Slaughter v. Colvin

Filing 23

ORDER granting 19 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephanie A Gallagher on 9/4/2015. (c/m 9/4/2015 ca2s, Deputy Clerk)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
CHAMBERS OF
STEPHANIE A. GALLAGHER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

101 WEST LOMBARD STREET
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21201
[phone]
Fax [phone]

September 4, 2015
Sherritaa Slaughter
5026 Gold Hill Rd.
Owings Mills, MD 21117
Craig Brian Ormson, Esq.
Social Security Administration
Altmeyer Building
6401 Security Blvd Rm 617
Baltimore, MD 21235
RE:

Sherritaa Slaughter v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration;
Civil No. SAG-15-454

Dear Ms. Slaughter and Counsel:
On February 18, 2015, Plaintiff Sherritaa Slaughter petitioned this Court to review the
Social Security Administration’s final decision to deny her claims for Disability Insurance
Benefits and Supplemental Security Income. (ECF No. 1).
I have considered the
Commissioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 19). I have also considered the
Response filed by Ms. Slaughter, who appears pro se.1 (ECF No. 22). I find that no hearing is
necessary. See Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2014). This Court must uphold the decision of the
Agency if it is supported by substantial evidence and if the Agency employed proper legal
standards. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996). Under
that standard, I will grant the Commissioner’s motion and affirm the Commissioner’s judgment
pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). This letter explains my rationale.
Ms. Slaughter filed claims for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental
Security Income (“SSI”) on June 7, 2011. (Tr. 176-88). She alleged a disability onset date of
September 20, 2009, for both claims. (Tr. 176, 183). Her claims were denied initially and on
reconsideration. (Tr. 65-106). A hearing was held on November 5, 2013, before an
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). (Tr. 27-62). Following the hearing, the ALJ determined
that Ms. Slaughter was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act during the
relevant time frame. (Tr. 8-26). The Appeals Council denied Ms. Slaughter’s request for
review, (Tr. 1-6), so the ALJ’s decision constitutes the final, reviewable decision of the Agency.

1

On June 12, 2015, a Rule 12/56 letter was sent to Ms. Slaughter advising her of her right to file a response to the
Commissioner’s motion within seventeen (17) days from the date of the letter. (ECF No. 21).

Sherritaa Slaughter v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration
Civil No. SAG-15-454
September 4, 2015
Page 2
The ALJ found that Ms. Slaughter suffered from the severe impairments of degenerative disc
disease, spinal disorders, and essential hypertension. (Tr. 13). Despite these impairments, the
ALJ determined that Ms. Slaughter retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to:
perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except
occasionally carrying 20 pounds, frequently carrying 10 pounds, stand about 6
hours in an 8 hour workday, sit for about 6[ ]hours in an 8 hour workday, limited
in push/pull in lower extremities, occasional climbing ramps stairs; no climbing of
ladders, ropes or scaffolds; occasional balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching;
never crawling, avoid concentrated exposure to extreme cold, unlimited exposure
to extreme heat, avoid concentrated exposure to wetness and vibration; unlimited
exposure to fumes, odors, gases, poor ventilation; avoid even moderate exposure
to hazards.
(Tr. 15). After considering the testimony of a vocational expert (“VE”), the ALJ determined that
Ms. Slaughter was capable of performing her past relevant work as a deli clerk and that,
therefore, she was not disabled. (Tr. 25).
I have carefully reviewed the ALJ’s opinion and the entire record. See Elam v. Barnhart,
386 F. Supp. 2d 746, 753 (E.D. Tex. 2005) (mapping an analytical framework for judicial review
of a pro se action challenging an adverse administrative decision, including: (1) examining
whether the Commissioner’s decision generally comports with regulations, (2) reviewing the
ALJ’s critical findings for compliance with the law, and (3) determining from the evidentiary
record whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s findings). For the reasons described
below, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision.
The ALJ proceeded in accordance with applicable law at all five steps of the sequential
evaluation. The ALJ ruled in Ms. Slaughter’s favor at step one and determined that she has not
engaged in substantial gainful activity since her alleged onset date. (Tr. 13); see 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i). At step two, the ALJ then considered the severity of each of
the impairments that Ms. Slaughter claimed prevented her from working. See 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). The ALJ concluded that Ms. Slaughter had the severe
impairments of degenerative disc disease, spinal disorders, and essential hypertension, thus
satisfying the step two threshold. (Tr. 13). After finding at least one severe impairment, the
ALJ continued with the sequential evaluation process and considered all of the impairments that
significantly impacted Ms. Slaughter’s ability to work, specifically noting that “appropriate
exertional, postural, reach, environmental and mental limitations” had been included in the RFC
assessment to address both severe and non-severe impairments. (Tr. 14-15); see 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1545(a)(2), 416.945(a)(2). Accordingly, I find no basis for remand.
At step three, the ALJ determined that Ms. Slaughter’s impairments did not meet the
specific requirements of, or medically equal the criteria of, any listings. (Tr. 52-53). An ALJ is
required to discuss listed impairments and compare them individually to listing criteria only
when there is “ample evidence in the record to support a determination that the claimant’s

Sherritaa Slaughter v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration
Civil No. SAG-15-454
September 4, 2015
Page 3
impairment meets or equals one of the listed impairments.” Ketcher v. Apfel, 68 F. Supp. 2d
629, 645 (D. Md. 1999). Here, the ALJ noted that “[n]o treating or examining physician or
psychologist has identified medical signs or findings that meet or medically equal the
requirements of Appendix 1.” (Tr. 15). Although, the ALJ’s discussion of the listings is brief, I
find no error because the record fails to demonstrate the ample evidence necessary to meet or
equal a listed impairment. Accordingly, I have carefully reviewed the record, and I agree that no
listings are met.
In considering Ms. Slaughter’s RFC, the ALJ first summarized her subjective complaints,
which included that she “has problems with sitting, standing, problems with her lower back and
left shoulder.” (Tr. 16). The ALJ then provided a thorough review of the medical records,
which documented the treatment Ms. Slaughter received for her impairments. (Tr. 15-25). After
assessing the medical evidence, the ALJ found that the record supported some degree of
limitation, as well as Ms. Slaughter’s history of prior spinal fusion, but found that the allegations
of “disability due to chronic back pain . . . [were] not supported by the evidence.” (Tr. 24-25).
Specifically, the ALJ noted evidence in the record indicating that Ms. Slaughter exhibited drugseeking behavior. (Tr. 25). She also noted that Ms. Slaughter exhibited a normal gait during the
majority of the relevant period, despite her complaints of back pain. Id. Furthermore, the ALJ
found that there was no diagnostic data to support Ms. Slaughter’s allegations of headaches,
edema, or chest pain. Id.
Finally, the ALJ considered all of the opinion evidence in the record, including a Physical
RFC Questionnaire submitted by a treating physician and the opinions of State agency medical
consultants at the initial and reconsideration levels. The ALJ provided little discussion of the
medical opinions. However, she included a more extensive discussion of the Physical RFC
Questionnaire, and the weight assigned to it, elsewhere in the decision and provided a lengthy
discussion of the medical evidence. The ALJ assigned the findings in the Physical RFC
Questionnaire little weight, finding that they were not supported by clinical findings.
Specifically, she noted that the physician’s opinion that Ms. Slaughter was limited to lifting less
than ten pounds and sitting for less than two hours was not supported in the record. (Tr. 24).
The ALJ also gave little weight to the findings of the State agency medical consultant who
reviewed Ms. Slaughter’s file at the initial level. The ALJ found that the limitation to less than
the full range of sedentary work provided by the initial State agency consultant was not
supported by the record. Rather, she stated that “the evidence indicates the claimant is not so
limited.” (Tr. 25). The ALJ did not reference specific evidence at that point in the opinion,
however, the ALJ’s extensive discussion of the medical evidence elsewhere includes notes that
Ms. Slaughter exhibited full strength in all extremities on multiple occasions, regularly
demonstrated full range of motion in her back, including just after a car accident in July of 2012,
and even reported that she could complete all activities of daily living despite her pain in April of
2011. (Tr. 23-24)(citing Tr. 613-731, 781-849). Accordingly, I find that the weight assigned to
the initial State agency medical consultant is supported by substantial evidence. Likewise, I find
that the ALJ’s assignment of great weight to the State agency medical consultant at the
reconsideration level, who found that Ms. Slaughter was capable of performing light work and

Sherritaa Slaughter v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration
Civil No. SAG-15-454
September 4, 2015
Page 4
her past relevant work, is also supported by substantial evidence in the ALJ’s discussion of the
medical evidence. (Tr. 25).
My review of the ALJ’s decision is confined to whether substantial evidence, in the
record as it was reviewed by the ALJ, supports the decision and whether correct legal standards
were applied. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390, 404 (1971). Even if there is other
evidence that may support Ms. Slaughter’s position, I am not permitted to reweigh the evidence
or to substitute my own judgment for that of the ALJ. Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456
(4th Cir. 1990). In considering the entire record, I find the ALJ’s RFC determination was
supported by substantial evidence.
Regarding Ms. Slaughter’s RFC assessment, I note that the decision fails to indicate the
extent to which Ms. Slaughter is “limited in push/pull in lower extremities”. Failure to identify
the extent of a claimant’s limitations generally constitutes an error warranting remand. See 20
C.F.R. §§ 404. 1545(b), 416.945(b) (“When we assess your physical abilities, we first assess the
nature and extent of your physical limitations and then determine your residual functional
capacity for work activity on a regular and continuing basis.”). In this case, however, the RFC
assessment written in the ALJ’s decision is not an accurate reflection of the hypothetical posed to
the VE at the hearing. When describing the limitation at the hearing, the ALJ stated, “Her ability
to push and pull in the lower extremities on the left is limited to occasionally.” (Tr. 47). Thus,
the hypothetical posed at the hearing identified the extent of Ms. Slaughter’s lower extremity
limitation. The VE testified that a person of the same age and education as Ms. Slaughter, and
having the hypothetical RFC described by the ALJ, would be able to perform Ms. Slaughter’s
past relevant work as a deli clerk. 2 (Tr. 25). Accordingly, the ALJ found that Ms. Slaughter was
capable of performing her past relevant work at step four of the sequential evaluation. Id.
Because this conclusion was based on a properly stated hypothetical at the hearing, I find no
reason for remand.3
Finally, I note that I reviewed Ms. Slaughter’s Response to Defendant’s Motion. Ms.
Slaughter’s statements in her Response largely mirrored her previous allegations of pain and
complications from hypertension. Pl. Resp. 1-3. Specifically, Ms. Slaughter stated that she has
“back and leg pains now that don’t allow me to do anything beyond 10-15 minutes. [E]xample:
walking, sitting, standing, bending.” Ms. Slaughter also stated that she is in constant pain, that
her headaches have gotten more severe, and that her doctor said that she needs surgery. She did
not indicate what type of surgery was recommended by which doctor. Ms. Slaughter’s Response
essentially asks me to reweigh evidence, which I am not permitted to do. See Hays, 907 F.2d at
2

The ALJ lists the DOT code for Deli Clerk as 211.462-301 in her decision, however, the VE testified that the DOT
code for this position is 316.684-014. The DOT code provided by the VE corresponds with the position of “Deli
Cutter-Slicer.” Thus, the information provided by the VE at the hearing accurately represents Ms. Slaughter’s past
relevant work, and I find the transcription error harmless.
3
Furthermore, the VE testified that given Ms. Slaughter’s RFC, she was also capable of performing other work,
including as a cashier, as a mail clerk, and as a housekeeper. (Tr. 47-48). Although the ALJ’s decision did not
proceed to step five of the sequential evaluation after finding that Ms. Slaughter could perform her past relevant
work at step four, the VE’s testimony provides additional support for the finding that Ms. Slaughter is not disabled.

Sherritaa Slaughter v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration
Civil No. SAG-15-454
September 4, 2015
Page 5
1456. Furthermore, Ms. Slaughter’s Response did not offer any new and material evidence to
confirm that any worsening change of her medical condition is relevant to the time pre-dating the
ALJ’s opinion. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.970, 416.1470. In the absence of such evidence, more recent
developments would only be relevant to a new application for benefits. Accordingly, I am
unable to consider the arguments raised in Ms. Slaughter’s Response.
For the reasons set forth herein, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No.
19) is GRANTED. The Commissioner’s judgment is AFFIRMED pursuant to sentence four of
42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Clerk is directed to CLOSE this case.
Despite the informal nature of this letter, it should be flagged as an opinion and docketed
as an order.
Sincerely yours,
/s/
Stephanie A. Gallagher
United States Magistrate Judge