Szathmary et al v. Elkton, Maryland Police Department et al

Filing 41

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge George Levi Russell, III on 3/31/2017. (bas, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
ROBERT SZATHMARY, et al.,

:

Plaintiffs,

:

v.

:
Civil Action No. GLR-14-2224

TOWN OF ELKTON, et al.,

:

Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendants’, Sergeant
Scott

Knauer,

Officer

Sergeant

Matthew

Jason

Nussle,

Hoffman,

Officer

Officer

Lindsey

Thomas

Newton,

Ziegenfuss

(the

“Officers”),1 and Town of Elkton, Motion for Summary Judgment
(ECF No. 36).

Also before the Court is Plaintiffs’, Robert and

Alyce Brooke Szathmary, Cross Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF
No. 37).
traffic

This 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action arises from the Officers’
stop

of

the

Szathmarys

in

Elkton,

Maryland

Officers’ subsequent detention of Robert Szathmary.
is ripe for disposition, and no hearing is necessary.
Rule 105.6 (D.Md. 2016).

and

the

The Motion
See Local

For the reasons outlined below, the

Court will grant Defendants’ Motion and deny the Szathmarys’
Motion.

1

The Court will direct the Clerk to amend the case caption
to reflect the full names and correct spellings of Sergeant
Scott Knauer, Sergeant Jason Hoffman, Officer Thomas Newton,
Officer Matthew Nussle, and Officer Lindsey Ziegenfuss.

BACKGROUND2

I.
A.

Newton’s Stop of the Szathmarys
On June 11, 2012, at approximately 10:10 p.m., Newton was

doing speed enforcement on Route 40 in Elkton, Maryland, between
Landing Lane and a bridge to the west.
18, 2016, ECF No. 36-3).

(Newton Dep. 19–20, Feb.

The Szathmarys, driving a Chevrolet

Impala, passed Newton traveling forty-seven miles per hour, two
miles above the speed limit.

(Newton Dep. 22, 25).

Newton

began following the Szathmarys and pulled them over soon after.
(Id. at 24).

After stopping the Szathmarys, Newton approached

the passenger’s side of their car.

(Compl. ¶ 34, ECF No. 1).3

Newton informed the Szathmarys that their license plates were
registered to a Nissan, rather than a Chevrolet, and that they
were going forty-seven miles per hour where the speed limit was
forty-five miles per hour.

(Robert Szathmary Dep. 99–100, Feb.

17, 2016, ECF No. 36-10; Alyce Szathmary Dep. 13–14, Feb. 17,
2016,

ECF

No.

36-11).

Newton

driver’s license and registration.
While

waiting

registration,

for

Newton

asked

Mr.

Szathmary

for

his

(Newton Dep. 28).

Mr.

Szathmary

to

began

asking

the

provide

the

Szathmarys

car’s
other

questions, including where they were going and why they had a
2

Unless otherwise indicated, the following facts are
uncontroverted.
3
To the extent the Court discusses facts that the
Szathmarys allege in their Complaint, they are uncontroverted as
well.
2

baseball bat in the car.

(Id. at 31).

They said they were

going to Lewes, Delaware or Cape May, New Jersey.
32).

(Id. at 31–

After giving the registration to Newton, Mr. Szathmary

informed Newton

that his driver’s license was in the trunk.

(Id.

After

at

30).

Newton

told

Mr.

Szathmary

to

get

his

driver’s license from the trunk, Mr. Szathmary advised Newton
that

there

were

also

(Compl. ¶¶ 39, 40).

two

unloaded

firearms

in

Newton called for backup.

the

trunk.

(Newton Dep.

43).
B.

The First Search
Between

10:16

p.m.

and

10:22

p.m.,

Ziegenfuss,

Nussle,

Nussle’s K-9 dog Rommel, and Officer Leffew arrived.4

(Cross

Mot. Summ. J. Ex. 6 [“CAD Report”] at 2, ECF No. 38-6).

Newton

brought Mr. Szathmary to the trunk, Mr. Szathmary gave Newton
permission to open the trunk, and Mr. Szathmary gave Newton his
driver’s

license.

(Newton

Szathmary’s handguns.

Dep.

46).

Newton

(Id. at 45–46).

secured

Newton called dispatch

and relayed the handguns’ serial numbers at 10:22 p.m.
49; CAD Report at 2).
car’s

passenger

thereafter,

asked

Szathmarys’ car for drugs.
38;

Nussle
4

Dep.

36,

(Id. at

He also observed loose ammunition in the

compartment.

Newton

Mr.

Feb.

(Newton

Nussle

to

Dep.
do

a

58–59).
K-9

scan

Shortly
of

the

(Cross Mot. Summ. J. at 8, ECF No.
18,

2017,

ECF

No.

Leffew is not a defendant in this case.
3

36-5).

Nussle

brought Rommel to the Szathmarys’ car for the K-9 scan.
Dep. 36–39).

(Nussle

Rommel alerted near the car’s passenger-side door

handle to the presence of drugs.

(Id. at 39–41).

After Rommel alerted, Newton searched the Szathmarys’ car
by performing a “lunge, reach, grab” search of the front and
rear passenger compartments, the areas underneath the seats, the
glove compartment, the center console, and the floor of the back
seats (the “First Search”).
find anything illegal.
p.m.,

and

dispatch
(VIN).

again

and

at

told

(Newton Dep. 78–79).

(Id. at 80).
10:36

dispatch

(CAD Report at 2).

p.m.,
the

He did not

During the search at 10:32

one

of

vehicle

the

Officers

called

identification

number

At 10:36 p.m., dispatch informed

Newton that there was no discrepancy with the car’s registration
after

all.

(Cross

Mot.

Summ.

J.

at

9).

With

Hoffman’s

permission, Newton decided nonetheless to bring the car to the
police station for another search.

(Newton Dep. 80; Hoffman

Dep. 16, Feb. 19, 2016, ECF No. 36-8).
Mrs. Szathmary and handcuffed her.
19, 2016, ECF No. 36-7).

Ziegenfuss patted down

(Ziegenfuss Dep. 42–43, Feb.

Ziegenfuss drove Mrs. Szathmary to the

Elkton police station.

(Id. at 41).

Newton drove Mr. Szathmary

to the police station.

(Newton Dep. 81–82).

By this point, the

length of the traffic stop was approximately thirty minutes.
(Robert Szathmary Dep. 67; Alyce Szathmary Dep. 22).

4

C.

The Second Search
At the police station, Ziegenfuss told Mrs. Szathmary she

was

released.

(Alyce

Szathmary

Dep.

remained in the police station lobby.

24).

Mrs.

(Id. at 24–25).

meanwhile, detained Mr. Szathmary in a holding cell.
Dep. 86).

Szathmary
Newton,
(Newton

Newton then searched the car again, this time looking

underneath the hood, searching the areas around the front and
back seats, feeling underneath the dashboard, opening the glove
compartment,

and

searching

the

trunk

(the

“Second

Search”).

(Id. at 90–91).

Again, Newton did not find anything illegal.

(Id. at 110–12).

Newton released Mr. Szathmary and returned the

car to the Szathmarys.

(Id. at 103–11).

he released Mr. Szathmary at 12:45 a.m.

According to Newton,

(Id. at 87).

According

to the Szathmarys, however, he released Mr. Szathmary at 4:47
a.m.,

because

they

arrived

in

Dover,

Delaware

at

sunrise,

sunrise was at 5:47 a.m., and Dover is an hour from Elkton.
(See Alyce Szathmary Dep. 34; Cross Mot. Summ. J. Exs. 9 & 10,
ECF Nos. 38-9, 38-10).
D.

Procedural History
The Szathmarys filed the present action against Defendants

on July 11, 2014.

(ECF No. 1).

In their six-count Complaint,

they allege: Custom and/or Policy in Violation of Constitutional
Rights Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count I); Violation of
Constitutional Rights Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count II);
5

False Arrest (Count III); False Imprisonment (Count IV); Battery
(Count V); and Attorney’s Fees and Costs (Count VI).

(Compl.).

On April 15, 2016, Defendants moved for summary judgment on all
counts.
Cross

(ECF No. 36).
Motion

Motion.

for

On May 6, 2016, the Szathmarys filed a

Summary

(ECF No. 37).

Judgment

and

opposed

Defendants’

On May 20, 2016, Defendants opposed the

Szathmarys’ Cross Motion and filed a Reply in further support of
their Motion, (ECF No. 39).

On June 2, 2016, the Szathmarys

filed a Reply. (ECF No. 40).
II.
A.

DISCUSSION

Standard of Review
In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the Court views

the facts in a light most favorable to the nonmovant, drawing
all justifiable inferences in that party’s favor.

Ricci v.

DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 586 (2009); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress &
Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158–59 (1970)).
when

the

materials

movant
in

the

demonstrates,
record,

Summary judgment is proper

through

including

“particular

depositions,

parts

of

documents,

electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations,
stipulations . . . admissions, interrogatory answers, or other
materials,” that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a), (c)(1)(A).

Significantly, a party must be
6

able to present the materials it cites in “a form that would be
admissible in evidence,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(3), and supporting
affidavits and declarations “must be made on personal knowledge”
and

“set

out

facts

that

would

be

admissible

in

evidence,”

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(4).
Once a motion for summary judgment is properly made and
supported,

the

burden

shifts

to

the

nonmovant

to

identify

evidence showing there is a genuine dispute of material fact.
See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
574,

586–87

dispute

(1986).
material

of

The
fact

nonmovant
“through

cannot
mere

building of one inference upon another.”

create

a

speculation

genuine
or

the

Beale v. Hardy, 769

F.2d 213, 214 (4th Cir. 1985) (citation omitted).
A “material fact” is one that might affect the outcome of a
party’s case.

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; see also JKC Holding

Co. v. Wash. Sports Ventures, Inc., 264 F.3d 459, 465 (4th Cir.
2001) (citing Hooven-Lewis v. Caldera, 249 F.3d 259, 265 (4th
Cir. 2001)).

Whether a fact is considered to be “material” is

determined by the substantive law, and “[o]nly disputes over
facts

that

governing
judgment.”

might
law

affect

will

the

properly

outcome
preclude

of

the

the

suit

entry

under
of

the

summary

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; accord Hooven-Lewis, 249

F.3d at 265.

A “genuine” dispute concerning a “material” fact

arises when the evidence is sufficient to allow a reasonable
7

jury

to

return

a

verdict

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

in

the

nonmoving

party’s

favor.

If the nonmovant has failed to make

a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case where
she has the burden of proof, “there can be ‘no genuine [dispute]
as to any material fact,’ since a complete failure of proof
concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case
necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.”

Celotex Corp.

v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986).
Here,
judgment.

the
The

parties

have

court,

filed

therefore,

cross-motions

for

summary

must

each

motion

“review

separately on its own merits to ‘determine whether either of the
parties deserves judgment as a matter of law.”

Rossignol v.

Voorhaar, 316 F.3d 516, 523 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting
Morris
1997)).

Inc.

v.

Harshbarger,

122

F.3d

58,

62

n.4

Philip

(1st

Cir.

Moreover, “[w]hen considering each individual motion,

the court must take care to ‘resolve all factual disputes and
any competing, rational inferences in the light most favorable’
to the party opposing that motion.”
Springfield
1996)).

Terminal

Ry.

Co.,

100

Id. (quoting Wightman v.
F.3d

228,

230

(1st

Cir.

This Court, however, must also abide by its affirmative

obligation

to

prevent

“factually

defenses” from going to trial.

unsupported

claims

and

Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774,

778–79 (4th Cir. 1993) (citing Felty v. Graves-Humphreys Co.,
818 F.2d 1126, 1128 (4th Cir. 1987).
8

If the evidence presented

by the nonmovant is “merely colorable, or is not significantly
probative, summary judgment may be granted.”

Anderson, 477 U.S.

at 249–50 (citations omitted).
B.

Analysis
Defendants argue they are entitled to qualified immunity.

The doctrine of qualified immunity shields government officials
“from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does
not

violate

clearly

established

statutory

or

constitutional

rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”
v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).

Harlow

In the Fourth Circuit,

courts should apply the qualified immunity doctrine “with due
respect for the perspective of police officers on the scene and
not with the greater leisure and acquired wisdom of judicial
hindsight.”

Gooden v. Howard Cty., 954 F.2d 960, 964–65 (4th

Cir. 1992).
Qualified immunity “is an immunity from suit rather than a
mere defense to liability.”
526 (1985).
that

the

Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511,

The United States Supreme Court has “made clear

‘driving

force’

behind

creation

of

the

qualified

immunity doctrine was a desire to ensure that ‘insubstantial
claims against government officials [will] be resolved prior to
discovery.’”

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231–32 (2009)

(quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 n.2 (1987)).
“Because the doctrine seeks to protect government officials from
9

the burdens of trial” and trial preparation, courts must resolve
qualified immunity questions “at the earliest possible stage in
litigation.”

Cloaninger

ex

rel.

Estate

of

Cloaninger

v.

McDevitt, 555 F.3d 324, 330 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Hunter v.
Bryant,

502

U.S.

224,

227

(1991)

(per

curiam))

(internal

quotation marks omitted).
There
government

is

a

two-prong

official

is

test

protected

for
by

determining
qualified

whether

immunity:

a
(1)

whether the facts that the plaintiff has alleged or shown make
out a violation of a constitutional right; and (2) whether that
right was “clearly established” at the time of the purported
violation.

Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232 (citing Saucier v. Katz,

533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)).

A right is “clearly established”

when “it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct
was unlawful in the situation he confronted.”

Cloaninger, 555

F.3d at 331 (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202).

Courts have

discretion to resolve these two prongs in whatever order they
consider appropriate based on the circumstances of the case at
hand.

Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236.

The answers to both prongs

must be in the affirmative for a plaintiff to defeat a motion
for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds.
Gomez, 324 F.3d 288, 293–94 (4th Cir. 2003).

Batten v.

The plaintiff

bears the burden of proof on the first prong, Bryant v. Muth,

10

994

F.2d

1082,

1086

(4th

Cir.

1993);

the

defendant

on

the

second, Wilson v. Kittoe, 337 F.3d 392, 397 (4th Cir. 2003).
The Court now addresses whether any of the parties deserves
judgment

as

a

matter

of

law

on

either

prong

of

qualified

immunity’s two-prong test.
1.

Whether Newton Diligently Pursued His Investigation

The Szathmarys bring their § 1983 claims under the Fourth
Amendment

to

the

United

States

Constitution.

The

Fourth

Amendment protects citizens against unreasonable searches and
seizures and provides that “no warrant shall issue, but upon
probable cause.”

U.S. Const. amend. IV.

“Temporary detention”

of suspects during a traffic stop by the police, “even if only
for a brief period and for a limited purpose, constitutes a
‘seizure’ of ‘persons’ within the [Fourth Amendment].”

United

States v. Vaughan, 700 F.3d 705, 709 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809–10 (1996)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
seizure”
custodial

more

akin

arrest,”

to
the

Because traffic stops are a “limited
an

“investigative
Supreme

Court’s

detention

than

framework

a
for

investigative detention set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968), also applies to police conduct during traffic stops.
Id. (citing United States v. Guijon–Ortiz, 660 F.3d 757, 764
(4th Cir. 2011)).

11

Under

Terry’s

framework

for

investigative

detention,

traffic stops are analyzed in two steps.

First, courts ask

“whether

justified

the

inception.”

police

officer’s

action

was

at

its

United States v. Digiovanni, 650 F.3d 498, 506 (4th

Cir. 2011) (citing United States v. Rusher, 966 F.2d 868, 875
(4th Cir. 1992)).
subsequent

Second, courts inquire “whether an officer’s

actions

were

reasonably

justification for the stop.
Here,

the

parties

do

related

in

scope”

to

the

Id.
not

dispute

the

first

step

under

Terry; they agree that Newton was justified in stopping the
Szathmarys for going two miles over the speed limit.
the

Szathmarys

argue

that

Defendants’

actions

Instead,

violated

the

second step under Terry because (1) Newton asked the Szathmarys
questions

unrelated

to

the

stop,

and

(2)

Defendants

delayed

checking the car’s VIN to do a K-9 scan of the car for drugs.
The Court disagrees.
Under

Terry’s

second

step,

“a

traffic

reasonable both in its scope and duration.”

stop

must

be

Digiovanni, 650

F.3d at 509 (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983)).
For a traffic stop to be reasonable in its duration, an officer
“must diligently pursue the investigation of the justification
for the stop.”
purpose

Id.

addressing

The scope of the stop is defined by its
“the

traffic

violation

that

warranted

stop” and “attend[ing] to related safety concerns.”
12

the

Rodriguez

v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 1614 (2015) (citing Illinois
v.

Caballes,

543

U.S.

405,

407

(2005)).

To

accomplish

the

purposes of the stop, an officer may not “detain the vehicle for
longer than necessary.”

United States v. Ortiz, 669 F.3d 439,

444 (4th Cir. 2012) (citing Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407–08).

So,

the “[a]uthority for the seizure . . . ends when tasks tied to
the traffic infraction are -- or reasonably should have been -completed.”
Cir.

2015)

United States v. Williams, 808 F.3d 238, 245 (4th
(quoting

Rodriguez,

quotation marks omitted).

135

S.Ct.

at

1614)

(internal

“Any detention longer than necessary

to accomplish the purposes of the stop must be justified by at
least

a

reasonable

suspicion

of

other

criminal

activity.”

Ortiz, 669 F.3d at 444; see Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407–08.

The

Court now addresses the Szathmarys’ claims in turn under Terry’s
second step.
i.
During
driver

for

Newton’s Questions Unrelated to the Stop
a

routine

a

driver’s

traffic

stop,

an

and

car

license

computer check, and issue a citation.

officer

may

registration,

ask

the

run

a

United States v. Green,

740 F.3d 275, 280 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting Rusher, 966 F.2d at
876).

An

officer

may

also

ask

questions

unrelated

traffic stop without rendering the stop unlawful.
660 F.3d at 766.
prolong

the

stop

to

the

Guijon-Ortiz,

The unrelated questions, however, may not
“beyond

the

period
13

reasonably

necessary

to

effectuate the purpose” of the traffic stop.
Mason, 628 F.3d 123, 131 (4th Cir. 2010).
officers

diligently

pursue

their

United States v.

Ultimately, whether

investigation

examination of “the totality of circumstances.”

requires

Digiovanni, 650

F.3d at 509 (citing United States v. Everett, 601 F.3d 484, 494
(6th Cir. 2010)).
Here, the undisputed facts show that Newton’s actions met
Terry’s second prong.
they

exceeded

the

Newton pulled the Szathmarys over because
speed

registration discrepancy.
Dep.

100;

Alyce

limit

and

because

there

was

a

(Newton Dep. 22–23; Robert Szathmary

Szathmary

Dep.

13–14).

Newton

asked

the

Szathmarys some questions unrelated to this purpose, but it is
uncontroverted that he did so while waiting for Mr. Szathmary to
find his registration.
the

unrelated

(Newton Dep. 31–32).

questions

while

waiting

for

Because he asked
Mr.

Szathmary’s

registration -- which Newton is permitted to request, see Green,
740 F.3d at 280 -- the unrelated questions did not prolong the
stop.

See

Guijon-Ortiz,

660

F.3d

at

766.

Thus,

Newton’s

questions unrelated to the stop did not violate Terry’s second
prong.
ii.
It

is

Defendants’ Delay Checking the VIN

undisputed

license at 10:22 p.m.

that

Newton

received

Mr.

Szathmary’s

(See Newton Dep. 46) (describing that Mr.

Szathmary opened his trunk to give Newton his license and for
14

Newton

to

secure

his

handguns);

(CAD

Report

at

2)

(showing

Newton called dispatch and relayed the handguns’ serial numbers
at 10:22 p.m.).

It is also undisputed that Defendants did not

begin checking the car’s VIN until 10:32 p.m.
2).

(CAD Report at

During the intermediate ten minutes, Defendants began a K-9

scan of the Szathmarys’ car for drugs.

(Nussle Dep. 36–39).

Defendants argue prolonging the stop by ten minutes to do a K-9
scan did not violate Terry’s second prong because Newton had
reasonable

suspicion

of

other

criminal

activity.

The

Court

agrees.
As described above, any detention longer than necessary to
accomplish the original purposes of the stop must be justified
by at least a reasonable suspicion of other criminal activity.
Ortiz,

669

F.3d

at

444;

Reasonable suspicion is

see

Caballes,

543

U.S.

at

407–08.

present “when an officer is able to

‘point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together
with rational inferences from those facts, evince more than an
inchoate

and

activity.’”
336

(4th

unparticularized

suspicion

or

hunch

of

criminal

Id. (quoting United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328,
Cir.

2008)).

The

reasonable

suspicion

standard

requires considering the totality of the circumstances, looking
at

all

“of

officer.”

the

facts

Branch,

537

and
F.3d

inferences
at

337.

produced
When

by

a

looking

police
at

the

totality of the circumstances, circumstances “consistent with
15

innocent travel can, when taken together,” constitute reasonable
suspicion.
Sokolow,

Digiovanni, 650 F.3d at 511 (citing United States v.

490

U.S.

1,

9

(1989)).

To

constitute

reasonable

suspicion, the innocent circumstances must “serve to eliminate
‘a substantial portion of innocent travelers.’”

Id.

(quoting

United States v. Foreman, 369 F.3d 776, 781 (4th Cir. 2004)).
Finally, when an officer has reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity, the officer may detain the suspect to “permit the
officer

to

(quoting

allay

Mason,

the

628

suspicion.”

F.3d

at

128)

Ortiz,
(internal

669

F.3d

at

quotation

444

marks

omitted).
Here, the uncontroverted facts establish that Newton had
sufficient reasonable suspicion of criminal activity consistent
with drug trafficking.5

Newton observed a baseball bat and loose

loaded ammunition magazines in the car’s passenger compartment,
and he observed loose handguns in the trunk.
27, 45–46, 58–59).

Newton’s training

(Newton Dep. 26–

advised him that drug

traffickers carry weapons to protect themselves.
62);

see

United

States

v.

Arvizu,

534

U.S.

266,

(Id. at 61–
273

(2002)

(holding that officers may rely on “specialized training to make
inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information
available to them that ‘might well elude an untrained person’”

5

The Court observes that the Szathmarys never contested
whether Newton had reasonable suspicion.
16

in

forming

reasonable

suspicion

(quoting

United

States

v.

Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981))).
In

addition,

Newton

registration discrepancy.

still

had

not

resolved

(Newton Dep. 41).

the

car’s

What is more, when

Newton asked where the Szathmarys were going, the Szathmarys
gave inconsistent answers; they said they were going to Lewes,
Delaware or Cape May, New Jersey.

(Newton Dep. 32–33); see

Digiovanni, 650 F.3d at 513) (holding that an unusual travel
itinerary

may

be

considered

in

forming

reasonable

suspicion

(citing United States v. Brugal, 209 F.3d 353, 360–61 (4th Cir.
2000)).6

While some of these circumstances are consistent with

innocent

travel,7

reasonable

taken

suspicion

together,

because

they

they

portion of innocent travelers.’”

constitute

“eliminate

‘a

sufficient
substantial

Digiovanni, 650 F.3d at 511

(quoting Foreman, 369 F.3d at 781).

Thus, the Court concludes

that Terry permitted Newton to detain the Szathmarys further and
request

a

trafficking.

K-9

scan

“to

allay

[his]

suspicion”

of

drug

See id. (quoting Mason, 628 F.3d at 128).

6

The Szathmarys maintain that because the Cape May ferry
leaves from Lewes, Delaware, Mr. Szathmary’s answer was not
suspicious and that Newton’s suspicion “was due to his
ignorance.” (Pls.’ Reply at 6, ECF No. 40). It is undisputed,
however, that Newton was aware that the Cape May ferry leaves
from Lewes.
(Newton Dep. 33).
He nonetheless thought it was
suspicious that the Szathmarys were not sure which location was
their destination. (Id.).
7
Indeed, the Defendants never found any drugs in the
Szathmarys’ car or on their person.
17

In

sum,

the

undisputed

facts

demonstrate

that

Newton’s

questions unrelated to the stop and Defendants’ delay checking
the car’s VIN to do a K-9 scan did not violate the Szathmarys’
Fourth

Amendment

rights

under

Terry’s

second

prong.

Accordingly, the Court concludes that Defendants are protected
by qualified immunity for their actions and deserve judgment as
a matter of law.
2.

Whether Probable
First Search

The

parties

do

not

Cause
dispute

“Dissipated”
that

after

After
Rommel

Newton’s
alerted

Defendants to the presence of drugs in the Szathmarys’ car, they
had probable cause to execute the First Search.

Instead, the

Szathmarys argue that Defendants violated their Fourth Amendment
rights when, after no drugs were found during the First Search,
Defendants took the car to the police station to execute the
Second Search.

The Court disagrees.

During a traffic stop, when an officer “has probable cause
to believe that a car is carrying contraband,” the officer may
do a warrantless search of the car at the scene or later at the
police station.

United States v. Fattaleh, 746 F.Supp.599, 601

(D.Md. 1990) (quoting United States v. Haley, 669 F.2d 201, 203
(4th Cir. 1982)).

The Szathmarys first contend that a search at

the police station requires Defendants to make an arrest.
under

United

States

v.

Brookins,

18

the

existence

of

But

probable

cause, rather than the arrest of a suspect, is what permits a
warrantless search at the police station.

See 345 F.3d 231, 238

(4th Cir. 2003) (holding that “the ongoing existence of probable
cause . . . not the factual happenstance of search incident to
arrest,” entitles an officer to a warrantless search at the
police station).
The Szathmarys next assert that because the First Search
was fruitless
cause

and

other “exculpatory” circumstances,

“dissipated,”

Second Search.

preventing

Defendants

from

probable

executing

the

The Szathmarys’ dissipation theory relies on

only two cases with binding authority: McDaniel v. Arnold, 898
F.Supp.2d 809 (D.Md. 2012) and United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S.
90 (2006).
In McDaniel, the Szathmarys overlook that the court was
addressing how
cause

from

exculpatory circumstances may

being

circumstances

established

may

--

dissipate

rather

prevent

than

probable

how

cause

probable

exculpatory
after

establishment, which is what the Szathmarys argue here.

its

See 898

F.Supp.2d at 842 (“[I]n order to arrive at probable cause, ‘an
officer may not disregard readily available exculpatory evidence
of

which

he

is

aware’”

(emphasis

added)

Arnold, 214 F.3d 535, 541 (4th Cir. 2000))).

(citing

Wadkins

v.

And the parties do

not dispute that there was probable cause for Newton to execute
the First Search.
19

In Grubbs, the Supreme Court observed that probable cause
“may cease to exist after a warrant is issued,” but only after
an officer learns that “contraband is no longer located at the
place to be searched” or because the probable cause has grown
“stale.”

547 U.S. at 95 n.2.

Here, Defendants never learned

after the First Search that drugs were no longer located in the
Szathmarys’ car because Newton did not search the entire car.
During the First Search, Newton did not search underneath the
hood,

underneath

the

dashboard,

the

glove

compartment,

and

perhaps most significantly, the trunk; he searched these areas
only during the Second Search.

(Newton Dep. 91).

Hence, only

after the Second Search did Defendants “learn” that drugs were
not

located

in

the

Szathmarys’

car.

At

best,

therefore,

probable cause “cease[d] to exist” only after the Second Search.
See 547 U.S. at 96.
For similar reasons, the authority outside of the Fourth
Circuit that the Szathmarys rely on to advance their dissipation
argument is readily distinguishable.

The Szathmarys rely mostly

on United States v. Bowling, 900 F.2d 926 (6th Cir. 1990), but
in that case, the Sixth Circuit held that “where an initial
fruitless

consent

search

dissipates

the

probable

cause

that

justified a warrant, new indicia of probable cause must exist to
repeat a search of the same premises pursuant to the warrant.”
Id. at 932 (emphasis added).

Here, searched different areas
20

during the Second Search – he did not repeat the First Search.8
Grubbs and Bowling aside, in the Fourth Circuit, once an officer
has probable cause, the officer “may search ‘every part of the
vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the
search.”

United States v. Kelly, 592 F.3d 586, 590 (4th Cir.

2010) (quoting United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982)).
The uncontroverted facts show that Newton’s First Search and
Second Search did just that.

Thus, the Court concludes that

Newton had probable cause to conduct the Second Search.
In

sum,

the

undisputed

facts

establish

that

the

Second

Search did not violate the Szathmarys’ Fourth Amendment rights.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that Defendants are protected
by qualified immunity for Newton’s actions and deserve judgment
as a matter of law.
3.

Whether Ziegenfuss Unlawfully Seized Mrs. Szathmary

In addition to protecting a citizen’s right to be free from
unreasonable

searches,

unreasonable seizures.

the

Fourth

Amendment

protects

against

Unus v. Kane, 565 F.3d 103, 119 (4th

Cir. 2009).

Reasonableness of a seizure “depends on a balance

between

public

the

interest

and

8

the

individual's

right

to

For the aforementioned reasons, the parties’ disagreement
over whether Newton conducted two searches, as the Szathmarys
contend, or whether Newton began his search on Route 40 and
simply finished the same search at the police station, as
Defendants maintain, is inconsequential. The relevant issue is
whether there was overlap between the areas Newton searched, not
whether there was continuity between the searches.
21

personal

security

officers.”
(1975).

free

from

arbitrary

interference

by

law

United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878

The Fourth Circuit has identified three categories of

police-citizen

interactions:

(1)

an

arrest,

which

requires

probable cause; (2) a brief investigatory stop, which requires
reasonable suspicion; and (3) brief encounters, which do not
implicate the Fourth Amendment.

United States v. Weaver, 282

F.3d 302, 309 (4th Cir. 2002) (internal citations omitted).
first
See

two

id.

categories
A

seizure

constitute
occurs

Fourth

when,

Amendment

under

the

The

“seizures.”

totality

of

the

circumstances, “a reasonable person would not feel free to leave
or

otherwise

(citing

United

States v. Sullivan, 138 F.3d 126, 131 (4th Cir. 1998)).

“[T]he

crucial

test

circumstances

terminate

is

the

whether,

surrounding

encounter.”

taking
the

Id.

into

account

encounter,

the

all

police

of

the

conduct

would ‘have communicated to a reasonable person that he was not
at

liberty

business.’”

to

ignore
Florida

the
v.

police
Bostick,

presence
501

U.S.

and

go

429,

about
437

his

(1991)

(quoting Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 569 (1988)).
Here, the parties do not dispute that Ziegenfuss seized
Mrs. Szathmary when she placed Mrs. Szathmary in handcuffs, put
her in the back of Ziegenfuss’s patrol car, and took her to the
police station.

Defendants argue this seizure was permissible

under the Fourth Amendment.

The Court agrees.
22

Mrs. Szathmary’s seizure falls between the first and second
kinds of police-citizen interactions identified in Weaver: the
K-9

provided

Ziegenfuss

probable

never

cause

formally

of

illegal

arrested

Mrs.

drug

activity,

Szathmary.

In

yet
any

event, Ziegenfuss’s detention of Mrs. Szathmary was reasonable
because Ziegenfuss had probable cause to believe Mrs. Szathmary
was involved in illegal drug activity.

See Jones v. Ashford,

No. TDC-14-3639, 2017 WL 221783, at *5 (D.Md. Jan. 18, 2017)
(concluding that

plaintiff’s detention was reasonable because

defendant officer had probable cause to believe plaintiff had
trespassed).
The

Szathmarys

also

argue

that

even

though

Ziegenfuss

released Mrs. Szathmary at the police station, she was still not
free to leave because she lacked a purse, money, identification,
mobile phone, or awareness of where she was.
constitute

a

seizure.

When

determining

This does not

whether

there

is

a

seizure, courts do not consider factual circumstances unrelated
to what the officer’s conduct communicated to the suspect.

See

Bostick, 501 U.S. at 437 (quoting Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 569)
(describing the test for seizure as whether the “police conduct
would ‘have communicated to a reasonable person that [she] was
not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about [her]
business” (emphasis added)).

It is uncontroverted that when

they got to the police station, Ziegenfuss told Mrs. Szathmary
23

that she is released, and in fact, commanded her to leave.

(See

Ziegenfuss Dep. 24) (“You’re going to be released . . . You need
to go.”).
In sum, the undisputed facts establish that Ziegenfuss did
not

violate

the

Mrs.

Szathmary’s

Fourth

Amendment

rights.

Accordingly, the Court concludes that Defendants are protected
by

qualified

immunity

for

Ziegenfuss’s

actions

and

deserve

judgment as a matter of law.
4.

Whether Newton Held Mr. Szathmary for an Unreasonable
Amount of Time

The

Szathmarys’

final

Fourth

Amendment

argument

is

that

Newton detained Mr. Szathmary for an unreasonable amount of time
under the Fourth Amendment.
To review, a

The Court is not persuaded.

detention may be longer than necessary to

accomplish the purposes of a routine traffic stop if there is at
least

some

Ortiz,

669

reasonable
F.3d

at

suspicion

cause

Mr.

seizure,

additional

Id. (citing Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 136
that

intrusive

this

arrest.

assert

more

of

activity.

activity

To

a

criminal

illegal

(2009)).

permits

other

Probable

444.

of

Szathmary’s

including

detention

was

unreasonably long, the Szathmarys rely on Chambers v. Maroney,
399 U.S. 42 (1970), to maintain that Mr. Szathmary’s detention
may only last as long as it would take Defendants to obtain a
warrant.

But Chambers does not address detentions at all.

24

The

Szathmarys also rely on Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500
(1983), for the proposition that the scope of Mr. Szathmary’s
detention
Royer,

must

be

however,

tailored

for

addressed

the

its

underlying

scope

of

seizures

detention is based on less than probable cause.
500

(“The

reasonableness

requirement

of

justification.

the

when

the

See 460 U.S. at
Fourth

Amendment

requires no less when the police action is a seizure permitted
on

less

than

enforcement

probable

interests.

cause

The

because

scope

of

of

the

legitimate

detention

law

must

be

carefully tailored to its underlying justification.”).
The Szathmarys cite no other authority, and the Court’s own
exhaustive research reveals none, that address how to evaluate
the reasonableness of a detention’s length based on probable
cause.

Ordinarily,

circumstances
suspect,

give

those

no such guidance is needed because
rise

same

arrest that suspect.

to

probable

circumstances

cause

usually

for
lead

when

detaining
officers

a
to

This typically renders the length of the

preceding detention unimportant.

Here, instead, there is the

unique circumstance of a K-9 scan alerting Defendants to the
presence

of

drugs

in

the

Szathmarys’

actually finding any drugs.

car,

yet

Newton

never

As a result, Newton detained Mr.

Szathmary but later releasing him without arrest.
The
Fourth

most

Circuit

analogous
case,

instance

United

States
25

occurred
v.

in

an

unreported

Ramirez–Jimenez,

where

criminal defendant Ramirez–Jimenez was a passenger in a car that
officers had probable cause to believe was involved in a drug
deal.

652 F.App’x 211, 212 (4th Cir. 2016).

An officer pulled

the car over and multiple officers searched the car twice.
at 213.

Id.

After “just over an hour,” the officers did not find

any drugs and Ramirez–Jimenez was free to go.

Id.

On appeal,

Ramirez–Jimenez

the

stop

argued

the

“constitutionally excessive.”

duration

of

Id. at 214.

was

The Fourth Circuit

held that the presence of probable cause justified the “extended
stop” and “protracted detention” of the car’s passengers.

Id.

at

on

the

detained

Mr.

215–16.

The

court,

however,

did

not

elaborate

protracted detention’s limits under the Fourth Amendment.
Here,

the

parties

dispute

how

long

Newton

Szathmary.

According to Newton, he released Mr. Szathmary at

12:45 a.m.

(Newton Dep. 86–87).9

According to the Szathmarys,

he released Mr. Szathmary at 4:47 a.m.
Dep. 34 (testifying that the

(See Alyce Szathmary

Szathmarys arrived in Dover at

sunrise); Cross Mot. Summ. J. Exs. 9 & 10 (stating that sunrise
that day was 5:47 a.m. and that Dover is a one hour drive from
Elkton)).

But assessing whether either detention’s length was

unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment requires the Court, at

9

To the extent the Szathmarys ask the Court to make a
credibility determination as to Newton’s recordkeeping, the
Court will not assess the credibility of a witness when
considering a motion for summary judgment.
26

best, to apply the vague standard in Ramirez–Jimenez.

Because

the Fourth Circuit decided Ramirez–Jimenez in June of 2016, a
little over four years after Newton detained Mr. Szathmary, the
Court concludes that Mr. Szathmary’s rights were not “clearly
established” at the time of Newton’s purported violation.

See

Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232 (citing Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201).
Thus, Defendants have met their burden under the second prong of
qualified immunity.

See Wilson, 337 F.3d at 397.

Accordingly,

the Court concludes that Defendants are protected by qualified
immunity for Newton’s actions and deserve judgment as a matter
of law.
5.

Claims under Maryland Law

Finally, the sole remaining claims under Maryland law are
the Szathmarys’ claims relating to Newton’s detention of Mr.
Szathmary.
jurisdiction

District courts may decline to exercise supplemental
over

a

state

claim

if

“the

district

court

has

dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.”
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3)

(2012).

District courts “enjoy wide

latitude” in making this determination.
F.3d 106, 110 (4th Cir. 1995).

Shanaghan v. Cahill, 58

The Court declines to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over these claims.

Accordingly, the

Court will grant Defendants’ Motion and deny the Szathmarys’
Motion.

27

III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will GRANT Defendants’
Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 36) and DENY Plaintiffs’
Cross Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 37).
also ENTER judgment in favor of Defendants.

The Court will

A separate Order

follows.
Entered this 31th day of March, 2017
/s/
________________________
George L. Russell, III
United States District Judge

28