Sinai Hospital of Baltimore, Inc. v. 1199 SEIU United Healthcare Workers East

Filing 24

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Richard D Bennett on 11/3/14. (ca2s, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
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SINAI HOSPITAL OF BALTIMORE,
INC.,

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Plaintiff,

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v.

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1199 SEIU UNITED HEALTHCARE
WORKERS EAST,

Civil Action No. RDB-14-948

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Defendant.
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Sinai Hospital of Baltimore, Inc. (“Sinai”) has filed this action against
Defendant 1199 SEIU United Healthcare Workers East (“the Union”) under Section 301 of
the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185, seeking vacatur of an arbitration
award in favor of the Union. Currently pending before this Court is the Union’s Motion to
Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment (“Motion for Summary Judgment”)
(ECF No. 8). On October 20, 2014, this Court held a hearing on the pending motion (ECF
No. 21). For the reasons that follow, Defendant Union’s Motion to Dismiss, or in the
Alternative, for Summary Judgment, construed as a Motion for Summary Judgment,1 (ECF
No. 8) is GRANTED.

At the October 20, 2014 hearing, Sinai and the Union agreed that, given the factual findings of the
arbitrator, there is no genuine dispute as to any material facts. See ECF No. 21. Defendant’s motion is thus

1

1

BACKGROUND
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, this Court reviews the facts and all
reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Scott v. Harris, 550
U.S. 372, 378 (2007); see also Hardwick ex rel. Hardwick v. Heyward, 711 F.3d 426, 433 (4th Cir.
2013).
Plaintiff Sinai Hospital of Baltimore, Inc. is a not-for-profit corporation organized
under Maryland law and operating in Maryland. Compl. ¶ 3, ECF No. 1. The arbitration
award at issue stems from the termination of an employee of Sinai, Dennis Day (“Mr. Day”).
Id. at ¶¶ 11-15. Mr. Day, a twenty-four year employee of Sinai, is represented by Defendant
Union. Compl. Ex. 1, 3, ECF No. 1-3. Under Section 3.1 of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement between the Union and Sinai (“the CBA”), Sinai retained authority to implement
policies, regulations, and other rules governing a broad range of subjects, from “patient care,
research, [and] education,” to employee conduct and discipline “for cause.” Compl. Ex. 2, 9,
ECF No. 1-4. Under this authority, Sinai promulgated a “Workplace Violence Policy” that
stipulates the various actions that qualify as “workplace violence.”2 Compl. Ex. 3, 1, ECF
No. 1-5. If an employee commits any of these actions, he is “subject to corrective action or
discipline, most often resulting in termination of employment.” Id. at 2.

ripe for construing as a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Id.
2 Among other actions, Sinai defines “[w]orkplace violence” as: (1) “[d]eliberately causing physical injury to
another person[;]” (2) “[e]ngaging in behavior that creates a reasonable fear of injury in another person[;]” (3)
“[p]ossessing, brandishing, or using a weapon while on LifeBridge Health premises or engaged in LifeBridge
Health business[;]” and (4) “[t]hreatening to injure an individual or to damage property[.]” Compl. Ex. 3, at 1.

2

On March 28, 2012, Mr. Day allegedly made threatening remarks directed at his
supervisor, Paul DiPino (“Mr. DiPino”).3 Compl. Ex. 1, 2, ECF No. 1-3. Mr. DiPino and
another Sinai employee, Halla Ingvars (“Ms. Ingvars”) overheard the alleged threats4 over a
VOCERA communications device worn by Mr. Day. Id. at 5. Mr. Day, who was at lunch
with his colleagues, was unaware that the VOCERA device had been activated. Id. at 5-6.
Although Mr. DiPino was not alarmed by the comments, Ms. Ingvars found them to be
threatening. Id. at 6. She therefore reported the alleged threats to a supervisor and Sinai
commenced an investigation of the incident. Id.
During the course of the investigation, Roger Sheets (“Mr. Sheets”), Sinai’s Corporate
Security Director, took written statements from Mr. DiPino and Ms. Ingvars. Id. Mr. Sheets
also interviewed Mr. Day and his lunch companions, but did not ask them to submit written
statements. Id. at 7. He then inspected Mr. Day’s locker, to which Mr. Day had affixed a
personal lock, in violation of Sinai policy. Id. Mr. Day’s locker was filled with “clutter.” Id.
During the course of removing the “clutter” from the locker, Mr. Sheets discovered a knife
with a five-inch blade. Id. On the basis of Mr. Day’s possession of this knife and the alleged

3

Immediately prior to this incident, Mr. Day met with Mr. DiPino to discuss an ongoing paycheck dispute. Compl.
Ex. 1, at 3. The parties disagree as to the tenor of the meeting – Mr. Day states that Mr. DiPino was confrontational
and made “controversial” comments, whereas Mr. DiPino explains that the conversation was not antagonistic. Id. at
4.

The Arbitrator made no conclusive finding as to the content of the alleged threats because he found that
witness accounts varied dramatically. Compl. Ex. 1, at 18. He concluded that it is “difficult to substantiate”
the different accounts, as Sinai took contemporaneous written statements only from Mr. DiPino and Ms.
Ingvars, but not from Mr. Day or his lunch companions. Id. at 19.

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threats directed toward Mr. DiPino, Sinai found that Mr. Day had violated the Workplace
Violence Policy and thus terminated Mr. Day on April 2, 2012.5 Id. at 8.
After his discharge, the Union filed a grievance on behalf of Mr. Day to challenge
Sinai’s decision. Compl. ¶ 12. The parties failed to reach a resolution under the CBAprescribed procedures, thus they submitted their dispute for arbitration. Id. at ¶ 13. The
assigned arbitrator conducted hearings and reviewed the parties’ arbitration briefs before
reaching the conclusion that Sinai did not have “just cause” for terminating Mr. Day. Compl.
Ex. 1, at 2, 22. The arbitrator thereby ordered Sinai to “reinstate[] [Mr. Day] to his former
position and pa[y] back pay up to and including April 8, 2013 and after September 23, 2013.”
Id. at 1.
Plaintiff filed this action against Defendant shortly after the arbitrator rendered his
arbitration award. See Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Vacate Labor Arbitration Award, 1-2
n.2, ECF No. 1-2. In its Complaint and accompanying Motion, Sinai asks this Court to
vacate the arbitration award and remand to the arbitrator to address alleged fundamental
flaws. Compl. ¶ 16. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that he ignored critical provisions of the
parties’ CBA and Sinai’s Workplace Violence Policy. See Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to
Vacate Labor Arbitration Award, at 1. Given these alleged deficiencies, Sinai asserts that the
arbitration award “fails to draw its essence” from the operative polices. Compl. ¶ 16.

On its official “Disciplinary Action Form,” Sinai listed two justifications for Mr. Day’s termination. Def.’s
Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 3, 1, ECF No. 8-4. First, Sinai reported that Mr. Day “violated the LifeBridge Heath
Human Resources Workplace Violence policy by making threatening statements about his manager to coworkers that were witnessed by the manager himself and another member of leadership.” Id. Second, Mr.
Day’s possession of a knife, in a locker “secured with his own lock, not the Hospital issued one[,]”
constituted an additional violation of the Workplace Violence Policy. Id.

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After answering Plaintiff’s Complaint, Def.’s Answer (ECF No. 7), Defendant moved
for summary judgment on the grounds that Plaintiff’s argument is not supported by the law
and is overly formalistic. See Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 8. In response, Plaintiff
reiterated the arguments of its Complaint. Pl.’s Resp. in Opp. to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J.,
ECF No. 13. The Union subsequently filed a Reply to Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant’s
Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 14). This Court then granted Sinai’s Motion for
Leave to File Sur-Reply (ECF No. 16) and Sinai filed its Sur-Reply to Defendant’s Motion
for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 18). Finally, this Court conducted a hearing on October
20, 2014 to address the pending Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 21).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a court “shall grant
summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A
material fact is one that “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A genuine issue over a material fact
exists “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party.” Id. When considering a motion for summary judgment, a judge’s
function is limited to determining whether sufficient evidence exists on a claimed factual
dispute to warrant submission of the matter to a jury for resolution at trial. Id. at 249. In
undertaking this inquiry, this Court must consider the facts and all reasonable inferences in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007).
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However, this Court must also abide by its affirmative obligation to prevent factually
unsupported claims and defenses from going to trial. Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 778-79
(4th Cir. 1993). If the evidence presented by the nonmoving party is merely colorable, or is
not significantly probative, summary judgment must be granted. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 24950.
Judicial review of a labor arbitration award is tightly constrained, as it is “among the
narrowest known to law.” U. S. Postal Serv. v. Am. Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO, 204 F.3d
523, 527 (4th Cir. 2000) (quoting Union Pac. R.R. v. Sheehan, 439 U.S. 89, 91 (1978)). A court
must “determine only whether the arbitrator did his job–not whether he did it well, correctly,
or reasonably, but simply whether he did it.” Mountaineer Gas Co. v. Oil, Chem. & Atomic
Workers Int’l Union, 76 F.3d 606, 608 (4th Cir. 1996). Vacatur is not appropriate when a court
simply disagrees with the arbitrator’s construction of the operative agreements. See Postal
Serv., 204 F.3d at 527; see also United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363
U.S. 593, 599 (1987) (explaining that “courts have no business overruling [the arbitrator]
because their interpretation of the contract is different from his”). Instead, if the arbitrator
“is even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of his
authority, that a court is convinced he committed serious error does not suffice to overturn
his decision.” United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987).
ANALYSIS
The Union, in moving for summary judgment, argues that Sinai has failed to meet the
high burden for vacatur of arbitration awards set forth by the Supreme Court and the Fourth
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Circuit. Given the factual findings of the arbitrator, Defendant contends that there is no
genuine dispute of material fact, and thus it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Sinai
does not dispute the Union’s assertion that judgment as a matter of law is appropriate.6 Nor
does Plaintiff suggest that the burden on a party moving for vacatur is not onerous. Rather,
Sinai argues that it has met this high standard by proving that the arbitrator ignored critical
provisions of the CBA and the Workplace Violence Policy. Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that
the award disregards Sinai’s rationale for a robust approach to workplace violence.7 Given
these deficiencies, Sinai insists that vacatur and remand are required.
Sinai bears a heavy burden in this case. This “heavy burden,” as noted by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in United States Postal Service v. American Postal
Workers Union, AFL-CIO, is critical to maintain confidence in the arbitration process. See 204
F.3d at 527. As the Fourth Circuit explained, “allow[ing] [courts] to delve into the merits of
an arbitration award” would “seriously undermine[]” the “federal policy of settling labor
disputes by arbitration.” Id. If courts were free to pick apart the arbitrator’s decision, then
the “binding [arbitration] process” becomes “purely an advisory one, and ultimately impair[s]
the value of arbitration for labor and management alike.” Westvaco Corp. v. United Paperworkers
Int’l Union, 171 F.3d 971, 974 (4th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Given this rationale, parties that have contracted to submit their disputes to
arbitration bear a heavy burden when moving for vacatur. Essentially, the arbitrator’s award
As previously mentioned, the parties agreed that their dispute is ripe for summary judgment at the Motion
Hearing held on October 20, 2014.
7 In the memorandum accompanying its Complaint, Sinai asserts that Mr. Symonette merely “pa[id] lip
service to [these] grave concerns.” Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Vacate Labor Arbitration Award, at 15.
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“must be upheld so long as it ‘draws its essence from the agreement.’” Patten v. Signator Ins.
Agency, Inc., 441 F.3d 230, 235 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting Upshur Coals Corp. v. United Mine
Workers, Dist. 31, 933 F.2d 225, 229 (4th Cir. 1991)). An award “fails to draw its essence
from the agreement only when the result is not ‘rationally inferable from the contract.’”
Patten, 441 F.3d at 235 (quoting Apex Plumbing Supply, Inc. v. U.S. Supply Co., 142 F.3d 188,
193 n.5n (4th Cir. 1998)). In other words, a court may question the arbitrator’s
interpretation, but it may not vacate the award unless that interpretation is so misguided as
to be irrational.
The arbitrator is “bound to consider and apply the relevant contractual provisions,”
as he derives his authority only from the bounds of that contract. Verizon Corporate Services
Corp. v. Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO, 362 Fed. App’x 352, 355-56 (4th Cir.
2010); see also Champion Int’l Corp. v. United Paperworkers Int’l Union, AFL-CIO, 168 F.3d 725,
729 (4th Cir. 1999) (explaining that the arbitration award must be “grounded in the collective
bargaining agreement”). When the arbitrator “has disregarded or modified unambiguous
contract provisions or based an award upon his own personal notions of right and wrong,”
vacatur is appropriate. Three S Delaware, Inc. v. DataQuick Information Systems, Inc., 492 F.3d
520, 528 (4th Cir. 2007); see also Patten, 441 F.3d at 235 (stating that the arbitrator cannot
ignore “unambiguous” provisions in the parties’ agreement). If the language is “unqualified
and admits of no exception,” then an arbitrator’s failure to apply those clear provisions will
open the door for a court to second-guess the judgment of the arbitrator. Postal Serv., 204
F.3d at 528.
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In this case, the arbitrator did not ignore the plain and unambiguous language of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement and Workplace Violence Policy when he concluded that
Sinai did not have just cause to terminate Mr. Day. Rather, he incorporated his interpretation
of the operative provisions into his award such that the result is “rationally inferable.” Mr.
Day allegedly violated two provisions of Sinai’s Workplace Violence Policy: (1)
“[t]hreatening to injure an individual . . .” (the “threats clause”);8 and (2) “[p]ossessing . . . a
weapon while on LifeBridge Health premises . . .” (the “weapon clause”).9 Compl. Ex. 1, at
1. After conducting hearings and making factual findings related to the charges, the
arbitrator determined that his remarks did not rise to the level of “actual threats” under the
Workplace Violence Policy. The arbitrator did determine that Mr. Day violated the weapon
clause, but reasoned that this violation alone, given the context, did not warrant termination.
To reach this decision, the arbitrator applied the principles of justice derived from the
operative provisions, and not his own notions of fairness.
In examining the award, this Court will consider only whether the arbitrator actually
interpreted the controlling agreements, not whether this Court agrees with that
interpretation. Far from contradicting the clear language of the CBA and Workplace
Violence Policy, the award demonstrates fidelity to the controlling provisions. First, the

8 Mr. Day’s Discipline Action Form, when explaining the threat-based violation, did not directly reference the
threats clause. See Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 3, at 1. This Court, however, will infer such a reference
because Sinai described this violation as “making threatening statements about his manager,” language that
closely mirrors that of the threats clause. Id.
9 Sinai argues that Mr. Day violated a third provision – “[e]ngaging in behavior that creates a reasonable fear
of injury in another person” – but the Disciplinary Action Form contained no reference to this provision. See
Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 3, at 1. This provision is a critical component of Plaintiff’s opposition to the
arbitration award, thus this Court will address it in turn.

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arbitrator recognized the broad authority of Sinai to craft a violence policy and promulgate
relevant regulations under the parties’ CBA. He quoted Section 3.1 in full, indicating that he
understood the source and scope of his inquiry. Under this discretion, he required Sinai to
prove just cause by clear and convincing evidence. The arbitrator based this selection on Mr.
Day’s lengthy tenure and unblemished work history, a reasonable decision given the
Workplace Violence Policy’s failure to specify a standard of proof.
Second, he conducted a thorough analysis of the alleged violations of the threats and
weapon clauses by considering the context in which the threats were made. Context is crucial
to determine the severity of an alleged action, and it is an exercise that is common in any
legal analysis. Regarding the threats clause, Mr. Day was “indeed upset with Mr. DiPino”
after the two men met to discuss Mr. Day’s paycheck. Id. at 17. Although such a feeling
could motivate an individual to make threatening comments, Mr. Day was not so easily
triggered. Rather, the record indicates that there was no evidence indicating that Mr. Day
intended to go through with the actions described in his alleged threats. Mr. Day did not,
after making the comments, proceed to his locker to retrieve his knife; instead, he continued
to perform his ordinary duties that day and the next. Id. at 18. Even further, the arbitrator
was unable to substantiate the credibility of each witness due to Sinai’s decision to take
written statements only from Mr. DiPino and Ms. Ingvars. Id. at 18-19. Given the
discrepancies between the proffered accounts, the arbitrator concluded that he could make
no finding as to the content of Mr. Day’s remarks. Id.

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The arbitrator’s application of the weapon clause exhibits similar fidelity. In
determining that Mr. Day did violate this clause, the arbitrator understood and never
disputed that mere possession of a weapon constitutes a violation of the Workplace Violence
Policy. His analysis of each violation does not contradict or ignore the clear language of the
relevant provisions. Employing the authority vested in him by the parties, the arbitrator
simply applied the operative provisions to his factual findings.
Likewise, the arbitrator hewed to the guidance of the Workplace Violence Policy in
reaching the conclusion that termination of Mr. Day was unwarranted. When an employee
violates the Workplace Violence Policy, he is “subject to corrective action or discipline, most
often resulting in termination of employment” (the “penalty clause”). Compl. Ex. 3, at 2
(emphasis added). Admittedly, the penalty clause does state that termination is the penalty
“most often” applied. Yet, this clause does not mandate that result. Instead, the decisionmaker may arguably impose any “corrective action or discipline.” In this case, several factors
support a lesser penalty than discharge. First, Mr. Day is a twenty-four year employee of the
hospital with an unblemished record. Second, on the basis of the arbitrator’s factual findings,
there is no evidence that Mr. Day intended to carry out his alleged threats. As noted above,
after he made the remarks at issue, he returned to his normal work routine. Third, the
arbitrator was unable to substantiate the credibility of the witnesses.10 Without this evidence,
the arbitrator could not resolve the discrepancies between the various accounts. The content
10

As previously noted, the arbitrator concluded that he was unable to substantiate the credibility of the witnesses
due to Sinai’s failure to take contemporaneous written statements from Mr. Day and his lunch companions. See
Comp. Ex. 1, at 18-19. Based on the record before this Court, Sinai took written statements only from Mr. DiPino
and Ms. Ingvars. Id.

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of the alleged threats thus remains unresolved. Finally, although Mr. Day’s possession of a
knife was a violation of the Workplace Violence Policy, it was buried beneath “clutter” at the
bottom of his locker. This violation alone reasonably does not merit termination under the
vague guidance of the penalty clause. The arbitrator’s conclusion that discharge was
inappropriate is a penalty thus contemplated by the penalty clause and supported by the
record. Given this fidelity, the arbitration award does derive its essence from the CBA and
the Workplace Violence Policy.
In support of its plea for vacatur, Plaintiff advances two arguments. First, Sinai
contends that the arbitrator ignored essential provisions of the Workplace Violence Policy,
thereby rendering the award fatally flawed and ripe for vacatur. Second, Sinai argues that the
arbitrator disregarded its rationale for a robust approach to workplace violence, preferring
his own conception of justice. Sinai does not quarrel with the arbitrator’s discretion to
analyze whether it had just cause in terminating Mr. Day. Rather, Plaintiff argues that the
arbitrator’s award is so deficient that it failed to draw its essence from the governing
agreement and policy. For the following reasons, each argument is unpersuasive.
In concluding that just cause was not present, Sinai contends that the arbitrator
ignored the reasonable fear of injury and penalty clauses both in substance and in form.
When, as is alleged, the arbitrator “blatantly ignore[d] the unambiguous language” of the
operative provisions, the Fourth Circuit demands vacactur. Mountaineer Gas, 76 F.3d at 610.
While Sinai cites to the correct law, its application is misguided. Upon examination of the
award, it is clear that the arbitrator understood and applied the relevant provisions of the
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Workplace Violence Policy. First, Sinai did not include the reasonable fear of injury clause in
its Discipline Action Form that described the charges for which Mr. Day was terminated.
Plaintiff did raise the reasonable fear of injury violation in its arbitration briefs. See Pl.’s SurReply, 1-2, ECF No. 18. If the arbitrator was tasked with determining whether Sinai
terminated Mr. Day for just cause, then the scope of his inquiry should be the violations
described by Sinai at the time of the discharge. Mr. Day may have created a reasonable fear
of injury in someone, but Sinai did not, according to its Discipline Action Form, terminate
him for that alleged violation.
Second, the arbitrator’s failure to quote or cite to the specific language of the
Workplace Violence Policy does not mandate vacatur. The Fourth Circuit does not require
this level of formalism. Sinai contends that, under the guidance of Champion, 168 F.3d at 731,
and Clinchfield Coal Co. v. District 28, United Mine Workers of Am. & Local Union #1452, 720
F.2d 1365, 1368-69 (4th Cir. 1983), failure to cite or quote the relevant language is, in and of
itself, grounds for vacatur. Yet, Champion and Clinchfield Coal did not establish such a broad,
formal rule. In Champion, the arbitrator failed even to apply the collective bargaining
agreement, instead substituting an inoperative policy that he “explicitly recognized . . . did
not apply.” The Fourth Circuit thus explained that, when the arbitrator cites to an irrelevant
provision, rather than the operative agreement, it will conclude that the arbitrator
impermissibly “drew on his own notions of fairness.” Id. Similarly, the arbitrator in Clinchfield
Coal, after stating an issue, never discussed any of the relevant contract provisions that

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governed that issue. 720 F.2d at 1368-69. Essentially, the arbitrator announced a decision
without providing any bases for his conclusions. Id. at 1369.
In contrast, the arbitrator for Sinai and the Union applied only the Collective
Bargaining Agreement and Workplace Violence Policy, which both parties agree are the
governing documents. Unlike the arbitrator in Champion, this arbitrator clearly understood
and applied only the controlling provisions, as he quotes the CBA directly and discusses the
application of the Workplace Violence Policy throughout the award.11 This Court thus will
not infer that the arbitrator applied his “own notions of fairness” solely because the
arbitrator did not quote directly from the Workplace Violence Policy. If an arbitrator only
had to cite or quote the operative provisions so as to avoid vacatur, then on remand he
could simply insert the relevant quotations into the award. The resulting award would be
identical to the offending award except for the addition of a few quotations. Requiring such
formality could transform the presently heavy burden for vacatur into an empty and easilycircumvented standard.
Moreover, the Fourth Circuit mandates vacatur only where the arbitrator contradicts
or “blatantly ignore[s] the unambiguous language,” not the overly formalistic rule urged by
Plaintiff. Mountaineer Gas, 76 F.3d at 610. Sinai argues that, even under this standard, the
arbitrator’s treatment of the penalty clause should still fail. Specifically, Sinai asserts that the
arbitrator’s conclusion that a warning letter, rather than termination, was the appropriate

In fact, the arbitrator referenced the Workplace Violence Policy eighteen times throughout the award. For
example, he acknowledged that the Workplace Violence Policy “clearly states that the possession [of a
weapon] itself is grounds for termination.” Compl. Ex. 1, at 10.
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punishment, contradicts the clear language of this provision. Yet, Sinai’s argument assumes
that the penalty provision unambiguously requires termination. Rather, the provision states
that termination is the penalty “most often” applied. The Workplace Violence Policy gives
no clues as to how frequently this penalty should be selected, or even the factors a decisionmaker should consider in reaching that conclusion. Given that this provision is inherently
vague and ambiguous, it can hardly be argued that the arbitrator’s conclusion contradicted
the “clear” language. In fact, the arbitrator employed the discretion created by the penalty
clause to determine the appropriate penalty for the situation at hand.
Finally, after reviewing the award, this Court can find no indication that the arbitrator
ignored Plaintiff’s significant interests in a strong workplace violence policy. This conclusion
does not undermine the importance of Sinai’s concerns. As persuasively explained in Sinai’s
briefs, a strong policy is critical to foster a safe hospital environment and meet the
expectations of the governing hospital bodies. See Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Vacate
Labor Arbitration Award, at 15. The arbitrator did not reject these concerns when
determining that a more lenient penalty was appropriate. Rather, he cited to Mr. Day’s long,
unblemished record, his resumption of his ordinary duties, and the relative inaccessibility of
the knife, among other factors, as support for his conclusion. While the underlying rationale
of the Workplace Violence Policy may be significant, the equivocal language of the penalty
clause does not convey a similar degree of concern. Under Section 3.1 of the CBA, Sinai may
certainly promulgate a zero tolerance policy with termination as the penalty for any instance

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of workplace violence.12 The language of the penalty clause in its current form, however,
vests discretion in the decision-maker. The arbitrator thus used this discretion when he
concluded that, given the context of the alleged threats and weapon possession, Sinai did not
have just cause to terminate Mr. Day.
In sum, the arbitrator drew the essence of his analysis from the CBA and the
Workplace Violence Policy. He carefully considered each alleged violation and exercised the
discretion vested in him by the relevant provisions to determine that Sinai did not have just
cause to terminate Mr. Day. Even if this Court disagreed with the arbitrator’s conclusions,
vacatur is inappropriate unless the arbitrator ignored the governing agreements and
implemented his own brand of justice. Plaintiff thus has failed to meet the weighty burden
for vacatur.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Defendant Union’s Motion to Dismiss, or in the
Alternative, for Summary Judgment, construed as a Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF
No. 8) is GRANTED.
A separate Order follows.
Dated:

_____/s/__________________
Richard D. Bennett
United States District Judge

12

At the hearing on October 20, 2014, counsel for both parties acknowledged that Sinai is free to adopt such a
policy at any time it chooses.

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