Wagner v. Commissioner, Social Security

Filing 23

ORDER granting 20 Motion of defendant for Summary Judgment. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephanie A Gallagher on 12/4/2014. (c/m 12/4/14 jnls, Deputy Clerk)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
CHAMBERS OF
STEPHANIE A. GALLAGHER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

101 WEST LOMBARD STREET
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21201
[phone]
Fax [phone]

December 4, 2014

LETTER TO PLAINTIFF AND COUNSEL:
RE:

Erin Beth Wagner v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration;
Civil No. SAG-14-0470

Dear Counsel:
On February 19, 2014, the Plaintiff, Erin Beth Wagner, petitioned this Court to review
the Social Security Administration’s final decision to deny her claims for Disability Insurance
Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”). (ECF No. 1). I have considered
the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment and the letter response filed by Ms. Wagner,
who appears pro se. (ECF Nos. 20, 22). I find that no hearing is necessary. Local Rule 105.6
(D. Md. 2014). This Court must uphold the decision of the agency if it is supported by
substantial evidence and if the agency employed proper legal standards. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g),
1383(c)(3); see Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996). Under that standard, I will
grant the Commissioner’s motion. This letter explains my rationale.
Ms. Wagner filed her claims in April, 2011, alleging disability beginning on August 30,
2010. (Tr. 164-76). Her claims were denied initially on September 1, 2011, and on
reconsideration on December 7, 2011. (Tr. 103-07, 109-16). A hearing was held on November
28, 2012, before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), and Ms. Wagner was represented by
counsel. (Tr. 31-54). Following the hearing, on December 7, 2012, the ALJ determined that Ms.
Wagner was not disabled during the relevant time frame. (Tr. 8-24). The Appeals Council
denied Ms. Wagner’s request for review, (Tr. 2-6), so the ALJ’s decision constitutes the final,
reviewable decision of the agency.
The ALJ found that during the relevant time period, Ms. Wagner suffered from the severe
impairment of an affective disorder. (Tr. 13). Despite this impairment, the ALJ determined that
Ms. Wagner retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to “perform a full range of
unskilled work at all exertional levels; however, she cannot work with the public or have more
than occasional interaction with co-workers and supervisors.” (Tr. 15). After considering the
testimony of a vocational expert (“VE”), the ALJ determined that Ms. Wagner could perform
jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy, and that she was therefore not
disabled during the relevant time frame. (Tr. 19).

Erin Beth Wagner v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration
Civil No. SAG-14-0470
December 4, 2014
Page 2

I have carefully reviewed the ALJ’s opinion and the entire record. See Elam v. Barnhart,
386 F. Supp. 2d 746, 753 (E.D. Tex. 2005) (mapping an analytical framework for judicial review
of a pro se action challenging an adverse administrative decision, including: (1) examining
whether the Commissioner’s decision generally comports with regulations, (2) reviewing the
ALJ’s critical findings for compliance with the law, and (3) determining from the evidentiary
record whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s findings). For the reasons described
below, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision.
The ALJ ruled in Ms. Wagner’s favor at step one, finding that she had not engaged in
substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date. (Tr. 13). The ALJ’s sequential
evaluation then addressed, at step two, each of the impairments Ms. Wagner suffered during the
relevant time frame. As noted above, the ALJ concluded that Ms. Wagner’s affective disorder
was severe. The ALJ also considered Ms. Wagner’s obesity, and her history of alcohol and
marijuana abuse. (Tr. 14). The ALJ found that obesity was not a severe impairment because
Ms. Wagner did not claim any physical problems, and found that substance abuse did not
constitute a severe impairment because Ms. Wagner had abstained from using substances since
she had been taking medication. Id. Accordingly, I find no basis for remand.
At step three, the ALJ determined that Ms. Wagner’s impairments did not meet the
specific requirements of, or medically equal the criteria of, Listing 12.04 (governing affective
disorders). (Tr. 14-15). Listing 12.04 requires a claimant to demonstrate that her impairment
results in at least two of the following: (1) marked restrictions of daily living; or (2) marked
difficulties in maintaining social functioning; or (3) marked difficulties in maintaining
concentration, persistence, or pace; or (4) repeated episodes of decompensation, each of
extended duration. Citing Ms. Wagner’s activities of daily living, which include caring for an
autistic child, interacting with friends, driving, and managing her finances, the ALJ concluded
that Ms. Wagner had mild restrictions in her activities of daily living, moderate difficulties in
social functioning and concentration, persistence, or pace, and no episodes of decompensation of
extended duration. Id. No medical source has opined that Ms. Wagner’s impairment meets the
Listing, and I find no evidence to suggest that the criteria of the Listing have been established.
At step four, the ALJ summarized Ms. Wagner’s subjective complaints. (Tr. 15-16). The
ALJ found Ms. Wagner’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of
her symptoms to be less than fully credible. (Tr. 17). Specifically, the ALJ relied upon Ms.
Wagner’s lack of any medical treatment until January, 2011, the improvement with use of
medications, her activities of daily living, the GAF scores assigned on August 12, 2011, and July
16, 2012, reflecting moderate and mild symptoms, respectively, and the medical opinions from
the State agency medical consultants. (Tr. 16-17). The ALJ assigned “great weight” to the
assessment of consultative examiner Dr. Miller, who recommended psychiatric treatment and
possible vocational services. (Tr. 18, 284). The ALJ also relied on the actual treatment notes
from Ms. Wagner’s physicians, and on the facts that Ms. Wagner had applied for and received
unemployment benefits, and had looked for work, during the period of alleged disability. (Tr.
18). The ALJ appropriately discounted the opinions of a certified registered nurse practitioner

Erin Beth Wagner v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration
Civil No. SAG-14-0470
December 4, 2014
Page 3

and a licensed clinical social worker, noting that the opinions are contradicted by the treatment
records from those sources. (Tr. 17-18).
My review of the ALJ’s decision is confined to whether substantial evidence, in the
record as it was reviewed by the ALJ, supports the decision and whether correct legal standards
were applied. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390, 404 (1971). Even if there is other
evidence that may support Ms. Wagner’s position, I am not permitted to reweigh the evidence or
to substitute my own judgment for that of the ALJ. Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th
Cir. 1990). In considering the entire record, then, I find the ALJ’s RFC determination was
supported by substantial evidence.
At step five, the ALJ next considered the impact of Ms. Wagner’s age and level of
education on her ability to adjust to work. (Tr. 19). Since Ms. Wagner’s RFC assessment
contained non-exertional limitations, the ALJ asked the VE whether jobs existed in the national
economy that were suited to Ms. Wagner’s particular assessment. (Tr. 49-50). The VE testified
that a person with Ms. Wagner’s RFC would be capable of performing the jobs of unskilled light
merchandise marker, light cleaner, medium cleaner, and hand packager. (Tr. 50-51). Based on
the VE’s testimony, the ALJ concluded that Ms. Wagner is capable of successfully adjusting to
work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy. (Tr. 19). I therefore find that
the ALJ’s determination was supported by substantial evidence.
Finally, I note that Ms. Wagner attached two recent medical records to her letter. (ECF
No. 22-1). Those records reflect a recent clinical diagnosis of depersonalization disorder from a
licensed clinical social worker in May, 2014, and a recent admission to an adult partial
hospitalization program in September, 2014. Id. However, I cannot consider evidence that was
not before the Commissioner, except under very limited circumstances where the evidence is
both new and material. See Smith v. Chater, 99 F.3d 635, 638, n. 5 (4th Cir. 1996). To establish
that the evidence was material, Ms. Wagner would have to show that the evidence might
reasonably have changed the decision of the Commissioner. See Wilkins v. Sec., Dept. of Health
and Human Servs., 953 F.2d 93, 96 (4th Cir. 1991); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Here, the
Commissioner’s decision was rendered in December of 2012, and the newly submitted records
contain no content suggesting that they have any relevance to the time pre-dating the ALJ’s
opinion. Accordingly, the evidence pertaining to Ms. Wagner’s medical condition in 2014
cannot be considered regarding this appeal.
For the reasons set forth herein, the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment (ECF
No. 20) will be GRANTED. The Clerk is directed to CLOSE this case.

Erin Beth Wagner v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration
Civil No. SAG-14-0470
December 4, 2014
Page 4

Despite the informal nature of this letter, it should be flagged as an opinion.
implementing Order follows.

Sincerely yours,
/s/
Stephanie A. Gallagher
United States Magistrate Judge

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