Quigley v. Meritus Health, Inc. et al

Filing 43

MEMORANDUM. Signed by Chief Judge Catherine C. Blake on 2/26/2016. (nd2s, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
MARGARET QUIGLEY
v.
MERITUS HEALTH, INC., et al.

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Civil No. CCB-14-2227

MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff Margaret Quigley, proceeding pro se, filed this action alleging interference with
her rights under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq.,
by her former employer Meritus Health, Inc., Meritus Medical Center, Chris Bumbaugh, and
Sherry Mace (collectively, “Defendants”). Now pending are the parties’ cross-motions for
summary judgment, along with the oppositions and replies to those motions. (ECF Nos. 36, 38,
40, 41). The issues have been fully briefed, and no hearing is necessary. See Local Rule 105.6
(D. Md. 2014). For the reasons stated below, the court will deny the cross-motions for summary
judgment.
BACKGROUND
In 2007, Quigley was hired by defendant Meritus Health, Inc. to work at Defendant
Meritus Medical Center (“the Hospital”) as an ultrasound technician. (Quigley Aff. 1 ¶ 3, Pl.’s
Mot. Summ. J. Ex. A, ECF No. 38).1 Defendant Mace, the Radiology Manager at the Hospital,

1

Defendants have filed two affidavits from Mace. Her August 20, 2015 affidavit (which was
subsequently filed again with a minor edit and a new date of October 1, 2015) will be referred to herein as
“Mace Aff. 1,” and her “second affidavit” dated October 1, 2015 will be referred to as “Mace Aff. 2.”
Quigley asserts that the first Mace affidavit is deficient in form and substance. Because no significant
deficiencies are apparent, both Mace affidavits have been considered in adjudicating this motion. Quigley
has also filed two affidavits. Her September 15, 2015 affidavit will be referred to as “Quigley Aff. 1,” and
her affidavit dated October 17, 2012 (which likely, based on context, was actually signed October 17,
2015) will be referred to as “Quigley Aff. 2.”

supervised Quigley throughout her employment. (Mace Aff. 1 ¶ 3, Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. Ex. A,
ECF No. 36-2). Defendant Bumbaugh works as Director of Human Resources for Meritus
Health, Inc. (Email from Chris Bumbaugh to Margaret Quigley, Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. Ex. B-13,
ECF No. 36-3).
The Hospital is a trauma center, and is required to have ultrasound technician coverage
on a 24/7 basis. (Mace Aff. 1 ¶ 4, Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. Ex. A). In 2011 and 2012, the Hospital
employed six full-time ultrasound technicians, who worked day, evening, and night shifts.
(Quigley Dep. 21-22, Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. Ex. B, ECF No. 36-3). Ultrasound technicians
working night and weekend shifts were paid a higher rate. (Quigley Aff. 2 ¶ 2, Pl.’s Reply Ex. E,
ECF No. 41-1). Beginning in 2008, Quigley worked a permanent schedule of night shifts,
including weekend nights.2 (Quigley Aff. 1 ¶¶ 5, 6, Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. Ex. A). Since 2011, the
other full-time ultrasound technicians regularly rotated among day, evening, and night shifts, and
had no fixed schedule. (Id. ¶ 7).
Quigley took FMLA leave on several occasions. In both 2011 and 2012, Quigley
exhausted her twelve weeks of FMLA entitlement. (Id. ¶¶ 12, 19, 23, 26, 28; Letter from Tammy
Beachley to Margaret Quigley, Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. Ex. B-5, ECF No. 36-3). In late November
of 2011, the Hospital experienced a failure in ultrasound coverage during one of Quigley’s
assigned night shifts. (Mace Aff. 1 ¶ 5, Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. Ex. A; Quigley Aff. 1 ¶ 21, Pl.’s
Mot. Summ. J. Ex. A). There were some additional coverage difficulties in late 2011 and early
2012. (Mace Aff. 1 ¶ 6, Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. Ex. A). As a result, beginning as early as
November, 2011, the Hospital began to discuss adopting a rotating shift for all ultrasound

2

Quigley occasionally filled in evening or day shifts as overtime or for the purposes of filling out an 80
hour pay period, but not as part of her regular schedule. Quigley Aff. 1 ¶¶ 5, 6, Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. Ex.
A, ECF No. 38.

technicians. (Id. ¶¶ 7, 8, 9). Mace had meetings with the ultrasound technicians in February and
March of 2012 to discuss schedule changes. (Id. ¶¶ 8, 9).
In anticipation of foot surgery, Quigley asked for and received approved FMLA leave,
scheduled to begin April 6, 2012. (Letter from Tammy Beachley to Margaret Quigley, Defs.’
Mot. Summ. J. Ex B-4, ECF No. 36-3). However, Quigley became ill on March 7, 2012, and did
not return to work from that date until her scheduled FMLA leave began. (Email from Linda
Walla to Sherry Mace, Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. Ex. C-7, ECF No. 38). In mid-March, during the time
Quigley was ill before her scheduled leave, Mace and other Meritus employees corresponded by
email about Mace’s desire to change Quigley’s schedule to day shift work. (Id.; Meritus Internal
Email Correspondence, Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. Ex. C-6). However, Quigley never worked day
shifts in March, since she remained on leave. (Id.)
On May 28, 2012, Quigley’s 2012 FMLA leave was exhausted. (Letter from Tammy
Beachley to Margaret Quigley, Def. Mot. Summ. J. Ex. B-5, ECF No. 36-3). Quigley emailed
Mace to notify her of her intent to return to work on May 30, 2012. (Email from Margaret
Quigley to Sherry Mace, Def. Mot. Summ. J. Ex. B-8, ECF No. 36-3). At that time, Mace told
Quigley that she would be placed in a rotational shift schedule with the other ultrasound
technicians upon her return. (Email from Sherry Mace to Margaret Quigley, Def. Mot. Summ. J.
Ex. B-10, ECF No. 36-3). Quigley objected, stating that the change would impact her financially
and would not allow her to care for her family obligations. (Emails Between Margaret Quigley
and Sherry Mace, Chris Bumbaugh, and Tammy Beachley, Def. Mot. Summ. J. Ex. B-10, B-11,
B-13, ECF No. 36-3). The Hospital, through Mace and Bumbaugh, took the position that the
decision to move to a completely rotational schedule had been planned for some time to best
serve the Hospital and its employees and patients. (Id.) Because Quigley refused to work the

rotating shift, her last day at the Hospital was June 4, 2012. (Quigley Aff. 1 ¶ 34, Pl.’s Mot.
Summ. J. Ex. A). She then filed the instant action, alleging that the Hospital’s failure to reinstate
her to her shift interfered with her FMLA rights.
ANALYSIS
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides that summary judgment “should be
rendered if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). Whether a fact is material depends upon the
substantive law. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
“A party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment ‘may not rest
upon the mere allegations or denials of [his] pleadings,’ but rather must ‘set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens Football Club,
Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 522 (4th Cir. 2003) (alteration in original) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)).
Conclusory or speculative allegations do not create a genuine issue of material fact, nor does a
“mere scintilla of evidence[.]” Thompson v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 312 F.3d 645, 649 (4th
Cir. 2002) (citing Phillips v. CSX Transp., Inc., 190 F.3d 285, 287 (4th Cir. 1999)). The court
must “view the facts and draw reasonable inferences ‘in the light most favorable to the party
opposing the [summary judgment] motion,’” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007)
(alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Diebold, 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962) (per curiam)).
Moreover, complaints filed by pro se litigants should be liberally construed. See De’Lonta v.
Angelone, 330 F.3d 630, 633 (4th Cir. 2003). However, the court also must abide by the
“affirmative obligation of the trial judge to prevent factually unsupported claims and defenses

from proceeding to trial.” Bouchat, 346 F.3d at 526 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 778–79 (4th Cir. 1993)).
The FMLA creates two types of claims. The first includes interference claims, which are
based on alleged attempts by an employer to “interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or
the attempt to exercise” any right protected by the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1); interference
claims encompass violations of the right to be reinstated to a similar position after taking leave.
The second is based on retaliation; these claims result from an employer’s allegedly
“discharg[ing] or in any other manner discriminat[ing] against any individual for opposing any
practice made unlawful by” the FMLA, id. at § 2615(a)(2). Quigley’s amended complaint is
limited to an interference claim. To establish an FMLA interference claim, an employee must
prove that: (1) she was an eligible employee; (2) her employer was covered by the FMLA; (3)
she was entitled to leave under the FMLA; (4) she gave her employer adequate notice of her
intention to take leave; and (5) the employer denied her FMLA benefits to which she was
entitled. Rodriguez v. Smithfield Packing Co., 545 F. Supp. 2d 508, 516 (D. Md. 2008) (citing
Edgar v. JAC Prods., Inc., 443 F.3d 501, 507 (6th Cir. 2006)). Specifically, Quigley alleges that
Defendants violated her right to be reinstated to her position on the night shift.
The FMLA generally entitles an employee to return to the same shift or equivalent work
schedule she had prior to taking FMLA leave. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.215(e)(2). Some courts have
found a change from a permanent day shift to a permanent overnight shift raises a question of
fact whether the schedules were equivalent for purposes of the FMLA. See, e.g., Hunt v. Rapides
Healthcare Sys. LLC, 277 F.3d 757, 766 (5th Cir. 2001). In this case, Quigley claims that the
schedules were not equivalent for two reasons: first, that the rotating shift did not allow her to
accommodate her family responsibilities, and second, that the pay would not be equivalent in the

rotating shift schedule because her permanent night and weekend shift schedule guaranteed her
higher rates of pay. Defendants do not contest that Quigley’s overall pay would be lower if she
were working more day shifts.
Instead, Defendants contend that no FMLA violation occurred because the “shift
reorganization” to a completely rotational schedule would have occurred regardless of Quigley’s
FMLA leave. The “shift reorganization” significantly changed only Quigley’s schedule, since the
undisputed evidence reflects that the other ultrasound technicians were already working on
rotating shift schedules (and had been covering Quigley’s night shifts during her FMLA leave).
While their rotating schedules would now regularly incorporate shifts that had been covered on a
permanent basis by Quigley, the fundamental nature of their rotating shift schedules would
remain unchanged. Defendants have established that there was some discussion about
implementing a changed shift schedule before Quigley went out on leave in March, 2012.
However, the evidence does not conclusively establish that any determination was made at that
time, and does not conclusively establish the nature of the changed schedule under contemplation
during that time frame. See, e.g., (Staff Meeting Notes, Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J Ex. A-1, ECF No.
36-2) (“The primary purpose of the meeting will be to discuss the creation of a new scheduling
model. The meeting is not mandatory but everyone is encouraged to attend since everyone will
be affected by the new model.”). In fact, Quigley asserts that the February, 2012 meeting
resulted in implementation only of a new rotational back up call schedule, which did not affect
her permanent night shift schedule. (Quigley Aff. 2 ¶¶ 3, 4, Pl.’s Reply Ex. E). Emails between
Meritus employees in March, 2012 reflect an intent to have Quigley work day shifts, at least
temporarily, but make no reference to a completely rotational schedule, despite Mace’s assertion
that the “decision to implement a completely-rotational schedule for ultrasound technicians was

made prior to Plaintiff’s scheduled leave for surgery.” Compare (Meritus Internal Email
Correspondence, Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. Ex. C-6, C-7, ECF No. 38) with Mace Aff. 2 ¶ 4, Defs.’
Reply Ex. C, ECF No. 40-3). The fact that discussions of some type occurred prior to Quigley’s
scheduled leave does not establish that any formal decision had been made or implemented, and
does not rule out the possibility that Defendants’ ultimate decision to end Quigley’s permanent
night shift assignment and move to a completely rotational schedule was affected, in some way,
by Quigley’s FMLA leave. Thus, a genuine dispute of fact remains as to whether the “shift
reorganization” implemented upon Quigley’s return would have occurred regardless of her
FMLA leave, rendering summary judgment for either party inappropriate.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the cross-motions for summary judgment will be denied. A
separate Order follows.

Dated: February 26, 2016

/S/
Catherine C. Blake
United States District Judge