Everett v. PP&G, INC. et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Richard D Bennett on 6/5/14. (bmhs, Deputy Clerk)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
DANIELLE EVERETT, et al.,
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Plaintiffs,
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v.
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PP&G, INC., et al.
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Defendants.
Civil Action No. RDB-14-0102
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiffs Danielle Everett, Lakisha Colbert, and Tamika McKay, on behalf of
themselves and others similarly situated, sued the Defendants PP&G, Inc., doing business as
Norma Jeans, and Peter Ireland for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §
201, at seq., and the Maryland Wage and Hour Law, Md. Code, Lab. & Empl. § 3-401, et seq.
Pending before this Court is Defendant Peter Ireland’s Motion to Dismiss, or in the
Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment of Plaintiffs’ First Amended Class Action and
Collective Action Complaint (ECF No. 15) (the “Motion”). The parties’ submissions have
been reviewed and no hearing is necessary. See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2011). For the
reasons that follow, the Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
BACKGROUND
For purposes of a motion to dismiss, this Court accepts as true the well-pled, nonconclusory factual allegations in a plaintiff’s complaint. See Aziz v. Alcolac, Inc., 658 F.3d 388,
390 (4th Cir. 2011). Defendant PP&G, Inc. operates Norma Jeans, an exotic dance club in
Baltimore, Maryland (“Norma Jeans” or the “Club”).
Am. Compl. ¶ 2.
The named
Plaintiffs are dancers who performed at Norma Jeans at various times between 2009 and the
present. Id. ¶¶ 13-16. The Plaintiffs typically worked between twenty and thirty hours per
week. Id. ¶ 17. During that time, the Plaintiffs were not paid a wage by Norma Jeans, but
rather received money directly from patrons of the club. Id. ¶¶ 19, 34-35. They were also
subject to a fee and fine system. Id. ¶ 33. The Plaintiffs were required to pay money to the
Club to start their shifts, and “tip in” a portion of the money received from patrons to Club
employees such as the “house mom” and other “non-tipped” employees. Id. ¶ 34. After a
typical shift, the Plaintiffs had to pay approximately $65.00 or more to the Club out of the
amount they received from customers. Id. ¶¶ 33-34. The Plaintiffs state that Norma Jeans
controlled all aspects of their job duties, had the ability to hire and fire them, set their
schedules, and determined the method by which they could be paid. Id. ¶¶ 22-26.
The Plaintiffs also make certain allegations as to Defendant Peter Ireland. They state
that at all relevant times, Ireland had a “personal or family financial interest in Norma Jeans
and has held himself out to the public and to the media as an owner and the individual in
charge of Norma Jeans,” “has been a high level manager,” has been in charge or managing
and controlling . . . managers who oversee day-to-day operations,” resolved “all important
business operation questions,” and “made all decisions relating to Plaintiffs’ misclassification
as independent contractors resulting in the wage claims alleged herein.” Id. ¶¶ 3-7. This is
the totality of their allegations against Ireland. The Plaintiffs allege that although they were
classified by the Defendants as independent contractors, they were in fact employees. Id. ¶¶
20-21.
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On January 14, 2014, the Plaintiffs filed a hybrid FLSA collective action and class
action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for violations of the
MWHL. The Plaintiffs sue on behalf of at least fifty other current or former dancers whom
they allege are similarly situated. Id. ¶¶ 36-39, 48-50. The Plaintiffs originally filed against
PP&G, Inc., Lisa Ireland, and Peter Ireland. PP&G, Inc. filed an Answer and Counterclaim,
and Lisa and Peter Ireland moved to dismiss.
The Plaintiffs then filed an Amended
Complaint, naming only PP&G, Inc. and Peter Ireland, thereby mooting the original
Motions to Dismiss (ECF Nos. 7 & 8). PP&G again filed an Answer and Counterclaim,
which the Plaintiffs answered. Peter Ireland filed the pending Motion to Dismiss, or in the
Alternative, for Summary Judgment.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a “short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Rule 12(b)(6) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes the dismissal of a complaint if it fails to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted; therefore, “the purpose of Rule 12(b)(6) is to test
the sufficiency of a complaint and not to resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits
of a claim, or the applicability of defenses.” Presley v. City of Charlottesville, 464 F.3d 480, 483
(4th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted) (quoting Edwards v. City of
Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999))). The Supreme Court’s decisions in Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), “require that
complaints in civil actions be alleged with greater specificity than previously was required.”
Walters v. McMahen, 684 F.3d 435, 439 (4th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). In Twombly, the
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Supreme Court articulated “[t]wo working principles” that courts must employ when ruling
on Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. First, while a court must accept
as true all the factual allegations contained in the complaint, legal conclusions drawn from
those facts are not afforded such deference. Id.; Walters, 684 F.3d at 439 (“The mere recital
of elements of a cause of action, supported only by conclusory statements, is not sufficient
to survive a motion made pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).” (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.)).
Second, a complaint must be dismissed if it does not allege “a plausible claim for
relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Under the plausibility standard, a complaint must contain
“more than labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Although the plausibility requirement does not impose a
“probability requirement,” id. at 556, “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see also Robertson v. Sea
Pines Real Estate Cos., 679 F.3d 278, 291 (4th Cir. 2012) (“A complaint need not make a case
against a defendant or forecast evidence sufficient to prove an element of the claim. It need only
allege facts sufficient to state elements of the claim.” (emphasis in original) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted)). In short, a court must “draw on its judicial experience and
common sense” to determine whether the pleader has “nudged his claim across the line
from conceivable to plausible.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 683 (citations, internal quotation
marks, and alterations omitted).
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ANALYSIS
The Plaintiffs in this case have not stated facts sufficient to allege a plausible claim
against Ireland. The Amended Complaint only states, in conclusory fashion, that Ireland
exhibited the characteristics that have been held by courts to indicate an employer-employee
relationship. While the Plaintiffs are not required to forecast evidence that will prove their
case, these vague generalizations provide no actual factual allegations as to Ireland’s conduct
from which it could be inferred that he is liable to the Plaintiffs. For instance, the Plaintiffs
state that Ireland has held himself out to the media and the public as the owner of Norma
Jeans, but state no factual examples of such conduct. Likewise, the Plaintiffs allege that
Ireland made all decisions relating to their “misclassification” as independent contractors
without stating any facts related to such “decisions” that could nudge their claims against
Ireland across the line from merely conceivable to plausible. These bald assertions are more
accurately categorized as legal conclusions that are not worthy of deference under Rule
12(b)(6). Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 253 (4th Cir. 2009)
(“[Courts] need not accept the legal conclusions drawn from the facts, and [ ] need not
accept as true unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions or arguments.”) (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted). In sum, the Plaintiffs fail to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted against Defendant Peter Ireland.
To be clear, this Court is not ruling at this stage on the merits of any claim that may
exist against Ireland; summary judgment in his favor is not warranted at this juncture. If,
during discovery, facts that could not have been previously discovered despite the exercise
of diligence by the Plaintiffs come to light, and that may cure the deficiencies noted above,
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the Plaintiffs may move for leave to amend their Amended Complaint pursuant to Rules 15
and 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
As the case now stands, however,
Defendant Peter Ireland is entitled to be dismissed.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Defendant Peter Ireland’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF
No. 15) is GRANTED pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
A separate Order follows.
Dated: June 5, 2014
/s/
Richard D. Bennett
United States District Judge
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