Coates v. M & T Bank

Filing 8

MEMORANDUM. Signed by Judge William M Nickerson on 6/23/2015. (c/m 6/23/2015 nd2s, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

SHARON K. COATES
v.
M&T BANK
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Civil Action No. WMN-14-3438

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MEMORANDUM
Before the Court is Defendant M&T Bank’s Motion to Dismiss.
ECF No. 5.

The motion is ripe for review.

Upon a review of the

papers, facts, and applicable law, the Court determines that no
hearing is necessary, Local Rule 105.6, and that Defendant’s
motion will be granted.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Ms. Coates – acting pro se – brings this action under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq.,
for M&T Bank’s alleged retaliation against her when it promoted
another M&T Bank employee over her.

Ms. Coates has been an

employee of M&T Bank for 35 years, and currently serves as a
Relationship Liaison.

In 2013, Ms. Coates applied for a

supervisor position, but was not selected in favor of another
candidate, Sheila Johnson.

Ms. Coates believes that she was

passed over in retaliation for her successful prior lawsuit, and
finds it “hard to believe that the individuals involved in the
hiring process were unaware of my prior complaints.”

ECF No. 1

at 5.

Although her personnel file contains a record of her

complaint, it apparently does not note that Ms. Coates won the
lawsuit.

She believes this absence is further evidence that M&T

Bank was retaliating against her.

Ms. Coates also objects to

the management training and “grooming” Ms. Johnson received
prior to applying for the supervisor position, believing that
such training and exposure gave an “unfair advantage.”

Finally,

Ms. Coates objects to the fact that Ms. Johnson participated in
performance reviews prior to receiving the supervisor position,
stating “I was not made aware that Sheila . . . had access to my
personal information . . . . [or] was designated the temporary
supervisor . . . . I am gravely concerned and feel that my
privacy has been compromised and violated.”

Id.

Ms. Coates filed a charge with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) on September 30, 2013, alleging
retaliation when she was denied a promotion despite the fact
that she had the “most seniority and [was] extremely qualified.”
ECF No. 1-2 at 2.
29, 2014.

She received her right to sue letter on July

ECF No. 1 at 3.

Ms. Coates then filed an action in

this Court on October 31, 2014.
II.

LEGAL STANDARD
M&T Bank has filed its Motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

In evaluating a motion to

dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must accept
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as true all well-pled allegations of the complaint and construe
the facts and reasonable inferences derived therefrom in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff.

See Ibarra v. United

States, 120 F.3d 472, 474 (4th Cir. 1997).

To survive

dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter .
. . to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell
Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 570 (2007)).

“A claim has

facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

Iqbal, 556

A court need not

accept a plaintiff’s legal conclusions as true, as “[t]hreadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice.”

Id.

Thus,

“[d]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for
relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the
reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common
sense.”

Id. at 679.

III. DISCUSSION
To commence a Title VII suit, a plaintiff must file a
timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC, receive a Right
to Sue Letter from the EEOC, and then file suit within 90 days
of receiving the Letter.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
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plaintiff who fails to file within 90 days is then generally
time barred from bringing an action in federal court.

See

Baldwin Cnty. Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 149-51
(1984).

The Fourth Circuit takes a strict view of this

deadline, and a claim should be considered time barred even if
filed one day late.

Harvey v. City of New Bern Police Dep’t,

813 F.2d 652, 654 (4th Cir. 1987).

The 90 day period is “clear

evidence that Congress intended to require claimants to act
expeditiously, without unnecessary delay.”

Id.

A plaintiff

acting pro se is provided no more leeway than a plaintiff
represented by counsel, as “the mere fact that plaintiff is
proceeding pro se does not provide an excuse for non-compliance
with the filing deadline.”

Shelton v. Atlantic Bingo Supply

Co., Civ. No. DKC-11-952, 2011 WL 4985277, at *2 (D. Md. Oct.
17, 2011).
In certain circumstances, there may be “reasonable grounds
for an equitable tolling of the filing period.”

Id.

Equitable

tolling is a narrow exception to the statute of limitations and
is appropriate when plaintiff is excusably ignorant of the
deadline or “where the defendant has wrongfully deceived or
misled the plaintiff in order to conceal the existence of a
cause of action.”

English v. Pabst Brewing Co., 828 F.2d 1047,

1049 (4th Cir. 1987).

Equitable tolling operates to prevent

defendants from engaging in “misconduct that prevents the
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plaintiff from filing his or her claim on time.”

Id.

Equitable

tolling, however, is not appropriate where “the claimant failed
to exercise due diligence in preserving [his or her] legal
rights.”

Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96

(1990).
Ms. Coates states in her complaint that she received her
right to sue letter on July 29, 2014.

As a result, her 90 day

period in which to file suit expired on October 27, 2014.

Ms.

Coates, however, filed suit on October 31, 2014, four days
outside the ninety day window and provides no grounds for
applying equitable tolling.

Excusable ignorance of the 90 day

statute of limitations is not available, as the Right to Sue
letter sent by the EEOC states, in bold, that “[y]our lawsuit
must be filed WITHIN 90 DAYS of your receipt of this notice; or
your right to sue based on this charge will be lost.”
1-1 at 1.

ECF No.

Nor is there any suggestion of misconduct on the part

of M&T Bank that would have prevented Ms. Coates from timely
filing her suit.

Ms. Coates essentially concedes the tardiness

of her suit, when in her Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss she
“apologize[s] for [her] error in filing on October 31, 2015
[sic] rather than on October 27, 2015 [sic] as prescribed by the
Right to Sue Letter . . . .”

ECF No. 7 at 1.

Accordingly, Ms.

Coates’ Title VII action is time-barred and must be dismissed.

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In her Opposition, Ms. Coates also argues that, in addition
to her Title VII retaliation claim, she also brings a claim for
invasion of privacy.

ECF No. 7 at 2 (“I cited in my original

Claim (attached) that my privacy rights have been violated.
However, there is no mention of this in the Defendant’s Motion
to Dismiss.”).

To the extent that one could construe as a cause

of action the section of Ms. Coates’ complaint stating that she
is “gravely concerned and feel[s] that [her] privacy has been
compromised and violated,” ECF No. 1 at 5, by Ms. Johnson being
included on performance reviews, Ms. Coates fails to state a
claim for which relief could be granted.
Although Ms. Coates states that Ms. Johnson participated in
performance reviews and that she was not “made aware that Sheila
was involved or had access to my personal information,” she does
not allege that Ms. Johnson participated in Ms. Coates’
performance review or was able to view Ms. Coates’ personnel
file.

That M&T Bank engaged in any misconduct against Ms.

Coates during performance reviews is speculative at best, and
Ms. Coates’ paragraph regarding performance reviews does not
“allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
U.S. at 678.

Iqbal, 556

Because Ms. Coates failed to file her Title VII

action within 90 days of receiving her Right to Sue Letter and

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otherwise failed to state a cognizable claim against M&T Bank,
her complaint shall be dismissed.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss shall be granted.

A separate order shall issue.

______________/s/__________________
William M. Nickerson
Senior United States District Judge

DATED: June 23, 2015

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