Cofield v. The-City of Baltimore et al

Filing 91

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge George Levi Russell, III on 6/30/2015. (c/m)(hmls, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
DR. KEENAN K. COFIELD,

:

Plaintiff,

:

v.

:

THE-CITY OF BALTIMORE, et al.,

:

Defendants.

Civil Action No. GLR-14-3976

:
MEMORANDUM OPINION

Pending

before

the

Court

are

Defendants’, Baltimore Police

Commissioner Anthony Batts and City of Baltimore Maryland Police
Department (the “BPD”), Motion to Dismiss or, Alternatively, Motion
for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 28); Defendant’s, Officer Anthony Brown,
Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment (ECF
No. 48); and Defendants’, City of Baltimore, City Board of Estimates,
Baltimore City Mayor Stephanie Rawlings-Blake, and Baltimore City
Council and its members (collectively, the “City Defendants”), Motion
to Reconsider the Court’s Order Denying their Motion to Dismiss (ECF
No. 58).1
Plaintiff, Keenan Cofield, filed this action in the Circuit Court
for Baltimore City, Maryland, on October 23, 2014.

(See ECF No. 2).

The Complaint, as amended, alleges false arrest/false imprisonment,
excessive use of force, assault, battery, negligence, and unlawful
detention (Count I); Failure to Train and/or Properly Train and
Supervise (Count II); Malicious Prosecution (Counts III & IV); and

1

Simultaneously with the drafting of this Opinion, Officer
Anthony Brown filed a Motion for Sanctions. (ECF No. 88). Because
Brown’s Motion to Dismiss will be granted and the case will be closed,
Brown’s Motion for Sanctions (ECF No. 88) will be denied as moot.

Denial of Medical Care in Violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendment (Count V). (See Am. Compl., ECF No. 7).

Cofield, acting pro

se, has filed a series of motions confusing the procedural posture of
this case including: a Motion to Strike (ECF No. 52); Motion to Strike
the Clerk’s Rule 12/56 Letter (ECF No. 54); Motion for Summary
Judgment (ECF No. 56); Motion to Vacate and/or Set Aside Order Dated
February 12, 2015 (ECF No. 59); Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
(ECF No. 62); Motion to Add Defendants (ECF No. 70); Motion for Leave
to File Amended/Supplemental Complaint (ECF No. 72); Motion for Remand
(ECF No. 76); Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 78); Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings (ECF No. 81); and Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings (ECF No. 86).
Having reviewed the pleadings and supporting documents, the Court
finds no hearing necessary.

See Local Rule 105.6 (D.Md. 2014).

For

the reasons outlined below, Cofield’s Motions will be denied and the
Defendants’ Motions will be granted.
I. BACKGROUND
A.

Factual Background
On April 7, 2009, Officer Brown arrested Cofield at his home in

Baltimore County, Maryland, pursuant to an arrest warrant.

During the

arrest, Officer Brown handcuffed Cofield behind his back and allegedly
caused injury to Cofield’s shoulder, back, neck, arm, and face.
Cofield

allegedly

complained

of

his

injuries,

but

was

ignored.

Moreover, Officer Brown allegedly refused to allow Cofield to use the
restroom for four to six hours, causing Cofield to urinate on himself.
2

I. Discussion
A.

Procedural Posture
Preliminarily, Cofield has filed a number of motions seeking to

prohibit the City Defendants and Brown from filing pleadings with this
Court on the basis that the Court is without jurisdiction over these
Defendants because they failed to file independent Notices of Removal
in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City.

The City Defendants, along

with Commissioner Batts and the BPD, were served with a copy of the
Summons and initial Complaint on November 20, 2014.

Pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1446 (2012), Commissioner Batts and the BPD removed the
action to this Court on December 19, 2014, predicated upon the Court’s
original jurisdiction over this case under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1).

(See

Commissioner Batts and the BPD

represented unambiguously that the other Defendants consented to the
removal.

(See Notice of Removal ¶ 2); (see also, Def.’s Joint

Statement Concerning Removal ¶ 5, ECF No. 29).

“[A] notice of removal

signed and filed by an attorney for one defendant representing
unambiguously
satisfies
removal.”
735,

742

the

that

the

other

requirement

of

defendants
unanimous

consent
consent

to
for

the

removal

purposes

of

Mayo v. Bd. of Educ. of Prince George’s Cnty., 713 F.3d
(4th

Cir.

2013),

cert.

denied,

134

S.Ct.

901

(2014).

Accordingly, Cofield’s Motion to Strike (ECF No. 52), Motion to Strike
the Clerk’s Rule 12/56 Letter (ECF No. 54), and Motion for Remand (ECF
3

No. 76) will be denied.
Further, Cofield argues Officer Brown failed to Answer or timely
consent to removal in this case.

In support of his contention that

Officer Brown was properly served, Cofield has filed an executed
summons indicating that Brown was served at 12:20 pm on November 20,
2014 at 100 N. Holliday Street.

(See Summonses 13-14, ECF No. 6);

(see also Mot. Summ. J. Exs. A-B, ECF No. 56-1).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e)(1) provides, in pertinent
part, that “an individual . . . may be served in a judicial district
of the United States by . . . following state law for serving a
summons in an action brought in courts of general jurisdiction in the
state where the district court is located or where service is made.”
Maryland Rule 2-121(a), in turn, provides:
Service of process may be made . . . (1) by delivering to
the person to be served a copy of the summons, complaint,
and all other papers filed with it; (2) if the person to be
served is an individual, by leaving a copy of the summons,
complaint, and all other papers filed with it at the
individual’s dwelling house or usual place of abode with a
resident of suitable age and discretion; or (3) by mailing
to the person to be served a copy of the summons,
complaint, and all other papers filed with it by certified
mail requesting: “Restricted Delivery--show to whom, date,
address of delivery.”
Md. Rules 2-121(a) (West 2015).

Thus, to date, neither Officer Brown,

nor any person with the legal authority to accept service on his
behalf, have been properly served.

Officer Brown was first informed

of the existence of this matter through counsel on January 23, 2014.
(See Def. Brown’s Removal Statement ¶ g, ECF No. 47).

On February 10,

2015, within 30 days of the acceptance of service by counsel on his
4

behalf, Officer Brown contemporaneously filed his Motion to Dismiss
and consented to removal.

(See Brown’s Removal Statement); (see also

Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 48).

Accordingly, Cofield’s Motion for

Summary Judgment (ECF No. 56) will be denied.
Further, Cofield has filed a number of motions seeking judgment
in his favor on the basis that Defendants have failed to answer or
otherwise defend.

First, the City Defendants along with the BPD and

Commissioner Batts were served on November 20, 2014.

Generally,

Maryland Rule 2-321(a) requires a party to file a responsive pleading
within thirty days after being served.
2015).

See Md. Rules 2-121(a) (West

On December 19, 2014, within thirty days of being served, the

City Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 9), which was
pending disposition before this matter was removed to federal court.
Thus, the City Defendants have not failed to plead or otherwise defend
this matter.
Second, Cofield has provided an inmate number and has represented
his address as the Eastern Correctional Institution.

Pursuant to

Standing Order 2012-01, In Re: State Prisoner Litigation, the BPD and
Commissioner Batts’s responses are due no later than sixty days after
the date on which counsel first received a copy of the Complaint.

On

January 20, 2015, within sixty days of being served, the BPD and
Commissioner Batts filed a Motion to Dismiss.

(ECF No. 28).

Thus,

the BPD and Commissioner Batts have not failed to plead or otherwise
defend.

Finally, as discussed above, Officer Brown also timely filed

his Motion to Dismiss.

Accordingly, Cofield’s Motion for Summary
5

Judgment (ECF No. 78) and Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings (ECF
Nos. 62, 81 & 86)2 will be denied.
For all of the reasons set forth above with respect to the
procedural posture of this case, Cofield’s Motion to Vacate and/or Set
Aside Order Dated February 12, 2015 will be denied.3

Additionally, on

March

Leave

24,

2015,

Cofield

filed

Amended/Supplemental Complaint.

a

Motion

for

(ECF No. 72).

to

File

A review of the

proposed Amended Complaint reveals no new allegations of law or fact
and, thus, appears to be a duplicate filing of the Amended Complaint
filed

in

this

Court

on

January

15,

2015.4

(See

ECF

No.

24).

Accordingly, Cofield’s Motion for Leave to File Amended/Supplemental
Complaint (ECF No. 72) will be denied as moot.
The Court will now consider the merits of the Defendants’ Motions
to Dismiss or, Alternatively, for Summary Judgment.
B.

Standard of Review
A Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion should be

granted unless an adequately stated claim is “supported by showing any
set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint.” Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 (2007); see Fed.R.Civ.P.

2

To the extent Cofield’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
(ECF No. 81) requests a writ of mandamus seeking an order directing
the Department of Justice to review his case, Cofield is not entitled
to mandamus relief.
3
On February 12, 2015, the Court issued an Order summarily
denying a number of duplicative motions filed by Cofield on the same
grounds as those discussed above.
(See ECF No. 51).
4
Cofield has failed to file a copy of the amended pleading in
which stricken material has been lined through or enclosed in brackets
and new material has been underlined or set forth in bold-face type in
compliance with Local Rule 103.6 (D.Md. 2014).
6

12(b)(6).

“[T]he purpose of Rule 12(b)(6) is to test the sufficiency

of a complaint and not to resolve contests surrounding the facts, the
merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses.”

Presley v. City

of Charlottesville, 464 F.3d 480, 483 (4th Cir. 2006) (alterations
omitted)(quoting Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th
Cir. 1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must
set forth “a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.

Iqbal, 556 U.S.

“In considering a motion to

dismiss, the court should accept as true all well-pleaded allegations
and should view the complaint in a light most favorable to the
plaintiff.”
1993).

Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir.

Although documents “filed pro se [are] to be liberally

construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be
held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers,” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)), the requirements of liberal
construction do not permit the Court to ignore a clear failure to
allege facts establishing a federal claim,

see Weller v. Dep’t of

Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
“When matters outside the pleading are presented to and not
7

excluded by the court, the [12(b)(6)] motion shall be treated as one
for

summary

judgment

and

disposed

of

as

provided

in

Rule

56.”

Laughlin v. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253, 260-61 (4th
Cir. 1998) (alteration in original) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b))
(internal quotation marks omitted).

Under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 56, the Court must grant summary judgment if the moving
party demonstrates there is no genuine issue as to any material fact,
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a).
“[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the
parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for
summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of
material fact.”
(1986).

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48

A “material fact” is one that might affect the outcome of a

party’s case.

Id. at 248; see also JKC Holding Co. v. Wash. Sports

Ventures, Inc., 264 F.3d 459, 465 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing Hooven-Lewis
v. Caldera, 249 F.3d 259, 265 (4th Cir. 2001)).

Whether a fact is

considered to be “material” is determined by the substantive law, and
“[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit
under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary
judgment.”

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; accord Hooven-Lewis, 249 F.3d

at 265.
B.

Analysis
1.

Statute of Limitations

All of Cofield’s claims, except for his malicious prosecution
8

claim, are barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

There is

no federal statute of limitations applicable to actions brought under
42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1988 (2012).
U.S. 42, 48 (1984).

See Burnett v. Grattan, 468

The Court, therefore, must apply the analogous

statute of limitations of the state where the federal court sits. (See
id.).

Here, Cofield’s claims are subject to the three-year-default

statute of limitations created by Md.Code.Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5–
101.

See Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 241 (1989) (stating the

“[s]tate’s personal injury statute of limitations should be applied to
all § 1983 claims.”); see also Barnhill v. Strong, No. JFM 07-1678,
2008 WL 544835, at *2 (D.Md. Feb. 25, 2008) (establishing that, in
Maryland, the common law claims for false arrest and imprisonment and
related constitutional torts are subject to the default statute of
limitations); see also Doe v. Archdiocese of Wash., 689 A.2d 634, 637
(Md.Ct.Spec.App. 1997) (“The Legislature has settled upon a three-year
period of limitations as a reasonable time to bring suit in most
cases.”).
To the extent Cofield alleges state law causes of action for
personal injury and intentional torts, those claims are all predicated
upon

the

alleged

misconduct

committed

by

Officer

Cofield’s allegedly unlawful arrest on April 7, 2009.5

Brown

The accrual

date of a § 1983 cause of action is resolved by federal law.

5

during

Wallace

Actions for assault are subject to a one year statute of
limitations. Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-105. Thus, the
statute of limitations on Cofield’s claim of assault expired on April
7, 2010.
9

v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007).
Under federal law, the running of the statute of limitations on
false arrest and imprisonment begins when the alleged false detention
or confinement ends.

Id. at 389.

Cofield complains that he was left

in a holding cell for four to six hours after his unlawful arrest on
April 7, 2009.

He alleges no other period of confinement.

Even

assuming he was not released on April 7, 2009, Cofield was arraigned
on April 20, 2009.

(See Def.’s BPD and Batts’s Mot. Dismiss or Summ.

J. Ex. D [“Criminal Docket”] at 1, ECF No. 28-5). In the context of
false arrest and imprisonment, the statute of limitations begins to
run when the victim is held pursuant to the legal process.

Wallace,

549 U.S. at 389.
Thus, the Court concludes that Cofield’s claims accrued, at the
latest, on April 20, 2009.

Because the statute of limitations is

three years, any accrued claim filed after April 20, 2012 is timebarred.

Cofield filed this lawsuit on October 23, 2014. Consequently,

all of Cofield’s claims, with the exception of malicious prosecution,
are untimely and must be dismissed.
2.

Malicious Prosecution

To state a cause of action for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff
must establish: “1) a criminal proceeding instituted or continued by
the defendant against the plaintiff; 2) without probable cause; 3)
with malice, or with a motive other than to bring the offender to
justice; and 4) termination of the proceedings in favor of the
plaintiff.”

Heron v. Strader, 761 A.2d 56, 59 (Md. 2000).
10

Because a

necessary element of an action for malicious prosecution requires
termination of the proceedings in the plaintiff’s favor, the cause of
action does not accrue until the proceedings brought against him are
resolved in his favor, such that the criminal action cannot be
revived.

Owens v. Balt. City State’s Attorneys Office, 767 F.3d 379,

390 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub nom., Balt. City Police Dep’t v.
Owens, 135 S.Ct. 1893 (2015).
Although Cofield alleges his case was favorably terminated, the
record reflects that the charges against him were placed on the stet
docket.

(See Criminal Docket at 5).

A stet is not a termination in

favor of the accused because it allows the case to be recalled by the
prosecution at any time.
(Md.Ct.Spec.App. 2004).

See Hines v. French, 852 A.2d 1047, 1057
Because the pleadings and factual documents

before the Court establish that the fourth element for malicious
prosecution cannot been satisfied, Defendants are entitled to summary
judgment in their favor with respect to malicious prosecution (Count
III).

Accordingly, Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss or, Alternatively,

Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF Nos. 28, 48) will be granted and the
BPD, Commissioner Batts, and Officer Brown will be dismissed.
3.

Motion to Reconsider

Because Cofield’s claims are time-barred and he cannot establish
the necessary elements for malicious prosecution, the City Defendants’
Motion to Reconsider the Court’s Order Denying their Motion to Dismiss
must be granted.

Moreover, under Maryland law, Baltimore City police

officers are state employees free from the City’s supervision and
11

control.

See Holloman v. Rawlings-Blake, No. CCB-14-1516, 2014 WL

7146974, at *4 (D.Md. Dec. 12, 2014).

The City cannot be liable for

negligence or an unconstitutional policy or custom as alleged by
Cofield in this case because it is not responsible for exercising such
supervision and control and sets no policy or custom that Baltimore
City police officers execute.
Additionally, to the extent that Cofield seeks to hold the Mayor,
City Council members, and City Board of Estimates members liable in
their personal capacities, those claims similarly fail for analogous
reasons.

Moreover, Cofield does not allege any facts showing that

Mayor Rawlings–Blake, or any of the City Council members, or City
Board of Estimates members personally caused the harm alleged. Absent
allegations that make plausible such a link, Cofield’s claims against
them in their personal capacities must be dismissed.

Accordingly, the

City Defendants’ Motion to Reconsider the Court’s Order Denying their
Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 58) will be granted and the City Defendants
will be dismissed.
4.

Motion to Add Defendants

Finally, on March 24, 2015, Cofield filed a Motion to Add
Defendants seeking to add the State of Maryland and the Office of the
Maryland Attorney General as parties to the case.

(ECF No. 70).

Because Cofield’s claims are time-bared and he cannot establish the
necessary elements for malicious prosecution, his claims against the
State of Maryland and the Office of the Maryland Attorney General are
futile.

See Elrod v. Busch Entm’t Corp., 479 F.App’x 550, 551 (4th
12

Cir. 2012) (indicating that it is within the Court’s discretion to
deny leave to amend where the proposed amendment would be unable to
withstand a motion to dismiss).

Accordingly, Cofield’s Motion to Add

Defendants (ECF No. 70) will be denied.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons given above, Cofield’s Motion to Strike (ECF No.
52); Motion to Strike the Clerk’s Rule 12/56 Letter (ECF No. 54);
Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 56); Motion to Vacate and/or Set
Aside Order Dated February 12, 2015 (ECF No. 59); Motion for Judgment
on the Pleadings (ECF No. 62); Motion to Add Defendants (ECF No. 70);
Motion for Leave to File Amended/Supplemental Complaint (ECF No. 72);
Motion for Remand (ECF No. 76) Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No.
78), Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (ECF No. 81), and Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings (ECF No. 86) are DENIED.
Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss or, Alternatively, Motion for
Summary Judgment (ECF Nos. 28, 48), and the City Defendants’ Motion to
Reconsider the Court’s Order Denying their Motion to Dismiss (ECF No.
58)

are

GRANTED.

All

claims,

with

the

prosecution, are DISMISSED with prejudice.
prosecution is DISMISSED without prejudice.

exception

of

malicious

The claim for malicious
A separate Order will

follow.
Entered this 30th day of June, 2015
/s/
_____________________________
George L. Russell, III
United States District Judge

13