based on counsel’s calculations, equal $1,652,168.08.”
Mem. Supp. Mot., p. 26, ECF No. 455-1. Additionally, class members’ settlement benefits
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will not be reduced by court-awarded attorneys’ fees and costs, Class Representatives’ service
awards, or by the costs of settlement administration or notice, which Defendants have
agreed to pay separately. Furthermore, as this Court observed in Singleton, “[t]he fact that no
objections have been filed further suggests that the result achieved is a desirable one.”
Singleton, 976 F. Supp. 2d at 683.
b.
Quality, Skill, and Efficiency of the Attorneys Involved
Settlement Counsel are experienced litigators who went to great lengths to prosecute
this action and obtained a quick and substantial settlement for the E Mortgage and E
Properties Classes. Lead Counsel, Mr. Michael Paul Smith, “has represented plaintiffs for 24
years and has tried over 50 cases in state and federal courts,” including numerous “complex
civil cases in the areas of commercial litigation, fraud and banking/real estate issues.” Mem.
Supp. Mot., p. 13, ECF No. 455-1. Mr. Smith and the law firm of Smith, Gildea & Schmidt,
LLC have significant experience preparing and trying complex civil cases, including Mosaic
Lounge v. BCR, Case No.: 03-C-14-00449, in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County and
Possidente v. GBMC, Case No. 03-C-10-003295, in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. Id.
The attorneys of Joseph, Greenwald & Laake, P.A. are also experienced plaintiffs’
counsel. Mr. Timothy Maloney “has represented plaintiffs for 30 years and has tried over
100 cases in state and federal courts.” Id. at 13-14. Mr. Maloney “regularly tries complex
civil cases in the areas of commercial litigation, fraud and constitutional violations” and has
served as plaintiffs’ counsel in several class action cases before this Court, including Robert J.
England, et al. v. Marriot International, Inc. et al., No. 8: 10-cv-01256-RWT, and In re Michelin
North America, Inc., PAX System Marketing & Sales Practice Litigation, No. 08:08-md-019118
RWT. Id. at 14. Ms. Veronica Nannis “has represented plaintiffs for 14 years and for the
past 10 years has focused on complex fraud cases under the False Claims Act.” Id.
In order to identify potential E Mortgage and E Properties Plaintiffs and class
members, Settlement Counsel went to great lengths to secure the records of the nowdefunct Genuine Title, LLC. In July of 2013, counsel filed a Petition for Emergency
Appointment of a Receiver for the limited purpose of retrieving and preserving the
documents, books, and records of Genuine Title in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County,
Maryland. That court granted the petition on July 30, 2014. The Receiver immediately seized
records that Plaintiffs have alleged were scheduled for destruction.
c.
Risk of Nonpayment
“ ‘In determining the reasonableness of an attorneys’ fee award, courts consider the
relative risk involved in litigating the specific matter compared to the general risks incurred
by attorneys taking on class actions on a contingency basis.’ ” Singleton, 976 F. Supp. 2d at
683 (quoting Jones v. Dominion Res. Servs., Inc., 601 F. Supp. 2d 756, 762 (S.D.W. Va. 2009)).
“The risk undertaken by class counsel is evaluated by, among other things, the presence of
government action preceding the suit, the ease of proving claims and damages, and, if the
case resulted in settlement, the relative speed at which the case was settled.” Id.
Settlement Counsel correctly note that several courts have dismissed RESPA claims
against other Lender Defendants in recent years. See, e.g., Perez v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.,
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24689 (D.N.J. Feb. 29, 2016); Minter v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No.
13-2131, 2014 WL 3827671 (4th Cir. Aug. 5, 2014). The fact that Settlement Counsel were
able to achieve such a substantial settlement for the members of the E Mortgage and E
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Properties classes despite this looming uncertainty weighs in favor of granting their
requested award.
d.
Objections
As discussed supra, E Mortgage and E Properties class members were notified of the
proposed Settlement Agreements, their expected recovery, and Settlement Counsels’ request
for attorneys’ fees. Particularly, a paragraph was included in each of the Notices (ECF Nos.
394-2 & 394-3) providing as follows:
8.
How will Class Counsel be paid?
Class Counsel will ask the Court to give final approval of the Settlement at the
Final Fairness Hearing, and will also ask the Court for an award of attorneys’
fees, costs, and expenses up to a maximum of 25% of the full potential
settlement value. The Court will make the final decision as to the amounts to
be paid to Class Counsel at or after the Final Fairness Hearing.
No objections were filed. “The lack of objections tends to show that at least from the class
members’ perspective, the requested fee is reasonable for the services provided and the
benefits achieved by class counsel.” Singleton, 976 F. Supp. 2d at 684 (D. Md. 2013).
“Nevertheless, the court must still determine the reasonableness of the requested fee
applying the remaining factors.” Id.
e.
Awards in Similar Cases
“Attorneys’ fees awarded under the ‘percentage of recovery’ method are generally
between twenty-five (25) percent and thirty (30) percent of the fund.” Singleton, 976 F. Supp.
2d at 684 (citing Manual for Complex Litigation (“MCL”), § 14.121). “Fees awarded under
‘the percentage-of-recovery’ method in settlements under $100 million have ranged from
15% to 40%.” Singleton, 976 F. Supp. 2d at 685 (citing Stoner v. CBA Information Services, 352
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F. Supp. 2d 549, 553 (E.D. Pa. 2005)). This Court in the Singleton case found that a
percentage fee award of 25% fell “within the range of awards deemed fair and reasonable by
courts within the Fourth Circuit.” Id. at 685. In this case, this Court has previously awarded
Wells Fargo and JPMorgan Chase Settlement Counsel attorneys’ fees and expenses in the
amounts of 15% and 25%, respectively, of the Common Funds in those prior settlements.
f.
The Complexity and Duration of the Litigation
“ ‘In evaluating the complexity and duration of the litigation, courts consider not only
the time between filing the complaint and reaching settlement, but also the amount of
motions practice prior to settlement, and the amount and nature of discovery.’ ” Singleton,
976 F. Supp. 2d at 686 (quoting Jones, 601 F. Supp. 2d at 761). As discussed supra, Settlement
Counsel went to great lengths to identify potential Class members and to obtain the evidence
necessary to prosecute this case, including retrieving records from Genuine Title’s server.
However, unlike other Lender Defendants, E Mortgage took significant steps toward
reaching a negotiated resolution to the claims against it shortly after being added as a
Defendant in this case in January of 2015. E Mortgage did not participate in briefing the
series of motions to dismiss filed in this Court in July of 2015, but instead sought a stay of
proceedings, pending mediation, which this Court granted on July 20, 2015.
Even when E Mortgage later joined the already fully-briefed motions to dismiss of
the remaining Lender Defendants when resolution efforts temporarily stalled in October of
2015, it did so via a brief memorandum (ECF No. 203-1), adopting many of the arguments
previously raised by the other Lender Defendants. Plaintiffs responded with a 2-page filing
(ECF No. 209) stating only that “[t]here are no new arguments made in the E Mortgage
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Motion that have not already been fully briefed and argued by other defendants,” and
incorporating their previously filed opposition briefs. Additionally, counsel have indicated
that E Mortgage did not engage in discovery. Opp’n to Mot., p. 2, ECF No. 463.
In light of E Mortgage’s expeditious efforts to reach a resolution and limited
participation in the extensive motions practice and discovery in this case, an award of 20%
of the maximum settlement value is more appropriate than Class Counsels’ requested award
of 25%. This Court similarly reduced Class Counsels’ requested award of 25% of the
Common Fund to 18% in the Wells Fargo Settlement. See Mem. Order, p. 19-20, ECF No.
411. Like E Mortgage, Wells Fargo entered into settlement discussions early. Additionally,
although Wells Fargo did file a Motion to Dismiss, the Wells Fargo Plaintiffs’ claims were
settled even before Wells Fargo’s Motion to Dismiss was ruled upon by this Court.
It is well-settled that a Defendant’s efforts to quickly resolve the claims against it
weighs in favor of reducing Class Counsels’ requested fee award. See Singleton, 976 F. Supp.
2d at 686 (citing Domonoske v. Bank of Am., N.A., 790 F. Supp. 2d 466, 469 (W.D. Va. 2011),
in which the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia reduced Class
Counsels’ requested award of 25% of the common fund to 18% of the common fund “ ‘due
to the lack of complexity and the brevity of discovery in [the] case,’ ” “despite finding that
the settlement produced a favorable result for the class, there were relatively few objections,
class counsel was experienced in consumer advocacy, and that there was substantial risk of
nonpayment.”).
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g.
Public Policy
“ ‘The most frequent complaint surrounding class action fees is that they are
artificially high, with the result (among others) that plaintiffs’ lawyers receive too much of
the funds set aside to compensate victims.’ ” Singleton v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC, 976 F. Supp.
2d 665, 687 (D. Md. 2013) (quoting Report on Contingent Fees in Class Action Litigation,
25 Rev. Litig. 459, 466 (2006)). “Thus, in assessing the reasonableness of the requested
attorneys’ fees, the court must strike the appropriate balance between promoting the
important public policy that attorneys continue litigating class action cases that ‘vindicate
rights that might otherwise go unprotected,’ and perpetuating the public perception that
‘class action plaintiffs’ lawyers are overcompensated for the work that they do.’ ” Id.
(quoting Third Circuit Task Force Report, 208 F.R.D. 340, 342, 344 (Jan. 15, 2002)). This
case does not pose serious concerns with respect to public policy because no Class member
has objected to Settlement Counsels’ requested attorneys’ fees, and Settlement Counsels’ fees
will not be deducted from class members’ benefits, but will be paid separately by
Defendants.
B.
Lodestar Cross-Check
For the foregoing reasons, an award of $330,433.62, or 20% of the full potential
settlement value for both Settlement Agreements, is a reasonable award under the
percentage of recovery analysis. A lodestar cross-check confirms that this is a reasonable fee
award. Under the “lodestar” method, a district court identifies a reasonable fee award, or
lodestar award, by multiplying the reasonable hours expended by a reasonable hourly rate.
See Xiao–Yue Gu v. Hughes STX Corp., 127 F. Supp. 2d 751, 764 (D. Md. 2001). The court
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may then adjust that award by employing a “multiplier.” See Whitaker, 2010 WL 3928616 at
*4. “The purpose of a lodestar cross-check is to determine whether a proposed fee award is
excessive relative to the hours reportedly worked by counsel, or whether the fee is within
some reasonable multiplier of the lodestar.” Singleton v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC, 976 F. Supp. 2d
665, 688 (D. Md. 2013) (citing In re Rite Aid Corp. Sec. Litig., 396 F.3d at 306). “Courts have
generally held that lodestar multipliers falling between 2 and 4.5 demonstrate a reasonable
attorneys’ fee.” Singleton, 976 F. Supp. 2d at 689 (citing Goldenberg v. Marriott PLP Corp., 33 F.
Supp. 2d 434, 439 (D. Md. 1998)).
a.
Settlement Counsels’ Reported Fees and Expenses
Settlement Counsel Michael Paul Smith of the law firm Smith, Gildea & Schmidt,
LLC (“SGS”) and Veronica Nannis of the law firm Joseph, Greenwald & Laake, P.A.
(“JGL”) have each submitted affidavits documenting their firms’ respective fees and
expenses. See Smith Aff., ECF No. 455-2; Nannis Aff., ECF No. 455-3.
i.
Smith, Gildea & Schmidt, LLC (“SGS”)
SGS has indicated that from the date of opening the file on this case through May 10,
2016, the date of conditional settlement with the E Mortgage Defendants, it has spent
numerous hours “generally applicable to all defendants” which, when multiplied by the
billing rates listed in this Court’s Local Rules, would yield $592,060.00. SGS has calculated
that $69,681.32 would represent the E Mortgage Defendants’ proportionate share of the
fees. Additionally, from the opening of the file through the approximate date of their filing
the pending motion, SGS spent numerous hours “specific to the E Mortgage Defendants”
which would yield $73,817.50. Accordingly, SGS attributes a total of $143,498.82 in fees to
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the E Mortgage Defendants. Additionally, SGS attributes a total of $8,140.31 in costs to the
E Mortgage Defendants.
ii.
Joseph, Greenwald & Laake, P.A. (“JGL”)
JGL has indicated that from the date of opening their file on this case through May
10, 2016, the date of conditional settlement with the E Mortgage Defendants, JGL has spent
numerous hours “generally applicable to all defendants” which, when multiplied by the
billing rates listed in this Court’s Local Rules, would yield $229,929.00. SGS has calculated
that $32,841.33 would represent the E Mortgage Defendants’ proportionate share of the
fees. Additionally, from the opening of the file through the approximate date their filing the
pending motion, JGL spent numerous hours “specific to the E Mortgage Defendants”
which would yield $22,530.00. Accordingly, JGL attributes a total of $55,371.33 in fees to
the E Mortgage Defendants. Additionally, JGL attributes a total of $5,702.69 in costs to the
E Mortgage Defendants.
Therefore, Class Counsel from both law firms attribute a grand total of $198,870.15
in fees to the E Mortgage Defendants. “ ‘[W]here the lodestar fee is used as a mere crosscheck to the percentage method of determining reasonable attorneys’ fees, the hours
documented by counsel need not be exhaustively scrutinized by the district court.’ ” Singleton
v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC, 976 F. Supp. 2d 665, 688 (D. Md. 2013) (quoting In re Royal Ahold
N.V. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 461 F. Supp. 2d 383, 385 (D. Md. 2006)) (emphasis added).
b.
Lodestar Cross-Check Multiplier
As discussed supra, in light of E Mortgage’s early efforts to settle the claims against it
in this case, the stay of proceedings against E Mortgage entered by this Court in July of 2015,
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and the fact that E Mortgage did not engage in discovery, an award of 20% of the maximum
settlement value in this case, or $330,433.62, is a more reasonable award of attorneys’ fees
and expenses than Class Counsels’ requested award of 25% of the Common Fund, or
$413,042.02. A lodestar cross-check confirms that 20% is a reasonable award.
As discussed supra, pursuant to the terms of the Settlement Agreement, $13,135.96 of
Class Counsels’ award will be paid to the Class Representatives—the difference between
their settlement benefits and $5,000 service awards, per married couple, previously awarded
by this Court. An additional $13,843.00 of that award will cover Settlement Counsels’
expenses. Accordingly, a 20% award represents $303,454.66 in fees alone. Accepting a
lodestar of $198,870.15, based on Settlement Counsels’ affidavits discussed supra, the
lodestar multiplier for a 20% award would be 1.53. This multiplier falls within the range of
reasonable fee awards previously authorized by this Court. See, e.g., Singleton, 976 F. Supp. 2d
at 689 (citing Goldenberg v. Marriott PLP Corp., 33 F. Supp. 2d 434, 439 (D. Md. 1998)).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is this 7th day of June, 2017, ORDERED that:
1.
Settlement Counsels’ Petition for Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses (ECF No. 455) is
GRANTED in the reduced amount of $330,433.62, an award equal to 20% of the
maximum settlement value for both the E Mortgage and E Properties Settlement
Agreements;
2.
Pursuant to the Settlement Agreements, E Mortgage and E Properties shall pay
Settlement Counsel attorneys’ fees and expenses in the amount of $330,433.62 in
addition to, not out of, the Common Fund. Payment shall be remitted by check
jointly payable to Settlement Counsel within ninety (90) days of this Order;
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3.
The difference between the settlement benefits and $5,000 service awards, previously
awarded to Class Representatives by this Court, shall be paid out of the funds
awarded to Settlement Counsel; and
4.
The Clerk of this Court shall transmit copies of this Memorandum Order to Counsel.
____/s/____________________
Richard D. Bennett
United States District Judge
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