Lewis v. Colvin

Filing 17

ORDER denying 15 Motion of plaintiff for Summary Judgment; granting 16 Motion of defendant for Summary Judgment; Affirming Commissioner's judgment. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephanie A Gallagher on 9/30/2015. (jnls, Deputy Clerk)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
CHAMBERS OF
STEPHANIE A. GALLAGHER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

101 WEST LOMBARD STREET
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21201
[phone]
Fax [phone]

September 30, 2015
LETTER TO COUNSEL
RE:

Stacy L. Lewis v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration;
Civil No. SAG-14-3694

Dear Counsel:
On November 25, 2014, Plaintiff Stacy L. Lewis petitioned this Court to review the
Social Security Administration’s final decision to deny her claims for Disability Insurance
Benefits and Supplemental Security Income. (ECF No. 1). I have considered the parties’ crossmotions for summary judgment. (ECF Nos. 15, 16). I find that no hearing is necessary. See
Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2014). This Court must uphold the decision of the Agency if it is
supported by substantial evidence and if the Agency employed proper legal standards. See 42
U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3); Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996). Under that
standard, I will deny Ms. Lewis’s motion, grant the Commissioner’s motion, and affirm the
judgment of the Commissioner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). This letter explains my rationale.
Ms. Lewis protectively filed her claim for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) in 2010,
and her claim for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) in 2012, alleging disability beginning
March 9, 2009. (Tr. 18, 161-67). Her claims were denied initially and on reconsideration. (Tr.
100-03, 107-13). A hearing was held on August 22, 2013, before an Administrative Law Judge
(“ALJ”). (Tr. 38-66). Following the hearing, the ALJ determined that Ms. Lewis was not
disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act during the relevant time frame. (Tr. 1537). The Appeals Council denied Ms. Lewis’s request for review, (Tr. 1-6), so the ALJ’s
decision constitutes the final, reviewable decision of the Agency.
The ALJ found that, during the relevant period, Ms. Lewis suffered from the severe
impairments of obesity, degenerative disc disease, degenerative joint disease/thoracic outlet
syndrome, diabetes mellitus, lupus, and depression with complaints of anxiety. (Tr. 20). Despite
these impairments, the ALJ determined that Ms. Lewis retained the residual functional capacity
(“RFC”) to:
perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except the
claimant can lift 10 pounds frequently and 20 occasionally with her dominant
right upper extremity, but she can lift five pounds frequently and 10 occasionally
with her non-dominant left upper extremity. The claimant can push and pull with
her bilateral upper extremities five pounds frequently and 10 occasionally. The
claimant is limited to jobs with no overhead work with her left arm, and her

Stacy L. Lewis v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration
Civil No. SAG-14-3694
September 30, 2015
Page 2
reaching ability with left arm, both laterally and in front, is limited to
occasionally. Furthermore, she is limited to no more than occasional fine and
gross dexterity with the left arm and hand. Ms. Lewis is limited to work in an
inside environment without excessive heat, cold, or humidity. She requires jobs
that allow her to change positions once per hour. Finally, Ms. Lewis is limited to
simple routine tasks, with positions that allow her to be off task about 5% of the
time, rest for 10 minutes every two hours, and miss eight days of work per year.
(Tr. 23). After considering the testimony of a vocational expert (“VE”), the ALJ determined that
Ms. Lewis could perform work existing in significant numbers in the national economy and that,
therefore, she was not disabled. (Tr. 30).
Ms. Lewis raises three arguments on appeal: (1) that the ALJ erred in evaluating the
opinions of some of her treating physicians; (2) that the ALJ failed to include relevant
information in the hypothetical posed to the VE; and (3) that the ALJ erred in assessing her
credibility. Each argument fails to warrant remand, and is addressed below.
First, Ms. Lewis complains that the ALJ assigned inadequate weight to the opinions of
her treating physician, Dr. Mahmood, and her treating rheumatologist, Dr. Jacob. Pl. Mot. 3-7.
Dr. Mahmood’s opinion, written in June, 2011, concedes that, despite having treated Ms. Lewis
since 2009, he was unable to provide either a diagnosis or a prognosis for Ms. Lewis’s condition.
(Tr. 578-80). He opined that she would be able to sit for 0-2 hours and stand/walk for three
hours in an eight-hour workday. Id. Dr. Jacob’s opinion was written in November, 2012, and
suggested that, as a result of her lupus diagnosis, Ms. Lewis would only be able to sit for two
hours and stand/walk for less than one hour in an eight hour day. (Tr. 919-25). The ALJ
assigned both opinions “partial weight,” explaining that the severity of the limitations suggested
by those physicians “is not entirely consistent with the longitudinal conservative treatment
record, the documented clinical and examination findings, and Ms. Lewis’s stated ongoing
capabilities.” (Tr. 29). Specifically, in the opinion, the ALJ reviewed Ms. Lewis’s activities of
daily living including caring for personal needs, driving up to 30 miles, and shopping for
groceries with assistance. (Tr. 24-25). The ALJ further provided an extensive review of the
clinical and examination findings, noting the relatively minor findings on objective diagnostic
testing and the mild impairments on clinical evaluation. (Tr. 25-28). The ALJ further noted Ms.
Lewis’s testimony that her lupus had been in remission since August, 2012. (Tr. 28).
Importantly, this Court’s role is not to reweigh the evidence or to substitute its judgment for that
of the ALJ, but simply to adjudicate whether the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial
evidence. See Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990). In light of the substantial
evidence cited by the ALJ, I find no fault in the assignments of “partial weight” to the treating
physicians.
Ms. Lewis’s next argument, regarding the adequacy of the hypothetical to the VE, is
essentially a challenge to the RFC assessment, which is used to formulate the hypothetical.
Essentially, Ms. Lewis contends that the RFC assessment should have incorporated limitations
suggested by a consultative psychological examiner, Dr. Miller, and should have included

Stacy L. Lewis v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration
Civil No. SAG-14-3694
September 30, 2015
Page 3
limitations to address her allegations of pain and fatigue. (Tr. 7-9). Specifically, Ms. Lewis
refers to Dr. Miller’s findings of “reduced general memory; low average immediate memory;
reduced concentration on some tasks; . . . fair judgment and insight.” (Tr. 571). In fact, however,
the ALJ credited Dr. Miller’s findings and Ms. Lewis’s complaints by determining that Ms.
Lewis suffers “moderate difficulties” in the functional area of “concentration, persistence, or
pace.” (Tr. 22). The ALJ then appropriately addressed those moderate difficulties by limiting
Ms. Lewis not only to “simple routine tasks,” but to jobs allowing her “to be off task about 5%
of the time, rest for 10 minutes every two hours, and miss eight days of work per year.” (Tr. 23).
Ms. Lewis has not explained how Dr. Miller’s findings required any additional limitation other
than those included by the ALJ.
Ms. Lewis’s second RFC argument essentially meshes with her final argument, that the
ALJ did not find her testimony credible, particularly as it pertained to her allegations of disabling
pain and fatigue. (Pl. Mot. 8-11). Ms. Lewis is correct that, if the ALJ had credited her
testimony, he likely would have concluded that she is unable to work. However, as described
above, the evidence the ALJ used to discredit the opinions of the two treating physicians is
equally applicable to discredit Ms. Lewis’s contention that her pain and fatigue are disabling.
While the record reflects that Ms. Lewis sought medical treatment to address her pain, it further
reflects that, as Dr. Mahmood noted, physicians were unable to find a medical diagnosis to
explain the pain she alleged. Ultimately, while the record contains evidence that could be
marshaled in favor of a disability finding, this Court’s role is not to reweigh the evidence. As
noted above, the ALJ cited to substantial evidence to support his conclusion, which cannot
therefore be disturbed.
For the reasons set forth herein, Ms. Lewis’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No.
15) is DENIED and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 16) is GRANTED.
The Commissioner’s judgment is AFFIRMED pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
The Clerk is directed to CLOSE this case.
Despite the informal nature of this letter, it should be flagged as an opinion and docketed
as an order.
Sincerely yours,
/s/
Stephanie A. Gallagher
United States Magistrate Judge