James v. Colvin

Filing 17

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER denying Plaintiff's 14 Motion for Summary Judgment; denying Defendant's 16 Motion for Summary Judgment; vacating ALJ's opinion; remanding case for further proceedings; closing case. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephanie A Gallagher on 2/25/2015. (dass, Deputy Clerk)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
CHAMBERS OF
STEPHANIE A. GALLAGHER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

101 WEST LOMBARD STREET
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21201
[phone]
Fax [phone]

February 25, 2015
LETTER TO COUNSEL
RE:

Brian E. James v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration;
Civil No. SAG-14-1945

Dear Counsel:
On June 16, 2014, Plaintiff Brian E. James petitioned this Court to review the Social
Security Administration’s final decision to deny his claims for Disability Insurance Benefits and
Supplemental Security Income. (ECF No. 1). I have considered the parties’ cross-motions for
summary judgment. (ECF Nos. 14, 16). I find that no hearing is necessary. See Loc. R. 105.6
(D. Md. 2014). This Court must uphold the decision of the agency if it is supported by
substantial evidence and if the agency employed proper legal standards. See 42 U.S.C. §§
405(g), 1383(c)(3); Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996). Under that standard, I
will deny both parties’ motions and remand the case to the Commissioner for further
consideration. This letter explains my rationale.
Mr. James filed claims for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental
Security Income (“SSI”) on March 24, 2010. (Tr. 119-29). He alleged a disability onset date of
July 1, 2008, which he later amended to January 15, 2011. (Tr. 118-19, 121). His claims were
denied initially and on reconsideration. (Tr. 91-96, 99-102). A hearing was held on December
3, 2012, before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). (Tr. 26-68). Following the hearing, the
ALJ determined that Mr. James was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act
during the relevant time frame. (Tr. 9-20). The Appeals Council denied Mr. James’s request for
review, (Tr. 1-5), so the ALJ’s decision constitutes the final, reviewable decision of the agency.
The ALJ found that Mr. James suffered from the severe impairments of bipolar disorder,
atrial fibrillation, diabetes, high blood pressure, hypertension, obesity, and cervical radiculitis.
(Tr. 14). Despite these impairments, the ALJ determined that Mr. James retained the residual
functional capacity (“RFC”) to:
perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) that does
not require climbing ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; nor more than occasional
balancing, crawling, crouching, kneeling, stooping, or climbing ramps and stairs;
and limited to work that is simple, as defined in the Dictionary of Occupational
Titles as specific vocational preparation levels one and two; and to routine and
repetitive tasks in a work environment free of fast paced production requirements,
which is defined as constant activity with work tasks performed sequentially in

Brian E. James v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration
Civil No. SAG-14-1945
February 25, 2015
Page 2

rapid succession. The claimant is further limited to work involving only simple
work related decisions; with few, if any, work place changes; and only occasional
interaction with the general public, supervisors, and co-workers.
(Tr. 16). After considering the testimony of a vocational expert (“VE”), the ALJ determined that
Mr. James could perform jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy and that,
therefore, he was not disabled. (Tr. 19-20).
On appeal, Mr. James raises a single argument: that the ALJ failed to accord adequate
weight to the opinions of Dr. Smith, Mr. James’s treating psychologist. Because the ALJ’s
evaluation of Mr. James’s mental impairments, including the ALJ’s assessment of Dr. Smith’s
opinions, was generally inadequate, remand is warranted. In so holding, I express no opinion as
to whether the ALJ’s ultimate determination that Mr. James was not entitled to benefits was
correct or incorrect.
Dr. Smith completed two opinion forms: a “Medical Assessment of Ability to do WorkRelated Activities (Psychological),” and a “Psychiatric Review Technique.” (Tr. 601-03, 60922). In assessing Mr. James’s ability to do work-related activities, Dr. Smith opined that Mr.
James had poor to no ability to make occupational and performance adjustments, fair to good
ability to make personal-social adjustments, and that Mr. James did not have the ability to handle
a forty hour work week from a psychiatric perspective. (Tr. 601-03). In the psychiatric review
technique, Dr. Smith opined that Mr. James’s mental impairments met or equaled the
requirements of Listing 12.04, which governs affective disorders. (Tr. 609, 612); see 20 C.F.R.
Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, Pt. A § 12.04. Dr. Smith explained that Mr. James satisfied Listing
12.04 because he suffers marked difficulties in maintaining social functioning and in maintaining
concentration, persistence, or pace, and because he has experienced three episodes of
decompensation. (Tr. 619).
The ALJ assigned “little weight” to the opinions expressed in both forms completed by
Dr. Smith, stating simply that the medical record supported, at most, moderate functional
limitations. (Tr. 18). In order for an ALJ to assign less than controlling weight to the opinion of
a treating physician, the ALJ must determine that the opinion either is not supported by objective
medical evidence or is inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in the claimant’s case
record. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2). First, I note that in this case the ALJ
offered no explanation whatsoever for why he assigned “little weight” to the opinions in Dr.
Smith’s assessment of Mr. James’s ability to do work-related activities. Moreover, the ALJ cited
no evidence in support of his conclusion that the record supported, at most, moderate functional
limitations. Because the ALJ did not adequately explain why Dr. Smith’s opinions were not
entitled to controlling weight or why they were instead entitled to “little weight,” I cannot
determine that the ALJ provided substantial evidence in support of his RFC assessment.
At step three, the ALJ likewise cited very little evidence in his application of the “special
technique,” which is used for evaluating the severity of mental impairments and whether mental
impairments meet or medically equal a listing. That technique is set forth in 20 C.F.R. §§

Brian E. James v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration
Civil No. SAG-14-1945
February 25, 2015
Page 3

404.1520a and 416.920a. See Robbers v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 582 F.3d 647, 652-54 (6th
Cir. 2009); Kohler v. Astrue, 546 F.3d 260, 265-66 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing Schmidt v. Astrue, 496
F.3d 833, 844 n. 4 (7th Cir. 2007)). The ALJ “must first evaluate [the claimant’s] pertinent
symptoms, signs, and laboratory findings to determine whether [he] ha[s] a medically
determinable mental impairment(s).” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520a(b)(1), 416.920a(b)(1). The ALJ
must “then rate the degree of functional limitation resulting from the impairment(s)” in four
broad functional areas.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520a(b)(2), 404.1520a(c), 416.920a(b)(2),
416.920a(c). The ALJ must document the application of the technique in the hearing decision,
incorporating pertinent findings and conclusions, and documenting the significant history and
functional limitations that were considered. Id. § 404.1520(e)(4). In this case, although the ALJ
outlined the broad functional areas, he simply stated the degree of limitation in each area,
providing little to no explanation in support of his determination. (Tr. 15-16). For most of the
functional areas, the “explanation” consisted of a simple, generic sentence with no reference to
supporting facts or evidence. Moreover, the remainder of the opinion contains no discussion of
Mr. James’s ability to engage in social functioning or to concentrate on tasks. In light of the
failure of sufficient explanation, remand is warranted for an adequate application of the special
technique.
Finally, I note that the ALJ did not discuss or assign weight to the opinions expressed by
Dr. Nanavati in the Department of Social Services Medical Report Form 402B. (Tr. 453-56).
Dr. Nanavati’s opinions were largely consistent with the opinions expressed in the forms
completed by Dr. Smith. Id. Although “there is no rigid requirement that the ALJ specifically
refer to every piece of evidence in his decision,” Reid v. Commissioner of Social Security, 769
F.3d. 861, 865 (4th Cir. 2014), the ALJ is required to “evaluate every medical opinion” in the
record, see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c) and 416.927(c). Accordingly, the ALJ’s failure to evaluate
Dr. Nanavati’s opinions further undermines the ALJ’s assessment of Dr. Smith’s opinions, and
on remand, the ALJ should evaluate Dr. Nanavati’s opinions in accordance with 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1527 and 416.927.
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. James’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No.
14) is DENIED and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 16) is DENIED. The
ALJ’s opinion is VACATED and the case is REMANDED for further proceedings. The clerk is
directed to CLOSE this case.
Despite the informal nature of this letter, it should be flagged as an opinion and docketed
as an order.
Sincerely yours,
/s/
Stephanie A. Gallagher
United States Magistrate Judge