Alexander v. Hendrix

Filing 15

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Richard D Bennett on 5/29/2015. (c/m)(hmls, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
DONNA M. ALEXANDER,

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Plaintiff,

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v.

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REGINALD HENRY HENDRIX,

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Defendant.
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Civil Action No. RDB-14-2666

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MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this case, in which both parties are proceeding pro se, Plaintiff Donna M. Alexander
alleges that she has been subjected to various forms of harassment and abuse by Defendant
Reginald Henry Hendrix (“Defendant” or “Mr. Hendrix”). This case was originally filed in
the United States District Court for the District of Eastern District of Pennsylvania,
dismissed for lack of venue, and subsequently refiled in this Court, and it presents just one
of a number of separate fronts in which the parties have waged their domestic disputes.1
The parties’ submissions have been reviewed and no hearing is necessary. See Local Rule
105.6 (D. Md. 2014). For the reasons that follow, Defendant Reginald Henry Hendrix’s
Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 8) is GRANTED and this case will be DISMISSED. Due to
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In addition to this case, Plaintiff filed another case in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania which was transferred to the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia. Additionally, it appears the parties were involved in, inter alia, a custody
dispute in the Virginia state court system and a criminal proceeding in Maryland state courts.
The effect of these actions—whether preclusive or otherwise—has not been raised by the
parties. This Court notes, however, that the action heard in the Eastern District of Virginia was
substantially similar to this action. The court held a hearing, granted the Defendant’s motion to
dismiss, and dismissed the action in its entirety on July 11, 2014. The minute entry states that the
court found “there [was] no 1983 cause of action regarding this matter.” See Alexander v. Hendrix,
14-cv-471-TSE-TRJ, ECF No. 13 (E.D. Va. Jul. 11, 2014).
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the dismissal of this case, Plaintiff’s Motion for Certificate of Default Judgment (ECF No.
11), Defendant’s Motion to Deny Certificate of Default Judgment (ECF No. 12), Plaintiff’s
Motion for Temporary Injunction and Restraining Order (ECF No. 13), and Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss Motion for Temporary Injunction and Restraining Order (ECF No. 14)
are DENIED as moot.
BACKGROUND
This Court accepts as true the facts alleged in the plaintiffs’ complaint. See Aziz v.
Alcolac, Inc., 658 F.3d 388, 390 (4th Cir. 2011). A plaintiff filing pro se is held to a “less
stringent standard[]” than is a lawyer, and the court must liberally construe his claims.
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citation omitted); accord Brown v. N.C. Dep’t of Corr.,
612 F.3d 720, 724 (4th Cir. 2010) (observing that liberal construction of a complaint is
particularly appropriate where a pro se plaintiff alleges civil rights violations).
Pro se Plaintiff Donna M. Alexander (“Plaintiff” or “Ms. Alexander”) levels a number
of allegations of abuse against the father of her minor child, Defendant Reginald Henry
Hendrix (“Defendant” or “Mr. Hendrix”). Specifically, the “Background & Facts” section
of the Complaint states in its entirety:
Donna M. Alexander (Plaintiff) and Reginald Henry
Hendrix (Defendant) share Joint Legal Custody of their minor
child and has [sic] exchanged the child at the Bel Air State
Trooper Barracks D, Bel Air Maryland location since March
2012. Defendant has been engaging in a Course of Conduct of
Domestic Violence, Harassment, Stalking, and Telephone
Misuse with Verbal Threats against the Plaintiffs [sic] life, wellbeing and other Malicious Conduct against Plaintiff on that
government property (Bel Air Maryland State Trooper
Barracks D) and at other locations to include conspiring with
others to harass Plaintiff in the presence of the Plaintiffs [sic]
minor child and friend who has been a witness of the ongoing
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abuse. Defendant and Plaintiff have a child in common and
Defendant has a history of Domestic Violence against the
Plaintiff and others.
In August 2012, Defendant was sent a letter from the Plaintiffs
[sic] attorney asking him to cease, desist and refrain from
harassing Plaintiff. The Defendant’s conduct persisted and he
was charged with a course of conduct of harassment and
telephone misuse of verbal abuse and threatening
Plaintiff’s life by the Hartford County Maryland District
Attorney and was placed on a probation program on
October 30, 2013 for that crime against the Plaintiff.
Defendant, Reginald Henry Hendrix has been investigated and
found guilty by the United States Inspector General’s Office, a
Federal Investigative Agency on several occasions other crimes
[sic] and/or violations that he has committed against the
Plaintiff. The Defendant’s malicious harassing conduct
has caused the Plaintiff considerable physical, mental,
emotion, economic and financial damages. Defendant’s
past and present conduct clearly indicates that he believes
that he is above the law since he continues to commit
these crimes against the Plaintiff. The Defendant has a
history of, [sic] Lying, Misrepresentation, Domestic Violence,
Physical Abuse, Drug and Alcohol DUI, Eluding Police
Officers and was convicted and sentenced in the State of
Georgia for these violations. Defendant also provided false
statements to the federal government to harm the Plaintiff and
their minor child and was found guilty by the government
(United States Inspector General) in violation of Article 107
(False Official Statements).
Pl.’s Compl. 3-4, ECF No. 1. Elsewhere, Ms. Alexander alleges that the minor child was in
her custody during the early days of April 2012. She asserts that she notified Mr. Hendrix of
her intentions regarding the exchange of the child at the Bel Air State Trooper Barracks “by
exchanging emails, voice messages and phone conversations.” Id. Despite these
communications, Ms. Alexander alleges that Mr. Hendrix “maliciously swore” a false
criminal complaint and police report to the local police officers in Prince William County,
Virginia on April 9, 2012. See id. at 7. Plaintiff asserts that, due to this complaint, State
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Troopers in Bel Air, Maryland falsely arrested her on April 10, 2012. Ms. Alexander asserts
that she was then jailed for six days without bail in the “Harford County maximum security
Detention Center . . . without suspicion or probable cause.” Id.
Ms. Alexander’s Complaint identifies a number of criminal statutes, including 18
U.S.C. § 875(c), 47 U.S.C. § 223, 18 U.S.C. § 2261, 18 U.S.C. § 2261A, 18 U.S.C. § 1509, 18
U.S.C. § 241, as the basis of her claims. On September 25, 2014, Mr. Hendrix filed the
pending Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 8). In her response, Ms. Alexander argued that her
claims were in the spirit of a civil rights claims and mentioned 28 U.S.C. § 1983, 1985, &
1986 for the first time.
Subsequently, Ms. Alexander filed a Motion to Request Certificate of Default
Judgment (ECF No. 11), and Mr. Hendrix countered with a Motion to Deny Certificate of
Default Judgment (ECF No. 12). Thereafter, Ms. Alexander filed a Motion for Temporary
Injunction and Restraining Order (ECF No. 13), and Mr. Hendrix responded with a Motion
to Dismiss Request by Plaintiff for Temporary Injunction and Restraining Order (ECF No.
14).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint must contain
a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.
R. Civ. P 8(a)(2). Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes the
dismissal of a complaint if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The
purpose of Rule 12(b)(6) is “to test the sufficiency of a complaint and not to resolve contests

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surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses.” Presley v. City of
Charlottesville, 464 F.3d 480, 483 (4th Cir. 2006).
The Supreme Court’s recent opinions in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544
(2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), “require that complaints in civil actions be
alleged with greater specificity than previously was required.” Walters v. McMahen, 684 F.3d
435, 439 (4th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). In Twombly, the Supreme Court articulated “[t]wo
working principles” that courts must employ when ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) motions to
dismiss. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. First, while a court must accept as true all the factual
allegations contained in the complaint, legal conclusions drawn from those facts are not
afforded such deference. Id. (stating that “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice” to plead a claim); see also
Wag More Dogs, LLC v. Cozart, 680 F.3d 359, 365 (4th Cir. 2012) (“Although we are
constrained to take the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, we need not accept
legal conclusions couched as facts or unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or
arguments.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Second, a complaint must be dismissed if it does not allege “a plausible claim for
relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although a “plaintiff need not plead the evidentiary standard
for proving” her claim, she may no longer rely on the mere possibility that she could later
establish her claim. McCleary-Evans v. Maryland Department of Transportation, State Highway
Administration, __ F.3d __, 2015 WL 1088931, *11-12 (4th Cir. 2015) (emphasis omitted)
(discussing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002) in light of Twombly and Iqbal).
Under the plausibility standard, a complaint must contain “more than labels and
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conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555. While the plausibility requirement does not impose a “probability requirement,”
id. at 556, “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see also Robertson v. Sea Pines Real Estate Cos., 679
F.3d 278, 291 (4th Cir. 2012) (“A complaint need not make a case against a defendant or
forecast evidence sufficient to prove an element of the claim. It need only allege facts sufficient to
state elements of the claim.” (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted)). In making this assessment, a court must “draw on its judicial experience and
common sense” to determine whether the pleader has stated a plausible claim for relief.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. “At bottom, a plaintiff must nudge [its] claims across the line from
conceivable to plausible to resist dismissal.” Wag More Dogs, LLC, 680 F.3d at 365 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
ANALYSIS
I.

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS
A. Federal Claims
Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant has engaged in a pattern of stalking, harassment

and domestic abuse, and has identified the following federal statutes in her Complaint as the
basis for her claims: 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), 47 U.S.C. § 223, 18 U.S.C. § 2261, 18 U.S.C. §
2261A, 18 U.S.C. § 1509, 18 U.S.C. § 241.2 These statutes are criminal in nature, however,

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In some of her following papers, Plaintiff states that she is asserting claims under 28 U.S.C. §§
1983, 1985, and 1986, as well as claims for defamation and conspiracy.” See, e.g., Pl.’s Resp. 1, ECF
No. 10. Even if this Court construed pro se Plaintiff’s statements as an attempt to seek leave to
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and they do not provide a private right of action. Chadda v. Mullins, Civ. A. No. 10-4029,
2010 WL 4484622, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 9, 2010) (noting that “18 U.S.C. § 875 does not
authorize a private cause of action”); Osborn v. Salter, Civ. A. No. 507CV00016, 2007 WL
1202848, at *1 (W.D. Va. Apr. 23, 2007) (“Private citizens . . . have no private right of action
under the CDA, [47 U.S.C. § 223].”); Jacobus v. Huerta, Civ. A. No. 3:12-02032, 2014 WL
1723631, at *10 (S.D.W.V. Apr. 22, 2013) (no private right of action under 18 U.S.C. §
2261); Tani v. President/CEO, Salomon Bros. Realty Corp./Citigroup, Civ. A. No. CCB-03-2566,
2005 WL 1334604, at *4 (D. Md. May 31, 2005) (noting that 18 U.S.C. § 1509 was not
“intended to be used in civil litigation or as a basis for a private right of action”), aff’d sub
nom. Tani v. Salomon Bros. Realty Corp./Citigroup, 155 F. App’x 715 (4th Cir. 2005); El-Bey v.
Rogalski, No. GJH-14-3784, 2015 WL 1393580, at *3 (D. Md. Mar. 24, 2015) (noting that 18
U.S.C. § 241 is a criminal statute and “therefore provide[s] for no private right of action”).
Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to plead a valid federal claim.3

amend her Complaint, this Court sees no basis for granting that relief at this time. Claims under 28
U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986 require state action, and Plaintiff has not pled any facts to plausibly
demonstrate that Defendant, the only named Defendant in this action, is a state actor. In addition,
Plaintiff has not pled sufficient facts at this time to support a claim for defamation or conspiracy.
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Due to the fact that Plaintiff has failed to plead a valid federal claim, this Court has no subject
matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. However, Plaintiff also asserts that this Court has
subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 due to diversity of citizenship for the assault and
malicious prosecution claims. Plaintiff is a citizen of Pennsylvania. Defendant is a citizen of
Virginia. While Plaintiff’s Complaint does not clearly specify the amount of compensatory damages
that she seeks, she requests $1 million in punitive damages. While the use of punitive damages to
satisfy the jurisdictional amount-in-controversy requirement is subject to special scrutiny, this Court
also notes that Plaintiff has alleged that Defendant’s actions have “hindered her ability and capacity
to earn a living and substantial income (between $75,000-$150,000 annually).” Pl.’s Compl. 12.
While the Plaintiff’s effort to satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement appears somewhat
dubious, this Court has nevertheless reviewed Plaintiff’s assault and malicious prosecution claims
under Rule 12(b)(6).
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B. Assault
Plaintiff’s Complaint also alleges a cause of action for assault. Under Maryland law,
“assault is defined as an ‘attempt to cause a harmful or offensive contact with another or to
cause an apprehension of such contact.’” Miles v. DaVita Rx, LLC, Civ. A. No. CCB-12-854,
2013 WL 4516468, at *8 (D. Md. Aug. 23, 2013) (quoting Wallace v. Poulos, 861 F. Supp. 2d
587, 596 n. 9 (D. Md. 2012)). Although Plaintiff repeatedly asserts that Defendant has
subjected her to domestic abuse, she has alleged no facts to support those allegations. Such
bald allegations are insufficient under Iqbal and Twombly, and Plaintiff’s assault claim will be
dismissed.
C. Malicious Prosecution
Plaintiff also appears to allege that Defendant is liable to her for malicious
prosecution due to her arrest at the Maryland State Trooper Barracks D.4 The elements of
malicious prosecution are: (1) a prior proceeding was instituted by the defendant; (2) the
prior proceeding was instituted without probable cause; (3) the prior proceeding was
instituted by the defendant with malice; and (4) the prior proceeding was terminated in favor
of the plaintiff. See Heron v. Stradler, 761 A.2d 56, 59 (Md. 2000). Plaintiff alleges that the
Defendant “maliciously swore in and filed a false criminal complaint & false police [sic]

under the Penalty of Perjury against (Plaintiff) Donna M. Alexander with a Magistrate and
Local Police Officers in Prince William County Virginia.” Pl.’s Compl. 7. Plaintiff has failed
to explain how the alleged statements in the criminal complaint and police reports (whatever

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While Plaintiff’s Complaint does not include a clear section on malicious prosecution, she does
assert that “[t]he elements of Malicious Prosecution were met” in the section titled “18 U.S.
Code § 1509 Obstruction of a Court Order.” See Pl.’s Compl. 8, ECF No. 1.
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those statements may have been) resulted in the institution of a proceeding without probable
cause. Thus, Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations are insufficient to plausibly state a claim for
malicious prosecution.
II.

OTHER OPEN MOTIONS
Both parties have filed a number of other motions that remain pending on the

docket. These motions include Plaintiff’s Motion for Certificate of Default Judgment (ECF
No. 11), Defendant’s Motion to Deny Certificate of Default Judgment (ECF No. 12),
Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Injunction and Restraining Order (ECF No. 13), and
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Motion for Temporary Injunction and Restraining Order
(ECF No. 14). Because Plaintiff’s Complaint will be dismissed, these motions are now
moot.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Defendant Reginald Henry Hendrix’s Motion to
Dismiss (ECF No. 8) is GRANTED and this case will be DISMISSED. Due to the
dismissal of this case, Plaintiff’s Motion for Certificate of Default Judgment (ECF No. 11),
Defendant’s Motion to Deny Certificate of Default Judgment (ECF No. 12), Plaintiff’s
Motion for Temporary Injunction and Restraining Order (ECF No. 13), and Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss Motion for Temporary Injunction and Restraining Order (ECF No. 14)
are DENIED as moot.
A separate Order follows.
Dated:

May 29, 2015

/s/
Richard D. Bennett
United States District Judge
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