Queen v. Warden of Maryland Correctional Institution-Hagerstown et al

Filing 26

MEMORANDUM. Signed by Chief Judge Catherine C. Blake on 6/29/2015. (c/m 6/30/2015)(ko, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
STEVE QUEEN,
#347-405

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v.

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WARDEN OF MARYLAND
CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION HAGERSTOWN, et al.

Civil Action No. CCB-14-2413

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MEMORANDUM

Pro se plaintiff Steve Queen, a state prisoner at Maryland Correctional InstitutionHagerstown (“MCI-H”), filed the instant verified complaint alleging he was told he possessed
excess property and had to mail it home at his own expense, donate it, or destroy it. He says he
was deprived of property without due process because MCI-H did not offer him a predeprivation
hearing. Now pending is a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment filed by defendants
Officer Jenkins, a Correctional Officer at MCI-H; Scott Oakley, Executive Director of the
Inmate Grievance Office (“IGO”); and Richard Dovey, MCI-H’s warden.1 Queen responded.
The court finds a hearing in this matter unnecessary. See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2014). For
the reasons that follow, defendants’ motion, construed as a motion for summary judgment, shall
be granted.
BACKGROUND
Queen filed his complaint on July 29, 2014. In it, he alleges that on April 4, 2014, after a
disciplinary hearing in which he was sentenced to 225 days of disciplinary segregation, he was
advised that he had to forfeit the remainder of his “non-allowable” property as his segregation
sentence exceeded 180 days. (Compl. 2, ECF No. 1.) Queen says that the issue of property
1

The Clerk shall be directed to amend the docket to reflect the correct name of MCI-H’s warden, Richard Dovey.

forfeiture was not discussed during the disciplinary hearing. He maintains that pursuant to a
prison directive, “Executive Directive OPS.220.0004.1,” MCI-H is required to store all nonallowable property so long as it does not exceed certain space limitations, which Queen claims
his property did not. He further claims that he should have been permitted 120 days to prove
ownership or appeal the decision regarding property through the administrative remedy
procedure but was denied this opportunity.
The defendants filed their motion to dismiss or for summary judgment on December 15,
2014. They say that on April 1, 2004, Queen was found guilty of violating inmate rule 122
(possession of telecommunications device) and sentenced to 225 days’ disciplinary segregation.
(IGO Letter 3, ECF No. 18-2.) Pursuant to Executive Directive MCI-H ID 110-0006-1, an
inmate who receives a disciplinary segregation sentence in excess of 180 days “shall have all
appliances and non-allowable/excess/contraband property mailed out of the institution at the
inmates’ [sic] expense, donated or destroyed.” (MCI-H ID 110-0006-1 2, ECF No. 18-3.) The
following items of Queen’s property were determined to be non-allowable: (1) a television,
remote control, and antenna; (2) a digital converter; (3) several music CDs and video games; (4)
a video game system; (5) two beard trimmers; and (6) a set of broken headphones. (Notice of
Confiscation, ECF No. 18-4.) In accordance with MCI-H ID 110-0006-1, Queen was advised of
his right to send all of his non-allowable property to his home or other residence. On April 4,
2014, Queen designated that most of his “non-allowable” personal belongings be sent to Ann
Queen in Baltimore, Maryland; marked the broken headphones to be destroyed; and donated the
CDs and video games. (Id.)
On April 14, 2014, and May 9, 2014, Queen filed requests for administrative relief
indicating that he did not approve of the sending out of his personal property, and complaining

that he had not been given a hearing on the issue. (Requests for Administrative Remedy, ECF
18-5.) Queen’s requests were dismissed and he filed a grievance with the IGO. (IGO Letter.)
The IGO complaint was dismissed with a finding that it failed to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted. It was further noted that Queen was not entitled to a hearing regarding the
“confiscation” of his property, and that the “confiscation” was in accordance with the applicable
directive, DCD 220-004,2 as it related to a rule violation. Id.
In his opposition to the defendants’ motion, filed on January 13, 2015, Queen reiterates
his claim that his due process rights were violated in the handling of his property. He also argues
that MCI-H failed to fully enforce its own directives by not providing him with a hearing and not
storing his property during the administrative appeals process.
ANALYSIS
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides that summary judgment should be granted
“if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (emphases added). “A dispute is
genuine if ‘a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’” Libertarian Party
of Va. v. Judd, 718 F.3d 308, 313 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Dulaney v. Packaging Corp. of Am.,
673 F.3d 323, 330 (4th Cir. 2012)). “A fact is material if it ‘might affect the outcome of the suit
under the governing law.’” Id. (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986)). Accordingly, “the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties
will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment[.]” Anderson,
477 U.S. at 247-48. The court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party, Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1866 (2014) (per curiam), and draw all
2

There is some confusion in the record as to whether the number of the directive is 220.004 (as stated in the IGO
Letter) or 220.0004 (as stated in the copy of the directive Queen attached to his opposition at ECF No. 24-1). The
discrepancy does not appear material to the issues in this case.

reasonable inferences in that party’s favor, Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007) (citations
omitted); see also Jacobs v. N.C. Admin. Office of the Courts, 780 F.3d 562, 568-69 (4th Cir.
2015). At the same time, the court must “prevent factually unsupported claims and defenses
from proceeding to trial.” Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 526 (4th
Cir. 2003) (quoting Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 778-79 (4th Cir. 2003)).
Queen claims MCI-H violated his procedural due process rights by denying him a
hearing before requiring him to send away, destroy, or donate his non-allowable property. His
claim fails.
To begin, Queen misreads the applicable prison regulations. OPS 220.0004.05(A)(2)
specifically provides that “[p]roperty in the possession of an inmate that exceeds established
limits is subject to confiscation and disposition according [to] procedures for handling and
disposition of inmate property.” Queen’s non-allowable property was, in fact, handled in
accordance with the procedures described in MCI-H ID 110-0006-1. And the provision
providing that property be held for 120 days prior to destruction, OPS 220.0004.05(F)(9), is
limited to property deemed contraband, and Queen’s property was not contraband. For the same
reason, OPS 220.0004.05(G), which provides inmates the right to a hearing on forfeiture of
property confiscated as contraband, is also inapplicable.
Further, the disposal of Queen’s non-allowable property followed a disciplinary
adjudication in which Queen pled guilty to possession of a telecommunications device, and
agreed to 225 days of disciplinary segregation.3 (Inmate Hearing Record 2, ECF No. 24-1.) The
disposal of his non-allowable property was not an additional sanction but rather flowed from his
disciplinary segregation. This is so because MCI-H agrees to store only some of a prisoner’s
possessions while that prisoner is in disciplinary segregation, and the characterization of some of
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Queen does not argue that his due process rights were violated by this adjudication.

Queen’s property as non-allowable for storage followed established, permissible prison
procedure. Further, as Queen readily admits, he accessed a meaningful hearing procedure
through the grievance process following the disposal of his property.
Finally, it is not clear that Queen suffered a cognizable property deprivation. Due
process generally requires that a state actor not deprive someone of a cognizable property interest
without first providing notice and an opportunity to be heard, before the deprivation occurs, if
practicable. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 541 (1981). That rule, however, presupposes
that a deprivation has taken place. The Tenth Circuit has flatly held that a prisoner is not
“deprived” of property when he is given the option of sending it “to a place of his choosing,”
reasoning that “[w]hile an inmate’s ownership of property is a protected property interest that
may not be infringed without due process, there is a difference between the right to own property
and the right to possess property while in prison.” Hatten v. White, 275 F.3d 1208, 1210 (10th
Cir. 2002). Similarly, the Seventh Circuit has questioned whether a prisoner “allege[d] an actual
deprivation of his property” when the prison sent several books he had ordered to a member of
his family rather than allowing him to possess them in prison. Munson v. Gaetz, 673 F.3d 630,
638 (7th Cir. 2012). See also Pryor-El v. Kelly, 892 F. Supp. 261, 271 (D.D.C. 1995) (“Where
an inmate’s personal property is seized and sent to an address of his choosing, such action is not
a deprivation.”). MCI-H gave Queen the option of sending those items of his property deemed
non-allowable to the address of his choosing. In so doing, MCI-H interfered only with his right
to possess that property within the prison, not with his actual ownership of it. It is therefore not

clear Queen suffered a cognizable deprivation within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.4
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the defendants’ motion to dismiss or for summary
judgment, treated as a motion for summary judgment, will be granted. A separate order follows.

June 29, 2015
Date

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/S/
Catherine C. Blake
United States District Judge

To the extent Queen asserts a claim based on Officer Jenkins’s alleged loss of Queen’s radio, that claim fails
because the deprivation did not occur as a result of established state procedure, and Queen had access to meaningful
post-deprivation remedies through Maryland’s Tort Claims Act and the IGO. See Parratt, 451 U.S. at 540-44.