King v. Blumberg

Filing 14

MEMORANDUM. Signed by Judge Ellen L. Hollander on 6/10/2015. (c/m 6/11/15) (kr, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
GAVATA S. KING,

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Petitioner

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v

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DAVID BLUMBERG, et al.,

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Respondents

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Civil Action No. ELH-14-2634

MEMORANDUM
Gavata S. King, a Maryland prisoner who is self-represented, filed a petition for writ of
habeas corpus on August 18, 2014, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. ECF No. 1. She challenges
the denial of parole following a hearing in October 2012 and subsequent review in 2014. Id.
The petition is supported by exhibits. Respondent, David Blumberg, Chairman of the Maryland
Parole Commission, has filed an answer in which he asks the Court to dismiss the petition. ECF
No. 6. Respondent claims that King has previously raised the identical issues in this Court (see
King v. Blumberg, Civil Action No. ELH-13-3750 D. Md.), and also argues that the claims are
not cognizable in federal court. Id. Petitioner has filed a reply. ECF No. 11.
No hearing is necessary to resolve the matter. See Local Rule 105.6. For the reasons that
follow, I shall dismiss the case.
Background
King has been incarcerated since December 2008 and has a current release date of 2019.
ECF No. 1 ¶ 18. She complains that Maryland law and regulations concerning parole were not
fairly applied to her. ECF No. 1. As in her previous filings with this court, King indicates that
she was denied parole based upon her “criminal history” which, according to King, is not a

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“sole” determining factor under Md. Code, § 7-305 of the Correctional Services Article. ECF
No. 1 ¶ 5. According to King, it is just one of eleven factors for consideration, and all other
factors are favorable to her. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 5, 6. She also points out that her “history will never
change.” Id. ¶ 14.
King asserts that, after her denial, she wrote to the Commission seeking reconsideration
for parole and was advised that, per Commission policy #089-002, she will be reconsidered for
parole after two years.

ECF No. 1-2. King notes that Code of Maryland Regulations

(“COMAR”) 12.08.01.23B states that parole may be considered “at any time.” ECF 1-2 at 18.
She takes issue with the Commission’s policy of reconsidering parole only every two years, and
notes an apparent error in a Commission policy statement indicating parole reconsideration will
occur biannually, i.e., twice a year, and not every two years. ECF No. 1; ECF No. 1-2 at 16-17.
Notably, King asserts that the Commission agreed with her claim of misinterpretation,
and again reviewed her file on June 5, 2014. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 13, 14. However, without a hearing,
she was again denied parole. Id. ¶ 14. And, King has been told that she is not eligible for
reconsideration until October 2016. Id. Although not clear from her initial pleading, King
clarifies in her reply that as relief, she requests a new parole hearing. ECF No. 11 at 2.
Discussion
By virtue of a valid criminal conviction and subsequent, legal confinement, a prisoner
loses her expectation of liberty.

See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976). The

Constitution itself does not create a protected liberty interest in the expectation of early release
on parole. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U. S. 1, 7
(1979); see also Jago v. Van Curen, 454 U. S. 14, 18 (1981) (mutually explicit understanding
that inmate would be paroled does not create liberty interest). The Supreme Court has said:

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“There is no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to be conditionally released
before the expiration of a valid sentence.” Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 7; see Burnette v. Faye, 687
F.3d 171 (4th Cir. 2012). Therefore, where a prisoner has no protected liberty interest in parole,
she cannot establish a due process violation. See Bryant v. Maryland, 848 F.2d 492, 493 (4th
Cir. 1988) (noting that “the Maryland parole statute does not create a legitimate expectation of
parole release”); McLaughlin-Cox v. Maryland Parole Com’n, 200 Md. App. 115, 24 A.3d 235
(2011) (concluding that Maryland statutory scheme governing Maryland Parole Commission’s
consideration of parole did not create a liberty interest protected by due process).
As in King’s previous filing, the only claims presented by King are allegations that the
Maryland Parole Commission improperly applied Maryland law and regulations when
considering both her eligibility for parole and her entitlement to reconsideration of parole
eligibility.1 Such claims are not cognizable in federal court.
Moreover, King has no absolute entitlement to appeal a federal district court's denial of
her habeas corpus request. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). A certificate of appealability is not
warranted here, as it may issue “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. ' 2253(c)(2). The petitioner “must demonstrate that
reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable
or wrong,” Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 282 (2004) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted), or that “the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed
further.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003). Because this court finds that there has
been no substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right, a certificate of appealability
shall be denied. See 28 U. S.C.§ 2253(c)(2).
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King notes that her first petition for habeas relief was denied by the Circuit Court for
Anne Arundel County. ECF No. 11.
3

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, King’s request for habeas corpus relief shall be denied and the
case shall be dismissed. Because King has failed to demonstrate entitlement to a certificate of
appealability in the instant case, a certificate of appealability shall not issue and the Clerk shall
be directed to close this case.
An Order follows.

June 10, 2015
Date

____________/s/______________________
Ellen L. Hollander
United States District Judge

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