Federal Insurance Company v. Mathews Brothers, LLC et al
Filing
26
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Richard D Bennett on 8/14/2015. (jnls, Deputy Clerk)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
FEDERAL INSURANCE COMPANY
*
Plaintiff,
*
v.
Civil Action No. RDB-14-3794
*
MATHEWS BROTHERS, LLC, and
ALBAN TRACTOR CO., INC
Defendants.
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
MEMORANDUM OPINION
*
*
*
Plaintiff Federal Insurance Company (“Plaintiff” or “Federal”) filed a ten-count
Complaint (ECF Nos. 1) against Defendants Mathews Brothers, LLC (“Mathews”) and
Alban Tractor Company, Inc. (“Alban”) (collectively “Defendants”) asserting negligence and
breach of warranty claims arising out of a sunken vessel. Currently pending before this Court
is Defendant Mathews’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 9) and Defendant Alban’s Motion to
Dismiss (ECF No. 11). The parties’ submissions have been reviewed and no hearing is
necessary. See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2011). For the reasons that follow, Defendant
Mathews’ Motions to Dismiss (ECF Nos. 9) is GRANTED and Defendant Alban’s Motion
to Dismiss (ECF No. 11) is GRANTED. Accordingly, this case is DISMISSED as to all
defendants.
BACKGROUND
This Court accepts as true the facts alleged in the plaintiff’s complaint. See Aziz v.
Alcolac, Inc., 658 F.3d 388, 390 (4th Cir. 2011). This case arises out of damage totaling
$750,000 to the yacht RIVER RAT (“RIVER RAT” or “the vessel”). See generally Compl.
Federal is a foreign corporation authorized to do business in the State of Maryland. Id. ¶ 3.
Mathews is a Maryland corporation that manufactured the vessel and sold it to Mr. and Mrs.
Ratcliffe,1 who subsequently sold it to Mr. Rardin. Id. ¶ 5. Alban is a Maryland corporation
that manufactures and installs marine engines and related parts. Id. ¶ 6.
Between October of 2007 and June of 2009, Mathews built the RIVER RAT for its
original owners, the Ratcliffes. Id. ¶ 8. During the vessel’s construction, Mathews contracted
with Alban to supply and install the vessel’s engine, along with other parts and fittings. Id.
Mathews physically placed the engine in the vessel, and approximately eight months later,
Alban completed final “hook ups” and accessory installations involving the fuel cooler and
seawater cooling discharge line. Id. In June of 2009, Alban conducted a “PAR Test” to
assure that the engine and the installation met Alban standards. Id. ¶ 9. When the test
showed the engine’s performance was unacceptable, Alban installed a replacement engine.
Id.
In May of 2012, Mr. Ratcliffe passed away and his estate sold the RIVER RAT to Mr.
Rardin. Id. ¶ 10. Mr. Rardin subsequently insured the vessel with Federal. Id. ¶ 3. Mr. Rardin
never made any alterations to the vessel’s engine or any of its related fittings. Id. On May 27,
2013, after docking the vessel, Mr. Rardin noticed that it was taking on water and sinking. Id.
¶ 11. As a result, Mr. Rardin was unable to get the boat completely on the boat lift, and
eventually the boat sunk in approximately four to five feet of water. Id. A subsequent
investigation revealed that the cause of the sinking was “the improper installation of the fuel
cooler discharge line to the engine exhaust elbow which caused the nipple fitting to break
1 The Complaint refers to the original owners as both the “Radcliffes” and “Ratcliffes.” Subsequently, the
Plaintiff consistently uses the name “Ratcliffes” in its responsive papers, thus this Court will do the same.
2
and consequential leakage of seawater into the boat.” Id. ¶12. Allegedly, the installation of
the fuel cooler discharge line was improper because:
A. The nipple fitting serving the fuel cooler seawater discharge
line connection to the engine exhaust elbow was not suitable
for use in the application in which it was deployed.
B. The fuel cooler seawater discharge line connection to the
engine exhaust elbow, being comprised of five fittings,
created complications and greater risks for failure due to
over-tensioning, loading, vibration and corrosion.
C. The nipple fitting that broke appears to have been
comprised of common “yellow” brass, which is inferior to
marine grade bronze. Using yellow brass constitutes a defect
in workmanship and assembly as the material selection is
unsuitable for the application in which the fitting was
deployed.
D. Using five fittings to connect the fuel cooler seawater
discharge line to the exhaust elbow qualifies as a defect in
workmanship and assembly in that the exhaust elbow should
have been fabricated with a welded pipe to accommodate
connecting the flexible hose serving the fuel cooler
discharge using marine grade hose clamps.
Id. ¶ 12. Due to the sinking, the vessel required repairs totaling over $750,000. Id. ¶ 16.
Because Mr. Rardin’s policy with Federal had hull limits of $750,000, that amount plus
$25,000 for other costs was paid by Federal under the insurance contract, and Federal is now
subrogated to the rights of Mr. Rardin. Id. ¶ 17.
Federal filed this action seeking $775,000 in damages plus interests and costs from
Defendants. The ten-count Complaint asserts five claims against Mathews and the same five
claims against Alban: breach of express warranty (Counts I and VI); breach of implied
warranty of merchantability (Counts II and VII); breach of implied warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose (Counts III and VIII); negligence (Counts IV and IX); and breach of
3
warranty of workmanlike performance (Counts V and X).2 Both Defendants move to
dismiss all counts against them pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes the dismissal of a
complaint if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The purpose of Rule
12(b)(6) is “to test the sufficiency of a complaint and not to resolve contests surrounding the
facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses.” Presley v. City of Charlottesville,
464 F.3d 480, 483 (4th Cir. 2006).
The Supreme Court’s recent opinions in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544
(2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), “require that complaints in civil actions be
alleged with greater specificity than previously was required.” Walters v. McMahen, 684 F.3d
435, 439 (4th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). In Twombly, the Supreme Court articulated “[t]wo
working principles” that courts must employ when ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) motions to
dismiss. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. First, while a court must accept as true all the factual
allegations contained in the complaint, legal conclusions drawn from those facts are not
afforded such deference. Id. (stating that “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice” to plead a claim); see also
Wag More Dogs, LLC v. Cozart, 680 F.3d 359, 365 (4th Cir. 2012) (“Although we are
constrained to take the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, we need not accept
2 Plaintiff asserts Counts I-V against Mathews and Counts VI-X against Alban.
4
legal conclusions couched as facts or unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or
arguments.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Second, a complaint must be dismissed if it does not allege “a plausible claim for
relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although a “plaintiff need not plead the evidentiary standard
for proving” her claim, she may no longer rely on the mere possibility that she could later
establish her claim. McCleary-Evans v. Maryland Department of Transportation, State Highway
Administration, 780 F.3d 582, 584 (4th Cir. 2015) (emphasis omitted) (discussing Swierkiewicz
v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002) in light of Twombly and Iqbal). Under the plausibility
standard, a complaint must contain “more than labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. While the
plausibility requirement does not impose a “probability requirement,” id. at 556, “[a] claim
has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678; see also Robertson v. Sea Pines Real Estate Cos., 679 F.3d 278, 291 (4th Cir. 2012) (“A
complaint need not make a case against a defendant or forecast evidence sufficient to prove an
element of the claim. It need only allege facts sufficient to state elements of the claim.”
(emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). In making this
assessment, a court must “draw on its judicial experience and common sense” to determine
whether the pleader has stated a plausible claim for relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. “At
bottom, a plaintiff must nudge [its] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible to
resist dismissal.” Wag More Dogs, LLC, 680 F.3d at 365 (internal quotation marks omitted).
ANALYSIS
5
Plaintiff’s Complaint asserts five causes of action against each Defendant under
theories of breach of warranty and negligence. In their respective Motions to Dismiss,
Defendants Mathews and Alban raise a variety of issues, including procedural defects, lack
of privity, and other substantive issues. This Court will address claims in the following
manner. First, this Court will consider whether § 2-725 of the Maryland Commercial Law
Code or § 5-101 of the Maryland Courts and Judicial Proceedings Code, and their respective
statutes of limitations, govern Counts I-III and VI-VIII. Next, this Court will determine
whether the economic loss rules bars Plaintiff’s negligence claims (Counts IV and IX).
Finally, this Court will address whether Plaintiff fails to state a claim against either
Defendant for breach of workmanlike performance (Counts V and X).
I.
Statute of Limitations as to Counts I-III and Counts VI-VIII
It is undisputed that Maryland law applies to Plaintiff’s claims of breach of express
warranty (Counts I and VI), breach of implied warranty of merchantability (Counts II and
VII), and breach of implied fitness for a particular purpose (Counts III and VIII). See Ace
American Ins. Co. v. Grand Banks Yachts, Ltd., 587 F. Supp. 2d 697, 704 (D. Md. 2008) (“It is
well established that the contract for the sale of a yacht is a non-maritime contract . . . As a
federal court sitting in diversity, the court applies Maryland’s choice of law rules.”); see also
Polestar Maritime Ltd. v. Nanjing Ocean Shipping Co. Ltd., 631 F. Supp. 2d 304, 308 (S.D.N.Y.
2009) (“Contracts for the sale of ships are not cognizable in admiralty. Similarly, a breach of
warranty in the sale of a vessel does not state a cause of action in admiralty either.”)
(citations omitted).
6
This Court must decide, however, whether the Maryland Uniform Commercial Code
(“UCC”) or Courts and Judicial Proceedings Code controls these claims. Defendants argue
that Md. Code Ann., Com. Law § 2-725 applies to the breach of warranty claims. Under § 2725, a four-year statute of limitations runs from the date of tender of delivery to the original
owner. Md. Code Ann., Com. Law § 2-725. Such a statute of limitations would bar these
claims. In contrast, Plaintiff asserts that Md. Code Ann. Cts & Jud. Proc. § 5-101 governs
both contracts. § 5-101 imposes a three-year statute of limitations that begins to run
according to Maryland’s “discovery rule.” Md. Code Ann., Cts & Jud. Proc. § 5-101.
The UCC applies to “transactions in goods.” Md. Code Ann., Com. Law § 2-102. A
good is something that is “movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale.” Id.
§ 2-105(1). If a contract involves the mixture of both goods and services, courts look to the
“predominant purpose” of the contract to determine whether the UCC controls. See Burton v.
Artery Co., Inc., 367 A.2d 935 (Md. 1977) (adopting the “predominant purpose” test
articulated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Bonebrake v. Cox,
499 F.2d 951 (8th Cir. 1974)); see also Lohman v. Wagner, 862 A.2d 1942, 1046 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 2004) (applying the “predominant purpose” test to determine whether the UCC
applied to a mixed contract). As set forth in Bonebrake, this test asks
not whether [the contracts] are mixed, but, granting that they
are mixed, whether their predominant factor, their thrust, their
purpose, reasonably stated, is the rendition of service, with
goods incidentally involved (e.g., contract with artist for
painting) or is a transaction of sale, labor incidentally involved
(e.g., installation of a water heater in a bathroom).
499 F.2d at 960 (footnotes omitted). In other words, the mere fact that labor is required to
install or deliver a good does not remove the contract from the purview of the UCC.
7
In this case, the contracts at issue are (1) the contract between Mathews and the
Ratcliffes, the original owners of the RIVER RAT, and (2) the contract between Mathews
and Alban regarding the vessel’s engine. These contracts are mixed contracts in that
Defendants were to provide goods, but also to perform certain services in fulfillment of the
transactions in goods. The contracts are mixed, but whether they are mixed is not the inquiry
of the Burton-Bonebrake test. See Bonebrake, 499 F.2d at 960. Instead, this Court looks to the
“predominant factor” or “thrust” of the subject contracts. Under the first contract, Mathews
built the vessel and then sold it to the original owner, the Ratcliffes. Compl. ¶ 5. During the
vessel’s construction, Mathews subcontracted with Alban to supply and install the engine. Id.
¶ 8. Any labor performed by either Defendant was incidental to the main objective of the
contracts, which was to provide a yacht and an engine, respectively. Under the BurtonBonebrake test, these sales were the “thrust,” and thus UCC controls.
To rebut the application of the UCC, Plaintiff argues that the service aspects of the
contracts predominated, “as evidenced by Alban’s involvement in the installation [of the
Caterpillar engine] and sea trial process,” (Pl.’s Resp., 8, ECF No. 13), and “Mathews
Brothers[’s] alleged supervision of that process,” (Pl’s Resp., 4, ECF No. 14). Federal
contends that this case is analogous to the decision of the Maryland Court of Appeals in
Anthony Pools, a Div. of Anthony Indus., Inc. v. Sheehan, 455 A.2d 434 (1983). In Anthony Pools,
the plaintiffs sought to recover damages from the manufacturer and builder of a swimming
pool and diving board after one of the plaintiffs fell from the side of the diving board. Id. In
the case of a contract for “the construction of an inground, steel reinforced, gunite
swimming pool with hand finished plaster surfacing, tile trim and coping,” the Court of
8
Appeals held that the predominant thrust was “the furnishing of labor and service by [the
defendant], while the sale of the diving board was incidental to the construction of the pool
itself.” Id. at 439. As the predominant purpose of the contract was the rendering of services,
the UCC did not apply. Id.
Yet, the subject action is factually distinguishable from Anthony Pools. In Anthony Pools,
the parties contracted to construct a pool, not to sell a diving board. The good at issue—the
diving board—was merely a subsidiary element of the services rendered. The pool, as it was
not “movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale,” was not itself a good.
Md. Code Ann., Com. Law § 2-105(1). The Ratcliffes and Mathews, and Mathews and
Alban, however, contracted to provide certain goods—the vessel and the engine. The
Ratcliffes sought a yacht, and Mathews sought an engine, where any necessary labor was of
secondary concern. Federal’s emphasis of the service of installing the engine does not
transform these contracts into ones predominantly for a service.3 See East River S.S. Corp. v.
Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, n.7 (1986) (explaining that contracts “relating to the
construction of or supply of materials to a ship” and warranty claims grounded in such
contracts are governed by state law and “[i]n particular the Uniform Commercial Code . . .
would apply”); see also RMS Technology, Inc. v. TDY Industries, Inc., 64 Fed. Appx. 853, 856 (4th
Cir. 2003) (finding that when the defendant agreed to manufacture specialized military
equipment and then pass title for that equipment to another party, that sort of contract was
3 Moreover, Plaintiff’s arguments with regards to how the installation was improper all relate to a defective
product: “the nipple fitting . . . was not suitable,” “the fuel cooler seawater discharge line connection . . .
created complications,” “the nipple fitting that broke appears to have been comprised of common ‘yellow’
brass, which is inferior,” and “the exhaust elbow should have been fabricated with a welded pipe.” Compl. ¶
12.
9
“necessarily one for the sale of goods and is properly governed by the UCC”). Anthony Pools
is thus inapposite, and the UCC governs the subject contracts.
As the UCC controls, its four-year statute of limitations applies to Plaintiff’s claims.
Md. Code Ann., Com. Law § 2-725. According to the Complaint, the vessel was tendered to
its first purchaser, the Ratcliffes, in June of 2009. Compl. ¶ 3. The four-year period therefore
ended in June of 2013. Federal filed the instant action on December 5, 2014, over eighteen
months after the statute of limitations expired. See generally id. Plaintiff’s claims are thus
barred and must be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6). Accordingly, Defendant Mathews’s
Motion to Dismis is GRANTED as to Counts I, II and III,4 and Defendant Alban’s Motion
to Dismiss is GRANTED as to Counts VI, VII and VIII.5
II.
Negligence Claims (Counts IV and IX)
Next, Federal asserts claims of negligence against Mathews and Alban (Counts IV
and X, respectively). Federal alleges that Mathews failed to conform to its “legal duty and
obligation . . . to exercise reasonable care in its construction of the RIVER RAT.” Compl. ¶¶
37-38. Similarly, Alban failed to meet its “legal duty and obligation . . . to exercise reasonable
care in its manufacture, design and installation of the Caterpillar engine.” Id. ¶¶ 59–60. Both
Mathews and Alban contend that the economic loss rule of admiralty law bars Plaintiff’s
negligence claims.
4 In the alternative, Mathews argues that Counts I and III fail for lack of privity and Count III additionally
fails because the vessel’s use was not “particular.” As the applicable statute of limitations bars both counts,
this Court need not reach these supplemental arguments.
5 In the alternative, Alban argues that Counts VI, VII and VIII are barred by a warranty disclaimer, Count VI
fails for lack of privity, and Count VIII fails because the vessel’s use was not “particular.” As the UCC’s
statute of limitations bars all three counts, this Court need not reach Alban’s alternative arguments.
10
While state law governs the breach of express warranty, breach of implied warranty
of merchantability, and breach of implied fitness for a particular purpose claims, admiralty
law controls the tort claims. See Ace American Ins. Co. v. Grand Banks Yachts, Ltd., 587 F. Supp.
2d 697, 700 (D. Md. 2008) (explaining that, in a damages suit against a hull manufacturer,
admiralty law applied to the plaintiff’s tort claims, whereas state law governed the breach of
warranty claims (citing Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358, 359 (1990))). Under admiralty law, the
economic loss rule generally prevents a party from recovering in tort when a defective
product harms only the product itself. See East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476
U.S. 858, 871 (1986) (holding that “a manufacturer in a commercial relationship has no duty
under either a negligence or strict products-liability to prevent a product from injuring
itself.”). In Ace American, this Court has extended the East River rule to the non-commercial
context. 587 F. Supp. 2d at 701 (citing Reliance Ins. Co. v. Carver Boat Corp., No. CIV. A.
WMN-96-194, 1997 WL 714900, at *2 (D. Md. May 29, 1997)). Applying this rule to the
non-commercial context derives from the notion that, “[i]n the absence of personal injury or
damage to other property, there is no reason to upset the parties’ bargain as to their
contractual responsibilities and corresponding purchase price.” Federal Ins. Co. v. Lazzara
Yachts of North America, Inc., No. 8:09-CV-607-T-27MAP, 2010 WL 1223126, at *4 (M.D. Fl.
Mar. 25, 2010) (citing East River, 476 U.S. at 872).
In this case, the damages Federal seeks arise only from damage to the vessel itself, not
from damage to any persons or other property. Under the economic loss rule, Plaintiff thus
may not recover in tort. Federal’s argument that the economic loss rule is inapplicable is
unpersuasive. It contends that its negligence claims survive because the damage was the
11
result of a defective service rather than a defective product. This distinction, however, is
irrelevant. Emp’rs Ins. of Wausau v. Suwannee River Spa Lines, Inc., 866 F.2d 752, 755 (5th Cir.
1989). As the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit explained, “the economic loss rule
adopted in the East River case precludes recovery in maritime tort for purely economic loss
stemming from the negligent performance of a contract for professional services where
those services are rendered as a part of the construction of a vessel.” Id. When a party
“provides professional services as part of the manufacture or construction of a product[, it]
has no duty in maritime tort, independent of its contractual obligations, to prevent the
product from injuring itself.” Id. at 767.
Although the Fourth Circuit has yet to speak authoritatively on this issue, this Court
is persuaded by the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit. See also Gulf Boat Marine Services, Inc. v.
George Engine Co., Inc., 659 F.Supp. 6, 7 (E.D. La. 1986) (dismissing a negligence claim for
improperly repairing an engine or repairing it with defective parts because “[t]he event giving
rise to plaintiffs’ lawsuit was the failure of the engine, resulting in purely economic losses”);
accord Hudson River Cruises Inc. v. Bridgeport Drydock Corp., 892 F. Supp. 380, 386 (D. Ct. 1994)
(holding that the economic loss rule applied in the case where “[t]he parties’ relationship is
governed by a service contract” (citing Emp’rs Ins. of Wausau, 866 F.2d at 765)). Any alleged
negligence in this case stemmed from services performed during the construction of the
RIVER RAT. Defendants had contractual obligations, but no independent tort obligations
when the vessel “injur[ed] itself.” Id. Plaintiff does not allege any damage other than that to
12
the vessel, which is the “product itself.”6 This Court therefore holds that the economic loss
rule bars the negligence claims of Counts IV and IX.7 Accordingly, Defendant Mathews’s
Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED as to Count IV and Defendant Alban’s Motion to
Dismiss is GRANTED as Count IX.
III.
Breach of Warranty of Workmanlike Performance
Finally, Federal alleges claims of breach of warranty of workmanlike performance
against Mathews and Alban (Counts V and X, respectively). Specifically, Plaintiff claims that
Defendants’ “breach of [their] maritime warranty of workmanlike performance given to
Rardin, pursuant to the aforesaid contract with the original owner” proximately caused
Plaintiff’s damages. Compl. ¶¶ 42, 64. Regarding Mathews, Federal asserts a warranty “to
properly construct the RIVER RAT and properly install the engine and engine accessories.”
Id. ¶ 42. Alban contracted “to properly manufacture, design and install the Catepillar engine
and engine accessories in the RIVER RAT.” Id. ¶ 64. Both Defendants argue that the
warranty of workmanlike performance inapplicable to either contract because neither
contract was for maritime services.8
The implied warranty of workmanlike performance originates in the United States
Supreme Court’s decision in Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corp., 350 U.S. 124
6 See Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J.M. Martinac & Co., 520 U.S. 875, 877 (1997) (explaining for a tort claim against the
manufacturer of a vessel and the designer of the vessel’s hydraulic system that “all agree that the ‘product
itself’ consists at least of a ship as built and outfitted by its original manufacturer and sold to an initial user”).
7 While Plaintiff attempts to argue, at least with respect to Mathews, that if “this Court applies the economic
loss rule [then] Matthews (sic) Brothers would be able to artificially insulate itself from its negligent conduct
from downstream consumers,” East River addressed this concern. As the Court explained, “[p]ermitting
recovery for all foreseeable claims for purely economic loss could make a manufacturer liable for vast sums. It
would be difficult for a manufacturer to take into account the expectations of persons downstream who may
encounter its product.” East River, 476 U.S. at 874.
8 In the alternative, Alban contends that Count X fails for lack of privity and because it is barred by a
warranty disclaimer. As this Court holds that Plaintiff’s claim for breach of warranty of workmanlike
performance does not apply to Alban’s contract, this Court need not reach the alternative arguments.
13
(1956). In Ryan Stevedoring, the Court concluded that the breach of this warranty entitled a
ship owner to indemnity from a stevedore. Essentially, the warranty of workmanlike
performance “is an admiralty application of the contract rule that one who undertakes to
perform a service does so with the implicit agreement to perform in a workmanlike fashion.”
Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Bohemia River Assocs, Ltd., 855 F. Supp. 802, 806–807 (D. Md.
1991). As an admiralty law theory, this implied warranty applies only to admiralty contracts,
specifically admiralty service contracts. See Chisholm v. UHP Projects, Inc., 205 F.3d 731, 734
(4th Cir. 2000) (“The implied warranty of workmanlike performance ensures that the
stevedore will warrant the quality of services while on board the vessel.”); see also MP Leasing
Corp. v. Colonna’s Shipyard, CIV. A. 2:07CV273, 2009 WL 2581575, ay *4 (E.D. Va. May 8,
2009) (“The warranty imposed on a contractor in admiralty is to effect ship repairs in a
workmanlike manner.”).
As briefly discussed supra, a contract for the sale of a vessel is a non-maritime
contract. Ace American, 587 F. Supp. 2d at 704 (“It is well established that the contract for
the sale of a yacht is a non-maritime contract.” (citing Flota Maritime Browning de Cude, Sociadad
Anonima v. Snobl, 363 F.2d 733, 735 (4th Cir. 1966))). Federal alleges no services on behalf of
either Defendant while the vessel was docked or traveling in navigable waters. See Marina
One, Inc. v. Jones, 29 F. Supp. 3d 669, 675 (E.D. Va. 2014) (“Because the Agreement governs
the temporary dockage of a vessel at a marina with access to navigable waters, its subject
matter is clearly maritime in nature and it is therefore subject to federal admiralty law.”). As
the contracts at issue are not maritime contracts, the implied warranty of workmanlike
performance does not apply. Plaintiff thus fails to state a claim for which relief may be
14
granted in Counts V and X. Defendant Mathews’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED as to
Count V and Defendant Alban’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED as Count X.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Defendant Mathews’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 9) is
GRANTED and Defendant Alban’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 11) is GRANTED.
Accordingly, this case is DISMISSED as to all defendants.
A separate Order follows.
Dated: August 14, 2015
_________/s/_____________________
Richard D. Bennett
United States District Judge
15
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?