Cassidy et al v. Murray
Filing
32
MEMORANDUM OPINION Signed by Judge George Levi Russell, III on 7/24/14. (cags, Deputy Clerk)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
SUSAN A. CASSIDY, et al.,
:
Plaintiffs,
:
v.
:
Civil Action No. GLR-14-1204
PAMELA A. MURRAY,
:
Defendant.
:
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
THIS
MATTER
is
before
the
Court
on
Plaintiffs
Susan
A.
Cassidy and John E. Bronson’s claims against Defendant Pamela A.
Murray for injuries they sustained as a result of Murray’s alleged
negligent
operation
of
a
vessel
Curtis Bay, Baltimore, Maryland.
in
the
Patapsco
Pending
Plaintiff Cassidy’s Motion to Remand.
River
off
of
before the Court is
(ECF No. 23).
The Court,
having reviewed the pleadings and supporting documents, finds no
hearing necessary.
See Local Rule 105.6 (D.Md. 2014).
For the
reasons outlined below, Cassidy’s Motion will be granted.
I.
BACKGROUND
On or about June 17, 2012, Cassidy was a passenger in a
vessel operated by her husband Bronson on the Patapsco River off
of Curtis Bay when the bow of Murray’s vessel collided with the
stern of Bronson’s vessel.
Cassidy and Bronson.
The collision resulted in injuries to
On January 27, 2014, Plaintiffs, individually and as husband
and
wife,
filed
suit
against
Baltimore City, Maryland.
Murray
in
the
Circuit
(ECF No.
Murray removed the case to this Court on April 11, 2014.
(ECF No. 1).
Cassidy filed the pending Motion to Remand on May 8,
(ECF No. 23).1
2014.
II.
A.
for
The three-count Complaint alleges two
counts of negligence and one loss of consortium count.
2).
Court
DISCUSSION
Standard of Review
Federal
courts
have
removal
jurisdiction
over
state
court
actions “of which the district courts of the United States have
original jurisdiction.”
28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2014).
When the
plaintiff challenges the propriety of removal, the defendant bears
the
burden
of
proving
that
removal
was
proper.
Mulcahey
v.
Columbia Organic Chems. Co., 29 F.3d 148, 151 (4th Cir. 1994).
On
a motion to remand, the court must “strictly construe the removal
statute and resolve all doubts in favor of remanding the case to
state court.”
702
(D.Md.
Richardson v. Phillip Morris Inc., 950 F.Supp. 700,
1997)
(quoting
Creekmore
F.Supp. 505, 507 (E.D.Va. 1992)).
v.
Food
Lion,
Inc.,
797
This standard reflects the
reluctance of federal courts “to interfere with matters properly
before a state court.”
1
Id. at 701.
The Court permitted the parties to conduct the videotaped
deposition of Bronson and related discovery while this Motion was
pending. (See ECF Nos. 28 & 29).
2
B.
Analysis
According to Murray, removal was proper in this case for two
reasons.
First,
the
Court
has
original
jurisdiction
over
Plaintiffs’ tort claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (2014) because the
accident occurred in navigable waters “and such negligence impacts
maritime
commerce
and
bears
a
traditional maritime activity.”
Remand at 3, ECF No. 27).
substantial
relationship
to
(Def.’s Opp’n to Pls.’ Mot. to
Second, the December 2011 amendment to
28 U.S.C. § 1441 permits general maritime claims to be removed
from state court in the absence of an independent jurisdictional
basis
such
(Id.).
as
diversity
of
citizenship
or
federal
The Court disagrees with both contentions.
question.
Namely, the
saving to suitors clause precludes removal of general maritime
claims
without
an
independent
jurisdictional
basis.
Moreover,
contrary to Murray’s argument, the 2011 amendment to § 1441 did
not drastically alter this removal requirement.
1.
The Saving to Suitors Clause
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1), “The district courts shall
have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the State,
of . . . [a]ny civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction,
saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they
are otherwise entitled.”
(Emphasis added).
The latter portion of
this jurisdictional statement, often referred to as the “saving to
suitors” clause (hereinafter, “saving clause”), preserves the role
3
of state courts in the traditional administration of common law
remedies in maritime matters.
Romero v. Int’l Terminal Operating
Co., 358 U.S. 354, 362 (1959), superseded by statute on other
grounds by 45 U.S.C. § 59; see also Servis v. Hiller Sys. Inc., 54
F.3d 203, 206 (4th Cir. 1995) (“Section 1333’s ‘saving to suitors’
clause preserves a maritime suitor’s election to pursue common-law
remedies in state court.”).
The
United
States
Supreme
Court
has
defined
the
savings
clause “as a grant to state courts of in personam jurisdiction,
concurrent with admiralty courts.”
Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine,
Inc., 531 U.S. 438, 445 (2001) (citing Red Cross Line v. Atl.
Fruit
Co.,
264
U.S.
109,
123
(1924)).
This
concurrent
jurisdiction includes the ability of state courts to oversee “all
means other than proceedings in admiralty which may be employed to
enforce
the
(quoting
Red
exclusive
those
right
Cross
or
redress
Line,
jurisdiction
maritime
to
264
of
causes
the
of
the
U.S.
at
federal
action
injury
124).
courts
begun
and
involved.”
Id.
Therefore,
only
applies
carried
on
the
“to
as
proceedings in rem, that is, where a vessel or thing is itself
treated
as
the
offender
and
made
the
description in order to enforce a lien.”
--
F.Supp.2d
---,
No.
C13-2304JLR,
(W.D.Wash. Feb. 28, 2014) (quoting
4
defendant
by
name
or
Coronel v. AK Victory, 2014
WL
820270,
at
*4
Madruga v. Superior Ct. of
State of Cal. in & for San Diego Cnty., 346 U.S. 556, 560-61
(1954)).
2.
The Removal Statute
The removal of cases from state to federal court is governed
by 28 U.S.C. § 1441.
Prior to the December 2011 amendment, the
removal statute read as follows:
(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by
Act of Congress, any civil action brought in a
State court of which the district courts of the
United States have original jurisdiction, may be
removed by the defendant or defendants, to the
district court of the United States for the
district and division embracing the place where
such action is pending. For purposes of removal
under
this
chapter,
the
citizenship
of
defendants sued under fictitious names shall be
disregarded.
(b) Any civil action of which the district
courts have original jurisdiction founded on a
claim or right under the Constitution, treaties
or laws of the United States shall be removable
without regard to the citizenship or residence
of the parties. Any other such action shall be
removable only if none of the parties in
interested
properly
joined
and
served
as
defendants is a citizen of the State in which
such action is brought.
28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) & (b) (2006).
The current version of the removal statute states:
(a) Generally.—Except as otherwise expressly
provided by Act of Congress, any civil action
brought in a State court of which the district
courts of the United States have original
jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or
the defendants, to the district court of the
United States for the district and division
embracing the place where such action is
pending.
5
(b) Removal based on diversity of citizenship.—
(1)In determining whether a civil action is
removable on the basis of the jurisdiction under
section 1332(a) of this title, the citizenship
of defendants sued under fictitious names shall
be disregarded.
(2) A civil action otherwise removable solely on
the basis of the jurisdiction under section
1332(a) of this title may not be removed if any
of the parties in interest properly joined and
served as defendants is a citizen of the State
in which such action is brought.
28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) & (b) (2012).
Although § 1441(a) remained
largely the same, Congress removed the “original jurisdiction” and
“other such action” language from § 1441(b).
3. Removal of Saving to Suitors Clause Cases
The
removal
analysis
interplay
statute
over
between
has
the
the
savings
garnered
years.
a
clause
substantial
Traditionally,
and
the
amount
federal
of
preservation
legal
of
the
concurrent jurisdiction granted by the savings clause resulted in
a prohibition against removing maritime cases filed in state court
without
diversity
(“[C]ommon-law
of
citizenship.
remedies
were,
Romero,
under
the
358
U.S.
saving
at
363
clause,
[enforceable] in the courts of the States and on the common-law
side of the lower federal courts when the diverse citizenship of
the
parties
permitted.
Except
in
diversity
cases,
maritime
litigation brought in state courts could not be removed to the
federal courts.”).
In Romero, the question presented was whether
the then-recently amended federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. §
6
1331, should encompass maritime claims.
In declining to answer
this question in the affirmative, the Supreme Court noted, in
dictum, that adopting an expanded view of § 1331 would essentially
eviscerate “the historic option of a maritime suitor pursuing a
common-law remedy to select his forum, state or federal,” thereby
making
maritime
actions
“freely
removable
under
§
1441”
and
undermining the concurrent jurisdiction the savings clause seeks
to preserve.
Despite
Romero, 358 U.S. at 371-72.
this
commentary,
prior
to
2011,
several
federal
courts, led by the Fifth Circuit in In re Dutile, 935 F.2d 61 (5th
Cir. 1991), held that § 1441 precluded the removal of savings
clause
actions
filed
in
state
court.
See,
e.g.,
Seeger
v.
Superior Diesel, Inc., 409 F.Supp.2d 669 (D.S.C. 2005); Bulen v.
Hall-Houston Oil Co., 953 F.Supp. 141 (E.D.La. 1997).
Under this
approach, § 1441(b), not the savings clause, constituted the Act
of Congress that barred removal.
Specifically, the Dutile court
concluded:
The first sentence of [§ 1441(b)] provides
that removal of actions ‘founded on a claim
or right arising under the Constitution,
treaties or laws of the United States’ may
proceed without regard to the citizenship of
the
parties.
Emphatically,
claims
in
admiralty, whether designated in rem or in
personam, do not fall within this category. .
. . Thus, admiralty and general maritime
claims fall within the category of ‘[a]ny
other [civil] action’ governed by the second
sentence of § 1441(b).
As such, they are
‘removable only if none of the parties in
interest properly joined and served as
7
defendants is a citizen of the State in which
the action is brought. The practical effect
of these provisions is to prevent the removal
of admiralty claims pursuant to § 1441(a)
unless
there
is
complete
diversity
of
citizenship (predicated upon out-of-state
defendants).
935
F.2d
at
62-63
(emphasis
in
original).
The
Dutile
court
reasoned that because maritime claims are not considered federal
questions
action”
under
Romero,
category
that
they
fall
required
into
the
diversity
of
“any
other
civil
citizenship
for
removal.
The 2011 amendment to § 1441, however, removed the “any other
civil
action”
rationale.
language
and,
with
it,
a
portion
of
Dutile
In light of the amendment, some federal courts have
held that general maritime cases are now removable
independent
the
jurisdictional
basis
due
to
the
jurisdiction over admiralty and maritime claims.
without an
courts’
original
See, e.g., Ryan
v. Hercules Offshore, Inc., 945 F.Supp.2d 772 (S.D.Tex. 2013);
Carrigan v. M/V AMBASSADOR, No. H-13-03208, 2014 WL 358353, at *2
(S.D.Tex. Jan. 31, 2014); Bridges v. Phillips 66 Co., No. 13-477JJB-SCR, 2013 WL 6092803, at *4-*5 (M.D.La. Nov. 19, 2013).
new approach is heavily attributed to the Ryan case.
This
The Ryan
plaintiff filed suit against vessel companies in state court for
negligence
and
unseaworthiness
working on a vessel.
after
her
husband
died
while
In denying plaintiff’s motion to remand, the
Ryan court concluded that the December 2011 amendment to § 1441(b)
8
constituted
a
jurisdiction
substantial
that
change
permits
the
in
traditional
district
courts’
removal
original
jurisdiction over maritime cases to be the sole basis of removal
under § 1441(a).
Ryan, 945 F.Supp.2d at 777-78.
The Court rejects this rationale for several reasons.
the
removal
of
admiralty
cases
without
an
First,
independent
jurisdictional basis permits the very occurrence the Supreme Court
attempted to avoid in Romero -- the
clause.
evisceration of the savings
See Romero, 358 U.S. at 371-72.
The purpose of the
clause is to preserve the traditional role of the states in the
administration
of
common-law
remedies
for
maritime
cases.
Permitting defendants to remove these cases without an independent
jurisdictional
basis
not
only
disrupts
decades
of
maritime
precedent but also renders the saving clause null and void.
Second, the Dutile and Ryan courts’ focus on section 1441
fail
to
apportion
sufficient
weight
to
the
savings
clause.
Although Murray correctly notes that the savings clause preserves
a common-law remedy, not the right to a non-federal forum, it is
an undisputed statement.
(1866).
See The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. 411, 431
In fact, the absence of this right is reflected in many
general maritime cases being removed from state court on the basis
of diversity jurisdiction.
An average savings clause case is no
different from any other state law claim that is removed on the
basis of diversity.
What is significant in either situation is
9
that the disruption of the plaintiff’s choice of forum via removal
must be predicated on an independent jurisdictional basis, such as
diversity of citizenship.
The savings clause places great weight
on the importance of preserving that choice whenever possible,
which was highlighted by the Supreme Court in Romero.
Focusing
solely on § 1441 ignores that purpose.
Finally, since the Ryan ruling, several decisions, including
one in the same district, have questioned the validity of that
ruling.
See, e.g., In re Foss Maritime Co., --- F.Supp.2d ---,
No. 5:12-CV-00021-TBR, 2014 WL 2930860, at *3-*4 (W.D.Ky. June 27,
2014)
(rejecting
Ryan’s
conclusion
that
the
December
2011
amendment altered the removability of maritime claims); Alexander
v. Seago Consulting, LLC, No. 4:14-CV-1292, 2014 WL 2960419, at *1
(S.D.Tex. June 23, 2014) (rejecting Ryan and remanding the case);
Freeman v. Phillips 66 Co., Nos. 14-311, 14-624, 2014 WL 1379786,
at *4 (E.D.La. Apr. 8, 2014) (collecting cases questioning Ryan).
The Court is not inclined to reject decades of well-established
law to adopt an unsettled attempt to alter the course of removal
procedures without clear, binding, precedent.2
2
The Court also recognizes Cassidy’s argument that the
savings clause is considered the Act of Congress that prohibits
removal absent an independent basis for jurisdiction because of
Plaintiffs’ right to a jury under the clause. See, e.g., Barry v.
Shell Oil Co., No. 13-6133, 2014 WL 775662, at *3 (E.D.La. Feb.
25, 2014) (stating “since the removal of Plaintiff’s claims solely
on the basis of admiralty jurisdiction would deprive him of the
right to pursue his nonmaritime remedy of a jury trial, the saving
10
Here,
City,
Plaintiffs
Maryland,
as
selected
their
traditionally
handled
jurisdictional
basis
by
for
the
forum
state
Circuit
and
seek
courts
removal.
Court
of
common-law
absent
Because
an
all
Baltimore
remedies
independent
parties
are
Maryland residents and there is no federal question presented, an
independent jurisdictional basis for removal is absent from this
case.
Accordingly,
the
Court
will
honor
Plaintiffs’
original
forum selection and remand this case to the state court.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court, by separate Order, will
GRANT Cassidy’s Motion to Remand.
(ECF No. 23).
Entered this 24th day of July, 2014
/s/
George L. Russell, III
United States District Judge
to suitors clause under these circumstances prohibits the removal
of this action.”).
11
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?