Parks v. Corcoran et al

Filing 10

MEMORANDUM. Signed by Judge Ellen L. Hollander on 2/10/2016. (c/m 2/10/16 bas, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

THRACY R. PARKS, JR., #403647
Petitioner

:

v.

: CIVIL ACTION NO. ELH-14-1279

DAYENA CORCORAN, Warden, et al.
Respondents

:

MEMORANDUM
Thracy R. Parks, Jr., a self-represented Maryland prisoner, seeks habeas corpus relief
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. ECF 1. He attacks his 2012 convictions in the Circuit Court for
Prince George’s County for two counts of attempted first-degree murder and other offenses.
ECF 1. He also submitted exhibits in support of the petition.1 The Warden of the Maryland
Correctional Institution and the Maryland Attorney General (collectively, the “State”) have
responded. See ECF 3; ECF 7. They also submitted many exhibits. Parks has not replied.2 For
the reasons set forth below, the petition shall be denied and a certificate of appealability shall not
issue.3
I. Factual and Procedural History
A. State Proceedings

1

The exhibits (A through L) were filed separately, and do not appear on the electronic

docket.
2

Although Parks did not submit a reply, in December 2015 he twice inquired as to the
status of his case. See ECF 8; ECF 9.
3

This case was initially assigned to the Honorable William D. Quarles, Jr. It was
reassigned to me on January 27, 2016, due to Judge Quarles’s retirement.

Parks was charged in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County with two counts of
attempted first-degree murder and related offenses. On February 9, 2012, a jury convicted him
of two counts of attempted first-degree murder, four counts of attempted second-degree murder,
five counts of first-degree assault, reckless endangerment, and two handgun offenses. On April
13, 2012, he was sentenced to life imprisonment, with all but 45 years suspended. ECF 1; ECF 31 through 3-4.4
On direct appeal, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals affirmed the convictions in an
unreported opinion issued on May 16, 2013. See ECF 3-4, Parks v. State of Maryland, No. 721,
Sept. Term 2012 (filed May 16, 2013). Of import here, the Court of Special Appeals set forth
the questions that Parks presented on direct appeal, as follows, ECF 3-2 at 2:
1.

Did the lower court err in denying Thracey[‘s] Motion to Suppress the
fruit of a warrantless search of a garage used by Thracy to store his
vehicles, based on the conclusions that: (1) Thracy lacked standing to
challenge the warrantless search of a parking garage he rented from a
friend, and possessed the only key to; and (2) the friend had validly
consented to the search of the garage?

2.

Where both parties examined a witness as to the fact that she exchanged
text messages with Thracy, but neither party inquired about or established
the content of those messages in direct or cross-examination, did the court
erroneously permit the State to exceed the scope of redirect examination
when it permitted the State to establish the content of the text messages in
redirect examination?

Notably, the Court of Special Appeals summarized at length the facts of the case, as
follows, id. at 3-10:
Facts and Procedural History
I.

Shooting Incidents and Investigation

4

This opinion references the pagination as it appears through this court’s electronic
docketing system.
2

On October 30, 2010, a dispute arose between Thracy[5] and his
former spouse, Rhonda Parks ("Rhonda"), concerning a jointly owned,
tenanted property. The dispute escalated into a physical confrontation
during which Thracy wielded a knife and bat, attempted to drive off
with Rhonda's vehicle, and stated that he was "going to have to shoot
somebody out here tonight." According to Rhonda, approximately
five to ten minutes
after this altercation, Thracy
initiated an
exchange of approximately ten text messages "along the same lines as
the verbal threat." On redirect examination at trial, Rhonda revealed
the contents of the text messages:
[STATE]: What did [the text messages] say?
[RHONDA]: [Thracy] told me to-that he hoped my father rests in
peace from that day forward when he went to bed at night.
[STATE]: Anything else?
[RHONDA]: [Thracy] told me, fuck me. Fuck my dad. [Thracy] told me
that.
[STATE]: Was that the gist of the text messages, what you just told me?
[RHONDA]: Yes.
In the early hours of November 4, 2010, five days after the dispute,
Rhonda was rousted from her sleep by the sound of gunfire. Rhonda, the
couple's five-year-old son Thracy III, and the homeowners, Henry and
Rhoda Gabriel (Rhonda's parents), were at the residence when the shooting
started. Shortly thereafter, a similar incident occurred at the home of Marcus
Gabriel, Rhonda's brother.
Detectives Melvin Kenney and Joseph Bellino of the Prince George's
County Police Department were summoned to conduct the investigation.
In the early stages of the investigation, the detectives determined that
Thracy met with a friend, Tamara Marsh, that morning. According to
Marsh, Thracy contacted her by text message at approximately 3:30 a.m. on
November 4, 2010, estimated by the State to be thirty minutes after the
shootings. One text message from Thracy stated, "I would probably
need the parking space." Thracy and Marsh met at Marsh's apartment
complex and had a conversation in Marsh's vehicle for an unspecified time.
The parking space in the text message referenced a detached garage
that Marsh rented at her apartment complex. Marsh entered into a rental
5

The Court of Special Appeals explained that because the defendant’s former spouse,
Rhonda Parks, has the same last name as the defendant, it would refer to these individuals by
their first names, to avoid confusion. See ECF 3-4 at 2 n.1.
3

agreement with her landlord, paying $100.00 per month to receive
access to the detached garage. Thracy advanced the rental fee to Marsh
and, in exchange, was permitted to use the garage unit to park a vehicle and
store items. Although Marsh was the named lessee, Marsh reportedly never
used or entered the unit, and Thracy retained the only key to access the unit.
At some point after Thracy and Marsh's meeting concluded, Thracy
called Marsh to report that he was detained by police. Thereafter, Marsh
appeared at a Prince George's County Police Department station at or about
5:15 a.m. to inquire as to Thracy's status and was interviewed by Det.
Bellino. D uring the course of Marsh's interview, consent was obtained to
search the detached garage unit.
A search of the garage unit revealed a Lexus, owned by Thracy,
as well as an assortment of boxes. Upon entering the unit, Det. Kenney
identified the butt of a handgun and holster in a box. Police impounded the
Lexus and recovered shell casings from the vehicle during the inventory
search.
II. Suppression Hearing
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, two conflicting accounts of
the interview and warrantless search emerged.
A.

Detectives' Testimony

As presented by Det. Bellino, Marsh was "very cooperative,"
provided a written statement, and answered questions. During the
interview, Marsh inquired about Thracy, informing Det. Bellino that
the two met earlier that morning, and then stated her intent to
terminate the interview if Det. Bellino did not provide an answer as to
why Thracy was detained.
Det. Bellino responded that Marsh was "free to leave," but that
he needed to retain her car keys and cell phone while a search
warrant was obtained because Thracy "could have possibly secreted
an item inside her vehicle." As Marsh continued to press Det.
Bellino for information, Det. Bellino agreed to tell Marsh the basis for
Thracy's detention if "she would listen."
Marsh agreed to continue the interview and was told about the
shooting incidents. According to Det. Bellino, Marsh's demeanor
changed at this point of the interview, however, Marsh did sign a
"consent to search
form"
for her vehicle
and permitted
photographs to be taken of the text messages on her phone sent by
Thracy earlier that morning.
4

The search of Marsh's vehicle proved unproductive. At 7:07 a.m.
Det. Bellino requested and obtained Marsh's consent to search her
apartment. Det. Bellino stated that he returned Marsh's car keys and
cell phone and allowed
her to use the restroom and make
arrangements to transport her children to school. At approximately
8:00 a.m., Marsh accepted Det. Bellino's invitation to allow him to drive
her to her apartment. While en route, Marsh "realized she needed the key
to her garage" which prompted Det. Bellino to return to the police station
in order to retrieve the key from Thracy's property.
Upon arrival at Marsh's apartment, Det. Bellino requested and
obtained written consent to search the detached garage. According to Det.
Bellino and Det. Kenney, during the search of her apartment, Marsh
appeared to be "cooperative," "calm," "relaxed," and "joked with the
detectives."
B.

Marsh's Testimony

Marsh's recollection of the interview and search process diverged
significantly from the detectives's testimony. According to Marsh, Det.
Bellino "yelled at her," confiscated her cell phone and car keys, and
informed Marsh that she would have to remain at the police station until
search warrants were obtained.
Marsh acknowledged that she signed the "consent to search form"
for her vehicle, however, she claimed she "did not really consent"
"because Detective Bellino stated she was an accessory to murder, and
that she would be charged with serious charges."
When Marsh's vehicle was searched, Marsh reported that she was
left in an interview room for approximately twenty to thirty minutes.
According to Marsh, during this period, an unidentified detective entered
the interview room and "told [Marsh] she was facing serious charges and
should do what Detective Bellino told her to do." When Det. Bellino
returned to the interview room and requested consent to search Marsh's
apartment, Marsh "felt forced and felt that she had no other choice."
Further, Marsh testified that she was not permitted to make a phone
call or use the restroom, and she signed the consent form to get home
in order to send her children off to school.
Contrary to Det. Bellino's testimony, Marsh testified that she was not
permitted to drive herself to her apartment and had to request
permission to use her own restroom upon arrival. During the search of
Marsh's apartment, Marsh agreed to a search of the detached garage,
feeling "compelled to consent to further searches because the officers
kept threatening to charge her."
5

C.

Circuit Court's Ruling

Thracy sought to exclude the evidence o b t a i n e d during the
warrantless search of Marsh's detached garage on the theory that Marsh was
subjected to a "protracted interrogation," was not free to leave, and w a s
threatened to be arrested as an accessory to attempted murder. Further,
Thracy maintained that his exclusive use of the garage provided standing to
challenge the warrantless search.
In response, the State argued that Thracy had no legitimate privacy
interest in the garage, and that the court should give more weight to the
testimony of Detectives Bellino and Kenney in determining whether
consent was voluntarily obtained. A grant of the motion to suppress stood
to exclude highly inculpatory forensic evidence.FN
__________________
FN
The importance of this evidence came to the forefront at trial
through the testimony of the State's DNA analyst. DNA extracted from the
grip of the handgun recovered by Det. Kenney was "consistent" with
Thracy's DNA. Further, "the likelihood that an individual in the African
American population would share the same profile [as Thracy] was one in
218 trillion." Ballistics testing revealed that expended shells recovered from
the scenes of booth shootings were fired from the handgun containing
Thracy's DNA recovered in Marsh's garage.
__________________
In addressing the motion, the circuit court engaged in a multifactor
analysis which examined: Thracy's possessory interest in the garage,
Thracy's right to and duration of stay in the garage, limitations on
Thracy's access to the area, Thracy's right to exclude others from the
area, the precautions Thracy took to ensure privacy, Thracy's subjective
expectation of privacy, the location of the seized property at the time of
the search, and Thracy's ownership interest in the property seized.
The circuit court found "instructive" that: Thracy did not have an
actual lease to the detached garage unit, Marsh referred to the unit as "my
garage," the lease agreement was "not a more permanent relationship as
[Thracy] would like the Court to believe" and, more saliently, the text
message sent to Marsh allowed for the inference that Thracy needed
advanced permission to use the garage unit. Further, the circuit court
found that because Thracy did not testify, the court was without a basis to
a scertain whether Thracy manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in
the garage. Taken together, the circuit court concluded that Thracy lacked
standing to challenge the search.
Although the court disposed of the motion to suppress by
concluding that Thracy lacked standing, the circuit court entered a specific
6

finding which addressed Thracy's claim that Marsh's consent was not
voluntarily obtained. The circuit court found that "the testimony of Ms.
Marsh lacked credibility in many areas" and "the officers' version of
how the consents came to be about to be credible." In light of the
events as recalled by the detectives and Thracy's lack of an "ownership
interest in either the apartment or the garage," the circuit court found
that Marsh had authority to provide consent and such consent was
voluntary.
III. Trial Proceedings
Rhonda testified as to the sequence of events which precipitated the
shootings. When asked on direct examination to divulge the content of text
messages received from Thracy on October 30, 2010, the circuit court
disallowed a response pursuant to Thracy's objection.
On crossexamination, Thracy asked about the substance of Rhonda's written
statement to detectives on November 4, 2010, with emphasis on a notation
written in the margin of the page submitted to the detectives. There were no
questions about the content of the text messages exchanged between Rhonda
and Thracy.
On redirect examination, the State responded to Thracy's counsel's
line of questioning by asking whether Rhonda, in providing her witness
statement, informed the detectives of the text messages she received from
Thracy. Thracy objected to the question and argued that the State exceeded
the scope of cross-examination. The objection was overruled. The redirect
examination continued:
[STATE]: Ms. Parks, did you tell, at the time, Detective Sinibaldi about
some text messages you received?
[RHONDA]: I wrote them.
[STATE]: You wrote those text messages?
[RHONDA]: Yes.
*
*
*
[STATE]: What did you write in your statements about the text messages
you received?
Again, Thracy objected, challenging the scope of the questioning on
the basis that the cross-examination did not address the text messages. The
circuit court ruled that Thracy's cross-examination of Rhonda established a
proper predicate to permit the State to introduce the contents of the text
messages. However, the circuit court required that Rhonda demonstrate
7

knowledge that the number from which she received the text messages in
question was associated with Thracy. Following this proffer, Rhonda
disclosed the contents of the text messages.[]
As noted, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals affirmed the judgments of conviction.
ECF 3-4. Thereafter, Parks filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Maryland Court of
Appeals. ECF 3-5 at 1. As his petition for certiorari reflects, Thracy raised the same challenge
to the search that he had raised in his direct appeal. See ECF 3-5 at 2. The Maryland Court of
Appeals denied certiorari on September 23, 2013. ECF 3-5 at 13. Then, on March 3, 2014, the
United States Supreme Court denied Parks’s request for further review. See Parks v. Maryland,
134 S.Ct. 1498 (2014).
Parks instituted State post-conviction proceedings on January 3, 2014, raising an array of
claims. ECF 3-1; ECF 3-6. These included claims that the trial court erred in denying his
motion to suppress and that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to litigate effectively the
motion to suppress. ECF 3-6. Post-conviction proceedings remain pending in State court. ECF
3-1.6
B. Federal Proceedings
In his petition, Parks asserts that the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County erred in
denying his motion to suppress the fruit of a warrantless search of a garage used exclusively to
store Parks’s personal property, based on its conclusions that (a) Parks lacked standing to
challenge the warrantless search of the garage he rented from a friend “and possessed the only
key to;” and (b) a third party had validly consented to the search of the garage. ECF 1 at 13.
These assertions were fully raised and litigated in the state courts at trial and on appeal. Parks

6

See State v. Parks, Case No. CT1100071X, http://casesearch.courts.state.md.us/
casesearch/inquiryDetail.jis
8

also claims that trial counsel did not present proper argument at the suppression hearing and, in
other, unidentified ways failed to act, causing cumulative prejudice to his defense. ECF 1 at 1819 and 36-37. Although the ineffective assistance claims may be raised in a post-conviction
proceeding, they had not yet been reviewed in the Maryland courts.
In an initial, limited response (ECF 3), the State asserted that Parks’s petition should be
dismissed in its entirety, because Parks had not exhausted his claim regarding ineffective
assistance of counsel. Id. Several exhibits were submitted by the State with its response. Judge
Quarles reviewed the exhaustion requirement in his Order of September 18, 2014. See ECF 4.
He also found that Parks had not exhausted his State remedies as to the ineffective assistance of
counsel claim. Id. at 3. Parks subsequently agreed to waive all unexhausted claims. ECF 5.7
The State then submitted a substantive response to the claims regarding the search of the
garage. ECF 7. The response is supported by exhibits. The State argues that Parks’s claims are
not cognizable, pursuant to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976),
and its progeny.
The State’s exhibits to ECF 3 and ECF 7 include, inter alia, Parks’s appellate brief in the
Court of Special Appeals and the transcripts from the suppression hearing held in the Circuit
Court for Prince George’s County on November 4 and November 8, 2011. Those proceedings
pertained to Parks’s motion to suppress evidence obtained from the search of the garage. See
ECF 3-4; ECF 7-1; ECF 7-2; ECF 7-3.

7

In ECF 4, Parks was apprised of the possible consequences of the waiver of his claim as
to ineffective assistance. Id. at 4.
9

II. Discussion
A. Applicable Statutory Standards
Parks’s claims must be analyzed under the statutory framework of the federal habeas
statute at 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A federal court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus unless the
state's adjudication on the merits: “1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States; or 2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d).
The statute sets forth a “highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings.”
Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333 n. 7(1997); see also Bell v. Cone, 543 U.S. 447, 455 (2005).
The standard requires courts to give state-court decisions “‘the benefit of the doubt’” and is
“‘difficult to meet.’” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 179, 180 (2011) (citations omitted); see also
White v. Woodhall, ____ U.S. ____, 134 S. Ct. 1697, 1699 (2014) (quoting Harrington v.
Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011) (“[A] state prisoner must show that the state court’s ruling on
the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error
well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded
disagreement.”)). Moreover, the petitioner “carries the burden of proof.” Woodford v. Visciotti,
537 U.S. 19, 25 (2002) (per curiam).
A state adjudication is contrary to clearly established federal law under § 2254(d)(1)
where the state court 1) “arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court
on a question of law,” or 2) “confronts facts that are materially indistinguishable from a relevant
Supreme Court precedent and arrives at a result opposite to [the Supreme Court].” Williams v.

10

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000). Under the “unreasonable application” analysis pursuant to
§ 2254(d)(1), a “state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas
relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the state court's
decision.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 88 (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664
(2004)). “‘[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because [it] concludes in its
independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal
law erroneously or incorrectly.’” Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010) (quoting Williams,
529 U.S. at 411). “Rather, that application must be ‘objectively unreasonable.’” Renico, 559
U.S. at 773 (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 409). Thus, “‘an unreasonable application of federal
law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.’” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 101
(quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 410).
Further, under § 2254(d)(2) “a state-court factual determination is not unreasonable
merely because the federal habeas court would have reached a different conclusion in the first
instance.” Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 301 (2010). “[E]ven if ‘[r]easonable minds reviewing
the record might disagree about the finding in question,” a federal habeas court may not conclude
that the state court decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Id. (citation
omitted).
The habeas statute provides that “a determination of a factual issue made by a State court
shall be presumed to be correct,” and the petitioner bears “the burden of rebutting the
presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e) (1). “Where
the state court conducted an evidentiary hearing and explained its reasoning with some care, it
should be particularly difficult to establish clear and convincing evidence of error on the state
court's part.” Sharpe v. Bell, 593 F.3d 372, 378 (4th Cir. 2010). This is especially true where

11

state courts have “resolved issues like witness credibility, which are ‘factual determinations' for
purposes of Section 2254(e)(1).” Id. at 379 (quoting 28 U .S.C. § 2254(e)(1)).
The Fourth Circuit recently summarized the applicable principles in Grueninger v.
Director, Virginia Dep’t of Corrections, ____ F. 3d ____, No. 14-7072 (filed Feb. 9, 2016). It
said, slip op. at 10-11:
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), “the availability of federal habeas relief is
limited with respect to claims previously ‘adjudicated on the merits’ in state court
proceedings.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 92 (2011). A federal habeas
court may not grant relief on such claims unless it concludes that the State court’s
merits determination “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,
clearly established Federal law” as set forth by the Supreme Court, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)(1), or rested on “an unreasonable determination of the facts” in light of
the evidentiary record before the state court, id. § 2254(d)(2). And a state court’s
factual findings must be presumed correct, absent rebuttal by the petitioner by
clear and convincing evidence. Id. §2254(e).
As the Supreme Court has made clear, § 2254(d) permits federal habeas
relief where a state court “identifies the correct governing legal principle from
[the Supreme] Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the
facts” of the prisoner’s case. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520 (2003) (quoting
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413 (2000)). But that is a high threshold, and
only an “objectively unreasonable” determination by a state court will warrant
federal habeas relief. Id.at 520-21; see also Tice v. Johnson, 647 F.3d 87, 108
(4th Cir. 2011).
B. Analysis
Parks’s claims center on the constitutionality of the search of the garage, and are
therefore premised on alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment. The law concerning Fourth
Amendment claims in federal habeas corpus proceedings is well established. The Supreme
Court has held that "where the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a
Fourth Amendment claim, the Constitution does not require that a state prisoner be granted
federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or
seizure was introduced at his trial.[]” Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 482 (1976); see also id. at

12

494 (reiterating that “where the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a
Fourth Amendment claim,[] a state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on
the ground that the evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at
his trial").
[A] district court, when faced with allegations presenting Fourth Amendment
claims, should, under the rule in Stone v. Powell, supra, first inquire as to whether
or not the petitioner was afforded an opportunity to raise his Fourth Amendment
claims under the then existing state practice. This may be determined, at least in
this Circuit, from the relevant state statutes, the applicable state court decisions,
and from judicial notice of state practice by the district court.
Second, . . . when the district court has made the “'opportunity” inquiry, it
need not inquire further into the merits of the petitioner's case, when applying
Stone v. Powell, supra, unless the prisoner alleges something to indicate that his
opportunity for a full and fair litigation of his Fourth Amendment claim or claims
was in some way impaired.
Doleman v. Muncy, 579 F.2d 1258, 1265 (4th Cir. 1978); see also Mueller v. Angelone, 181 F.3d
557, 570 n.8 (4th Cir. 1999) (recognizing continued application of Stone post-AEDPA), cert.
denied, 527 U.S. 1065 (1999); Grimsley v. Dodson, 696 F.2d 303, 304 (4th Cir. 1982) (AStone v.
Powell marked, for most practical purposes, the end of federal court reconsideration of Fourth
Amendment claims by way of habeas corpus petitions where the petitioner has the opportunity to
litigate those claims in state court.@).
The record shows that Parks was provided with the opportunity to fully litigate his Fourth
Amendment claims, challenging the validity of the search and seizure. Through counsel, he filed
a motion to suppress in the trial court. Testimony was taken during an evidentiary hearing held
on November 4, 2011 (ECF 7-1; ECF 7-2), at which the defense expressly challenged the search
of the garage. See, e.g., ECF 7-1 at 5-7. The trial judge ruled orally a few days later, and denied
the motion to suppress. See ECF 7-3. After Parks was convicted, he again raised the issue in his
direct appeal.

The Maryland Court of Special Appeals thoroughly examined the facts
13

surrounding the seizure of the evidence as well as the legal reasoning of the circuit court, and
upheld the trial court=s denial of the motion to suppress. The Maryland Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court denied certiorari.
Clearly, Parks had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the legality of the search in the
Maryland courts. Thus, his Fourth Amendment claim provides no basis for federal habeas
corpus relief.
Conclusion
The instant petition for habeas corpus relief will be denied and this case dismissed by
separate Order. When a district court dismisses a habeas petition, a certificate of appealability
may issue Aonly if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional
right.@ 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating “‘that
reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable
or wrong’” Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 282 (2004) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S.
473, 484 (2000)), or that “the issues presented were ‘adequate to deserve encouragement to
proceed further.’” Miller-el v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335-36 (2003) (quoting Barefoot v.
Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 n. 4 (1983)). Parks does not satisfy this standard. Therefore, the court
declines to issue a certificate of appealability.

Date: February 10, 2016

___________/s/______________
Ellen L. Hollander
United States District Judge

14