Norvell v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Richard D Bennett on 10/28/2015. (bmhs, Deputy Clerk)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
VICKI LYNN NORVELL,
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Plaintiff,
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v.
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METROPOLITAN LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Civil Action No. RDB-14-3662
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Defendant.
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Vicki Norvell (“Plaintiff” or “Norvell”) initiated the present action against
Defendant Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (“Defendant” or “MetLife”), claiming
breach of contract.1 Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to pay benefits due
under an Accidental Death and Dismemberment Insurance Policy (“the Policy”) following
the death of her husband, Tas2 Owens (“Decedent” or “Owens”). Plaintiff originally filed
this action in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, Maryland. Compl., p. 1., ECF
No. 2. The Defendant removed this action to this Court based on diversity of citizenship
under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, as Norvell is a citizen of Maryland and MetLife is incorporated in
the state of New York, with its principal place of business in New York, New York. See
1 Plaintiff initially alleged “gross negligence and malice and evil intent.” Compl. at ¶ 6, ECF No. 2. However,
in an April 20, 2015 Joint Status Report, she agreed to neither “claim . . . bad faith” nor “seek[] punitive
damages.” Joint Status Report at ¶ 8, ECF No. 13. Her “claim is for breach of contract for $195,000.” Id.
2 Plaintiff refers to her deceased husband as both “Tas” and “Taz.” See, e.g., Compl. at ¶ 5, ECF No. 2; Pl.
Mot Summary J. at ¶ 3, ECF No. 14. Mr. Owens’ state-issued Certificate of Death (ECF No. 14-2) spells his
first name “Tas.” Therefore, this Court will adopt that spelling of the decedent’s name.
1
Not. Of Removal, p. 3, ECF No. 1. In addition, the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.
Id. Currently pending before this Court are Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF
No. 14), Plaintiff’s Motions in Limine (ECF Nos. 15 & 17), Defendant’s Cross Motion for
Summary Judgment (ECF No. 22), and Plaintiff’s Second Motion for Summary Judgment
(ECF No. 23). For the reasons stated below, Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment
(ECF No. 14) is DENIED, and Plaintiff’s Second Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No.
23) is also DENIED. Additionally, Defendant’s Cross Motion for Summary Judgment
(ECF No. 22) is DENIED. A hearing will be scheduled to resolve Plaintiff’s pending
Motions in Limine (ECF Nos. 15 & 17).
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Vicki Norvell (“Plaintiff” or “Norvell”) is an employee of the State of
Maryland. Norvell Aff., p. 11, ECF No. 22-3. 3 As a state employee, she is covered by a
Voluntary Accidental Death and Dismemberment Insurance Policy (“the Policy”),
underwritten by Defendant Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (“Defendant” or
“MetLife”).
Id. at p. 11-12.
On September 19, 2010, Norvell married Tas Owens
(“Decedent” or “Owens”) and added him to the policy as a dependent. See Id. at p. 12; Pl.
Mot. Summary J. at ¶ 5, ECF No. 14; Claim Coverage List, ECF No. 22-4.
The Policy guaranteed Norvell a $195,000 benefit payment in the event Owens
“sustain[ed] an accidental injury that [was] the Direct and Sole Cause of a Covered Loss.”
Policy, p. 42, MET000186, ECF No. 20-2. According to the Policy, “Direct and Sole Cause
means that the Covered Loss occurs within 12 months of the date of the accidental injury
3 The parties have stipulated that “all documents produced by Plaintiff and Defendant are genuine.” Joint
Stipulation of Facts at ¶ 1, ECF No. 22-7.
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and was a direct result of the accidental injury, independent of other causes.” Id. A covered
loss is an injury for which an insured party may recover benefits, including loss of life. Id. at
23, MET000167.
The Policy does not provide benefits “for any loss caused or contributed to by:”
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
physical or mental illness or the diagnosis or treatment of such illness;
infection, other than infection occurring in an external accidental wound;
suicide or attempted suicide;
self-inflicted injury by an insane person;
service in the armed forces of any country or international authority,
except the United States National Guard;
6. You or Your Dependents committing or attempting to commit a felony;
7. You or Your Dependents being under the influence of any narcotic;
8. war, whether declared or undeclared; or act of war.
Id. at 42, MET000186. Additionally, the Policy includes an “Exclusion for Intoxication”
provision. Id. That provision states as follows:
Exclusion for Intoxication
We will not pay benefits under this section for any loss resulting from Your or
Your Dependents intoxication.
Intoxicated means that Your or Your Dependents blood alcohol level met or
exceeded the level that creates a legal presumption of intoxication under the
laws of the jurisdiction in which the incident occurred. Id.
Norvell has testified that her husband, Owens, drank alcohol on a nightly basis, both
to cope with chronic pain and to help him relax. Norvell Dep., p. 35, 70, ECF No. 14-4.
However, on the night of January 30, 2013, there was no alcohol in their house. Id. at 40.
Norvell testified that Owens was drinking soda when she went to bed. Id. At that time, he
seemed “normal and coherent.” Id. However, when Norvell awoke the next morning, she
found Owens “really out of it, . . . not coherent,” and hardly able to speak. Id. Norvell
called an ambulance, and Owens was transported to a hospital. Id.
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The parties have stipulated that Owens “intentionally drank Prestone from a spray
bottle of Prestone Ice and Frost Shield.” Joint Stipulation of Facts at ¶ 2, ECF No. 22-7.
He “unscrewed the top of [the bottle] and either poured the Prestone into a glass and drank
it, or drank [it] directly from the bottle.” Id.
Prestone Ice and Frost Shield is sold in a plastic spray bottle. See Prestone Photo,
ECF No. 14-5. Prestone is a vehicle glass treatment product. Id. It is intended to be
sprayed onto a car’s exterior glass surfaces in the evening to prevent morning frost. Id. The
front of the bottle reads, in large letters: “Prestone Ice and Frost Shield.” Id. A warning is
written on the back of the bottle. It states the following:
“DANGER [skull and cross bones image] POISON: Contains methyl alcohol
(67-56-1) and propylene glycol (57-55-6). PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES:
Cannot be made nonpoisonous. Do not swallow or breathe vapors. Avoid
eye and skin contact. Use in a well-ventilated area. Deliberate concentration
and inhalation of vapors may be fatal. FIRST AID: If swallowed, do NOT
induce vomiting. IMMEDIATELY call a local poison control center or
hospital emergency department. If inhaled, move person into fresh air. If in
eyes, immediately flush eyes with water for 15 minutes. If on skin, remove
contaminated clothing and wash skin thoroughly with soap and water. If
irritation develops and persists, contact a doctor.
KEEP OUT OF REACH OF CHILDREN.
Prestone Photo, ECF No. 14-5 (emphasis omitted).
Owens died on February 1, 2013 at a hospital in Annapolis, Maryland. Certificate of
Death, ECF No. 14-2. The cause of death was listed as “Methanol Poisoning.” Id. Nothing
in the record suggests that Owens left a suicide note. Tests taken at the hospital indicate
that Owens’ methanol blood alcohol level was 333 milligrams per deciliter, or .333 grams per
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100 milliliters.4 Abstract Report, p. 21, ECF No. 17-4. Owens had an alcohol serum level of
less than 10 milligrams per deciliter, or .01 grams per milliliter. IP Encounter Report, p. 5,
ECF No. 17-2. Dr. Yale Caplan was hired by Defendant to review Owens’ records. He
concluded that Owens consumed at least 14-25 ounces of Prestone, or at least forty-five
percent of the bottle. Caplan Report, p. 3, ECF No. 22-6. The methanol contained in
Prestone caused intoxication, loss of hand-eye coordination, diminished vision, depression
of Owens’ nervous system, severe toxicity, and ultimately death. Id.
Plaintiff retained Dr. Aaron Noonberg to assess whether Owens died accidentally or
by suicide. Dr. Noonberg concluded that Owens died of methanol poisoning, but that the
facts do not support a finding of suicide. 5 Noonberg Post Morten Eval. at p. 1, ECF No.
14-6. Rather, Dr. Noonberg concluded, Owens needed a drink, but did not have any alcohol
in the house. Id. at 7. Therefore, like many alcoholics, he reached for another liquid with
alcohol as a primary ingredient. Id. In the present case, that liquid happened to be Prestone.
Id. In reaching his conclusion, Dr. Noonberg considered a wide array of evidence, including
information about Owens’ lifestyle and recent activity, as an indication of his mental state.
Dr. Noonberg first considered evidence suggesting that Owens did commit suicide.
Id. at 2. He noted that Owens had recently resumed contact with his estranged mother. Id.
Although this may have been a “goodbye,” Norvell had stated that Owens was proud to
4 Under MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-307(a)(3), blood alcohol concentrations expressed in
milligrams per deciliter should be converted into grams per 100 milliliters by dividing the measure by 1000.
5 Defendant has attacked Dr. Noonberg’s report as an “unsworn expert report” and argues that it is not
admissible as evidence under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Def. Mot. Summary J., p. 9,
ECF No. 22-1. This Court will consider Dr. Noonberg’s report in ruling on the instant motions. However,
even if this Court did not consider Dr. Noonberg’s report, it would still deny Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment. The record contains sufficient evidence, even without Dr. Noonberg’s report, such that
there is a genuine issue of material fact. See discussion infra.
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show off his wife. Id. Additionally, his conduct did not change significantly following the
visit. Id. Second, Dr. Noonberg discovered that Owens’ had a job in automobile parts,
suggesting that he was familiar with toxic chemicals and therefore aware of the dangers of
drinking a product like Prestone.
Id.
Third, Owens had discussed the possibility of
increasing his life insurance coverage. Id. However, Norvell indicated that he understood
that life insurance companies do not pay proceeds when an individual commits suicide. Id.
Additionally, his health had improved following a recent surgery, and he did not actually
follow through on his plan to increase life insurance coverage. Id. Ultimately, Dr. Noonberg
concluded that the weight of the evidence suggested a non-suicidal death. The evidence
weighing against suicide included the following:
Norvell indicated that Owens drank alcohol nightly, and that there was no alcohol in
the house at the time of his death. Id. at 2-3. According to Dr. Noonberg, many alcoholics
will drink a wide range of products when alcohol is not available. Id. He found no evidence
that Owens expected to die from the amount of Prestone he consumed.
Id. at 3.
Additionally, Norvell suggested that her marriage to Owens was very happy. Id. Owens got
along well with her family and they went on trips together, despite only two years of
marriage.
Id.
Owens loved cats and had adopted one just a year before his death.
Furthermore, Owens had access to prescription Oxycotin and Ativan, both of which could
have been used to attempt a suicide if that is what he had intended. Id. In fact, it would
have been a less painful alternative to drinking Prestone. Id.
Dr. Noonberg further observed that Owens had clear plans to join a shooting range
with his wife and had lamented that his alcohol intake was unhealthy, that Owens’ Facebook
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activity indicated that he had a supportive circle of friends, and that he was in the process of
restoring a classic car. Id. at 3-4. Owens was recovering from surgery, was feeling much
better, and had begun enjoying activities and foods he had been unable to enjoy for a long
time on account of his illness. Id. at 4. Furthermore, Owens had just become interested in
football and was enjoying watching games. Id. at 4.
Dr. Noonberg also discovered that Owens was planning a trip to Mexico or Jamaica
at the time of his death. Id. He had compiled a list of destinations he wished to visit during
summer 2013. Id. Owens had stated that he wanted to take Norvell to Hawaii for their 50th
wedding anniversary and, although Owens died before Valentine’s Day, he had already made
Valentine’s Day dinner reservations for Norvell and himself. Id.
Owens professional life also weighed against suicidal behavior. He had recently been
hired at a new job, with a higher salary and more pleasant work environment. Id. at 6. He
had recently purchased new boots, and renewed his license as a tow truck operator. Id. at 5.
Although he had a prior history of depression, Owens was not prescribed medication for
depression and his medical records indicated that he was psychologically normal. Id. at 6.
Additionally, he was prescribed opiates for back pain, which would have been
contraindicated if he was severely depressed. Id.
Dr. Noonberg further noted that Owens was very pleased with his doctor, who had
recently identified the cause of his gall bladder problems. Id. at 6. Owens had stopped
smoking in 2012 and had not resumed. Id. Additionally, medical records from September of
2012 and January of 2013 indicate that Owens had no psychological complaints. Id. During
several visits to his primary care provider, Dr. Joseph Randall, Owens exhibited no signs of
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anxiety or use of psychiatric medication. Id. at 6-7. Owens had not exhibited any of the
common signs of suicidal intent, including giving away possessions, stockpiling medication,
or saying goodbye to friends and family. Id. at 7. Finally, Dr. Noonberg noted that Owens’
Death Certificate did not indicate suicide as his cause of death. Id. at 6. In light of these
findings, Dr. Noonberg concluded that Owens’ death was not a suicide.
Following Owens’ death, Norvell submitted a claim for benefits under the Policy,
which was subsequently denied.6 She initiated the present action by filing a Complaint in the
Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, Maryland. Compl., p. 1, ECF No. 2. She alleges
breach of contract by Defendant and seeks to recover $195,000, “the potential value of the
insurance proceeds at issue.” Joint Status Report at ¶ 8, ECF No. 13. The case was removed
to this Court on November 21, 2014. Subsequently, Norvell filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment (ECF No. 14) and two Motions in Limine (ECF Nos. 15 & 17). Her first Motion
in Limine seeks an instruction to “the juries, witnesses, experts, and anyone who will testify”
that Dr. Caplan “cannot testify to anything except areas of toxicology.” Pl. Mot in Limine,
ECF No. 15. In her second Motion in Limine, Norvell seeks an instruction that neither the
“suicide” nor “intoxication” exclusions to the Policy apply in this case. Pl. Mot. in Limine,
p. 1, ECF No. 17.7 Defendant has since filed a Cross Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF
No. 22) and Plaintiff has filed a Second Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 23).
6 Norvell did receive a $25,000 benefit payment under a separate life insurance policy provided by her
employer and underwritten by MetLife. Norvell Aff., p. 13, ECF No. 22-3.
7 Plaintiff’s second Motion in Limine is essentially a second memorandum in support of her Motion for
Summary Judgment. She argues that Owens’ death was neither suicide nor caused by his intoxication.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a court “shall grant
summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A
material fact is one that “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A genuine issue over a material fact
exists “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party.” Id. In considering a motion for summary judgment, a judge’s function is
limited to determining whether sufficient evidence exists on a claimed factual dispute to
warrant submission of the matter to a jury for resolution at trial. Id. at 249.
In undertaking this inquiry, this Court must consider the facts and all reasonable
inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372,
378 (2007). However, this Court must also abide by its affirmative obligation to prevent
factually unsupported claims and defenses from going to trial. Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774,
778-79 (4th Cir. 1993).
If the evidence presented by the nonmoving party is merely
colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment must be granted. Anderson,
477 U.S. at 249-50. On the other hand, a party opposing summary judgment must “do more
than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986); see also In re Apex Express Corp.,
190 F.3d 624, 633 (4th Cir. 1999). This Court has previously explained that a “party cannot
create a genuine dispute of material fact through mere speculation or compilation of
inferences.” Shin v. Shalala, 166 F. Supp. 2d 373, 375 (D. Md. 2001) (citations omitted).
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When both parties file motions for summary judgment, as here, the court applies the
same standard of review to both motions, with this Court considering “each motion
separately on its own merits to determine whether either [side] deserves judgment as a matter
of law.” Rossignol v. Voorhaar, 316 F.3d 516, 523 (4th Cir. 2003), cert denied, 540 U.S. 822
(2003); see also havePower, LLC v. Gen. Elec. Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 402, 406 (D. Md. 2003)
(citing 10A Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2720 (3d ed.1983)).
ANALYSIS
I.
Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment
Plaintiff contends that the undisputed facts support only once conclusion—that
“Owens did not intentionally take his life.” Pl. Mot. Summary J. at ¶ 12, ECF No. 14.
“[L]ife was going extremely well” for Owens at the time of his death, Plaintiff argues. Id. at
¶ 17. He did not commit suicide, she claims, but rather drank Prestone because it contained
alcohol. Id. According to Plaintiff, drinking alcohol was a nightly ritual for Owens, but
there was no alcohol in the house on the night of February 30th. Id. She posits that
alcoholics often resort to products like Prestone that contain alcohol when alcohol is not
otherwise available. Id. The Prestone bottle indicates that it contains alcohol, it looks like
alcohol, and even smells like alcohol, she observes, but provides inadequate warning of its
dangers. Id. at ¶ 12-13. Plaintiff notes that Owens did not leave a suicide note. Id. at ¶ 18.
Plaintiff asserts that Maryland law creates a presumption against suicide and,
therefore, that Defendant bears “the burden of proving that the death of insured, under an
accidental death clause, was due to suicide.” Id. at ¶ 14 (quoting Dick v. New York Life Ins.
Co., 359 U.S. 437 (1959)). Owens’ actions were “careless,” but he did not “intend” to take
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his own life, Plaintiff argues. Id. at ¶ 19. She claims that no evidence in the record rebuts
Maryland’s presumption against suicide. Id. Therefore, she argues, as a matter of law
Owens’ death was not suicide, Defendant wrongly denied her claim for benefits, and she is
entitled to summary judgment. Id. at p. 5-6.
Defendant raises several objections to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
Def. Opp’n, p. 8, ECF No. 22-1. First, Defendant claims that whether or not Owens
committed suicide is a material fact in dispute. Id. While the parties have stipulated that
Owens “intentionally drank the Prestone that killed him,” they disagree over whether or not
he intended to kill himself. Id.; see also Joint Stipulation of Facts at ¶ 2, ECF No. 22-7.
Furthermore, Defendant notes that much of Plaintiff’s argument depends on the findings of
Dr. Noonberg, which are contained in his “unsigned and unsworn” expert report. Id. Since
the report is unsworn, Defendant argues, this Court cannot consider it in ruling on Plaintiff’s
Motion for Summary Judgment. Id. at p. 8-9. Plaintiff does not otherwise meet her burden
of establishing no material dispute of fact and, therefore, her motion must be denied. Id.
Defendant also objects that Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the look and smell of Prestone
and the inadequacy of the warning labels have no foundation in the record. Id. at p. 10.
Additionally, Defendant denies that “MetLife has the burden of proof to show
Decedent’s death was accidental.”
Id. at p. 9, n. 2.
Under long-standing Maryland
precedent, Defendant argues, “[P]laintiff has the burden of showing that the death was
[accidental],” and introducing the defense of suicide does not shift the burden to the
Defendant. Id. (citing Globe Indem. Co. of New York v. Reinhart, 152 Md. 439 (1927). Finally,
Defendant objects to Plaintiff’s misguided assumption that “if [Owens] did not commit
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suicide, then his death is covered under the Policy.” Id. at p. 9. On the contrary, Defendant
argues, the Policy specifically excludes from coverage intentional injuries and those that
occur as a result of intoxication. Id. Defendant claims that Plaintiff has not established as a
matter of law that these exclusions do not apply. Id. at 10.
After reviewing the evidence in the record, this Court finds that there are genuine
issues of material fact with respect to whether Owens intended to commit suicide or, at least,
intentionally injure himself. While it is true that Owens did not leave a suicide note, the
parties have stipulated that he “intentionally” drank a fatal dose of a poisonous substance.
There is no indication that he was intoxicated at the time he first picked up the Prestone
container and there is no indication that he had poor eyesight. In fact, Plaintiff admits that
Owens read the container to identify that it contained alcohol.
The container’s label
included a paragraph of warning materials, stating “DANGER [skull and cross bones image]
POISON . . . Cannot be made nonpoisonous. Do not swallow or breathe vapors. Avoid
eye and skin contact . . . FIRST AID: If swallowed, do NOT induce vomiting.
IMMEDIATELY call a local poison control center or hospital emergency department.”
Regardless of whether Dr. Noonberg’s report is admitted into evidence, a genuine issue of
material fact remains. Plaintiff is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Therefore,
Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 14) is DENIED.
II.
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment
Defendant claims that no reasonable jury could find Owens’ death accidental and that
the Policy’s intoxication exclusion precludes recovery for his death as a matter of law. Def.
Mot. Summary J., p. 11., ECF No. 22-1. Therefore, Defendant argues, it is entitled to
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summary judgment. Id. However, a genuine dispute of material fact remains as to both
questions, so both of Defendant’s arguments fail.
A. Owens’ Death Did Not Result From His Intoxication as a Matter of Law
The Policy includes an “Exclusion for Intoxication” provision, which denies coverage
for deaths “resulting from . . . intoxication” as defined “under the laws of the jurisdiction in
which the incident occurred.” Policy, MET000186, ECF No. 20-2. Plaintiff does not
dispute that “the incident occurred” in the State of Maryland. Def. Mot. Summary J., p. 11,
ECF No. 22-1. In the Complaint, she alleges that “at all times the Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s
decedent were residents of Anne Arundel County, Maryland.” Compl. at ¶ 1, ECF No. 2.
Maryland law recognizes a legal presumption of intoxication at a blood alcohol level of 0.08
grams per 100 milliliters. Def. Mot. Summary J., p. 11, ECF No. 22-1. Additionally,
Maryland defines “alcohol” as “any substance or substances containing any form of alcohol,
including . . . methanol . . .” Id. (citing MD. CODE, TRANSP. § 11-103.1). Therefore,
Defendant contends, Owens’ death falls within this exclusion as a matter of law because his
methanol blood alcohol level was .333 grams per milliliter, rendering him “intoxicated,” and
he died from “methanol poisoning,” a result of his methanol “intoxication.” Id. at p. 12.
Plaintiff’s Second Motion for Summary Judgment directly addresses Defendant’s
argument under the intoxication exclusion. Pl. Second Mot. Summary J., ECF No. 23. She
again contends that the facts in this case are undisputed and reiterates her argument that
Owens’ death was neither intentional nor the result of intoxication and, therefore, that she is
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entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. Specifically, she argues that Owens was not
intoxicated because his “blood alcohol level was less than .01.” Id. at ¶ 8.8
The parties have stipulated that the decedent, Mr. Owens, drank Prestone from a
spray bottle of Prestone Ice and Frost Shield. Joint Stipulation of Facts at ¶ 2, ECF No. 227. Additionally, they agree that Maryland’s legal presumption of intoxication at a blood
alcohol level of 0.08 grams per 100 milliliters controls in this case. However, based on the
evidence in the record, there is room for reasonable minds to disagree over whether Owens
was “intoxicated” within the meaning of the Policy and whether his death “result[ed] from”
his “intoxication.”
The parties seem to cite different measures of blood alcohol
concentration. Defendant cites Owens’ methanol blood alcohol level of .333 grams per 100
milliliters, Abstract Report, p. 21, ECF No. 17-4, while Plaintiff cites Owens’ alcohol serum
level, which was less than .01 grams per milliliter, IP Encounter Report, p. 5, ECF No. 17-2.
Neither party has presented this Court with compelling scientific or legal authority indicating
which measure is the appropriate measure of intoxication in this case.
Additionally, even if this Court were to accept that Owens was intoxicated at the time
of his death, it is not clear that his death “result[ed] from” intoxication as a matter of law.
Most cases interpreting intoxication exclusions in insurance contracts have involved a more
direct causal link between intoxication and death than the present case. See, e.g., Balthis v.
AIG Life Ins. Co., 5 Fed. Appx. 320, 323 (4th Cir. 2001) (upholding trial court’s decision to
8 To the extent that Plaintiff reiterates in her Second Motion for Summary Judgment claims already made in
her initial Motion for Summary Judgment, her argument fails. See discussion supra. Additionally, her
arguments for summary judgment on account of the inapplicability of the Intoxication Exclusion fail. As
discussed infra, a genuine dispute of material fact remains as to whether Owens was intoxicated and, if he was,
whether his death “result[ed] from” his intoxication. Therefore, Plaintiff’s Second Motion for Summary
Judgment (ECF No. 23) is DENIED.
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grant defendant insurer’s motion for summary judgment where “the decedent died after he
choked on his vomit which was caused by alcohol intoxication”); Horton v. Life Ins. Co. of
North America, No. ELH–14–32015, 2015 WL 1469196, at *30 (D. Md. Mar. 30, 2015)
(denying summary judgment where decedent was found in open water with a blood alcohol
concentration of .13. and had been operating a boat while drinking alcohol). This case is
unique in that the same liquid that intoxicated Owens also poisoned him, and it is unclear
from the evidence in the record whether intoxication occurred before, after, or
simultaneously with death. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
recently ruled on a similar case, in which a woman died of “mixed drug intoxication.” See
Nichols v. Unicare Life and Health Ins. Co., 739 F. 3d 1176, 1179 (8th Cir. 2014). Finding that
an intoxication exclusion similar to the one in this case did not apply to the woman’s death,
the court reasoned that the exclusion “is intended to apply to death caused by committing
acts, such as driving, while intoxicated; not to situations where the immediate cause of death
is ingestion of a lethal mixture of drugs.” Id. at 1184.
After reviewing the evidence in the record, there is a genuine issue of material fact
with respect to causation in this case. In fact, in her Second Motion in Limine, Plaintiff
argues that Owens’ death was not caused by intoxication. Pl. Second Mot. in Limine at ¶ 13,
ECF No. 17. On the contrary, she contends, a fatal dose of Prestone is two ounces, while it
would take “at least four two-ounce drinks” to reach “intoxication.” Id. Therefore, she
concludes, intoxication could not have been the cause of Owens’ death because Owens’
would necessarily have received a deadly dose of Prestone before becoming intoxicated. Id.
For these reasons, Defendant’s first argument for summary judgment fails.
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B. Owens’ Death Was Not The Result of an Intentional Injury as a Matter of Law
Defendant argues that, even if Owens did not intend to commit suicide, he still died
from an intentional injury. Def. Mot. Summary J., p. 14, ECF No. 22-1. Defendant notes
that, under Maryland law, “the key inquiry is whether the intentional act caused a foreseeable
injury, not whether the decedent derived pleasure from the injury or intended result.” Id.
(citing MAMSI Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Callaway, 825 A.2d 995 (Md. 2003)).
Here,
Defendant argues, “drinking Prestone poses a serious foreseeable risk of injury or death.”
Id. at p. 15. Plaintiff acknowledges that Owens’ read the label, and the label includes the
warning “fatal if swallowed.” Id. Even if this Court applied an objective, rather than
subjective, standard of foreseeability, 9 Defendant argues, it must still find as a matter of law
that Owens’ actions were intentional. Id. at 16. A reasonable person would surely have
expected that drinking a large amount of a poisonous substance labeled “DANGER [skull
and cross bones] POISON” would cause death. Id. at 17. Therefore, Defendant argues,
Plaintiff’s “accidental death” policy does not cover Owens’ death.
Dr. Noonberg testified that Owens did not commit suicide, but rather drank
Prestone because it contained alcohol. Alcoholics often display this behavior when, as in
this case, there is no other available source of alcohol. Additionally, Dr. Noonberg noted
that Owens had recently experienced a string of positive developments in his life that
9 Under Maryland law, an insured party’s injury is not considered accidental if it results from a voluntary act
taken by the insured with a serious foreseeable risk. See Gordon v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 260 A.2d 338, 33940 (Md. App. 1970). The Maryland Court of Appeals has established a different test for determining whether
an insured’s death caused by a third party was an accident. See Cole v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 753 A.2d 533,
542 (Md. App. 2000). The Cole test includes analyses of both objective and subjective foreseeability. An
injury is not “accidental” if either the insured or a reasonable person with the same knowledge and experience
as the insured would have foreseen injury. Id. While the Cole test has not been applied to self-inflicted
injuries, Defendant still addresses both subjective and objective foreseeability.
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suggest he would not have drunken Prestone if injury was foreseeable. These included a
new job, new pet, and a recent surgery that had dramatically improved his quality of life.
Furthermore, he had made plans for the following summer and even had dinner reservations
with his wife for Valentine’s day. Even if Dr. Noonberg’s report is not admitted into
evidence, there is additional evidence in the record sufficient to create a genuine issue of
material fact with respect to Owens’ “intent.” Plaintiff testified that Owens drank nightly
and that he did not have alcohol in the house on the night he drank Prestone. Additionally,
while the Prestone bottle included labels indicating the dangers of consuming it, a genuine
issue of material fact remains regarding whether or not they were insufficient to put
someone on alert as to the danger, particularly someone who was unfamiliar with the
product. While Dr. Noonberg noted that Owens worked in automobile parts, there is no
indication that he had purchased the Prestone that was in his home, that he had ever used it,
or even seen it before. As an issue of fact exists as to Owens’ cause of death, Defendant’s
second argument fails. Defendant is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law and,
consequently, its Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 22) is DENIED.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff Vicki Norvell’s Motion for Summary Judgment
(ECF No. 14) is DENIED, and her Second Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 23) is
also DENIED. Additionally, Defendant Metropolitan Life Insurance Company’s Cross
Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 22) is DENIED. A hearing will be scheduled to
resolve Plaintiff’s pending Motions in Limine (ECF Nos. 15 & 17).
A separate Order follows.
Dated: October 28th, 2015
____/s/_______________________
Richard D. Bennett
United States District Judge
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