Skinner v. Ibeadogbulem et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM filed. Signed by Judge J. Frederick Motz on 2/19/2015. (c/m 2/19/15)(kr, Deputy Clerk)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
TRACY LAMONTE’ SKINNER, #317270
Plaintiff,
v.
CPT. K. IBEADOGBULEM
OFC. JULIET NGEH
LT. DAVID JOHNSON
SGT. OWENS
OFC. FREDERICKS, CO II
Defendants.
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CIVIL ACTION NO. JFM-14-145
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MEMORANDUM
Tracy Skinner (“Skinner”), a Maryland inmate, filed this self-represented 42 U.S.C. § 1983
complaint for damages against Patuxent Institution correctional officers, alleging that they violated
his rights under the Eighth Amendment by using excessive force. Defendants have filed a motion to
dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment, construed as a motion for summary judgment,
and Skinner has filed oppositions. ECF Nos. 15, 18 & 20. The matter is ripe for disposition. For
reasons that follow, the court will deny defendants’ summary judgment motion.
Summary judgment is proper when the moving party demonstrates through “particular parts
of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information,
affidavits or declarations, stipulations ..., admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials,” that
“there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), (c)(1)(A); see Baldwin v. City of Greensboro, 714 F.3d 828, 833-34
(4th Cir. 2013). If the party seeking summary judgment demonstrates that there is no evidence to
support the nonmoving party's case, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to identify evidence that
shows that a genuine dispute exists as to material facts. See Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
The existence of only a “scintilla of evidence” is not enough to defeat a motion for summary
judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251 (1986). Instead, the evidentiary
materials submitted must show facts from which the finder of fact reasonably could find for the party
opposing summary judgment. Id.
Skinner’s claims arise from an incident that allegedly occurred on June 1, 2013, while
confined at Patuxent Institution. His verified complaint alleges that he wrote an administrative
remedy on Patuxent Tier Officer Juliet Ngeh, who contacted Captain K. Ibeadogbulem to inform him
of the remedy. Skinner asserts that Ibeadoglulem arrived on the tier and accused him of using
profanity and disrespecting an officer, even though Skinner was silent. He then claims that he
engaged in conversation with Captain Ibeadogbulem, who called a code on his radio and told him to
lock in. Skinner alleges that both Ibeadogbulem and Ngeh grabbed him and he “shook them off of
me and pushed them away...” He then claims he was punched in the stomach by inmate Jason
Delong, and subsequently grabbed, punched in the face, kicked in the ribs and face, and stomped on
the back of his neck by correctional officers after he complied with an order to lay on the ground. He
claims that the assault left him unconscious and he was examined on site by medics and transported
by ambulance to the Shock Trauma Unit of the University of Maryland Hospital Center, where he
was treated for back and neck injuries and multiple contusions. ECF No. 1, Compl. at pgs. 3-6.
Skinner claims that he could not file administrative remedy procedure (“ARP”) grievances regarding
the incident because he was placed on isolation and denied access to writing material. Id., Compl. at
pg. 7.
Defendants provide a significantly different factual background concerning the incident.
They state that Skinner is a “mental health inmate” who was housed in the Correctional Mental
Health Center at Patuxent Institution. Defendant Ngeh reported that during the morning of June 1,
2013, Skinner was cursing out loud. When questioned regarding his disrespectful language, Skinner
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indicated that he was speaking to his cell mate who was in the shower and he was going to call home.
When Skinner came out of the shower area, he punched Ibeadogbulem in the head and face. When
Ngeh tried to intervene, Skinner knocked her against the wall. Defendants affirm that at this time,
Skinner’s cell mate, Daniel Rector, joined him and they both continued hitting and kicking
Ibeadogbulem while he was lying on the floor. Other officers responded to the scene and stopped the
assault. ECF No. 15, Ex. 5 at Ngeh Decl.
Correctional Officer Diane Komgeum affirms that she observed Skinner cursing at
Ibeadogbulem and then saw Skinner hit the Captain with a closed fist. She further observed Ngeh
attempt to assist Ibeadogbulem, but Skinner pushed her against a wall. Id., Ex. 6 at Komgeum Decl.
Komgeum maintains that she temporarily left the scene to allow responding officers into the secured
door, and when she returned she observed Ibeadogbulem lying on the floor with blood on his face and
uniform shirt. Id. Correctional Officer Owens affirms that when he responded to a call for officer in
need of assistance, he observed Skinner and his cellmate Daniel Rectos standing over Ibeadogbulem,
who was lying face down in a pool of blood. Owens maintains that he instructed both inmates to get
on the ground, but both were combative and assaulted him. Owens stated that he blocked a punch
and grabbed Skinner, who was then subdued when other correctional officers arrived on the scene.
Id., Ex. 7 at Owens Decl. Owens’ affirmations are corroborated by that of defendant Fredericks, who
maintains that he observed Ibeadogbulem laying down on the floor in a pool of blood, with Skinner
and Rector standing over him in combative stances. He affirms that Skinner continued to struggle
until other officers arrived and helped to subdue him. Id., Ex. 8 at Fredericks Decl.
The Internal Investigation Unit (“IIU”) Report provided by defendants is factually on point
with the declarations provided by defendants and other officers. It states that:
“Captain Kenneth Ibeadogbulem and CO II Juliet Ngeh was conducting security
rounds and Inmate Tracy Skinner #317270 started a verbal altercation with Captain
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Ibeadogbulem. Inmate Skinner then struck Captain Ibeadogbulem in the face and
head several times with closed fists. CO II Ngeh attempted to assist and was thrown
into the wall by Inmate Skinner. At some point Inmate Skinner's Cellmate (Inmate
Daniel Rector #363751) began striking Captain Ibeadogbulem with closed fists.
Captain Ibeadogbulem, CO II Ngeh and Inmate Daniel Rector were transported to
Howard County General Hospital for treatment of their injuries.”
No surveillance cameras in the facility captured this incident.”
ECF No. 15, Ex. 2.
Defendants provide medical records to show that a contemporaneous evaluation was made of
the involved parties. Nurse Sarah Bangbade noted that Ibeadogbulem was responsive but bleeding
from bruises and lacerations. Skinner was found to have swelling on both sides of his face and minor
bruises around the face and head. Skinner, who was treated at the University of Maryland Hospital
Center’s Shock Trauma Unit, received care for multiple contusions, abrasions, and a lip laceration.
A CT Scan of his whole body was normal. The summary noted facial pain and prescribed the use of a
“Miami J collar” for one week, with a recommended follow-up appointment in one week. Id. Exs. 2
& 10.
In his opposition “affidavit” Skinner affirms that he wrote an ARP on defendant Ngeh and
initially had difficulty getting Ibeadogbulem to sign off on it. ECF No. 18. Skinner maintains that
he engaged in several discussions with Ibeadogbulem, resulting in the officer calling a code, and that
both Ngeh and Ibeadogbulem grabbed his arms in an effort to put him in his cell. He states that he
“shook loose from Ibeadogbulem” and “pushed him away from me.” Skinner reaffirms that at that
time Patuxent inmate Jason DeLong attacked him and punched him repeatedly in the chest and
stomach. Id. He maintains that his cell mate, Daniel Rector, then started hitting both officers and
“after both my hands were free I attempted to keep everyone at least arms length away from me by
pushing them away.” Skinner alleges that “when he saw an opening he went through it” and walked
to his cell. Skinner maintains that Correctional Officer Owens ordered him to lie on the ground and
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he complied without any resistance. Id. He claims that after he lay on the ground, Owens ordered
officers to “fuck him up” while he was in handcuffs behind his back and Owens and two officers
beat him while he was handcuffed, and repeatedly stomped and kicked him. Skinner states that he
was maliciously beaten and denies that he kicked or hit Ibeadogbulem, Ngeh or any other officers
with his feet or a closed fist. ECF Nos. 18 & 20.1
Skinner’s claims are subject to the administrative exhaustion requirement of the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). This requirement “applies to all inmate suits
about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they
allege excessive force or some other wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). Under the
PLRA, prisoners must exhaust their administrative remedies before filing claims under § 1983. See
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(h) (“[T]he term ‘prisoner’ means any person ... detained in any facility who is
accused of ... violations of criminal law....”). Administrative remedies must, however, be available to
the prisoner and this court is “obligated to ensure that any defects in administrative exhaustion were
not procured from the action or inaction of prison officials.” Aquilar-Avellaveda v. Terrell, 478 F.3d
1223, 1225 (10th Cir. 2007).
Skinner was therefore required to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing this
lawsuit. There is no dispute that Skinner did not file an ARP regarding the June 1, 2013 incident at
issue. Scott Oakley, Executive Director of the Inmate Grievance Office (“IGO”), avers that Skinner
filed just one grievance with the Inmate Grievance Office back in October of 2010, and failed to
otherwise exhaust administrative remedies as to the excessive force issue. ECF No. 15, Ex. 1, Oakley
Decl. Defendants, through the Declaration of Kristina M. Donnelly, affirm that Skinner was housed
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The medical records attached to Skinner’s affidavit show that he suffered “blunt trauma” with
facial contusions. ECF No. 18, Ex. 1 at pgs. 1-2.
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on the Patuxent Institution mental health center/segregation unit from June 1, 2013 through July 8,
2014, and that although the ARP forms are “readily available to every Patuxent inmate,” Skinner did
not file an ARP. Id., Ex. 2, Donnelly Decl. Throughout his pleadings Skinner claims that he was
prevented from instituting or completing the ARP process because he was assigned to isolation,
denied writing material, and was not permitted access to ARP forms. See ECF Nos. 1, 18, 20.
Prison officials may not take unfair advantage of the exhaustion requirement and a remedy
becomes “unavailable” if prison employees do not respond to a properly filed grievance, or if they
otherwise act to prevent a prisoner from exhausting his administrative remedies. See Moore v.
Bennett, 517 F.3d 717, 725 (4th Cir. 2008). Thus, a court may excuse a prisoner’s failure to exhaust
an administrative remedy if a prisoner “through no fault of his own, was prevented from availing
himself of” the remedy. Id. The burden of showing that administrative remedies were unavailable lies
with the plaintiff. See, e.g., Graham v. Gentry, 413 F. Appx. 660, 663 (4th Cir. 2011) (“[I]n order to
show that a grievance procedure was not ‘available,’ a prisoner must adduce facts showing that he
was prevented, through no fault of his own, from availing himself of that procedure.”) (citing Moore,
517 F.3d at 725).
To be sure, if prison officials impede a prisoner’s attempts to exhaust by denying that inmate
the proper forms, by failing to educate the inmate on the grievance process, or by failing to respond to
a proper grievance, a prisoner may be excused from exhaustion requirements. See Mitchell v. Horn,
318 F.3d 523, 529 (3d Cir. 2003); Miller v. Norris, 247 F.3d 736, 740 (8th Cir. 2001). Prison officials
may not take unfair advantage of the exhaustion requirement, however, and a remedy becomes
“unavailable” if prison employees do not respond to a properly filed grievance, or if they otherwise
act to prevent a prisoner from exhausting his administrative remedies. See Moore, 517 F. 3d at 725;
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see also Gary Proctor, Ngo Excuses: Proving, Rebutting, and Excusing Failure to Exhaust
Administrative Remedies in Prisoner Suits after Woodford v. Ngo and Jones v. Bock, 31 Hamline
L.Rev.471, 487–489 (2008).
In light of factual information presented to the court, there is some question as to whether
plaintiff’s attempts to file grievances were impeded by prison personnel. The court cannot say on the
record before it that Skinner did not exhaust “available” administrative remedies.2 As such, the court
will consider the merits of Skinner’s claims.
Whether force used by prison officials was excessive is determined by inquiring if Aforce was
applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause
harm.@ Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U. S. 1, 6-7 (1992). This court must look at the need for
application of force; the relationship between that need and the amount of force applied; the extent of
the injury inflicted; the extent of the threat to the safety of staff and inmates as reasonably perceived
by prison officials; and any efforts made to temper the severity of the response. See Whitley v.
Albers, 475 U. S. 312, 321 (1986). The absence of significant injury alone is not dispositive of a
claim of excessive force. See Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 36-39 (2010). It is the nature of force
used by the correctional officer, rather than the extent of the prison inmate’s injury, that is the
relevant inquiry in an Eighth Amendment claim. See Hill v. Crum, 727 F.3d 312, 320-321 (4th Cir.
2013). The extent of injury incurred is one factor indicative of whether or not the force used was
necessary in a particular situation, but if force is applied maliciously and sadistically liability is not
avoided simply because the prisoner had the good fortune to escape serious harm. Id. Not every
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Although not noted by defendants, this court is familiar with the Division of Correction’s
practice to decline an investigation for an ARP where one is already pending before the IIU. Thus, the court
concludes that the exhaustion requirement regarding the alleged excessive use of force is satisfied where, as
here, the administrative procedure is unavailable.
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malevolent touch by a prison guard, however, gives rise to a federal cause of action for excessive
force in violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 37.
Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Skinner, he has been challenged to show that
correctional officers maliciously applied force. There is no material dispute that Skinner was initially
argumentative and that his behavior became physically and verbally aggressive and disruptive on the
tier. He admits to escalating the situation and was otherwise being difficult by “pushing” the officers
away when they attempted to place him in his cell.
Where, as here, there are factual disputes that are relevant and necessary in the determination
of the outcome of the suit, summary judgment is precluded. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986). Plainly, there are genuine disputes of material facts concerning the events
following the argument between Ibeadogbulem and Skinner, including questions as to whether
Skinner, himself, assaulted Ibeadogbulem and Ngeh and whether he was maliciously kicked, stomped
on, or punched by responding officers either before or after he had been placed in restraints. The
parties factually disagree as to the precise extent of force subsequently used and the need for that
force.
It is not the role of the court on summary judgment to determine the truth of the matter or to
make a credibility determination. The court is mindful that the minimal medical exhibits indicate that
Skinner was transported to University of Maryland Medical Center’s Shock Trauma Unit. This court
cannot, on the record before it, make an assessment as to whether the force was maliciously applied
or reasonably used to subdue Skinner even under the facts he has presented.
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For the aforementioned reasons, defendants= motion, construed as a motion for summary
judgment, shall be DENIED. The complaint alleging excessive force shall proceed. Skinner shall
be granted an additional period of time to seek the appointment of counsel. A separate Order follows.
Date:___February 19, 2015
__/s/_____________________
J. Frederick Motz
United States District Judge
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