Germain v. Oakley et al

Filing 25

MEMORANDUM. Signed by Judge J. Frederick Motz on 2/15/2017. (c/m 2/15/17)(kr2, Deputy Clerk)

-,

•

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

•

JEAN B. GERMAIN

•
•

Plaintiff
v

Civil Action No. JFM-14-1536

•

SCOTT S. OAKLEY and
ROBIN WOOLFORD

•

Defendants

•••
MEMORANDUM

In response to the above-entitled

civil rights complaint, defendant Woolford'

motion to dismiss or for summary judgment.
This court denied plaintiffs

ECF 18. Plaintiff opposes the motion.

filed a
ECF 24.

request for discovery pursuant to Fed. R. of Civ. Proc. 56(d) in its

November 2, 2016 memorandum and order. ECF 22 and 23. A hearing is not necessary for the
disposition of the claims pending before this court. See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2016). For
the reasons that follow, defendant's motion, construed as a motion for summary judgment, shall
be granted and the complaint dismissed.
Background
By his complaint, plaintiff Jean Germain, an inmate committed to the custody of the
Maryland

Division

of Correction

and confined

at North

Branch Correctional

Institution

("NBC!"), alleges that he has been denied meaningful access to the courts for purposes of
litigating specific claims regarding the conditions of his confinement by virtue of the improper
dismissals of complaints he filed with the Inmate Grievance Office ("I GO").

ECF I.

Defendan' Scott Oakley, the fonner director of the Inmate Grievance Office, was never properly served
with the complaint. For the reasons stated herein, the complaint against him shall be dismissed without further
attempts at service.

The

/
specific claims plaintiff alleges were thwarted by the IGO's refusal to hear his claims are listed
below.
Scalding Water in Showers (July 14,2011 letter) - ARP NBCI-2071-12
Plaintiff claims that since 2011 he has been forced to endure "scalding hot water just to
shower." ECF I at p. 3. He states that he exhausted administrative remedies at the institutional
level2 and filed a grievance with the IGO which was received on May 6, 201 I. /d.
On July 14, 2011, defendant Woolford sent a letter to plaintiff requesting medical
records. See ECF I-I at p. I. Plaintifrs{esponded
he did not have access to the records.

to the letter "several times" and explained that

Plaintiff also told Woolford that the records were "not

relevant" for a preliminary review of his complaint.
"Woolford destroyed plaintiffs

ECF I at pp. 3 - 4. Plaintiff states that

mails (sic)." /d. at p. 4.

Plaintiff alleges that due to Woolford's actions, he has been forced to endure "these harsh
prison conditions with no ability to ever challenge them through the ARP process." /d. He adds
that his inability to exhaust administrative remedies has prohibited him from accessing the state
courts for a remedy. /d.
Unspecified claims (December 18 and 19.2012 letters) - ARP NBCI-2071-12 & 1343-12
Plaintiff states that a grievance "challenging serious prison conditions" was filed with the
IGO on November 5, 2012.

He alleges he filed all necessary paperwork to establish that he

exhausted the ARP process before filing the grievance, but by letter of December 18, 2012,
Woolford asked plaintiff to provide additional paperwork.

Plaintiff states that he had no access

to the documents requested and that he had no idea what documents were being requested.

Presumably, plaintiff implies he filed an administrative remedy procedure complaint ("ARP") with the
Warden and appealed any denial to the Commissioner of Correction.

2

He

concludes that Woolford's "intentional act" left him with no way to seek a remedy in any state
court "for the wrongs done to him." ECF I at pp. 4 - 5.
Similarly, plaintiff claims that the December 19, 2012 letter from Woolford requesting
additional documentation was improper because plaintiff sent all the necessary paperwork to the
IGO with his grievance. Id. at p. 5. Plaintiff again concludes that Woolford's request prohibited
him from seeking redress of the "wrongs done to him." Id. at p. 6. Plaintiff does not provide any
details regarding either of the underlying claims raised in the ARP or grievance.
Food items confiscated (January 4, 2013 letter) - ARP NBCI-2561-12
Plaintiff filed a grievance appealing the dismissal of an ARP regarding food items that he
alleged were wrongfully confiscated by the Warden.

ECF I-I at p. 6.

Plaintiff claims he

provided all necessary paperwork with his grievance, but Woolford "still insisted that plaintiff
send him additional
plaintiffs

grievance."

paperworks (sic) that were not relevant to the preliminary

review of

ECF I at p. 6. Plaintiff again concludes that Woolford "intentionally

thwarted" his attempt to exhaust state remedies and he is not unable to access the Maryland state
courts to seek redress. Id. at p. 7.
Excessive force} (March 7, 2013 letter) ARP NBCI-0198-13
Plaintiff states that an ARP he filed was dismissed by the NBCI ARP coordinator and
that he was told he had no remedies available to him through the ARP process. Plaintiff states he
filed a grievance with the IGO appealing this dismissal. ECF 1 at p. 7.
By letter dated March 7, 2013, Director of the IGO Scott Oakley dismissed the grievance
because plaintiff did not appeal the Warden's dismissal of the ARP to the Commissioner

of

Correction; rather, he simply filed a grievance with the IGO and bypassed that step in the review.
The letter from Director of the tGO Scott Oakley states that plaintiff"complained
in [his]originat ARP
complaint to the Warden ... that [he was] subjected to an excessive use of force in an incident [plaintiff]
acknowledge[d] [he] provoked." ECF I-t at p. 8.

3

ECF 1-1 at pp. 8 - 9. Plaintiff characterizes the dismissal of the grievance as malicious and
intentional and claims the grounds for the dismissal was "bogus." ECF I at p. 7.
Refusal to send certified mail (January 30, 2014 letter) ARP NBCI-2946-13 & 3071-13
Plaintiff filed an IGO complaint on December 10, 2013, regarding the prison's refusal to
send legal mail certified mail. ECF 1 at p. 8. He claims he again sent all necessary paperwork to
establish that he had exhausted remedies through the warden and the commissioner.
Plaintiff alleges that "Woolford destroyed part of plaintiffs

Jd.

mail then wrote plaintiff a

letter claiming that plaintiff had failed to send the IGO proof that he had appealed the warden's
decisions to the Commissioner."

Jd. Plaintiff was told to provide the documentation within 30

days and states he had "to pay another inmate 20 stamps to have him send the !GO the
Commissioner's

decisions by certified [mail] because NBC! officials refused to allow him to

send his mail out by certified mai1." Jd.
Although

Woolford received the initial information

requested,

he requested further

information from plaintiff that plaintiff alleges Woolford "knows doles] not exist." Jd. at p. 9.
Plaintiff further alleges that Woolford has ignored his "other grievance."

Jd. Plaintiff concludes

that because of Woolford's intentional actions he cannot seek a remedy in state courts. Jd.
Allegation against Scott Oakley
Plaintiff claims that Oakley was aware of the complaints regarding Woolford and that he
was unable to access state courts due to the wrongful actions of Woolford.

ECF I at pp. 9 - 10.

He states that Oakley failed to intervene to protect plaintiff from the wrongful conduct of
Woolford.

Jd. at p. 10. Plaintiff further claims that Oakley and Woolford conspired to prevent

him from exhausting "state remedies" and denying him access to the state courts. Jd.

4

Plaintiff alleges that the conduct described violates his rights to due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment and Art. 19 of the Maryland Constitution.

Id. at pp. II - 12. As relief,

plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief as well as unspecified compensatory and punitive
damages. Id. at pp. 12 - 13.
Standard of Review
Summary Judgment is governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) which provides that:
The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
The Supreme Court has clarified that this does not mean that any factual dispute will
defeat the motion:
By its very terms, this standard provides that the mere existence of
some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an
otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the
requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U. S. 242, 247-48 (1986) (emphasis in original).
"A party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment

'may not rest

upon the mere allegations or denials of [his] pleadings,' but rather must 'set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'"

Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens Football Club,

Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 522 (4th Cir. 2003) (alteration in original) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)).
The court should "view the evidence in the light most favorable to ... the nonmovant, and draw
all inferences in her favor without weighing the evidence or assessing the witness' credibility."
Dennis v. Columbia Colleton Med. Ctr., Inc., 290 F.3d 639, 644-45 (4th Cir. 2002). The court
must, however, also abide by the "affirmative obligation of the trial judge to prevent factually
unsupported claims and defenses from proceeding to trial." Bouchat, 346 F.3d at 526 (internal

5

quotation marks omitted) (quoting Drewil/ v. Pral/, 999 F.2d 774, 778-79 (4th Cir. 1993), and
citing Celolex Corp. v. Calrel/, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986)).
Analysis
Conspiracy
To establish a civil conspiracy

S 1983,

under

plaintiff must present evidence that

defendants acted jointly in concert and that some overt act was done in furtherance of the
conspiracy,

which resulted in deprivation

of a constitutional

Clarksburg, 81 F.3d 416, 421 (4th Cir.1996).
deprive

plaintiff of a constitutional

conspirators.
Cir.1987).

See Ballinger

right. See Hinkle v. City of

An essential element for a claim of conspiracy to

right, is an agreement to do so among the alleged co-

v. N.c. Agric. Exlension Serv., 815 F.2d 1001, 1006-07 (4th

Without an agreement, the independent acts of two or more wrongdoers do not

amount to a conspiracy. See Murdaugh Volkswagon v. Firsl Nal'l Bank, 639 F.2d 1073, 1075-76
(4th Cir.1981). Plaintiff must allege facts establishing that defendants shared a "unity of purpose
or a common design" to injure him. Am. Tobacco Co. v. United Slates, 328 U.S. 781, 809-10
(1946).

Neither the complaint nor plaintiffs

opposition response (ECF 24) provide facts to

establish that Oakley and Woolford shared a unity of purpose to injure him. The allegation is
simply a conclusory one without even a hint that there existed a conspiracy to prevent him from
pursuing valid claims in a court of law. The claim must be dismissed.
Mail Claim
A plaintiff's claims regarding his ability to mail documents bears upon his constitutional
right of access to the courts. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977). A claim of denial of
access to court based on alleged interference with legal mail must still meet the actual injury
requirement of Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996). Isolated instances of mishandling of inmate

6

mail do not constitute valid constitutional claims.

BlIie v. Jones, 717 F.2d 925, 926 (4th Cir.

1983).
Plaintiff asserts that Woolford destroyed his mail presumably because he claims that he
sent all necessary paperwork was sent with his grievances, yet Woolford contacted him to
request additional documentation.

Woolford provides an affidavit and records that establish that

plaintiff has filed more than 130 grievances since 200 I, thus even if plaintiff could establish that
some of his mail was mishandled, it constitutes an isolated incident for which no liability
attaches. I ECF 18 at Ex. 2, p. 2. Woolford further avers that plaintiffs

grievances were treated

no differently than other grievances filed with the 100, in reliance on relevant Maryland
regulations governing the 100. Jd.

Indeed, plaintiffs

allegation that some grievances were

destroyed while the vast majority of his grievances were processed, is simply inexplicable and
lends no credence to his claim that Woolford targeted him for some sort of reprisal with respect
to the claims asserted.

Even assuming documents were misplaced or destroyed in these few

instances, plaintiff makes no assertion that he informed Woolford those documents

were

included, or that he attempted to obtain additional copies for the purpose of responding to the
request.
exists.

Plaintiff also makes no effort to demonstrate that the documentation
See ECF 24.

intentional and plaintiffs

Absent that evidence, Woolford's

requested even

conduct cannot be characterized as

claim regarding his mail is vitiated.

Woolford is entitled to summary

judgment on this claim.
Access to Courts
The Prison Litigation Reform Act ["PLRA"] requires a prisoner to exhaust administrative
remedies before filing suit in federal court.

Title 42 U.S.C.

action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under

7

S
S

1997e(a) provides that "[n)o
1983 of this title, or any other

Federal law by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such
administrative remedies as are available are exhausted."

The Supreme Court has interpreted the

language of this provision broadly, holding that the phrase "prison conditions" encompasses "all
inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes,
and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong." Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516,
532 (2002).

Plaintiff claims that he was improperly

denied the opportunity

to exhaust

administrative

remedies which had the effect of denying him meaningful access to the state

courts to pursue claims regarding conditions of his confinement.
Prisoners have a constitutionally protected right of access to the courts.

See Bounds v.

Smith, 430 U. S. 817, 821 (1977). However,
Bounds does not guarantee inmates the wherewithal to transform themselves into
litigating engines capable of filing everything from shareholder derivative actions
to slip-and-fall claims. The tools it requires to be provided are those that the
inmates need in order to attack their sentences, directly or collaterally, and in
order to challenge the conditions of their confinement. Impairment of any other
litigating capacity is simply one of the incidental (and perfectly constitutional)
consequences of conviction and incarceration.
Lewis v. Casey, 518 U. S. 343, 355 (1996).
"Ultimately, a prisoner wishing to establish an unconstitutional

burden on his right of

access to the courts must show "actual injury" to 'the capability of bringing contemplated
challenges to sentences or conditions of confinement before the courts.'''

0 'Dell v. Netherland,

112 F. 3d 773, 776 (4th Cir. 1997) (quoting Lewis, 518 U.S. at 355). "The requirement that an
inmate alleging a violation of Bounds must show actual injury derives ultimately from the
doctrine of standing, a constitutional principle that prevents courts of law from undertaking tasks
assigned to the political branches."

Lewis, 518 u.S. at 349.

8

Actual injury occurs when a

prisoner demonstrates that a "nonfrivolous" and "arguable" claim was lost because of the denial
of access to the courts. Id. at 399.
In Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 403 (2002), the Court characterized access-tothe courts claims as being in one of two categories.

Id at 413-14.

The first, termed "forward

looking claims," are cases where official action frustrates a plaintiff's ability to bring a suit at the
present time.

Jennings v. City oj Stillwater, 383 FJd

1199, 1208-09 (lOth Cif. 2004).

The

second class, termed "backward looking claims," arise when a plaintiff alleges that a specific
claim "cannot be tried (or tried with all the evidence) [because past official action] caused the
loss or inadequate settlement of a meritorious case." Id. at 1209. In this way, the official action
is said to have '''rendered

hollow [the plaintiff's] right to seek redress' "in the courts.

!d.

(quoting Christopher, 536 U.S. at 415 (brackets in original)) (internal citations omitted)).
Whether the claim is forward or backward looking, a prisoner claiming he was denied
access to the courts must ultimately prove he suffered an actual injury by showing that the
defendant's

acts hindered

his ability to pursue a nonfrivolous

legal claim.

Conclusory

allegations are not sufficient in this regard. See Wardell v. Duncan, 470 F.3d 954, 959 (10th Cif.
2006) (denying access to court claim based on allegation that petition for a writ of certiorari had,
for unspecified reasons, been dismissed and where plaintiff did not even mention the point on
appeal). The right of access to the courts is "ancillary to the underlying claim, without which a
plaintiff cannot have suffered injury by being shut out of court." Christopher, 536 U.S. at 415.
"[T]he predicate claim [must] be described well enough to apply the 'nonfrivolous'
show the 'arguable'
omitted).

nature of the underlying claim is more than hope."

test and to

Id. at 416 (footnote

A prisoner's right to access the courts does not include the right to present frivolous

claims. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. at 353, n.3.

9

The grievance plaintiff filed regarding scalding hot water in the showers alleges in part
that he suffered bums as a result of the water temperature; that the Warden dismissed his ARP as
frivolous; and the Commissioner of Correction did not respond to his appeal. See ECF 24 at Ex.
I, pp. 15 - 18. The ARP filed by plaintiff alleges that he was denied his weekly shower because
the shower was broken due to the water being so hot. Jd. at p. 20. He further claimed that his
skin could not tolerate the heat of the water and he asked the officer who escorted him if he
could use a different shower and he was told he could not. Jd. As relief he asked for the broken
shower to be fixed.

Jd. The ARP was dismissed with the notation that: "per DCD 185-002

[i)nmates may not seek remedy through a complaint which is not serious or practical in content
or form, this complaint is considered frivolous." Jd.
The letter sent to plaintiff from the 100 in response to his grievance asked plaintiff to
"provide the following additional information: the nature of the injuries you suffered, what
medical treatment was required and any pertinent documentation."

ECF I-I at p. 1. Plaintiff

contends that this information was irrelevant to a preliminary investigation.

ECF I at p. 5. It is

clear, however, that the only potentially serious allegation raised by plaintiff is that he was
burned.

Absent supporting evidence for that alleged injury, the claims asserted are frivolous.

Expenditure

of limited resources to conduct a hearing on a matter that is frivolous is not

constitutionally

required.

The dismissal of this grievance was occasioned by plaintiffs

abject

refusal to provide pertinent information regarding his claim, and not by a deliberate attempt to
prevent him from litigating a legitimate claim.
Plaintiffs claims regarding unspecified allegation which he supports with letters from the
100 dated December 18 and 19,2012,

are subject to dismissal.

The underlying claim is not

described in the complaint and plaintiff provides no further clarification of the nature of those

10

claims in his opposition response. ECF 24. As such, the allegation fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted.
Plaintiffs

grievance regarding the confiscation

of food items alleged that officers

inventoried his property and would not store his food items while he was on disciplinary
segregation.

ECF 18 at Ex. 1, pp. 70 - 71. Plaintiff claimed that the regulations permitting the

officers to confiscate his food were arbitrary and capricious and that they ran afoul of the
constitution.

Id. To the extent plaintiff lost an opportunity to litigate this claim in a court of law,

his constitutional right of access to courts was not violated. The underlying claim does not state
a viable constitutional claim regarding the conditions of his confinement.

A prison policy was

applied to plaintiff as it is with other disciplinary segregation inmates; there is no allegation that
he was improperly targeted or that the actions taken were unauthorized.

To the extent plaintiff

lost an opportunity to litigate this claim, his constitutional right of access to the courts was not
violated.
The grievance plaintiff filed regarding the claim he was subjected to excessive force was
dismissed by letter dated March 7, 2013, because plaintiff did not appeal the Warden's response
to the Commissioner

of Correction.

ECF 1-1 at p. 9.

Dismissal of the grievance due to plaintiffs

Plaintiff does not dispute this fact.

failure to follow procedural rules for filing a viable

grievance is not an intentional deprivation of plaintiffs

right of access to courts. This claim is

subject to dismissal.
Plaintiffs

grievance regarding the failure to send mail by certified delivery (lOO No.

2013-2188 and ARP NBC! 2946-13) concerns what he describes as a long-standing issue with
prison policy that does not allow inmates to send out legal mail by certified mail at the prison's
expense, or to charge the inmates the fee for doing so at a later date.

11

ECF 24 at pp. I - 3.

Plaintiff claims that because of this policy a lawsuit he tiled in the Circuit Court for Allegany
County, Maryland was dismissed for failure to prosecute because he could not properly serve the
defendant in that case, Lt. Bradley Wilt. Id., see also ECF 24-1.
In response to the grievance plaintiff filed concerning the certified mail policy, a letter
dated January 22, 2014, notified plaintiff that he was required to demonstrate exhaustion of the
ARP process when he submitted the grievance.

ECF I-I at pp. 10- 11. The ARP itself was

dismissed because plaintiff failed to establish that he was required to use certified mail for the
items he attempted to send without payment of the fees. ECF 24 at Ex. I, p. 119. Plaintiff was
asked to provide copies of his appeal to the Commissioner and any receipt or response received
from the Commissioner.

ECF 1.1 at p. 11. Plaintiff was given 30 days to do so. Id. He was also

granted an additional 30 days within which to comply. ECF 24 at Ex. 1, p. 121.
After plaintiff provided the documents related to the exhaustion of his ARP, he was asked
to provide "documentation that the correspondence was required to be sent by certified mail and
copies of [his] request to [his] case manager for the additional postage."

Id. at p. 127. This

information was requested pursuant to Code of Maryland Administrative Regulations (CO MAR)
12.0701.03(B)(6)

which imposes a duty on the Executive Director of the IGO to conduct a

preliminary investigation.

Id. The grievance, or one raising the same claim,4 was dismissed

without a hearing because plaintiff "failed to cite any federal or state constitutional,

statutory,

regulatory, or policy provision that has conferred" on plaintiff the "absolute right to send legal
mail by certified or registered mail, without any cost to you."

Id. at p. 156. Dismissal of a

grievance that plaintiff could not or would not provide additional evidence to support is not a
deliberate denial of his right of access to the courts.

There does not appear to be a copy of the decision dismissing IGO No. 2013-2188 in the record, but the
dismissal of20 13-2189 addresses a very similar claim.

12

Qualified Immunity
"Qualified immunity balances two important interests-the
accountable

when they exercise power irresponsibly

need to hold public officials

and the need to shield officials from

harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably."
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 23 I (2009).

"In particular, ....

Pearson v.

qualified immunity protects law

officers from 'bad guesses in gray areas' and it ensures that they may be held personally liable
only 'for transgressing

bright lines.'''

Gomez v. Atkins, 296 F.3d 253, 261 (4th Cir. 2002)

(quoting Maciariello v. Sumner, 973 F.2d 295, 298 (4th Cir. 1992)).

The defense provides

protection for public officials for mistakes of law, mistakes of fact, or a combination of the two.
See Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 55 1,567 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).

Qualified immunity is

a defense from suit, not simply liability, which is lost if a matter is improperly permitted to go to
trial. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 5 I I, 526 (1985).

Resolution of whether an official is

entitled to qualified immunity must be determined "at the earliest possible stage in litigation."
Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991).
In order to determine if a public official is entitled to the protections afforded by qualified
immunity, two inquiries must be addressed by this Court.

Although the Supreme Court's

decision in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001) directed a rigid approach to the inquiries
involved, the requirement that the two-prong analysis must be "considered in proper sequence"
has since been revised. Katz, 533 U.S. at 200. Courts are now "permitted to exercise their sound
discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be
addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand." Pearson, 555 U.S. at
8 I 8.

13

The first prong is whether ••••t]aken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the
[
injury, ...

the facts alleged show [that] the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right[.]"

Saucier, 533 U.S. at 20 I. If the evidence establishes a violation of a constitutional right, the
second prong is to assess whether the right was "clearly established" at the time of the events at
issue.

/d. If the right was not clearly established, the qualified immunity doctrine shields a

defendant officer from liability.

The "answer to both Saucier questions

affirmative in order for a plaintiff to defeat a ...
immunity grounds."

must be in the

motion for summary judgment on qualified

Henry v. Purnell, 501 F.3d 374, 377-78 (4th Cir. 2007) (citing Ballen v.

Gomez, 324 FJd 288, 293-94 (4th Cir. 2003)).
To the extent that any of plaintiff's

underlying claims may have been meritorious,

Woolford and Oakley are entitled to qualified immunity. In the discharge of their official duties,
that include review of a relentless stream of grievances that cover all aspects of prison life,
defendants are not liable for dismissing a claim that may later be found meritorious in the state
courts. The asserted right - to file what is in essence a tort claim in state court - is not a clearly
established right; these claims are the sort of legal actions for which prisoners are not guaranteed
a constitutional

right of access to the courts.

This court is familiar with plaintiffs

litigious

nature and the volume of claims he files. To the extent he is under the impression that he is
entitled under the Constitution to file any and all claims that he might feel the need to file, he is
mistaken.

Administrative

remedies and the IGO process serve the purpose of resolving

meritorious complaints, they are not simply precatory steps to the courthouse door.

14

Woolford's motion shall be granted and the complaint as to Oakley shall be dismissed. A
separate order follows.

I......?- y'4 P

Date

J. FJ?derick Mot~
United States District Judge

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