McCray v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.

Filing 17

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER denying Renee L. McCrays 6 Motion for Relief from Judgment or Order. Signed by Judge George Levi Russell, III on 3/30/2016. (dass, Deputy Clerk) (c/m 3/30/16-das)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
Chambers of
GEORGE L. RUSSELL, III
United States District Judge

101 West Lombard Street
Baltimore, Maryland 21201
410-962-4055

March 30, 2016
MEMORANDUM TO PARTIES RE:

Renee Louise McCray v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
Civil Action No. GLR-14-3445

Dear Parties:
Pending before the Court is pro se Plaintiff Renee L. McCray’s Motion for Relief from a
Judgment or Order. (ECF No. 6). The Motion is ripe for disposition and no hearing is necessary.
See Local Rule 105.6 (D.Md. 2014). For the reasons that follow, McCray’s Motion will be denied.
This dispute arises from McCray’s bankruptcy adversary proceeding initiated against
Defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (“Wells Fargo”), styled McCray v. Wells Fargo Bank, Adv. Proc.
No. 13-0710-NVA (Bankr.D.Md. Sept. 29, 2014) (the “Adversary Proceeding”). (See ECF No. 1).
On May 23, 2013, McCray filed a lawsuit against Wells Fargo and several other defendants alleging
the defendants attempted to foreclose on her property without proving they had a legal right to do so
(the “District Court Action”). McCray v. Fed. Home Mortg. Corp., No. GLR-13-1518 (D.Md. Mar.
27, 2015). While the District Court Action was pending, McCray filed a petition for relief under
chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code on September 23, 2013 (the “Bankruptcy Proceeding”). In re
McCray, No. 13-26131 NVA (Bankr.D.Md. filed Sept. 23, 2013). The United States Bankruptcy
Court for the District of Maryland converted the case to a petition for chapter 7 relief and appointed a
chapter 7 trustee. Id.; (see ECF No. 1). On January 31, 2014, in the Bankruptcy Proceeding, Wells
Fargo asserted it was entitled to enforce an existing security interest in the subject property. (See
ECF No. 1).
On November 12, 2013, McCray initiated the Adversary Proceeding alleging Wells Fargo did
not have the right to enforce a security interest against the subject property. (See id.). On September
29, 2014, the bankruptcy court issued Proposed Findings and Conclusions in Support of Dismissal of
McCray’s Amended Complaint in the Adversary Proceeding. (Id.) The bankruptcy court found
McCray lacked standing to bring the claim against Wells Fargo because “[a]ny lawsuit that was, or
could have been, initiated by a chapter 7 debtor prior to the filing of the [bankruptcy] petition
becomes part of the bankruptcy estate and is subject to the direction and control of the trustee.” (Id.).
Also, the bankruptcy court found McCray failed to state a claim for relief pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) because McCray signed a promissory note for a loan with American Home
Mortgage (the undisputed originator of the loan) regarding the subject property and the note was
endorsed to Wells Fargo, thereby making Wells Fargo the holder of the note and entitled to enforce
it. (Id.).

On October 14, 2014, McCray filed an Objection to the Proposed Findings and Conclusions.
(ECF No. 2). On October 14, 2015, this Court issued an Order adopting the Proposed Findings and
Conclusions and dismissing McCray’s Amended Complaint in the Adversary Proceeding. (ECF No.
5). On October 26, 2015, McCray filed a Motion for Relief from a Judgment or Order under Rule
60(b)(3). (ECF No. 6). On November 9, 2015, Wells Fargo filed a Response and Opposition to the
Motion. (ECF No. 7). On November 13, 2015, McCray filed a Notice of Appeal. (ECF No. 8). On
November 20, 2015, McCray filed a Reply to Wells Fargo’s Response and Opposition. (ECF No.
12).
“A motion under Rule 60(b) is addressed to the sound discretion of the district court.”
Square Constr. Co. v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 657 F.2d 68, 71 (4th Cir. 1981) (citing Cent.
Operating Co. v. Util. Workers of Am., 491 F.2d 245, 252 (4th Cir. 1974)). Rule 60(b)(3) allows the
Court to relieve a party from a final judgment or order for fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct by
an opposing party. A moving party must establish three factors to prevail on a Rule 60(b)(3) motion:
“(1) the moving party must have a meritorious defense; (2) the moving party must prove
[misrepresentation or fraud] by clear and convincing evidence; and (3) the [misrepresentation or
fraud] prevented the moving party from fully presenting its case.” Schultz v. Butcher, 24 F.3d 626,
630 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing Square Constr. Co., 657 F.2d at 71). Then, “the court must balance the
competing policies favoring the finality of judgments and justice being done in view of all the facts,
to determine within its discretion, whether relief is appropriate in each case.” Id. (quoting Square
Constr. Co., 657 F.2d at 71).
First, McCray argues the Court must set aside its October 14, 2015 Order because Wells
Fargo misrepresented to the Court that is it the holder of the promissory note, specifically asserting
that she never entered into a loan agreement with American Home Mortgage regarding the subject
property. 1 The Court finds McCray does not have a meritorious defense because she lacked standing
to bring the Amended Complaint in the Adversary Proceeding. The claim could only be brought by
the appointed chapter 7 trustee. Further, the Court finds McCray has failed to present any evidence
of Wells Fargo’s alleged misrepresentation. Lastly, because McCray lacked standing to bring the
action, she cannot demonstrate Wells Fargo’s alleged misrepesentation prevented her from fully
presenting her case.
Next, McCray argues American Home Mortgage’s endorsement of the promissory note to
Wells Fargo is invalid and Wells Fargo’s presentment of the note in the Adversary Proceeding
constitutes fraud on the court. “The doctrine of fraud on the court is a principle to be narrowly
construed and applied, and it embraces ‘only that species of fraud which does or attempts to, defile
the court itself, or is a fraud perpetrated by officers of the court so that the judicial machinery can not
perform in the usual manner its impartial task of adjudging cases that are presented for adjudication .
. . .’” Asterbadi v. Leitess, 176 F.App’x 426, 430 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting Great Coastal Express,
Inc. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 675 F.2d 1349, 1356 (4th Cir. 1982)). The conduct complained of
must have been part of “a deliberate scheme to directly subvert the judicial process.” Id. (quoting
1

McCray previously presented this argument in her Objection to the Proposed Findings and
Conclusions. (ECF Nos. 2, 4).
2

Great Coastal Express, 675 F.2d at 1356). “Thus ‘fraud on the court’ is typically confined to the
most egregious cases, such as bribery of a judge or juror, or improper influence exerted on the court
by an attorney . . . .” Great Coastal Express, 675 F.2d at 1356. McCray, however, has failed to
demonstrate Wells Fargo engaged in a deliberate scheme to directly subvert the judicial process or
any other conduct directly impinging “the integrity of the court and its ability to function
impartially.” Id. As such, the Court will deny McCray’s Motion.
For the foregoing reasons, McCray’s Motion for Relief from a Judgment or Order (ECF No.
6) is DENIED. Despite the informal nature of this memorandum, it shall constitute an Order of this
Court, and the Clerk is directed to docket it accordingly and mail a copy to McCray at her address of
record.
Very truly yours,
/s/
_______________________
George L. Russell, III
United States District Judge

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