Sampson v. Colvin

Filing 22

ORDER Granting 20 Motion for Summary Judgment; Affirming the Commissioner's judgment pursuant to sentence four of 42:405(g). Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephanie A Gallagher on 5/4/2015. (c/m 5/4/2015 nd2s, Deputy Clerk)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
CHAMBERS OF
STEPHANIE A. GALLAGHER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

101 WEST LOMBARD STREET
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21201
[phone]
Fax [phone]

May 4, 2015
De-Sayles Donnell Sampson
3213 Burleith Ave.
Baltimore, MD 21215
Jennifer Hope Stinnette
Social Security Administration
6401 Security Blvd Rm 617
Baltimore, MD 21235
RE:

De-Sayles Donnell Sampson v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration;
Civil No. SAG-14-2448

Dear Mr. Sampson and Counsel:
On August 1, 2014, Plaintiff De-Sayles Donnell Sampson, who appears pro se, petitioned
this Court to review the Social Security Administration’s final decision to deny his application
for Supplemental Security Income. (ECF No. 1). I have considered the Commissioner’s Motion
for Summary Judgment.1 (ECF No. 20). I also carefully reviewed the entire file. I find that no
hearing is necessary. See Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2014). This Court must uphold the decision of
the agency if it is supported by substantial evidence and if the agency employed proper legal
standards. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3); Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir.
1996). Under that standard, I will grant the Commissioner’s motion. This letter explains my
rationale.
Mr. Sampson protectively filed his application for benefits on December 17, 2009,
alleging a disability onset date of September 10, 2008. (Tr. 51, 165-72). His application was
denied initially and on reconsideration. (Tr. 53-55, 57-58). A hearing, at which Mr. Sampson
was represented by counsel, was held on April 10, 2013, before an Administrative Law Judge
(“ALJ”). (Tr. 18-49). Following the hearing, the ALJ determined that Mr. Sampson was not
disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act during the relevant time frame. (Tr. 617). The Appeals Council denied Mr. Sampson’s request for review, (Tr. 1-4), so the ALJ’s
decision constitutes the final, reviewable decision of the agency.
The ALJ found that Mr. Sampson suffered from the severe impairments of spinal
stenosis, degenerative joint disease, myalgia, peripheral neuropathy, and obesity. (Tr. 11).

1

Mr. Sampson did not file a Motion for Summary Judgment. After the Commissioner filed her Motion for
Summary Judgment on March 25, 2015, a Rule 12/56 letter was mailed to Mr. Sampson, advising him of the
potential consequences of failure to oppose the Commissioner’s motion. (ECF No. 21). Mr. Sampson has not filed
anything in response.

De-Sayles Donnell Sampson v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration
Civil No. SAG-14-2448
May 4, 2015
Page 2

Despite these impairments, the ALJ determined that Mr. Sampson retained the residual
functional capacity (“RFC”) to “perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(b) with a
sit/stand at-will option; that does not require climbing ladders, ropes or scaffolds; nor more than
occasional climbing ramps/stairs, crawling, crouching, kneeling, balancing, overhead reaching
and stooping.” (Tr. 12). After considering the testimony of a vocational expert (“VE”), the ALJ
determined that Mr. Sampson could perform jobs existing in significant numbers in the national
economy and that, therefore, he was not disabled. (Tr. 16-17).
I have carefully reviewed the ALJ’s opinion and the entire record. See Elam v. Barnhart,
386 F. Supp. 2d 746, 753 (E.D. Tex. 2005) (mapping an analytical framework for judicial review
of a pro se action challenging an adverse administrative decision, including: (1) examining
whether the Commissioner’s decision generally comports with regulations, (2) reviewing the
ALJ’s critical findings for compliance with the law, and (3) determining from the evidentiary
record whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s findings). For the reasons described
below, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision.
The ALJ proceeded in accordance with applicable law at all five steps of the sequential
evaluation. The ALJ ruled in Mr. Sampson’s favor at step one, and determined that he had not
engaged in substantial gainful activity since his application date. (Tr. 11); see 20 C.F.R.
§404.1520(a)(4)(i). At step two, the ALJ considered the severity of each of the impairments that
Mr. Sampson claimed prevented him from working. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). As
noted above, the ALJ concluded that several of Mr. Sampson’s impairments were severe, and
determined that his right leg impairments and carpal tunnel syndrome were nonsevere. (Tr. 11).
After finding at least one of Mr. Sampson’s impairments severe, the ALJ continued with the
sequential evaluation and considered, at step four, whether Mr. Sampson’s severe and non-severe
impairments limited his ability to work. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(2), 416.945(a)(2).
At step three, the ALJ determined that Mr. Sampson’s impairments did not meet the
specific requirements of, or medically equal the criteria of, any listings. (Tr. 17-21). The ALJ
considered the specific requirements of Listing 1.04, which pertains to disorders of the spine.
See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, Pt. 1 § 1.04; (Tr. 18). The ALJ found that Mr. Sampson
did not have any of the requisite criteria, including nerve root compression, spinal arachnoiditis,
or motor loss. The ALJ noted that Mr. Sampson suffered from lumbar spinal stenosis “possibly
resulting in pseudoclaudication,” but noted that he did not meet the listing because he did not
display an inability to ambulate effectively. (Tr. 11-12). The ALJ supported that conclusion
with evidence that Mr. Sampson uses no assistive devices and walks his son to and from school
on a daily basis. (Tr. 12). A claimant bears the burden of demonstrating that his impairment
meets or equals a listed impairment. Kellough v. Heckler, 785 F.2d 1147, 1152 (4th Cir. 1986).
For a claimant to establish that his impairment meets or equals a listing, it must “meet all of the
specified medical criteria. An impairment that manifests only some of those criteria, no matter
how severely, does not qualify.” Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 530 (1990) (emphasis in
original). Notably, no medical source has opined that Mr. Sampson’s impairments met any
listing, and I agree that no listings are met.

De-Sayles Donnell Sampson v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration
Civil No. SAG-14-2448
May 4, 2015
Page 3

In considering Mr. Sampson’s RFC, the ALJ summarized Mr. Sampson’s subjective
complaints of pain affecting his legs, thighs, buttock and big toes, and the effects on his daily
activities. (Tr. 12-13). The ALJ also provided a detailed review of the medical records. (Tr. 1314). The ALJ noted that Mr. Sampson’s course of treatment has been “generally conservative”
and that he appears to have had relief from certain medications, although they were not always
taken consistently. (Tr. 14). The ALJ further noted the limited findings on physical examination
pertaining to Mr. Sampson’s symptoms. (Tr. 13-14). Accordingly, the ALJ determined that Mr.
Sampson’s subjective complaints were not entirely credible.2 (Tr. 13). The ALJ finally
reviewed the opinions of various medical sources. The ALJ assigned “minimal weight” to the
opinions of the non-examining State agency medical consultants who believed Mr. Sampson had
no severe impairments. (Tr. 14). Instead, the ALJ determined that several of Mr. Sampson’s
impairments were severe and would limit the type of jobs he would be able to perform. The ALJ
assigned “no weight” to the opinion of Ms. Dorothy Ware, a certified registered nurse
practitioner, on the grounds that she was not an acceptable medical source and that it is both
internally inconsistent and inconsistent with other medical records. (Tr. 15). The ALJ provided
specific examples of the alleged inconsistencies. Thus, the ALJ provided substantial evidence to
support his assignment of no weight. The ALJ also assigned “little weight” to the opinion of Dr.
K. Shaw-Taylor, which was a one-page opinion form simply requesting a “yes/no” answer to the
question of whether the claimant is disabled. (Tr. 309). Dr. Shaw-Taylor answered “yes,” and
wrote in the comment “if it is not surgically corrected,” but provided no additional comments or
rationale on the form. Id. The ALJ assigned the opinion little weight because it contained only
an opinion on the ultimate issue of disability, which is reserved to the Commissioner. I find no
error in that analysis.
My review of the ALJ’s decision is confined to whether substantial evidence, in the
record as it was reviewed by the ALJ, supports the decision, and whether correct legal standards
were applied. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390, 404 (1971). Even if there is other
evidence that may support Mr. Sampson’s position, I am not permitted to reweigh the evidence
or to substitute my own judgment for that of the ALJ. Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456
(4th Cir. 1990). In considering the entire record, therefore, I find the ALJ’s RFC determination
was supported by substantial evidence.
Next, at step four, the ALJ determined that, pursuant to his RFC assessment, Mr.
Sampson was unable to perform his past relevant work as a construction worker or disc jockey.
(Tr. 15). Accordingly, the ALJ proceeded to step five, where he considered the impact of Mr.
Sampson’s age and level of education on his ability to adjust to new work. (Tr. 15-16). Relying
on the Medical-Vocational Guidelines, 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2 § 202.21, the

2

The ALJ’s statement discounting Mr. Sampson’s credibility is similar to the problematic boilerplate language that
the Fourth Circuit recently determined warranted remand in Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632, 639 (4th Cir. 2015). It
is, however, critically distinguishable from that boilerplate because it does not reference the ALJ’s RFC assessment
and thus does not imply that the ALJ first assessed Mr. Sampson’s RFC and then used that assessment to determine
his credibility. See id. Moreover, the ALJ cured any issue created by his use of boilerplate credibility language by
thereafter properly and thoroughly analyzing Mr. Sampson’s credibility, specifically noting which of his complaints
were credited.

De-Sayles Donnell Sampson v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration
Civil No. SAG-14-2448
May 4, 2015
Page 4

ALJ correctly found that an individual of Mr. Sampson’s age and education, with a light RFC, is
not disabled per se. (Tr. 16). Since Mr. Sampson’s RFC assessment contained additional
limitations which impeded his ability to perform all or substantially all of the requirements of
light work, however, the ALJ asked the VE whether jobs existed in the national economy that
were suited to Mr. Sampson’s particular assessment. (Tr. 43-45). The VE testified that a person
with Mr. Sampson’s RFC would be capable of performing the jobs of photocopy machine
operator, mail clerk, and retail marker. Id. Based on the VE’s testimony, the ALJ concluded that
Mr. Sampson is capable of successfully adjusting to other work that exists in significant numbers
in the national economy. (Tr. 16-17). I find that the ALJ’s determination was supported by
substantial evidence.
For the reasons set forth herein, the Commissioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment
(ECF No. 20) is GRANTED. The Commissioner’s judgment is AFFIRMED pursuant to
sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The clerk is directed to CLOSE this case.
Despite the informal nature of this letter, it should be flagged as an opinion and docketed
as an order.
Sincerely yours,
/s/
Stephanie A. Gallagher
United States Magistrate Judge