Barkley v. State of Maryland et al
Filing
42
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge George Levi Russell, III on 9/2/2015. (c/m 9/2/15 bas, Deputy Clerk)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
KEITH BARKLEY,
:
Plaintiff,
:
v.
:
STATE OF MARYLAND, et. al.,
:
Defendants.
Civil Action No. GLR-14-399
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pending before the Court is Defendants’, State of Maryland
and Edmund O’Leary, Motion for Summary Judgment.
(ECF No. 33).
Having reviewed the pleadings and supporting documents, the Court
finds no hearing necessary.
See Local Rule 105.6 (D.Md. 2014).
For the reasons outlined below, the Motion will be granted.
I. BACKGROUND
On June 5, 2000, Plaintiff Keith Barkley pled guilty to
child
abuse
and,
on
June
13,
2000,
he
was
sentenced
to
the
Maryland Department of Corrections (“DOC”) for a period of 833
days, time served.
2).
(Bartholomew Decl. Ex. 1, at ¶ 3, ECF No. 33-
According to the statement of charges filed in the case,
Barkley’s
(Id.).
conduct
involved
the
sexual
abuse
of
the
victim.
The child abuse occurred in 1990-1991. (Id.).
At the
time of his sentencing for the child abuse charge, Barkley was
serving other sentences.
(Id. at ¶ 4).
He was released from the
DOC to mandatory supervision on March 6, 2011, and his term of
mandatory supervision expired on January 5, 2002.
(Id.).
In
2001,
Maryland’s
sex
offender
registration
law
was
amended to mandate registration of sex offenders who committed an
offense
requiring
registration
before
July
1,
1997,
if
the
offender was either in custody or under the supervision of a
supervising authority on October 1, 2001.
Proc. § 11-702.1(a) (2001 Repl. Vol.).
mandatory
supervision
registration
date.
statute
as
of
required
Md. Code. Ann., Crim.
Because Barkley was on
October
1,
Barkley’s
2001,
Maryland’s
registration
on
that
As a result of an error on the part of the Maryland Sex
Offender Registry (“MSOR”), however, Barkley was not registered
at that time.
In
April
2012,
Barkley
returned
to
DOC
custody
and
was
confined at Poplar Hill Pre-Release Unit (“PHPRU”) for charges
related to indecent exposure and theft.
case
file
and
confirming
with
MSOR
Upon reviewing Barkley’s
staff
that
Barkley’s
conviction for child abuse required his registration on the MSOR,
Edmund
O’Leary,
a
Correctional
Case
Management
Specialist,
advised Barkley that he was being placed on the MSOR database.
(O’Leary Decl. Ex. 2, at ¶¶ 3-4, ECF No. 33-5). Subsequently, on
September 9, 2013, upon convictions for distribution of CDS and
possession of CDS, Barkley was sentenced to serve a period of
twenty years.
He is presently confined at the DOC’s Eastern
Correctional Institution.
2
At time of the filing of this action on February 10, 2014,
Barkley was listed on the MSOR.
Barkly initiated this action
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012), alleging O’Leary wrongly
registered him on the MSOR because his conviction for indecent
exposure, for which he is serving his sentence, is not an offense
requiring registration, and that he had no other convictions that
would otherwise require registration.
Barkley contends that, as
a result of being wrongly registered on the MSOR, he has lost a
book
contract
deal
and
was
denied
admission
to
film
school.
Further, Barkley alleges his subsequent drug use, rearrest, and
twenty-year sentence of confinement are all attributable to being
wrongly placed on the MSOR.
Barkley claims being wrongly placed on the MSOR is cruel and
unusual
and
misconduct.
constitutes
an
abuse
of
power
and
official
He requests that his name be removed from the MSOR
and seeks two-million dollars in damages and asks that O’Leary be
terminated
from
his
position.
Defendants
Motion
for
Summary
Judgment has been fully briefed and is ready for disposition.
II. Discussion
A.
Standard of Review
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, the Court must
grant
summary
judgment
if
the
moving
party
demonstrates
that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the
moving
party
is
entitled
to
judgment
3
as
a
matter
of
law.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). In reviewing a motion for summary judgment,
the
Court
views
the
facts
in
a
light
most
favorable
to
the
nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
255 (1986) (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157
(1970)).
Once a motion for summary judgment is properly made and
supported, the opposing party has the burden of showing that a
genuine dispute exists. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87 (1986).
“[T]he
between
mere
the
existence
parties
will
of
some
not
alleged
defeat
an
factual
otherwise
dispute
properly
supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that
there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson, 477 U.S.
at 247–48 (alteration in the original). A “material fact” is a
fact that might affect the outcome of a party's case. Id. at 248;
see also JKC Holding Co. v. Wash. Sports Ventures, Inc., 264 F.3d
459, 465 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing Hooven–Lewis v. Caldera, 249
F.3d 259, 265 (4th Cir. 2001)). Whether a fact is considered to
be “material” is determined by the substantive law, and “[o]nly
disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit
under
the
governing
law
will
properly
preclude
the
entry
of
summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Hooven–Lewis, 249
F.3d at 265.
“The party opposing a properly supported motion for summary
judgment may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of
4
[his] pleadings, but rather must set forth specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens
Football
Club,
Inc.,
346
F.3d
514,
525
(4th
Cir.
2003)
(alteration in original) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). The Court
must “view the evidence in the light most favorable to ... the
nonmovant,
without
and
draw
weighing
all
the
reasonable
evidence
inferences
or
in
assessing
her
the
favor
witness
credibility,” Dennis v. Columbia Colleton Med. Ctr., Inc., 290
F.3d 639, 645 (4th Cir. 2002).
B.
Analysis
On March 4, 2013, subsequent to Barkley’s placement on the
MSOR, the Maryland Court of Appeals concluded that retroactive
application of Maryland's sex offender registration laws violates
the prohibition against ex post facto laws under Article 17 of
the Maryland Declaration of Rights.
Doe v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety
& Corr. Servs. (Doe I), 62 A.3d 123, 133 (Md. 2013).
June
30,
conflict
2014,
between
the
the
Maryland
Court
federal
Sex
of
Appeals
Offender
Then, on
addressed
the
Registration
and
Notification Act (“SORNA”) and the state constitution.
Dep’t of
Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs. v. Doe (Doe II), 94 A.3d 791, 794 (Md.
2014).
The
Maryland
Court
of
Appeals
concluded
that
notwithstanding the federal registration obligations of SORNA,
the State of Maryland had the authority to remove sex offender
5
registration
information
from
MSOR
violated the state constitution.
Following
the
issuance
where
such
registration
Id. at 811.
of
the
opinion
of
the
Court
of
Appeals in Doe II, MSOR staff conducted a review of Barkley’s
case and determined that Barkley was not required to register in
the State of Maryland as a sex offender.
1, at ¶ 7).
(Bartholomew Decl. Ex.
By letter dated October 31, 2014, the MSOR notified
Barkley that his name and other identifying information had been
removed from the MSOR and the National Sex Offender Registry.
(Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. Ex. 1, Attach. A, ECF No. 33-3).
Barkley’s
information is no longer contained on the MSOR’s public website
and
all
relevant
federal
removal from the MSOR.
ECF
No.
33-4);
agencies
have
been
advised
of
his
(Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. Ex. 1, Attach. B,
(Bartholomew
Decl.
Ex.
1,
at
¶
9).
Thus,
Barkley’s claim for injunctive relief in the form of an order
directing
his
removal
from
the
MSOR
is
moot,
and
will
be
dismissed.
To the extent Barkley seeks damages pursuant to § 1983, he
has failed to allege any constitutional violation.
Alaska’s
United
retroactive
States
application
of
sex
Supreme
the
offender
Court
statute
concluded
did
Constitution’s Ex Post Facto Clause.
105-06 (2003).
registration
not
that
violate
In analyzing
statute,
the
retroactive
the
federal
Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84,
Additionally, the United States Court of Appeals
6
for
the
Fourth
registration
Circuit
concluded
requirements
have
a
that
because
legitimate,
SORNA's
non-punitive
purpose, they do not violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition
on cruel and unusual punishment.
United States v. Under Seal,
709 F.3d 257, 266 (4th Cir. 2013).
Finally,
even
assuming
Barkley
has
properly
alleged
a
constitutional violation, his claims are barred by the Eleventh
Amendment.
The Eleventh Amendment immunizes states from suit
brought in federal court absent waiver from the state or a clear
exercise of congressional power to override such immunity under
the Fourteenth Amendment.
491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989).
Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police,
The State of Maryland has not expressly
waived its immunity under the Eleventh Amendment to such suits.
Further, a suit against a state official acting in his official
capacity is no different from a suit against the state itself.
Id. at 71.
Accordingly, the State of Maryland and O’Leary, in
his official capacity, must be dismissed from this action.
With respect to the claims against O’Leary in his individual
capacity,
Barkley’s
claim
similarly
fails.
Even
where
a
defendant participated in constitutionally impermissible conduct,
he may be “shielded from liability for civil damages if [his]
actions
did
not
violate
‘clearly
established
statutory
or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.’”
Hope
v.
Pelzer,
536
U.S.
7
730,
739
(2002)
(quoting
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
Here, Barkley
was
sex
placed
on
registration
decision
law
that
constitution.
the
MSOR
and
pursuant
prior
retroactive
Thus,
to
to
to
the
Maryland’s
Maryland
registration
the
extent
Court
violated
Barkley
has
offender
of
Appeals
the
state
alleged
the
deprivation of a constitutional right, if at all, that right was
not clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.
Accordingly,
O’Leary,
is
entitled
to
immunity
and
must
be
dismissed from this action.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons given above, Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment (ECF No. 33) is GRANTED.
A separate Order will follow.
Entered this 2nd day of September, 2015
/s/
_____________________________
George L. Russell, III
United States District Judge
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