Rayman v. Colvin

Filing 30

ORDER denying 20 Mr. Rayman's Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 29 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment; affirming the Commissioner's Judgment; and directing the Clerk to close the case. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephanie A Gallagher on 11/6/2015. (bmhs, Deputy Clerk)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
CHAMBERS OF
STEPHANIE A. GALLAGHER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

101 WEST LOMBARD STREET
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21201
[phone]
Fax [phone]

November 6, 2015
LETTER TO COUNSEL
RE:

Roy Rayman v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration;
Civil No. SAG-14-3102

Dear Counsel:
On October 2, 2014, Plaintiff Roy Rayman petitioned this Court to review the Social
Security Administration’s final decision to deny his claims for Disability Insurance Benefits and
Supplemental Security Income. (ECF No. 1). I have considered the parties’ cross-motions for
summary judgment. (ECF Nos. 20, 29). I find that no hearing is necessary. See Loc. R. 105.6
(D. Md. 2014). This Court must uphold the decision of the Agency if it is supported by
substantial evidence and if the Agency employed proper legal standards. See 42 U.S.C. §§
405(g), 1383(c)(3); Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996). Under that standard, I
will deny Mr. Rayman’s motion, grant the Commissioner’s motion, and affirm the
Commissioner’s judgment pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). This letter explains
my rationale.
Mr. Rayman protectively filed claims for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and
Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) on June 23, 2010. (Tr. 197-200). He alleged a disability
onset date of August 2, 2007.1 (Tr. 14). His claims were denied initially and on reconsideration.
(Tr. 82-109, 113-25). A hearing was held on May 14, 2013, before an Administrative Law Judge
(“ALJ”). (Tr. 28-54). Following the hearing, the ALJ determined that Mr. Rayman was not
disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act during the relevant time frame. (Tr. 1426). The Appeals Council denied Mr. Rayman’s request for review, (Tr. 1-5), so the ALJ’s
decision constitutes the final, reviewable decision of the Agency.
The ALJ found that Mr. Rayman suffered from the severe impairments of back pain;
recurrent lumbar pain; neck pain; radiculopathy; major depressive disorder; bipolar disorder;
learning disability; and ADHD. (Tr. 16). Despite these impairments, the ALJ determined that
Mr. Rayman retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to:
perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except the
claimant is limited to occasional balancing, kneeling, crouching, stooping,
1

Mr. Rayman initially alleged an onset date of April 2, 2009, in his applications for DIB and SSI, (Tr. 197), but
apparently amended his onset date to August 2, 2007, which is the onset date that appears in the hearing transcript,
(Tr. 30), and the ALJ’s decision, (Tr. 14).

Roy Rayman v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration
Civil No. SAG-14-3102
November 6, 2015
Page 2
crawling, and climbing. In addition, the claimant is limited to unskilled work;
requires a low stress environment, such that there are few changes in the work
setting and no fast-paced or quota production standards; and the claimant is
limited to occasional contact with the public, supervisors, and co-workers.
(Tr. 20). After considering the testimony of a vocational expert (“VE”), the ALJ determined that
Mr. Rayman could perform jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy and
that, therefore, he was not disabled. (Tr. 25-26).
Mr. Rayman raises several arguments on appeal. Specifically he argues that the ALJ
erred by: 1) failing to include limitations in the RFC assessment that adequately account for his
moderate limitation in concentration, persistence, or pace, contrary to the holding in Mascio v.
Colvin, 780 F.3d 632 (4th Cir. 2015); 2) not including any limitations in the RFC assessment
related to Mr. Rayman’s cervical radiculopathy or neck pain; and, 3) failing to properly support
the weight assigned to each of the medical opinions of record. Each argument lacks merit and is
addressed below.
Mr. Rayman first argues that the ALJ’s findings of Mr. Rayman’s mental limitations in
the RFC assessment do not comport with the standard established by the Fourth Circuit in
Mascio, 780 F.3d at 638. In Mascio, the Fourth Circuit determined remand was warranted for
several reasons, including a discrepancy between the ALJ’s finding at step three concerning the
claimant’s limitation in concentration, persistence, and pace, and his RFC assessment. 780 F.3d
632, 638 (4th Cir. 2015). Although a similar discrepancy appears to exist in this case, it is
critically distinguishable in several respects, and Mascio does not require remand.
To understand why this case is distinguishable from Mascio, some background is
necessary. At step three of the sequential evaluation, the ALJ determines whether a claimant’s
impairments meet or medically equal any of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404,
Subpart P, Appendix 1. Listings 12.00 et. seq., pertain to mental impairments. 20 C.F.R. Pt.
404, Subpt. P, App. 1 § 12.00. Each listing therein,2 consists of: (1) a brief statement describing
its subject disorder; (2) “paragraph A criteria,” which consists of a set of medical findings; and
(3) “paragraph B criteria,” which consists of a set of impairment-related functional limitations.
Id. § 12.00(A). If both the paragraph A criteria and the paragraph B criteria are satisfied, the
ALJ will determine that the claimant meets the listed impairment. Id.
Paragraph B consists of four broad functional areas: (1) activities of daily living; (2)
social functioning; (3) concentration, persistence, or pace; and (4) episodes of decompensation.
The ALJ employs the “special technique” to rate a claimant’s degree of limitation in each area,
based on the extent to which the claimant’s impairment “interferes with [the claimant’s] ability
to function independently, appropriately, effectively, and on a sustained basis.” 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520a(c)(2). The ALJ uses a five-point scale to rate a claimant’s degree of limitation in the
2

Listing 12.05, which pertains to intellectual disability, and Listing 12.09, which pertains to substance addiction
disorders, do not follow this structure.

Roy Rayman v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration
Civil No. SAG-14-3102
November 6, 2015
Page 3
first three areas: none, mild, moderate, marked, or extreme. Id. § 416.920a(c)(4). In order to
satisfy paragraph B, a claimant must exhibit either “marked” limitations in two of the first three
areas, or “marked” limitation in one of the first three areas with repeated episodes of
decompensation. See, e.g., 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 § 12.02. Marked limitations
“may arise when several activities or functions are impaired, or even when only one is impaired,
as long as the degree of limitation is such as to interfere seriously with your ability to function.”
Id. § 12.00(C).
The functional area of “concentration, persistence, or pace refers to the ability to sustain
focused attention and concentration sufficiently long to permit the timely and appropriate
completion of tasks commonly found in work settings.” Id. § 12.00(C)(3). Social Security
regulations do not define marked limitations in concentration, persistence, or pace “by a specific
number of tasks that [a claimant is] unable to complete.” Id. The regulations, however, offer
little guidance on the meaning of “moderate” limitations in the area of concentration, persistence,
or pace.
The RFC assessment is distinct, but not wholly independent, from the ALJ’s application
of the special technique at step three. In Mascio, the Fourth Circuit voiced its agreement with
other circuits “that an ALJ does not account for a claimant’s limitations in concentration,
persistence, and pace by restricting the hypothetical question to simple, routine tasks or unskilled
work.” 780 F.3d at 638 (joining the Third, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). The Fourth Circuit explained that “the ability to perform
simple tasks differs from the ability to stay on task. Only the latter limitation would account for
a claimant’s limitation in concentration, persistence, or pace.” Id. In so holding, however, the
Fourth Circuit noted the possibility that an ALJ could offer an explanation regarding why a
claimant’s moderate limitation in concentration, persistence, or pace, at step three did not
translate into a limitation in the claimant’s RFC assessment, such that the apparent discrepancy
would not constitute reversible error.
In this case, at step three, the ALJ found that Mr. Rayman has a moderate limitation in his
ability to maintain concentration, persistence, or pace. In his discussion of the limitation, the
ALJ noted medical records indicating that Mr. Rayman “displays depression, anxiety, mood
swings, some difficulty with attention and concentration, difficulty completing tasks, and
possible learning disability or below average intellectual functioning.” (Tr. 19). The ALJ also
noted that there was no evidence that Mr. Rayman experiences hallucinations or delusions and
no evidence of abnormal thought content or process. Id. Finally, the ALJ cited statements by
Dr. Cascella, a consultative psychological examiner, who found that Mr. Rayman was “alert”
and “cooperative” during the examination. (Tr. 405). In his RFC assessment, the ALJ found
that, with respect to his mental impairments, Mr. Rayman is limited to “unskilled work; requires
a low stress environment, such that there are few changes in the work setting and no fast-paced
or quota production standards; and the claimant is limited to occasional contact with the public,
supervisors, and co-workers.” (Tr. 20). While limitation to unskilled work alone is insufficient
under Mascio, here the ALJ included other limitations that clearly account for Mr. Rayman’s
moderate limitation in concentration, persistence, or pace. Specifically, the limitation to an

Roy Rayman v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration
Civil No. SAG-14-3102
November 6, 2015
Page 4
environment with few changes and no production quotas assures that Mr. Rayman is not required
to produce any particular volume of work-product and is not distracted or required to adapt to
changes in the workplace. Thus, the ALJ accounted for any time that Mr. Rayman would be offtask due to his limited ability to maintain focus. Accordingly, I find no error warranting remand
under Mascio.
Next, Mr. Rayman argues that the ALJ erred by not including limitations in the RFC
assessment related to his cervical radiculopathy or neck pain. Mr. Rayman cites complaints of
pain in his left shoulder, arm, and fingers, as well as “constant stinging pain in his upper
extremities.” Pl. Mem. 6 (citing Tr. 253-54). In addition, he cites evidence of decreased
sensation in his left fingers and arm, and chronic neck pain radiating to his left arm. Id. (citing
Tr. 302, 435-36). There is no requirement that every severe impairment correlate with a
particular restriction in the RFC assessment. Carrier v. Astrue, No. SAG-10-3264, 2013 WL
136423, at *1 (D. Md. Jan. 9, 2013). A claimant’s burden of showing a severe impairment at
step two is only a “de minimis screening used to dispose of groundless claims.” Taylor v.
Astrue, No. BPG-11-032, 2012 WL 294532, at *8 (D. Md. Jan. 31, 2012) (quoting Webb v.
Barnhard, 433 F.3d 683, 687 (9th Cir. 2005)). Accordingly, any doubt or ambiguity in the
evidence at step two should be resolved in the claimant’s favor, and the ALJ should continue
with the sequential evaluation. SSR 85-28. While there is no requirement that each impairment
correlate with particular restrictions, the ALJ’s findings of the claimant’s limitations must be
supported by substantial evidence. Carrier, 2013 WL 136423 at *1.
In this instant case, the ALJ noted Mr. Rayman’s allegations and reviewed the medical
evidence of record, but found that none of the evidence indicated “substantial or ongoing
treatment plans or recommendations relative to the claimant’s physical impairments other than
continued medication.” (Tr. 22). Furthermore, the ALJ found that Mr. Rayman’s reports of his
activities of daily living were inconsistent with the degree of pain he alleged. Specifically, he
noted that Mr. Rayman is able to care for his dog, help care for his children, play the guitar,
attend church, do laundry, and maintain his driver’s license. (Tr. 21). Thus, the ALJ found that
Mr. Rayman’s allegations about his physical limitations were not entirely credible. Even so, the
ALJ gave little weight to the opinions of Drs. Sadler and Spetzler, who found that Mr. Rayman
could lift or carry up to 50 pounds occasionally, finding that the opinions did not adequately
account for Mr. Rayman’s subjective complaints. (Tr. 23). Thus, the ALJ felt that restriction to
the light exertional level adequately accounted for Mr. Rayman’s subjective complaints,
including his cervical radiculopathy and neck pain. Importantly, this Court’s role is not to
reweigh the evidence or to substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ, but simply to adjudicate
whether the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence. See Hays v. Sullivan, 907
F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990). Here, I find that the ALJ provided substantial evidence to
support his findings of Mr. Rayman’s physical limitations.
Finally, Mr. Rayman contends that the ALJ did not provide adequate explanation for the
weight assigned to the medical opinions of record and did not properly apply the criteria for
weighing medical opinions set out in the regulations. Specifically, Mr. Rayman states that the
ALJ’s discussion “sheds no light whatsoever on the actual weight accorded to any of the medical

Roy Rayman v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration
Civil No. SAG-14-3102
November 6, 2015
Page 5
opinions of record, as it fails to provide any cogent explanation regarding which opinions were
credited, which opinions were rejected, and how much weight was accorded to any particular
opinion.” Pl. Mem. 7. Mr. Rayman also cites 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c) and 416.927(c), which
provide that an ALJ should consider the following factors when assigning weight to a medical
opinion: 1) examining relationship; 2) treatment relationship (including the length, nature, and
extent of that relationship); 3) supportability; 4) consistency; 5) specialization; and, 6) other
factors. Mr. Rayman contends that the ALJ erred by applying only one of these factors, that of
consistency, in assigning weight to the medical opinions of record. However, upon review, I
note that the ALJ cited not only the consistency of medical opinions with the record, but also
treating relationship, examining relationship, the specialization of the medical source, and the
supportability of the opinion based on Mr. Rayman’s allegations and reported activities of daily
living. See (Tr. 23-24). Thus, I find that the ALJ properly applied the regulations in assigning
weight to the medical opinions, and that his findings are supported by substantial evidence.
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Rayman’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No.
20) is DENIED and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 29) is GRANTED.
The Commissioner’s judgment is AFFIRMED pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
The Clerk is directed to CLOSE this case.
Despite the informal nature of this letter, it should be flagged as an opinion and docketed
as an order.
Sincerely yours,
/s/
Stephanie A. Gallagher
United States Magistrate Judge