Johnson v. Yonkers

Filing 10

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER Granting in part and denying in part 6 Defendant Casey Yonkers' Motion to Dismiss and for Summary Judgment; Dismissing all claims brought pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution; Dismissing all claims relating to the legality of the traffic stop and regarding any detention at the police station; Directing Plaintiff to arrange a telephone conference. Signed by Judge Marvin J. Garbis on 8/10/2015. (nd2s, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
KORTNI JOHNSON

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Plaintiff

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vs.

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POLICE OFFICER CASEY YONKERS

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Defendant
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CIVIL ACTION NO. MJG-15-237

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MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: DISMISSAL AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The Court has before it Defendant Casey Yonkers' Motion to
Dismiss and for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 6] and the materials
submitted relating thereto.

The Court finds a hearing

unnecessary.

I.

BACKGROUND
In the Complaint1 [ECF No. 1], Plaintiff Kortni Johnson

("Johnson") asserts claims against Defendant Police Officer
Casey Yonkers ("Yonkers") for alleged violations of her
constitutional rights in connection with a traffic stop that
occurred on January 24, 2013.

1

Johnson refers to an "amended complaint" three times in her
Response to the instant Motion. However, Johnson has filed only
the Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, [ECF No. 1]; there is
no amended complaint on the docket.

The parties present versions of the facts that are starkly
different in various respects.

For present purposes, however,

the Court must assume that Johnson's version is correct to the
extent that there is evidence from which a reasonable jury could
find those facts.
At approximately 8:43 AM on the morning of January 24,
2013, Yonkers was driving her Mazda minivan in the 500 block of
Virginia Avenue in Hagerstown, Maryland.

The parties agree that

Yonkers was driving over 40 miles per hour ("mph") in a 25 mph
zone.2
Yonkers got into his patrol vehicle and began to follow
Johnson to pull her over.

Yonkers activated his emergency

lights and sirens, but Johnson continued to drive for several
blocks.

Johnson initially was unaware of Yonkers' attempts to

pull her over because she was playing music loudly.
When Johnson did pull over at 8:46 AM, Yonkers approached
the minivan and shouted at Johnson to turn off the engine and
give him the keys.

Yonkers yelled at Johnson that she was under

arrest and reached into the minivan through the open window to
take the keys.

He then opened the driver's side door and

forcibly and roughly removed Johnson from the minivan using the
2

Yonkers contends that he was operating a handheld radar
unit and clocked Johnson travelling at 46 mph. [ECF No. 6-1] at
3. However, Johnson contends that "she may have been traveling
41 mph in a 25 mph zone." [ECF No. 7] at 3.

2

arm bar technique, slamming Johnson's head against the door
frame in the process.
Yonkers handcuffed Johnson and placed her in the back of
his patrol car.

Two additional police officers arrived on the

scene and spoke with Johnson, who indicated that she wanted to
make a complaint against Yonkers.3
At 9:10 AM, Yonkers issued Johnson two traffic citations
for speeding and failure to pull over.

He released the

handcuffs, and Johnson was free to leave.
As a result of the interaction with Yonkers, Johnson
sustained injuries to her head and bruising to her shoulders,
arms, and wrists.
Johnson pled guilty to the traffic citations on October 17,
2013.
By the instant Motion, "Yonkers moves to dismiss Johnson's
Fourteenth Amendment claim and for summary judgment as to
Johnson's Fourth Amendment claims," pursuant to Rule4 12(b)(6)
and Rule 56, respectively, of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.

[ECF No. 6-1] at 1.

3

The parties agree that Lieutenant Chad Woodring was one of
the officers who arrived on the scene. However, Johnson
contends that Yonkers misrepresented Woodring's identity and
introduced Woodring as "Lieutenant William Wright." [ECF No. 7]
at 4.
4
All "Rule" references herein are to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.

3

II.

LEGAL STANDARDS
A.

Dismissal

A motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) tests
the legal sufficiency of a complaint.

A complaint need only

contain "'a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief,' in order to 'give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds
upon which it rests.'"

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 555 (2007) (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
When evaluating a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff's
well-pleaded allegations are accepted as true and the complaint
is viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
However, conclusory statements or "a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not [suffice]."

Id.

A

complaint must allege sufficient facts "to cross 'the line
between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.'"
Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009)
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
Inquiry into whether a complaint states a plausible claim
is "'a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court
to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.'"
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

Id.

Thus, if "the well-pleaded

facts [contained within a complaint] do not permit the court to
infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the

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complaint has alleged – but it has not 'show[n]' – 'that the
pleader is entitled to relief.'"

Id. (quoting Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (alteration in original)).
The Court shall consider herein, the adequacy of the
Complaint.

B.

Summary Judgment

A motion for summary judgment shall be granted if the
pleadings and supporting documents "show[] that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law."

Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(a).
The well-established principles pertinent to summary
judgment motions can be distilled to a simple statement:

The

Court may look at the evidence presented in regard to a motion
for summary judgment through the non-movant's rose-colored
glasses, but must view it realistically.

After so doing, the

essential question is whether a reasonable fact finder could
return a verdict for the non-movant or whether the movant would,
at trial, be entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

See,

e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-323 (1986);
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986);
Shealy v. Winston, 929 F.2d 1009, 1012 (4th Cir. 1991).

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The Court finds the summary judgment motion premature.

It

is perfectly obvious that there are genuine issues of material
fact5 with regard to Johnson's claims that survive dismissal.
Therefore, the Court shall deny Yonkers summary judgment without
prejudice to his renewal of the motion at a later stage of the
case.

III. DISCUSSION
A.

Fourteenth Amendment Claims

The claims asserted in the Complaint arise out of
allegations that Yonkers unjustifiably arrested and imprisoned
Johnson and used excessive force against her during the traffic
stop on January 24, 2013. Compl. ¶17.

Johnson contends that

Yonkers' actions violated the rights guaranteed to her by the

5

In his Reply, Yonkers contends that Johnson's Affidavit,
[ECF No. 7-1], is inadmissible because the Affidavit states that
the "information herein is true to the best of [Johnson's]
information, knowledge and belief," and presumably, therefore,
cannot have been "made on personal knowledge" as required by
Rule 56(c)(4). [ECF No. 9]. However, the substance of Johnson's
affidavit indicate that the statements were based on her
personal knowledge of the interactions she had with Yonkers and
other police officers in connection with the January 24, 2013
traffic stop. Accordingly, the Court will not strike Johnson's
affidavit. Cf. Klaus v. Hilb, Rogal & Hamilton Co. of Ohio, 437
F. Supp. 2d 706, 719 (S.D. Ohio 2006) ("While the Court agrees
that much of Klaus's Supplemental Affidavit is argumentative in
tone, there is no basis to strike most of the testimony because
the Supplemental Affidavit is based on what Klaus personally
saw, heard or did during her employment with BOA.").

6

Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and,
therefore 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The Supreme Court of the United States explained in Graham
v. Connor that:
Where, as here, the excessive force claim
arises in the context of an arrest or
investigatory stop of a free citizen, it is
most properly characterized as one invoking
the protections of the Fourth Amendment,
which guarantees citizens the right "to be
secure in their persons . . . against
unreasonable . . . seizures" of the person.
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989) (alterations in
original).
In Graham, the Supreme Court held that:
all claims that law enforcement officers
have used excessive force—deadly or not—in
the course of an arrest, investigatory stop,
or other "seizure" of a free citizen should
be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and
its "reasonableness" standard, rather than
under a "substantive due process" approach
[under the Fourteenth Amendment].
Because
the Fourth Amendment provides an explicit
textual source of constitutional protection
against this sort of physically intrusive
governmental conduct, that Amendment, not
the more generalized notion of "substantive
due
process,"
must
be
the
guide
for
analyzing these claims.
Id. at 395; see also Veney v. Ojeda, 321 F. Supp. 2d 733, 738-39
(E.D. Va. 2004) ("[P]laintiff claims that his constitutional
rights were violated when Officers Ojeda and Jones (i) initiated
the traffic stop, (ii) directed plaintiff to exit the vehicle,

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(iii) attempted to conduct a pat-down search, (iv) exerted
excessive force against plaintiff in effecting the arrest, and
(v) falsely arrested plaintiff for obstruction of justice.
Although plaintiff claims that these actions violated his
constitutional rights under the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendments, these alleged constitutional violations
need only be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment for it is clear
that plaintiff cannot raise a due process claim under either the
Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments.").
Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Johnson's Fourteenth
Amendment claims.6

B.

Claims Based on Legality of the Traffic Stop

In the Complaint, Johnson appears to challenge the legality
of the traffic stop, contending that Yonkers "unjustifiably
arrested" and imprisoned her.

Compl. ¶ 17.

The Complaint asserts that Johnson was "detained at the
police station."

Compl. ¶ 20.

However, in her Response to the

instant Motion, Johnson acknowledges that she was handcuffed and
placed into the back of Yonkers' patrol car, and that "[a]fter

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"While an equal protection claim under the Fourteenth
Amendment might exist under other circumstances, plaintiff has
neither specifically raised nor pursued such a claim." (Veney v.
Ojeda, 321 F. Supp. 2d 733, 739 n.4 (E.D. Va. 2004) (internal
citation omitted).

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issuing the [traffic] citations, Defendant released Plaintiff."
[ECF No. 7] at 4.

Therefore, all claims relating to any alleged

detention at the police station shall be dismissed.
"'[A] relatively brief encounter, a routine traffic stop is
more analogous to a so-called Terry stop . . . than to a formal
arrest.'"

Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614

(2015) (alterations in original) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted).

The Supreme Court of the United

States has held "once a motor vehicle has been lawfully detained
for a traffic violation, the police officers may order the
driver to get out of the vehicle without violating the Fourth
Amendment's proscription of unreasonable searches and seizures."
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111, 98 S. Ct. 330, 333, 54
L. Ed. 2d 331 (1977).

More recently, the Supreme Court has

stated that "[l]ike a Terry stop, the tolerable duration of
police inquiries in the traffic-stop context is determined by
the seizure's 'mission'—to address the traffic violation that
warranted the stop, and attend to related safety concerns."
Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1614.

Thus, "'[a] brief but complete

restriction of liberty is valid under Terry.'

In fact, Terry

stops customarily involve 'detentions where the person detained
is not technically free to leave while the officer pursues the
investigation.'"

United States v. Leshuk, 65 F.3d 1105, 1109

(4th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted).

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Here, it is clear that Yonkers had probable cause to stop
Johnson's vehicle after determining by radar that Johnson was
exceeding the speed limit by at least sixteen miles per hour.
See United States v. $206,323.56 More or Less, in U.S. Currency,
998 F. Supp. 693, 697 (S.D.W. Va. 1998).

The traffic stop was

initiated at 8:46 AM and ended at 9:10 AM with Yonkers issuing
the traffic citations and releasing Johnson.
1.

[ECF No. 6-7] at

There is no indication that Johnson unreasonably extended

the traffic stop.

Cf. Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1612 ("[A]

police stop exceeding the time needed to handle the matter for
which the stop was made violates the Constitution's shield
against unreasonable seizures.").
Moreover, in her Response to the instant Motion, Johnson
appears to have abandoned all claims based on the legality of
the traffic stop, as she challenges only the methods and force
that Yonkers used to remove her from the minivan.

See [ECF No.

7] at 6.
Accordingly, the Court shall dismiss all claims based on
the legality of the traffic stop.

C.

Fourth Amendment Claims Based on Excessive Force

Johnson contends that Yonkers "used excessive force when he
climbed through her car window and forcefully and violently
extracted her from her vehicle." [ECF No. 7] at 6.

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A federal civil rights claim based
§ 1983 has two essential elements:

upon

"[A] plaintiff must allege the violation of
a right secured by the Constitution and laws
of the United States, and must show that the
alleged deprivation was committed by a
person acting under color of state law."
Crosby v. City of Gastonia, 635 F.3d 634, 639 (4th Cir. 2011)
(alteration in original) (quoting West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42,
48 (1988)).
As discussed supra, "an 'excessive force' claim against
police officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is to be judged under
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence . . . ."
762 A.2d 48, 56 (Md. 2000).

Richardson v. McGriff,

The excessive force inquiry

"focuses on the objective reasonableness of the officer's
conduct."7

Id.

"[T]he test of reasonableness 'is not capable

of precise definition or mechanical application,' [so] its
proper application 'requires careful attention to the facts and
circumstances of each particular case.'"
omitted).

Id. (citation

In Graham, the Supreme Court stated that:
The "reasonableness" of a particular use of
force must be judged from the perspective of
a reasonable officer on the scene, rather

7

Johnson's reliance on the standards under the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments for analyzing excessive force claims
brought by pretrial detainees and prisoners is misplaced
because, as discussed supra, Johnson was not under arrest and
her claims are to be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment.
Moreover, Johnson does not even assert an Eighth Amendment claim
in the Complaint.

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than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.
. . . With respect to a claim of excessive
force, the same standard of reasonableness
at the moment applies: "Not every push or
shove" . . . violates the Fourth Amendment.
The calculus of reasonableness must embody
allowance for the fact that police officers
are
often
forced
to
make
split-second
judgments — in circumstances that are tense,
uncertain, and rapidly evolving — about the
amount of force that is necessary in a
particular situation.
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97 (1989) (citations
omitted).
In the Complaint, Johnson alleges that as a result of the
traffic stop, she was bruised and sustained injuries to her head
and that:
Defendant Yonkers, without opening the door,
then violently and forcefully reached into
the vehicle by placing his upper body and
arms
through
the
window,
climbed
over
Plaintiff Johnson, and grabbed Plaintiff
Johnson's head and forcibly and maliciously
held her head down while violently snatching
the keys from Plaintiff Johnson's hand.
[Defendant Yonkers] roughly pulled Plaintiff
Johnson from her vehicle, and forcefully and
violently
handcuffed
her.
As
Defendant
Yonkers
was
forcefully,
violently
and
maliciously dragging Plaintiff Johnson from
her car, he struck Plaintiff's head against
the vehicle's the door frame.
Compl. ¶¶ 13-14.
Yonkers contends that Johnson cannot prevail on the
excessive force claim because his actions were objectively
reasonable in light of the circumstances and that "at a minimum,

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[he] is entitled to qualified immunity."
9-11.

See [ECF No. 6-1] at

The evidence may, of course, establish that Yonkers is

correct.

However, in the present dismissal context, the Court

finds that Johnson has alleged facts sufficient to present a
plausible excess force claim.

IV.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons:
1.

Defendant Casey Yonkers' Motion to Dismiss and
for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 6] is GRANTED IN
PART.

2.

All claims brought pursuant to the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution are
DISMISSED.

3.

All claims relating to the legality of the
traffic stop and regarding any detention at the
police station are DISMISSED.

4.

Plaintiff shall arrange a telephone conference to
be held by August 31, 2015 to discuss the
scheduling of further proceedings herein.

SO ORDERED, on Monday, August 10, 2015.

/s/__________
Marvin J. Garbis
United States District Judge

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