Gunsay, et al. v. Mozayeni, et al.

Filing 46

ORDER denying 41 Motion to Alter/Amend Judgment. Signed by Judge J. Frederick Motz on 6/19/2015. (ca2s, Deputy Clerk)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
CHAMBERS OF

101 WEST LOMBARD STREET
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21201
[phone]
[phone] FAX

J. FREDERICK MOTZ
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

June 19, 2015
MEMO TO COUNSEL RE: Brieanna Gunsay, et al. v. B. Robert Mozayeni, M.D., et al.
Civil No. JFM-14-1347
Dear Counsel:
I have reviewed the memoranda submitted in connection with plaintiffs’ motion to alter
or amend the judgment issued on January 13, 2015. The motion (document 41) is denied. In this
letter I will also address certain issues not raised by the motion.
1. I am satisfied that my collateral estoppel ruling was entirely correct. The Circuit Court did
make a critical factual finding (the fact was undisputed): that plaintiffs did not file a claim with
the Health Care Alternative Dispute Resolution Office. That finding led to the court’s order
dismissing plaintiffs’ claims against Dr. Mozayeni. In my view, that order was “a judgment” for
collateral estoppel purposes. Cf. Bryan v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 205 Md. App.
587, 593–602 (2012); Mathias v. Goldberg, No. 12-1777 DKC, 2013 WL 524708 at *6 (D. Md.
Feb. 12, 2013). To hold otherwise would be to undermine the doctrine of comity upon which a
workable relationship between the state and federal courts depends.
I also note that Md. Courts & Judicial Proceedings Code Ann. § § 3-2A-06A and 3-2A-06B
does not, as plaintiffs argue, support the proposition that Maryland law requiring mandatory
arbitration does not foreclose subsequent litigation in another court. These sections simply
govern the appropriate procedure for waiving mandatory Health Care Alternative Dispute
Resolution.1
2. Plaintiff Kristen Gunsay is correct in arguing that her claims against Williams and Metin
Gunsay are not barred by the doctrine of res judicata because she was not a party to the claims
asserted by Brieanna Gunsay in the prior action against these defendants.
3. As to the exercise of this court’s supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, I decline
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims asserted against Metin Gunsay and
Williams because (1) the claims raise novel or complex issues of Maryland law, and (2)
exceptional circumstances exist for declining the exercise of jurisdiction. It is not at all clear that
the defendants invaded plaintiffs’ privacy in any way or that, in allegedly orchestrating the arrest
1

Plaintiffs did eventually follow the procedure for waiving mandatory health care arbitration and
were issued an order of transfer in October 2014, six months after this case was filed. (ECF No.
41-1). Plaintiffs did not follow the appropriate procedure and file a complaint (or any
notification to this court) within sixty days of receipt of this order of transfer.

of Kristen Gunsay and the detention of Brieanna Gunsay, they intentionally inflicted emotional
distress on the plaintiffs. Moreover, exceptional circumstances exist for not exercising
supplemental jurisdiction because although there clearly is a federal interest in preventing any
abuse of official authority by state or local officers, any claim against Mr. Gunsay or Williams
arise from a domestic dispute over which federal courts have traditionally declined (when
possible) to exercise jurisdiction. Accordingly, my prior ruling that the claims against Metin
Gunsay and Williams are dismissed still stands, based on this alternative reasoning.2
4. I erred in my original opinion in stating that Troy Plummer had not entered an appearance.3
To the extent that Brieanna Gunsay asserts any claims against Mr. Plummer under 42 U.S.C. §
1983, the claim is not viable because he was acting in his capacity as a federal officer. However,
the standards for liability under § 1983 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents are essentially
the same. Therefore, to the extent that Plummer was acting in his capacity as a federal officer,
he is potentially liable for any wrongful actions he took. Moreover, the scope of discovery
would not be broadened in any respect by consideration of any state claims asserted against him.
Therefore, my ruling against Plummer should parallel my rulings against defendants Henderson
and Stultz. Of course, Plummer (as well as Henderson and Stultz) may renew any arguments
that he has by virtue of motion for summary judgment at the close of discovery.
A scheduling conference will be held by telephone on July 1, 2015 at 4:30 pm. I ask
counsel for plaintiff to make the arrangements for the conference call.
Despite the informal nature of this letter, it should be flagged as an opinion and docketed
as an order.
Very truly yours,
/s/
J. Frederick Motz
United States District Judge

2

Additionally, even assuming arguendo that the claims against Moyazeni were not barred by
collateral estoppel, I would also decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over them for the
reasons provided here.
3
My reason for missing the entry of his appearance is that he was characterized by defendants as
a “federal defendant” and the motion to dismiss filed by the federal defendants was not opposed
by plaintiffs.