Norvell v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company
Filing
33
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Richard D Bennett on 12/23/2015. (hmls, Deputy Clerk)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
VICKI LYNN NORVELL,
*
Plaintiff,
*
v.
*
METROPOLITAN LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY,
*
*
Defendant.
*
*
*
Civil Action No. RDB-14-3662
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Vicki Norvell (“Plaintiff” or “Norvell”) initiated the present action
against Defendant Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (“Defendant” or “MetLife”),
claiming breach of contract. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to pay
benefits due under an Accidental Death and Dismemberment Insurance Policy (“the
Policy”) following the death of her husband, Tas Owens (“Decedent” or “Owens”).
The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment (ECF Nos. 14, 22, and 23),
which this Court denied via Order dated October 28, 2015 (ECF No. 26). Currently
pending before this Court are Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine (ECF No. 15), Plaintiff’s
Second Motion in Limine (ECF No. 17), and Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration
(ECF No. 29). Having reviewed the parties’ submissions, this Court finds that no
1
hearing is necessary.1 See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2014). For the reasons that follow,
Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine (ECF No. 15) and Plaintiff’s Second Motion in Limine
(ECF No. 17) are both DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, subject to refiling.
Additionally, Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration (ECF No. 29) is DENIED.
BACKGROUND
The background facts of this action were set forth fully in this Court’s
Memorandum Opinion dated October 28, 2015 (ECF No. 25).
To summarize,
Plaintiff Vicki Norvell (“Plaintiff” or “Norvell”) was the beneficiary of a Voluntary
Accidental Death and Dismemberment Insurance Policy (“the Policy”), covering her
husband Tas Owens (“Decedent” or “Owens”) and underwritten by Defendant
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (“Defendant” or “MetLife”). Norvell Aff., p.
11-12, ECF No. 22-3. The Policy guaranteed Norvell a $195,000 payment in the event
Owens “sustain[ed] an accidental injury that [was] the Direct and Sole Cause of a
Covered Loss.” Policy, p. 42, MET000186, ECF No. 20-2.
The Policy did not provide benefits “for any loss caused or contributed to by:”
1. physical or mental illness or the diagnosis or treatment of such illness;
2. infection, other than infection occurring in an external accidental
wound;
3. suicide or attempted suicide;
4. self-inflicted injury by an insane person;
1
This Court suggested in its October 28, 2015 Memorandum Opinion that a hearing would be
scheduled to resolve Plaintiff’s pending Motions in Limine. Memorandum Opinion, p. 2, ECF No.
25. However, having reviewed the parties’ submissions and pursuant to Local Rule 105.6, this Court
finds that no hearing is necessary. This Court will now rule on all pending motions.
2
5. service in the armed forces of any country or international authority,
except the United States National Guard;
6. You or Your Dependents committing or attempting to commit a
felony;
7. You or Your Dependents being under the influence of any narcotic;
8. war, whether declared or undeclared; or act of war.
Id. at 42, MET000186.
Additionally, the Policy included an “Exclusion for
Intoxication” provision. Id. That provision stated as follows:
Exclusion for Intoxication
We will not pay benefits under this section for any loss resulting from
Your or Your Dependents intoxication.
Intoxicated means that Your or Your Dependents blood alcohol level
met or exceeded the level that creates a legal presumption of intoxication
under the laws of the jurisdiction in which the incident occurred. Id.
Norvell has testified that her husband, Owens, drank alcohol on a nightly basis,
both to cope with chronic pain and to help him relax. Norvell Dep., p. 35, 70, ECF
No. 14-4.
However, on the night of January 30, 2013, there was no alcohol in
their house. Id. at 40. Norvell testified that Owens was drinking soda when she went
to bed. Id. At that time, he seemed “normal and coherent.” Id. However, when
Norvell awoke the next morning, she found Owens “really out of it, . . . not
coherent,” and hardly able to speak. Id. Norvell called an ambulance, and Owens was
transported to a hospital. Id.
The parties have stipulated that Owens “intentionally drank Prestone from a
spray bottle of Prestone Ice and Frost Shield.” Joint Stipulation of Facts at ¶ 2, ECF
3
No. 22-7. He “unscrewed the top of [the bottle] and either poured the Prestone into a
glass and drank it, or drank [it] directly from the bottle.” Id. A warning was printed
on the back of the Prestone bottle. It stated the following:
DANGER [skull and cross bones image] POISON: Contains methyl
alcohol (67-56-1) and propylene glycol (57-55-6). PRECAUTIONARY
MEASURES: Cannot be made nonpoisonous. Do not swallow or
breathe vapors. Avoid eye and skin contact. Use in a well-ventilated
area. Deliberate concentration and inhalation of vapors may be fatal.
FIRST AID: If swallowed, do NOT induce vomiting. IMMEDIATELY
call a local poison control center or hospital emergency department. If
inhaled, move person into fresh air. If in eyes, immediately flush eyes
with water for 15 minutes. If on skin, remove contaminated clothing and
wash skin thoroughly with soap and water. If irritation develops and
persists, contact a doctor.
KEEP OUT OF REACH OF CHILDREN.
Prestone Photo, ECF No. 14-5 (emphasis omitted).
Owens died on February 1, 2013 at a hospital in Annapolis, Maryland.
Certificate of Death, ECF No. 14-2. The cause of death was listed as “Methanol
Poisoning.” Id. Nothing in the record suggests that Owens left a suicide note. Tests
taken at the hospital indicate that Owens’ methanol blood alcohol level was 333
milligrams per deciliter, or .333 grams per
100 milliliters.2 Abstract Report, p. 21, ECF No. 17-4. Owens had an alcohol serum
level of less than 10 milligrams per deciliter, or .01 grams per milliliter. IP Encounter
Report, p. 5, ECF No. 17-2. Dr. Yale Caplan was hired by Defendant to review
Owens’ records.
He concluded that Owens consumed at least 14-25 ounces of
2
Under MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-307(a)(3), blood alcohol concentrations expressed
in milligrams per deciliter should be converted into grams per 100 milliliters by dividing the measure
by 1000.
4
Prestone, or at least forty-five percent of the bottle. Caplan Report, p. 3, ECF No. 226.
The methanol contained in Prestone caused intoxication, loss of hand-eye
coordination, diminished vision, depression of Owens’ nervous system, severe toxicity,
and ultimately death. Id.
Plaintiff retained Dr. Aaron Noonberg to assess whether Owens died
accidentally or by suicide. Dr. Noonberg concluded that Owens died of methanol
poisoning, but that the facts do not support a finding of suicide. 3 Noonberg Report
at p. 1, ECF No. 14-6. Rather, Dr. Noonberg concluded, Owens needed a drink, but
did not have any alcohol in the house. Id. at 7. Therefore, like many alcoholics, he
reached for another liquid with alcohol as a primary ingredient. Id. In the present
case, that liquid happened to be Prestone.
Id.
In reaching his conclusion, Dr.
Noonberg considered a wide array of evidence, including information about Owens’
lifestyle and plans for the future that suggested he would not have intentionally
harmed himself by consuming a substance he knew to be poisonous. Id. at 2-7.
Following Owens’ death, Norvell submitted a claim for benefits under the
Policy, which was subsequently denied. Soon thereafter, she initiated the present
action. Subsequently, both Norvell and MetLife filed cross-motions for summary
judgment, which this Court denied. See Order, ECF No. 26.
3
Defendant has attacked Dr. Noonberg’s report as an “unsworn expert report” and argues that it is not
admissible as evidence under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Def. Mot. Summary J.,
p. 9, ECF No. 22-1. This Court rejected Defendant’s argument and did consider Dr. Noonberg’s
report in its October 28, 2015 Memorandum Opinion denying the parties’ cross-motions for summary
judgment (ECF No. 25).
5
STANDARD OF REVIEW
I.
Motion for Reconsideration
Rule 54(b) provides in pertinent part that an interlocutory order “may be
revised at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all
the parties’ rights and liabilities.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); Boyd v. Coventry Health Care,
Inc., 828 F. Supp. 2d 809, 813–14 (D. Md. 2011). “Motions for reconsideration of
interlocutory orders are not subject to the strict standards applicable to motions for
reconsideration of a final judgment. Rather, whether to review a prior decision is left
to the discretion of the district judge.” WW, LLC v. Coffee Beanery, Ltd., No. WMN–
05–3360, 2013 WL 4602845, at *1 (D. Md. Aug. 28, 2013) (citing Am. Canoe Ass’n v.
Murphy Farms, Inc., 326 F.3d 505, 514–15 (4th Cir. 2003) and Boyd, 828 F. Supp. 2d at
813–14). Reconsideration may be appropriate “where, for example, the Court has
patently misunderstood a party, . . . [or there has been] a controlling or significant
change in the law or facts since the submission of the issue to the Court.” Solomon v.
Dawson, No. PWG–13–1953, 2013 WL 4747987, at *1 (D. Md. Sept. 3, 2013) (quoting
Above the Belt, Inc. v. Bohannon Roofing, Inc., 99 F.R.D. 99, 101 (E.D. Va. 1983)
(internal quotation marks omitted)). However, “relief is rarely ever appropriate when
the motion raises no new arguments, but merely requests the district court to
reconsider a legal issue or to change its mind.” Boyd, 828 F. Supp. 2d at 814 (quoting
6
Pritchard v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 3 F. App’x 52, 53 (4th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation
marks and alterations omitted)).
II.
Motions in Limine
Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that an expert witness may
testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if “(a) the expert’s scientific, technical,
or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or
to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the
testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert has
reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case. Fed. R. Evid. 702.
A court’s role in applying Rule 702 is to act as a gatekeeper, excluding unreliable
expert testimony. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); see also
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) (holding that Daubert’s gatekeeping
obligation applies not only to scientific testimony but to all expert testimony).
In determining whether proffered expert testimony is reliable, the district court
has broad discretion to consider whatever factors bearing on validity the court finds to
be useful; the particular factors will depend upon the unique circumstances of the
expert testimony involved, and no single factor is necessarily dispositive. See Kumho
Tire, 526 U.S. at 152–53. “The court, however, should be conscious of two guiding,
and sometimes competing, principles: (1) ‘that Rule 702 was intended to liberalize the
introduction of relevant expert evidence’; and (2) ‘that due to the difficulty of
7
evaluating their testimony, expert witnesses have the potential to be both powerful
and quite misleading.’ ” United States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316, 337 (4th Cir. 2004)
(quoting Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi AB, 178 F.3d 257, 261 (4th Cir. 1999)).
The proponent of expert testimony bears the burden of production to come
forward with evidence to support its contention that an expert’s testimony would be
both reliable and helpful. See Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987). The Court
in Daubert reminded district courts, however, that “[v]igorous cross-examination,
presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are
the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.”
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595. Moreover, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit has held that “[a] court need not determine that the expert testimony a
litigant seeks to offer into evidence is irrefutable or certainly correct.” Westberry, 178
F.3d at 261.
I.
Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration (ECF No. 29)
A. Owens’ Death Was Not Intentional as a Matter of Law
Defendant contends that this Court “misunderstood MetLife’s argument that
Mr. Owens intentionally engaged in a voluntary act that caused him harm based on
the undisputed facts, and these facts prevent a reasonable jury from concluding as a
matter of law that Mr. Owens’s death was the result of an ‘accidental injury.’ ” Mot.
for Recons., p. 4, ECF No. 29-1. Defendant posits that “whether Mr. Owens’ death
8
was the result of an accidental injury turns on whether he intentionally committed an
act that he knew (subjectively) carried a foreseeable risk as set forth in Gordon v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 260 A.2d 338 (Md. App. 1970), and as more recently
articulated in MAMSI Life v. Health Ins. Co. v. Callaway, 825 A.2d 995, 1007 (Md.
2003).” Id. at 5.
Here, like in MAMSI and Gordon, Defendant argues, it is undisputed that
Owens “intentionally drank the Prestone.” Mot. for Recons., p. 7, ECF No. 29-1
(citing Memorandum Opinion, p. 4, ECF No. 25). Additionally, Norvell has stated
that “Owens knew ‘that drinking Prestone could hurt him,’ he knew ‘that drinking
poison could hurt him,’ and he knew ‘that drinking a large amount of [Prestone] could
kill him’).” Id. Furthermore, MetLife argues that Dr. Caplan “provided un-rebutted
expert testimony stating that consuming Prestone causes injury (and specifically caused
Mr. Owens’s injuries and death.)”. Id. For these reasons, Defendant argues, Owens
died of an intentional injury, barring Plaintiff’s recovery as a matter of law. Id. at 8-9.
Defendant further argues that the sufficiency of the warning labels should have no
impact on this Court’s analysis because Norvell testified that Owens understood that
drinking Prestone was harmful. Id. at 9 (citing Norvell Dep., 50-51, 58, ECF No. 223).
Additionally, Defendant presents new evidence indicating that “Mr. Owens
purchased the Prestone that was in his home and that he had previously used it for its
9
intended industrial use (as opposed to drinking it recreationally).” Id. at 10 (citing
Norvell Dep., p. 76:6-7).
This Court did not misconstrue Defendant’s argument in its October 28, 2015
Memorandum Opinion (ECF No. 25). Defendant does not necessarily contend that
the policy’s suicide exclusion applies, but that Plaintiff has failed, as a matter of law, to
meet her burden of showing that Owens’ death was the result of an “accidental injury”
covered by the Policy. In the October 28, 2015 Memorandum Opinion, this court
correctly identified the test for determining whether an injury is “accidental”—the test
now proposed by Defendant—stating that “ ‘the key inquiry is whether the intentional
act caused a foreseeable injury . . .’ ” Mem. Opinion, p. 16, ECF No. 25 (citing MAMSI
Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Callaway, 825 A.2d 995 (Md. 2003)). In this case, as this Court
concluded in its October 28, 2015 Memorandum Opinion, a genuine issue of material
fact remains as to whether or not Owens intentionally drank the Prestone despite a
foreseeable risk of injury.
The parties have stipulated that Owens “intentionally drank Prestone.” Joint
Stipulation of Facts at ¶ 2, ECF No. 22-7. Additionally, Norvell has testified that
Owens “bought [Prestone] for squirting on the windshield,” responded “I’m sure he
did” when asked if Owens knew “that drinking Prestone could hurt him,” and
responded “I’m sure that he did” when asked if Owens “understood that drinking a
large amount of the alcohol based product he consumed could kill him.” Norvell
10
Dep., p. 50-51, 58, 76. However, Norvell could not remember the precise date on
which Owens had allegedly purchased the Prestone, or even if he had purchased it in
the same year as his death. Id. at 76. Additionally, this Court has reviewed the
warnings on the Prestone bottle and, as stated in the October 28, 2015 Memorandum
Opinion, “a genuine issue of material fact remains regarding whether or not they were
insufficient” to convey a “foreseeable” risk of injury to someone in Owens’ situation.
Mem. Opinion, p. 17, ECF No. 25.
Furthermore, Dr. Noonberg concluded that Owens “died accidentally,” writing
that:
Like many alcoholics [Owens] tried a product containing alcohol because
he did not have any alcohol in the house, and died accidentally at a time
when life was going extremely well for him having learned six months
earlier that many chronic medical problems were due to his gall bladder
that was extracted without adverse consequence rendering him able to
enjoy a new quality of life, and foods that he had missed for a long time.
He had just started a new job with a promotion to management and a
raise and occupational opportunity that was exciting to him. He had
made multiple short term and long term future plans with a wife of two
years he obviously loved. There is no evidence of any reason Mr. Owens
would have preferred to end his life.
Noonberg Report, p. 7, ECF No. 14-6.
Although the issue presently before this court is one of “foreseeability” as
opposed to Owens’ subjective intent or risk for suicidal behavior, all of these findings
suggest that injury must not have been “foreseeable” when Owens drank from the
11
Prestone bottle on January 30, 2013. Otherwise, he would not have consumed it.4 A
genuine issue of material fact remains as to whether or not Owens intentionally drank
Prestone despite a “foreseeable” risk of injury. Therefore, Defendant’s request for
reconsideration fails with respect to its argument that Owens’ death was intentional as
a matter of law.
B. Owens’ Death Was Not “Resulting From” Intoxication as a Matter of
Law
Defendant argues that “based on additional law, evidence and argument upon
which MetLife did not rely in its summary judgment briefing or which was not
considered in the Summary Judgment Decision, there is no genuine material factual
dispute that Mr. Owens dies from methanol intoxication within the meaning of the
ADD policy.” Mot. for Recons., p. 4, ECF No. 29-1. Defendant objects that “[t]here
is no medical record stating that Mr. Owens was not intoxicated based on his ‘blood
alcohol level’ as contemplated in the ADD policy.” Id. at 12. Defendant argues that
Plaintiff’s counsel incorrectly defines “blood alcohol level” as “alcohol serum level,”
and offers no expert testimony to support that interpretation. Id. On the contrary,
Defendant contends that Dr. Caplan, in his sworn statement, explained that “Mr.
Owens was intoxicated based on his methanol blood alcohol level and based on
applicable Maryland law regarding intoxication.”
Id.
Defendant concludes that
4
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, this Court must consider the facts and all reasonable
inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378
(2007).
12
Plaintiff, by relying on mere argument of counsel, has failed to raise a genuine dispute
that Owens was not intoxicated. Id. at 13.
Defendant also contends that Plaintiff fails to raise a genuine dispute that
Owens’ intoxication was not the cause of his death. Id. Defendant objects that this
Court attempts “to draw a distinction between alcohol intoxication and alcohol
poisoning without any record evidence presented by Plaintiff (other than unsupported
argument of her counsel).” Id. at 14. Defendant cites several cases from outside the
Fourth Circuit for the proposition that “intoxication” includes “alcohol poisoning.”
See, e.g., Brauer v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, No. Civ.A. 04-531-JBC, 2006 WL
39058, at *1 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 4, 2006); Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Florida, Inc. v. Steck, 778
So. 2d 374, 376 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001). Defendant asserts that Dr. Caplan offered
“an unchallenged expert opinion that “Mr. Owens ingested a dose of approximately 10
ounces of pure 100% methanol;” that “Mr. Owens was intoxicated by the alcohol
(methanol) during the course of his initial ingestion;” and that the dose was ultimately
fatal. Id. at 15 (citing Caplan Report, ECF No. 20, Ex. 5-A, Conclusions 1-3).
While Defendant objects that Plaintiff has offered insufficient evidence to show
that the intoxication exclusion does not apply, “[a] basic rule of insurance law provides
that the insured must prove that a covered loss has occurred, while the insurer carries
the burden of demonstrating that a loss falls within an exclusionary clause of the
policy.” Jenkins v. Montgomery Industries, Inc., 77 F.3d 740, 743 (4th Cir. 1996); Horton
13
v. Life Ins. Co. of North America, No. ELH-14-3, 2015 WL 1469196, at *15 (D. Md.
Mar. 30, 2015). Therefore, in this case, Defendant bears the burden of proving that
Owens’ death “result[ed] from” intoxication and that the intoxication exclusion should
bar Plaintiff’s recovery under the Policy. As this Court concluded in its Memorandum
Opinion dated October 28, 2015, a genuine dispute of material fact remains as to
whether or not Owens’ death “result[ed] from” intoxication.
Most cases interpreting intoxication exclusions in insurance contracts have
involved a more distinct causal link between intoxication and death than the present
case. See, e.g., Balthis v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 5 Fed. Appx. 320, 323 (4th Cir. 2001)
(upholding trial court’s decision to grant defendant insurer’s motion for summary
judgment where “the decedent died after he choked on his vomit which was caused by
alcohol intoxication”); Horton v. Life Ins. Co. of North America, No. ELH–14–32015,
2015 WL 1469196, at *30 (D. Md. Mar. 30, 2015) (denying summary judgment where
decedent was found in open water with a blood alcohol concentration of .13. and had
been operating a boat while drinking alcohol). In its October 28, 2015 Memorandum
Opinion, this Court observed that the present case more closely resembles Nichols v.
Unicare Life and Health Ins. Co., 739 F. 3d 1176, 1179 (8th Cir. 2014). In that case, the
decedent died of “mixed drug intoxication.” Nichols, 739 F.3d at 1179. Finding that an
intoxication exclusion similar to the one in this case did not apply to the woman’s
death, the court in Nichols reasoned that the exclusion is not intended to apply to
14
“situations where the immediate cause of death is ingestion of a lethal mixture of
drugs.” Id. at 1184. Here, like in Nichols, Owens did not consume an alcoholic
beverage, but rather a lethal chemical concoction, one of the ingredients being a form
of alcohol.
The “alcohol poisoning” cases cited by Defendant are readily distinguishable
from the facts in this case. For example, the decedent in Brauer, 2006 WL 39058, at *1
“had been drinking very heavily [all night], continuing into the early morning,” before
dying from “accidental alcohol poisoning” and the decedent in Blue Cross, 778 So. 2d at
376 was killed “by a vehicle while attempting to cross a busy street,” an accident
“occasioned by her inebriated condition.” Furthermore, the Blue Cross court affirmed
an order denying the Defendant insurer’s motion for summary judgment, finding that
the intoxication exclusion in that case did not apply. Blue Cross, 778 So. 2d at 377.
Each of these cases involves the consumption of an alcoholic product marketed for
consumption, as opposed to a poisonous compound with a lesser-known form of
alcohol as an ingredient. This Court maintains that the Nichols case is the closest
analogue to the facts here.
In that case, the Court found that the intoxication
exclusion did not apply. Therefore, this Court will not rule as a matter of law that the
intoxication exclusion does bar recovery in this case.
Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.
II.
Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine (ECF No. 15)
15
Accordingly, Defendant’s
Plaintiff requests that this Court “instruct the juries, witnesses, experts and
anyone who will testify in Limine . . . [that] Dr. Yale H. Caplan cannot testify to
anything except areas of toxicology.” Mot. in Limine, p. 1, ECF No. 15. She argues
that Dr. Caplan “is not qualified to testify to state of mind, intent or psychiatric
issues.” Id. Therefore, Plaintiff contends, he should be “precluded from testifying to
these issues . . . and [the] defense is precluded from making any arguments based on a
position that is not supported by the evidence in this case.” Id.
Defendant objects that Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine is untimely because “[t]his
Court has not set a pre-trial order or scheduled any trial actions beyond hearing
dispositive motions,” “[it was] filed before this Court and the parties . . . determined
the relevant issues for trial,” and because “Plaintiff is asking the Court to rule on trial
issues when a trial may not be necessary if summary judgment is entered in MetLife’s
favor.” Def.’s Opp’n, p. 2, ECF No. 19. “Until this Court rules on the cross motions
for summary judgment,” Defendant argues, “the Motion[] [is] untimely and thus
improper.” Id.
Defendant also argues that Plaintiff’s Motion is “nothing more than [a]
summary judgment motion[] in disguise.”
Id. at 3.
“Rather than addressing the
grounds to exclude evidence, Plaintiff instead improperly argues that particular
exclusions to the policy should not apply as a matter of law based on the facts of the
case.”
Id.
Defendant objects that “a motion in limine is not the appropriate
16
mechanism for determining whether the facts of a particular case support a particular
legal conclusion.”
Id. at 4.
Furthermore, MetLife contends, “Plaintiff does not
provide a single citation to either a Federal Rule of Evidence or any relevant case law
whatsoever to the evidentiary grounds for the Motion[].” MetLife requests that this
Court “deny Plaintiff’s motion[] in limine, or at least defer ruling on Plaintiff’s
motion[] in limine until after summary judgment.” Id. at 4.
Dr. Caplan’s report does not, on its face, include findings pertaining to “state of
mind, intent, or psychiatric issues.” Caplan Report, ECF No. 22-6. Additionally,
Plaintiff has not identified any specific objectionable testimony that she anticipates Dr.
Caplan will offer. If Defendant offers Dr. Caplan as an expert witness at trial, this
Court will assess his expertise pursuant to Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence
and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
Until that time,
however, this Court will not issue an order limiting Dr. Caplan’s testimony.
Therefore, Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE,
subject to refiling.
III.
Plaintiff’s Second Motion in Limine (ECF No. 17)
Plaintiff requests that this Court “instruct the juries, witnesses, experts and
anyone who will testify in Limine . . . [that]” neither the “Suicide or attempted
suicide” exclusion nor the intoxication exclusion to the Policy applies in this case.
17
Second Mot. in Limine at ¶ 1, ECF No. 17. Therefore, she contends, “Defense counsel
and witnesses ought to be precluded from testifying to these arguments.” Id.
This Court has already considered, and rejected, Plaintiff’s argument that the
intoxication exclusion does not apply as a matter of law. See Mem. Op., p. 14-15. On
the contrary, a genuine dispute of material fact remains as to whether or not Owens’
death “result[ed] from” intoxication. See discussion supra. Therefore, this Court will
not instruct
the “juries, witnesses, experts and anyone who will testify in
Limine” that the intoxication exclusion does not apply. Likewise, this Court will not
issue the same instruction with respect to the “suicide or attempted suicide” exclusion.
As this Court concluded in its October 28, 2015 Memorandum Opinion, “there are
genuine issues of material fact with respect to whether Owens intended to commit
suicide or, at least, intentionally injure himself.” Mem. Op., p. 12, ECF No. 25.
Consequently, Plaintiff’s Second Motion in Limine is DENIED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE, subject to refiling.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine (ECF No. 15) and
Plaintiff’s Second Motion in Limine (ECF No. 17) are both DENIED WITHOUT
18
PREJUDICE, subject to refiling. Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration (ECF No.
29) is also DENIED.
A separate Order follows.
Dated:December 23, 2015
_/s/________________________
Richard D. Bennett
United States District Judge
19
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?