Hart v. Shearin

Filing 31

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge George Levi Russell, III on 1/15/2016. (c/m 1/15/16)(krs, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
NATHANIEL LEKAI HART,

:

Plaintiff,

:

v.

:

BOBBY P. SHEARIN,

:

Defendant.

Civil Action No. GLR-14-2477

:
MEMORANDUM OPINION

THIS

MATTER

is

before

the

Court

on

pro

se

Plaintiff

Nathaniel Lekai Hart’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 24)
and Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint (ECF No. 30),
and Defendant Bobby P. Shearin’s Motion to Dismiss or, in the
Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No 25).

Hart is

an inmate at the North Branch Correctional Institution (“NBCI”)
in Cumberland, Maryland, and Shearin is NBCI’s former warden.
Principally at issue is whether Shearin violated Hart’s federal
constitutional rights when he placed Hart in segregated housing.
The

Court,

having

reviewed

the

documents, finds no hearing necessary.
(D.Md. 2014).

Motions

and

supporting

See Local Rule 105.6

For the reasons outlined below, the Court will

deny Hart’s Motions and grant Shearin’s Motion.

I.
A.

BACKGROUND1

NBCI Lockdown and Segregated Housing Units
Due to a rash of severe assaults by NBCI inmates on other

inmates and NBCI staff, NBCI placed the institution on lockdown
on August 5, 2013.

During the lockdown, NBCI limited inmate

showers, recreation, congregate religious observance, and group
schooling.

Inmates were permitted, however, to exercise and

conduct religious worship in their cells.
In further effort to quell the violence initiated by NBCI
inmates,

NBCI

created

four

housing

units.

NBCI

Housing Unit #1 as the primary segregation unit.

designated

NBCI reserved

Housing Unit #2 for Maximum II inmates—inmates requiring special
programming, such as mental health services, and inmates being
released

from

Housing

Unit

#1

whose

behavioral

histories

suggested difficulty in adjusting to a general population unit.
NBCI

designated

Housing

population units.

Units

#3

and

#4

as

the

general

NBCI made housing unit assignments based on

each inmate’s behavioral history and institutional adjustment.
NBCI placed Hart on disciplinary segregation on December
19,

2013;

he

was

released

on

January

2,

2014.

NBCI

then

transferred Hart to Housing Unit #2 on January 23, 2014.2
1

Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are taken from
the parties’ briefings on the instant Motions, and are viewed in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
2
The record is unclear as to where Hart was housed between
January 2, 2014 and January 23, 2014.
2

All

housing

units,

except

Housing

Unit

#1,

transition back to normal operations in 2014.

began

to

Housing Unit #2

resumed normal operations in August 2014.
B.

Hart’s Worship, Visitor, and Occupational History at NBCI
Between Sunday, August 10, 2014, and Sunday, January 11,

2015,

Hart

regularly

attended

Protestant

worship

services.

Specifically, he attended three services in August 2014, two
services in September 2014, four services in October 2014, five
services in November 2014, and four services in December 2014.
Hart has received two visits at NBCI.

A social worker

visited him on October 8, 2012, and his former wife visited him
on April 26, 2014.
NBCI placed Hart on a waiting list for a sanitation job on
January 27, 2014.
job.

On

On August 8, 2014, he began his sanitation

November

19,

2014,

Hart

was

reassigned

from

his

sanitation job to his current status as a student.
C.

Procedural Background
On

August

7,

2014,

Hart

filed

an

Administrative

Remedy

Procedure (“ARP”) request, complaining that he was a general
population

inmate,

but

had

been

population since January 2014.
the

ARP

request

as

segregated

from

(ECF No. 25-11).

untimely.

(Id.).

Hart

the

general

NBCI dismissed
then

filed

a

grievance with the Inmate Grievance Office (“IGO”), appealing
the dismissal of his ARP request.
3

(ECF No. 25-12).

The IGO

dismissed

the

grievance

on

November

3,

2014

for

exhaust administrative remedies and mootness.
2014,

NBCI

finding

had

him

sanctioned

guilty

of

Hart

with

interfering

order, and refusing an assignment.

cell

with

failure

On August 28,

restriction

staff,

to

after

disobeying

an

(Id.).

Hart filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) action on August 4,
2014.

(ECF No. 1).

Pursuant to the Court’s August 11, 2014

Order (ECF No. 3), Hart supplemented his Complaint on August 20,
2014.

(ECF

segregation

No.

4).

violated

Hart
his

alleges

federal

that

his

placement

constitutional

right

in
to

substantive due process because he has been unable to attend
school or church, have contact visits, or engage in recreation
or “normal movement.”

(ECF Nos. 1, 4).

Shearin filed a Motion

to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment
on March 13, 2015.

(ECF No. 25).

Motion for Summary Judgment.32
Response

to

Defendant’s

That same day, Hart filed a

(ECF No. 24).

Motion

to

Dismiss

Hart filed a
or,

in

Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment on May 18, 2015.

3

the
(ECF

Hart’s Motion for Summary Judgment is based solely on his
claim that the Court should have required Shearin to file a
response to Hart’s claims without first granting several
extensions of time. First, the Court notes that it also granted
Hart an extension of time to reply to Shearin’s Motion to
Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment.
(ECF No. 28). Second, because Hart fails to identify any facts
material to his claims, let alone argue that there is no genuine
dispute of material fact, the Court will deny his Motion for
Summary Judgment.
4

No. 29).

He also filed an unopposed Motion for Leave to File an

Amended Complaint on August 17, 2015.
II.
A.

(ECF No. 30).

DISCUSSION

Standard of Review
A complaint fails to state a claim if it does not contain

“a

short

and

plain

statement

of

the

claim

showing

that

the

pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), or does
not state “a plausible claim for relief.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).

A claim has facial plausibility when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.

Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

Generally, “a court may not consider extrinsic evidence at
the 12(b)(6) stage.”
Sparrows

Point,

Pursuant

to

Rule

LLC,

Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. Severstal
794

12(d),

F.Supp.2d
however,

602,

when

611

(D.Md.

“matters

2011).

outside

the

pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the
[12(b)(6)] motion must be treated as one for summary judgment
under Rule 56.”
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
has articulated two requirements for proper conversion of a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to a Rule 56 motion.

First, the “parties [must]

be given some indication by the court that it is treating the
5

12(b)(6) motion as a motion for summary judgment” and, second,
“the parties ‘first [must] be afforded a reasonable opportunity
for discovery.’”

Greater Balt. Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns,

Inc.

Balt.,

v.

Mayor

of

721

F.3d

264,

281

(4th

Cir.

2013)

(quoting Gay v. Wall, 761 F.2d 175, 177 (4th Cir. 1985)).
The

alternative

caption

of

Shearin’s

Motion

and

the

attached exhibits are sufficient indicia that the Motion might
be treated as one for summary judgment.
381 F.Supp.2d 458, 464 (D.Md. 2005).

See Moret v. Harvey,

Furthermore, Hart has not

filed a Rule 56(d) affidavit expressing a need for discovery or
a motion to appoint counsel to assist him with discovery.

See

Nguyen v. CNA Corp., 44 F.3d 234, 242 (4th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he
failure

to

file

an

affidavit

under

Rule

56[(d)]

is

itself

sufficient grounds to reject a claim that the opportunity for
discovery

was

inadequate.”

(quoting

Paddington

Bouchard, 34 F.3d 1132, 1137 (2d Cir. 1994))).

Partners

v.

Accordingly, the

Court will treat Shearin’s Motion as one for summary judgment.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, the Court must
grant summary judgment if the moving party demonstrates that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the
moving

party

is

entitled

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a).

to

judgment

as

a

matter

of

law.

In reviewing a motion for summary judgment,

the Court views the facts in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party.

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
6

255 (1986) (citing Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144,
157 (1970)).
Once a motion for summary judgment is properly made and
supported, the opposing party has the burden of showing that a
genuine dispute exists.

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87 (1986).

Rule 56(c) requires

the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and by its own
affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986).
“[T]he
between

the

mere

existence

parties

will

of

some

not

defeat

alleged
an

factual

otherwise

dispute
properly

supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that
there be no genuine issue of material fact.”
at 247–48.

Anderson, 477 U.S.

A “material fact” is one that might affect the

outcome of a party’s case.

Id. at 248; see also JKC Holding Co.

v. Wash. Sports Ventures, Inc., 264 F.3d 459, 465 (4th Cir.
2001) (citing Hooven-Lewis v. Caldera, 249 F.3d 259, 265 (4th
Cir. 2001)).

Whether a fact is considered to be “material” is

determined by the substantive law, and “[o]nly disputes over
facts

that

governing
judgment.”

might
law

affect

will

the

properly

outcome
preclude

of

the

the

suit

entry

under
of

the

summary

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; accord Hooven-Lewis, 249
7

F.3d at 265.

A “genuine” issue concerning a “material” fact

arises when the evidence is sufficient to allow a reasonable
jury

to

return

a

verdict

in

the

nonmoving

party’s

favor.

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
B.

Analysis
1.

Shearin’s Motion for Summary Judgment

The Court will grant Shearin’s Motion for Summary Judgment
because

Hart

failed

to

exhaust

administrative

remedies.

Moreover, even assuming Hart exhausted administrative remedies,
there

is

no

evidence

that

Shearin

violated

Hart’s

federal

constitutional rights.
a.

Exhaustion

The Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. §
1997e(a)

(2012),

requires

inmates

to

pursue

administrative

grievances until they receive a final denial of
all

available

stages

appealing

through

process.

Chase v. Peay, 286 F.Supp.2d 523, 530 (D.Md. 2003),

aff’d, 98 F.App’x 253 (4th Cir. 2004).

in

the

the claims,

This Court may not

consider a claim that has not been exhausted.
Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 219–20 (2007).

administrative

See Jones v.

Exhaustion “means using all

steps that the agency holds out, and doing so properly (so that
the agency addresses the issues on the merits).”

Woodford v.

Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006) (quoting Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286
F.3d 1022, 1024 (7th Cir. 2002)).
8

Pursuant

to

12.07.01.02(D),

Code

an

of

inmate

Maryland

Regulations

incarcerated

in

an

(“COMAR”)
institution

employing the ARP system, such as NBCI, must exhaust the system
before filing a grievance with the IGO.

In order to exhaust the

ARP system, Hart was required to obtain a response from the
Commissioner of Corrections.

See

Hart, however, failed to do so.

COMAR 12.07.01.04(B)(9)(a).

(See ECF No. 29-2).

Thus, Hart

failed to exhaust administrative remedies, and, consequently, he
is not permitted to bring his claims in this Court.

Jones, 549

U.S. at 211 (citing Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002)).
b.
Even

Merits of Hart’s § 1983 Claims

assuming

Hart

exhausted

administrative

remedies,

Shearin is entitled to summary judgment on all of Hart’s § 1983
claims.

To

demonstrate

prevail
a

on

a

deprivation

§

1983

of

claim,

rights

a

plaintiff

guaranteed

must

by

the

Constitution or laws of the United States and that the alleged
deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of
state law.

West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

Liberally

construing his Complaint, Hart asserts that Shearin violated his
Eighth

and

Fourteenth

Amendment

4

rights.43

See

Erickson

v.

Hart also alleges that Shearin violated his First
Amendment rights because his confinement to segregation caused
him to lose all access to church services. This claim is moot,
however, because it is undisputed that Hart has attended at
least eighteen church services while in segregation.
(See ECF
No. 25-9).
9

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (explaining that a Court should
liberally construe pro se pleadings).

The Court will address

these rights in turn.
i.

Eighth
Amendment
Punishment

Cruel

and

Unusual

The Eight Amendment, applicable to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment, provides that cruel and unusual punishment
shall not be imposed.

U.S. Const. amend. VIII.

To establish

the imposition of cruel and unusual punishment, a prisoner must
prove two elements: (1) that the deprivation of a basic human
need

was

objectively

sufficiently

serious;

and

(2)

that

subjectively the officials acted with a sufficiently culpable
state of mind.

Shakka v. Smith, 71 F.3d 162, 166 (4th Cir.

1995) (quoting Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1379 (4th
Cir.

1993)).

either

of

Because

these

two

Hart

presents

elements,

no

the

evidence

Court

finds

to

satisfy

Shearin

is

entitled to summary judgment on Hart’s Eighth Amendment claim.
ii.

Fourteenth Amendment Due Process

The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause provides that
no

state

shall

“deprive

any

person

property, without due process of law.”
§

1.

For

Hart

to

prevail

on

his

of

life,

liberty,

or

U.S. Const. amend. XIV,
§

1983

claim

alleging

a

violation of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, the
Court must find that a liberty interest protected by the Due

10

Process Clause is at stake.

See Scheuerman v. Bozman, No. 09-

1386, 2010 WL 761125, at *4 (D.Md. Mar. 1, 2010) aff’d, 382
F.App’x 284 (4th Cir. 2010).

In Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472,

483–84 (1995), the Supreme Court of the United States recognized
that

“States

may

under

certain

circumstances

create

liberty

interests which are protected by the Due Process Clause.”

A

state creates such an interest when it “imposes atypical and
significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary
incidents of prison life.”

Id. at 484.

To determine whether Hart possessed a liberty interest in
avoiding confinement in segregation, the Court must compare the
conditions to which he has been exposed in segregation with
those he could expect to experience as an ordinary incident of
prison life.
1997).

Beverati v. Smith, 120 F.3d 500, 503 (4th Cir.

In Beverati, the United States Court of Appeals for the

Fourth Circuit concluded that there was no liberty interest in
avoiding

segregation

when

conditions in segregation:

inmates

experienced

the

following

vermin-infested cells smeared with

human feces and urine; unbearably hot temperatures; cold food
served

in

considerably

population;

dirty

smaller

clothing,

portions

linens,

and

than

in

bedding;

the

general

no

outside

recreation; permission to leave their cells only three to four
times per week; and no educational or religious services.
F.3d at 504.
11

120

Here, Hart presents no evidence of how the conditions in
segregation differ from those he could expect as an ordinary
incident

of

his

life

in

NBCI.

The

undisputed

record

demonstrates that Hart’s conditions in segregation are better
than those experienced by the inmates in Beverati because he is
registered

as

services.

a

(See

therefore,

that

student

and

ECF

Nos.

there

is

has
25-8,

no

attended

numerous

25-9).

liberty

The

interest

religious

Court
at

finds,

stake

and

Shearin is entitled to summary judgment on Hart’s Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process claim.
iii. Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection
The Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause provides
that no state shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.”

U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.

To prevail on an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must show
“that he has been treated differently from others with whom he
is similarly situated and that the unequal treatment was the
result of intentional or purposeful discrimination.” Morrison v.
Garraghty, 239 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir. 2001).
makes

such

disparity

a

in

showing,

the

Court

treatment

can

be

must

If the plaintiff

determine

justified

under

whether

the

the

requisite

level of scrutiny. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr.,
473 U.S. 432, 439–40 (1985); In re Long Term Admin. Segregation
of Inmates Designated as Five Percenters, 174 F.3d 464, 471 (4th
12

Cir. 1999).
regulations
strict

Because prisoners are not a suspect class, “prison
need

only

scrutiny.”

survive

Waters

a

v.

reasonableness

Bass,

304

inquiry,

F.Supp.2d

802,

not
810

(E.D.Va. 2004).
Hart presents no evidence that he was treated differently
than any similarly situated inmates.
finds

Shearin

is

entitled

to

Accordingly, the Court

summary

judgment

on

Hart’s

Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection claim.
2.

Hart’s Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2), the Court
should “freely give leave” to file an amended complaint “when
justice so requires.”

The United States Court of Appeals for

the Fourth Circuit has “interpreted Rule 15(a) to provide that
‘leave

to

amend

a

pleading

should

be

denied

only

when

the

amendment would be prejudicial to the opposing party, there has
been bad faith on the part of the moving party, or the amendment
would have been futile.’”

Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 426

(4th Cir. 2006) (quoting Johnson v. Oroweat Foods Co., 785 F.2d
503, 509 (4th Cir. 1986)).
In his Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint, Hart
attempts to add a § 1983 claim for violation of his right to
procedural

due

process.

He

contends

he

was

entitled

hearing or notice before NBCI placed him in segregation.
would

be

futile

to

permit

Hart
13

to

add

this

claim

to

to

a
It

his

Complaint because “the security and custody classification of
state

prison

inmates

is

a

matter

for

state

prison-official

discretion whose exercise is not subject to federal procedural
due process constraints.”
(4th Cir. 1994).

Slezak v. Evatt, 21 F.3d 590, 594

Thus, Hart’s Motion for Leave to File Amended

Complaint will be denied.
CONCLUSION
For

the

foregoing

reasons,

Shearin’s

Motion

for

Summary

Judgment (ECF No. 25) is GRANTED.

Hart’s Motion for Summary

Judgment

for

(ECF

No.

24)

and

Motion

Complaint (ECF No. 30) are DENIED.

Leave

to

an

A separate Order follows.

Entered this 15th day of January 2016
/s/
____________________________
George L. Russell, III
United States District Judge

14

Amended