EALY v. TOEY et al
Filing
30
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge George Levi Russell, III on 3/18/2016. (dass, Deputy Clerk) (c/m 3/18/16-das)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
LARRY E. EALY, SR.,
:
Plaintiff,
:
v.
:
TOEY, et al.,
:
Defendants.
Civil Action No. GLR-15-545
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendant’s, Maryland
State Police Trooper First Class Christopher Toey, Motion to
Dismiss
or
for
Summary
Judgment
(ECF
No.
17)
and
Motion
to
Strike Plaintiff’s, Larry E. Ealy, Sr., First Amended Complaint
(ECF No. 23).
Also pending are Defendant’s, City of Cumberland
(“Cumberland”), Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative, Motion
for
Summary
Judgment
(ECF
No.
18)
and
Motion
Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (ECF No. 24).
are ripe for disposition.
supporting
documents,
the
below,
Cumberland’s
the
first
Dismiss
The Motions
Having considered the Motions and
Court
finds
no
pursuant to Local Rule 105.6 (D.Md. 2014).
forth
to
Court
will
grant
Motion
to
Dismiss,
second Motion to Dismiss as moot.
hearing
For the reasons set
Toey’s
and
necessary
Motions,
deny
grant
Cumberland’s
BACKGROUND 1
I.
On
August
16,
2012,
Ealy,
a
resident
of
Ohio,
and
his
companion were driving in a 2012 GMC Cheyenne along Route 68, a
Maryland State highway.
That day, Toey, a Maryland State Police
officer, was conducting traffic enforcement in Allegany County,
Maryland in a marked police vehicle on Route 68.
Toey’s vehicle
was equipped with a license plate scanner that issued alerts
when a vehicle associated with a scanned license plate has been
reported stolen.
At or around 10:48 a.m., Toey received an alert regarding a
stolen vehicle matching the vehicle description of and license
plates on Ealy’s car.
Toey initiated a traffic stop.
During
the stop, Toey also confirmed that Ealy’s driver’s license was
suspended.
Toey placed Ealy and his companion under arrest and
transported
them
to
Cumberland,
Maryland
the
for
Maryland
State
processing.
Police
Ealy
was
Barracks
charged
in
with
unlawful taking of a motor vehicle, driving without a license,
and
driving
$5,000
bail,
with
Ealy
a
suspended
was
sent
license.
to
the
After
Allegany
being
County
held
on
Detention
Center in Cumberland, where he was strip searched.
Ealy was held in the detention center from August 18, 2012
until October 23, 2012, when the unlawful taking of a vehicle
1
Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are taken from
the parties’ briefings on the instant Motions, and are viewed in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
2
charge against him was nol-prossed.
See State of Maryland v.
Ealy, No. 3W00062569 (D.Ct. Allegany Cty. Oct. 23, 2012).
As to
the charge for driving without a license, the District Court for
Allegany County found Ealy guilty and sentenced him to sixty
days of incarceration, but credited him for time served in the
detention center.
State of Maryland v. Ealy, No. 01K12014812
(Cir.Ct. Allegany Cty. Feb. 8, 2013).
On appeal to the Circuit
Court for Allegany County, Ealy’s license-related charges were
nol-prossed on February 8 and June 24, 2013.
Id.
On February 4, 2015, Ealy filed a Complaint in this Court
regarding his arrest and detention, alleging violations of the
United States Constitution under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(3)
(2012)
(Counts
2–5)
and
the
Maryland
Declaration
of
Rights
(Count 6); false arrest (Count 1); malicious prosecution (Count
5); and intentional infliction of emotional distress (Counts 7–
9).
(ECF
No.
1).
Plaintiff
invokes
this
Court’s
federal
question and diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§
1331 and 1332 (2012), respectively.
On
May
27,
2015,
Toey
and
Dismiss or for Summary Judgment.
Cumberland
filed
Motions
(ECF Nos. 17, 18).
to
On July
29, 2015, rather than oppose the Motions, Ealy filed an untimely
First Amended Complaint without seeking the Court’s leave in an
apparent attempt to address the Defendants’ arguments in their
Motions.
(ECF No. 22).
On August 11, 2015, Toey filed a Motion
3
to Strike the First Amended Complaint (ECF No. 23).
On August
19, 2015, Cumberland filed a Motion to Dismiss the First Amended
Complaint.
Ealy
an
(ECF No. 24).
extension
of
On October 6, 2015, the Court granted
time
to
file
responses
Motions to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment.
to
the
pending
To date, however,
the Court has no record that Ealy has filed responses to the
Motions.
The Court will deem the Motions unopposed.
II.
DISCUSSION
A. Motion to Strike First Amended Complaint
1. Standard of Review
A “court may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense
or
any
redundant,
matter.”
Procedure]
immaterial,
Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(f)
impertinent,
or
“[Federal
Rule
12(f).
motions
are
generally
viewed
scandalous
of
with
Civil
disfavor
‘because striking a portion of a pleading is a drastic remedy
and
because
it
is
dilatory tactic.’”
often
sought
by
the
movant
simply
as
a
Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Gilmore, 252
F.3d 316, 347 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting 5A Charles Alan Wright &
Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1380, 647 (2d
ed.
1990)).
“[F]ederal
courts
generally
require
the
moving
party to establish that the materials to be struck prejudice the
moving party in some way.”
Can.,
Inc.,
965
F.Supp.2d
Asher & Simons, P.A. v. j2 Glob.
701,
705
Wright & Miller, supra, § 1381 n.34).
4
(D.Md.
2013)
(citing
5C
Toey argues the First Amended Complaint should be stricken
because Ealy failed to seek leave from the Court to amend his
Complaint
pursuant
however,
the
to
court
should
justice so requires.
federal
policy
instead
of
in
Rule
freely
Rule
give
leave
15(a)
to
states,
amend
when
“This liberal rule gives effect to the
favor
disposing
15(a)(2).
of
of
resolving
them
on
cases
on
their
technicalities.”
Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 426 (4th Cir. 2006).
merits
Laber
v.
According to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, “leave to
amend a pleading should be denied only when the amendment would
be prejudicial to the opposing party, there has been bad faith
on the part of the moving party, or the amendment would have
been futile.”
Id. (quoting Johnson v. Oroweat Foods Co., 785
F.2d 503, 509 (4th Cir. 1986)).
“Futility
fails
to
is
state
apparent
a
claim
if
the
under
proposed
the
amended
applicable
complaint
rules
and
accompanying standards: ‘[A] district court may deny leave if
amending the complaint would be futile—that is, if the proposed
amended
complaint
federal rules.’”
fails
to
satisfy
the
requirements
of
the
Katyle v. Penn Nat. Gaming, Inc., 637 F.3d
462, 471 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States ex rel. Wilson
v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 525 F.3d 370, 376 (4th Cir.
2008)).
The Rule 12(b)(6) standard, therefore, governs futility
arguments.
Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Coach Works Auto Collision
5
Repair Ctr., Inc., No. WMN-07-CV-2918, 2010 WL 889543, at *2
(D.Md. Mar. 4, 2010) (citing Openshaw v. Cohen, Klingenstein &
Marks, Inc., 320 F.Supp.2d 357, 359 (D.Md. 2004)).
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint
must set forth “a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
A claim
is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
Iqbal, 556
Pro se pleadings
are liberally construed and held to a less stringent standard
than pleadings drafted by lawyers.
89,
94
(2007)
(citing
Estelle
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.
v.
Gamble,
429
U.S.
97,
106
(1976)); accord Brown v. N.C. Dep’t of Corr., 612 F.3d 720, 722
(4th Cir. 2010).
“In considering a motion to dismiss, the court
should accept as true all well-pleaded allegations and should
view the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff.”
Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993).
Toey
argues
Ealy’s
First
Amended
Complaint
is
futile
because the amendments do not cure the substantive defects of
the original Complaint.
The Court agrees.
The First Amended
Complaint does not include any additional factual allegations,
6
but adds defendants and claims for violations of the Federal
Tort Claims Act and 42 U.S.C. § 14141, and a “Bivens Action.”
2. Newly-Added Defendants
In the First Amended Complaint, Ealy adds Maryland Governor
Larry
Hogan,
Lieutenant
Governor
Boyd
K.
Rutherford,
“State
Representatives,” Attorney General of Maryland Brian E. Frosh,
and the State of Maryland as Defendants (the “State Defendants”)
without including any additional factual allegations to support
his claims against them.
Further, under the Eleventh Amendment to the United States
Constitution, a state, its agencies, and departments are immune
from
suits
in
federal
court
brought
by
its
citizens
citizens of another state, unless it consents.
State
of
Maryland
has
waived
its
sovereign
the
See Penhurst
State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984).
the
or
While
immunity
for
certain actions brought in state courts, see Md.Code Ann., State
Gov’t § 12-104(a) (West 2015), it has not waived its immunity
under the Eleventh Amendment to suit in federal court, see id. §
12-103(2).
Also, “a suit against a state official in his or her
official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather
is a suit against the official’s office.
As such, it is no
different from a suit against the State itself.”
Will v. Mich.
Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (citing Brandon v.
Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471 (1985)).
7
The Court, therefore, finds
the
State
Defendants
Accordingly,
Ealy’s
are
claims
protected
against
from
the
Ealy’s
State
claims.
Defendants
are
futile.
Additionally, Ealy does not include Cumberland, but adds
Allegany County, as a Defendant in the First Amended Complaint.
The
Court
Complaint
will,
as
an
therefore,
attempt
County as a Defendant.
to
construe
replace
Ealy’s
First
Amended
with
Allegany
Cumberland
Construing the First Amended Complaint
liberally, Ealy also attempts to allege federal constitutional
claims against Allegany County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Section
1983
provides,
in
pertinent
part:
“Every
person
who, under color of [law], subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction
thereof
to
the
deprivation
of
any
rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law . . .
.”
Id.
Municipalities are considered persons under § 1983 and
may be sued for damages for constitutional deprivations.
Monell
v. N.Y. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).
deprivations,
policy
alleged
or
however,
custom.
the
Id.
existence
must
at
of
be
attributable
690-91.
a
Ealy,
municipal
to
a
municipal
however,
policy
Such
or
has
not
custom
implemented by Allegany County that has violated his federal
8
constitutional rights.
Thus, Ealy has failed to allege a § 1983
claim against Allegany County.
Similarly,
Ealy
attempts
to
allege
a
class-based
discrimination claim under § 1985(3) against Allegany County for
denying poor or lower-class individuals equal protection under
the law with its bail system.
“To recover under § 1985(3), a
plaintiff must establish the existence of a conspiracy and show
‘some
racial
or
perhaps
otherwise
class-based,
invidiously
discriminatory animus behind the conspirators’ action.’”
C & H
Co.
2003)
v.
Richardson,
78
F.App’x
894,
901-02
(4th
Cir.
(quoting Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102-03 (1971)).
Ealy states Allegany County denied him equal protection due to
his economic status, not due to his race.
Claims under § 1985(3) cannot be based on a plaintiff’s
membership
in
a
particular
economic
class.
United
Bhd.
of
Carpenters & Joiners of Am., Local 610, AFL-CIO v. Scott, 463
U.S. 825, 837-38 (1983) (“[W]e find no convincing support in the
legislative history for the proposition that [§ 1985(3)] was
intended to reach conspiracies motivated by bias towards others
on account of their economic views, status, or activities. . . .
We
thus
cannot
construe
§
1985(3)
to
reach
motivated by economic or commercial animus.”).
not
sufficiently
alleged
a
§
9
1985(3)
claim.
conspiracies
Thus, Ealy has
The
Court,
therefore,
finds
that
Ealy’s
federal
constitutional
claims
against Allegany County are futile.
Additionally, Ealy attempts to allege claims for violations
of
his
rights
Declaration
of
under
Articles
Rights
regarding
strip
search
24
and
at
the
of
the
Maryland
arrest
his
26
by
Toey
and
Allegany
County
his
detention
and
Detention
Center. 2
“Articles 24 and 26 of the Maryland Declaration of
Rights are the state counterparts to the Due Process Clause and
the
Fourth
Amendment
of
the
United
States
Constitution,
respectively.”
Kashaka v. Balt. Cty., 450 F.Supp.2d 610, 618
(D.Md. 2006).
Supreme Court interpretations of the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments function as authority for interpretation
of Articles 24 and 26.
2010
WL
1980094,
at
See Johnson v. Maryland, No. AW-09-2594,
*5
(D.Md.
May
13,
2010)
(quoting
Pitsenberger v. Pitsenberger, 410 A.2d 1052, 1056 (Md. 1980)).
“Local
government
entities
have
respondeat
superior
liability for violations of the Maryland Declaration of Rights
that were committed by the entity’s agents and employees acting
within the scope of their employment.”
Kashaka, 450 F.Supp.2d
at 618 (citing DiPino v. Davis, 729 A.2d 354, 372 (Md. 1999)).
Because
Ealy
does
not
allege
that
2
Toey
is
an
employee
of
Ealy also attempts to allege false arrest, malicious
prosecution, and intentional infliction of emotional distress
claims against Allegany County.
10
Allegany
County,
Ealy
cannot
bring
state
law
claims
against
Allegany County regarding the arrest.
As to his detention and strip search, Ealy cannot bring his
claims
against
Allegany
County
because
a
municipality
is
entitled to immunity when it performs “governmental, as opposed
to propriety functions.”
Gray-Hopkins v. Prince George’s Cty.,
309 F.3d 224, 232 (4th Cir. 2002); see also Dotson v. Chester,
937 F.2d 920, 928 (4th Cir. 1991) (implying the operation of a
county
jail
is
a
governmental
waived
this
immunity
for
function).
Maryland
municipalities.
See
has
Md.Code
not
Ann.,
Cts.& Jud.Proc. § 5-303(d) (West 2016); Clark v. Prince George’s
Cty.,
65
A.3d
Government
785,
Tort
791
(Md.Ct.Spec.App.
Claims
Act
of
the
2013)
Courts
(“[T]he
and
Local
Judicial
Proceedings Article, does not specifically waive immunity for
common law tort claims against a County or municipality in its
own capacity, for governmental actions.”).
“Thus,
any
state
against
individual
Paulone
v.
City
of
law
County
tort
claim
employees,
Frederick,
787
would
not
have
the
F.Supp.2d
to
County
360,
proceed
itself.”
378
(D.Md.
2011); see Kashaka, 450 F.Supp.2d at 619 (finding county could
not be held vicariously liable for violations of Articles 24 and
26
because
employees).
plaintiff
Ealy,
failed
however,
to
has
identify
not
Allegany County employees as defendants.
11
individual
named
any
county
individual
The Court, therefore,
finds that Ealy’s state law claims against Allegany County are
futile.
3. Newly-Added Claims
In the First Amended Complaint, Ealy also adds claims for
violations of the Federal Tort Claims Act and 42 U.S.C. § 14141,
and a “Bivens Action.”
First, the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28
U.S.C. § 2674, applies to the federal government, not state and
local
governments.
Second,
42
U.S.C.
§
14141
“permits
the
Attorney General of the United States to bring constitutional
tort
claims
responsibility
against
for
government
officials
administration
incarceration of juveniles.”
of
or
employees
juvenile
with
justice
or
Awah v. Bd. of Educ. of Balt.
Cty., No. WMN-09-CV-1044, 2010 WL 1929908, at *2 (D.Md. May 11,
2010).
action.
Section
14141
does
not
provide
a
private
right
of
Id.
Third, Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), “established that the victims of
a constitutional violation by a federal agent have a right to
recover damages against the official in federal court despite
the absence of any statute conferring such a right.”
Carlson v.
Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18 (1980) (emphasis added).
Ealy, however,
does not allege a claim against a federal agent.
Because Ealy’s
added claims cannot be asserted against the named Defendants in
this matter, the Court finds that they are futile and will be
12
striken. 3
As such, the Court will grant the Motion to Strike the
First Amended Complaint. 4
B. Motions to Dismiss or, Alternatively, for Summary Judgment
1. Standard of Review
As
stated
above,
to
survive
a
Rule
12(b)(6)
motion
to
dismiss, a complaint must set forth “a claim to relief that is
plausible
on
its
face.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at
Iqbal,
570).
556
U.S.
at
678
(quoting
“When matters outside the pleading
are presented to and not excluded by the court, the [12(b)(6)]
motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed
of as provided in Rule 56.”
Auth.,
149
F.3d
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d)).
the
Court
must
253,
Laughlin v. Metro. Wash. Airports
260-61
(4th
Cir.
1998)
(quoting
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56,
grant
summary
judgment
if
the
moving
party
demonstrates there is no genuine issue as to any material fact,
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the Court must
draw all justifiable inferences in the non-moving party’s favor.
3
Ealy also attempts to add a claim under the “1871 Force
Act,” which is also known as the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17
Stat. 13, where 42 U.S.C. § 1983 derived. See Adickes v. S. H.
Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 203 (1970).
In essence, the Civil
Rights Act of 1871 is surviving in § 1983. Id. 205-06. Because
Ealy has already brought a claim under § 1983 in his original
Complaint, the Court finds the added 1871 Force Act claim to be
redundant and will strike it.
4
Because the Court will strike the First Amended Complaint,
Cumberland’s Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint will
be denied as moot.
13
Anderson
v.
Liberty
Lobby,
Inc.,
477
(citing Adickes, 398 U.S. at 158-59).
U.S.
242,
255
(1986)
Once a motion for summary
judgment is properly made and supported, the opposing party has
the burden of showing that a genuine dispute exists.
Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87
(1986).
between
“[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute
the
parties
will
not
defeat
an
otherwise
properly
supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that
there be no genuine issue of material fact.”
Anderson, 477 U.S.
at 247-48.
A “material fact” is one that might affect the outcome of a
party’s case.
Ventures,
Id. at 248; see JKC Holding Co. v. Wash. Sports
Inc.,
264
F.3d
459,
465
(4th
Cir.
2001)
(citing
Hooven-Lewis v. Caldera, 249 F.3d 259, 265 (4th Cir. 2001)).
Whether a fact is considered to be “material” is determined by
the substantive law, and “[o]nly disputes over facts that might
affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will
properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.”
Anderson, 477
U.S.
265.
at
248;
accord
Hooven-Lewis,
249
F.3d
at
Here,
because the Court will consider matters outside of the pleading,
the Motions to Dismiss will be construed as motions for summary
judgment.
14
2. Cumberland’s Motion
The Court will grant Cumberland’s Motion.
bring
several
Maryland
claims
common
law
against
for
Cumberland
Toey’s
allegedly
Ealy attempts to
under
improper
Toey, however, is not an employee of Cumberland.
3, ECF No. 18-2).
Cumberland.
The
federal
and
actions.
(Leake Aff. ¶
Ealy fails to demonstrate any claims against
Court,
therefore,
finds
that
Cumberland
is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law and will grant its
Motion.
3. Toey’s Motion
a.
Federal Constitutional Claims
The Court finds Toey cannot be held liable for violating
Ealy’s federal constitutional rights.
In Counts 2, 3, 4, and 5 of the Complaint, Ealy attempts to
assert claims against Toey under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations
of
his
constitutional
rights. 5
Liberally
construing
the
Complaint, Ealy alleges he was arrested without probable cause
in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
5
Toey argues he did not
The Court will dismiss the federal constitutional claims
against Toey in his official capacity as an employee of the State
of Maryland. Md.Code Ann., State Gov’t § 12-103(2); Will, 491 U.S.
at 71 (citing Brandon, 469 U.S. at 471); supra page 7-8. Further,
the Court will dismiss Count 3, in which Ealy asserts his federal
constitutional rights were violated during a strip search at the
Allegany County Detention Center, because Ealy has not demonstrated
that Toey conducted the strip search.
(Toey Decl., ECF No. 17-2).
15
violate
Ealy’s
constitutional
rights
because
the
arrest
was
supported by probable cause.
Arrests are illegal when probable cause did not exist at
the time of the arrest.
227 (4th Cir. 1990).
United States v. McCraw, 920 F.2d 224,
Probable cause exists where “the facts and
circumstances within the [the officer’s] knowledge and of which
they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to
warrant
a
prudent
man
in
believing
that
committed or was committing an offense.”
Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964)).
the
[suspect]
had
Id. (quoting Beck v.
Examining the events preceding
the arrest, the court must decide whether the facts amount to
probable
cause
when
viewed
from
the
objectively reasonable police officer.
U.S.
366,
371
(2003).
A
finding
perspective
of
an
Maryland v. Pringle, 540
of
probable
cause
would
eliminate Ealy’s claims regarding his arrest because “there is
no cause of action for ‘false arrest’ under Section 1983 unless
the
arresting
officer
lacked
probable
cause.”
Claiborne
v.
Cahalen, 636 F.Supp. 1271, 1277 (D.Md. 1986) (quoting Street v.
Surdyka, 492 F.2d 368, 372–73 (4th Cir. 1974)).
Toey
stolen
received
vehicle
in
an
alert
violation
stating
of
§
that
7-105
Article of the Maryland Code——a felony.
§ 7-105(c)(1) (West 2015).
Ealy
of
the
was
driving
Criminal
a
Law
Md.Code Ann., Crim.Law
Toey then initiated a traffic stop
and confirmed Ealy was also driving with a suspended license.
16
At that point, Toey placed Ealy under arrest.
These undisputed
facts amount to probable cause for Ealy’s arrest. 6
The Court,
therefore, Toey has demonstrated that the arrest did not violate
Ealy’s constitutional rights. 7
As such, the Court finds Toey is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law and will grant Toey’s
Motion as to Ealy’s § 1983 claims. 8
b.
Maryland State Law Claims
The Court finds that Toey is entitled to statutory immunity
from Ealy’s state law claims.
In Count 6, Ealy attempts to allege claims for violations
of his rights under the Maryland Declaration of Rights, stating
Toey
arrested
him
without due process.
without
probable
cause
and
detained
him
Also, in Counts 1, 5, 7, 8, and 9, Ealy
6
To the extent Ealy asserts the charges against him were
nullified because they were nol-prossed, that argument does not
support his Fourth Amendment claim because “a nolle prosequi
does not automatically provide evidence of lack of probable
cause.”
Palmer v. Griffith, No. JKB-15-1586, 2015 WL 6152282,
at *3 (D.Md. Oct. 16, 2015).
7
Ealy also alleges that he was arrested and detained
without due process of law, in violation of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments.
“These claims are merely other ways of
pleading ‘false arrest’ under Section 1983,” and because
probable cause existed for Ealy’s arrest, Toey is entitled to
summary judgment on these claims as well.
Claiborne, 636
F.Supp. at 1277 (citing Street, 492 F.2d at 372).
8
Because the Court finds Ealy has failed to demonstrate a
federal constitutional violation, the Court will not address
Toey’s qualified immunity argument.
Meyers v. Balt. Cty., 981
F.Supp.2d 422, 429 (D.Md. 2013) (“Qualified immunity extends to
protect officials ‘who commit constitutional violations . . .
.’” (quoting Williams v. Ozmint, 716 F.3d 801, 805 (4th Cir.
2013))).
17
attempts
to
allege
claims
for
false
arrest,
malicious
prosecution, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Toey argues he is entitled to statutory immunity from Ealy’s
state law claims under the Maryland Tort Claims Act (“MTCA”),
Md.Code Ann., State Gov’t, §§ 12–101 et seq. (West 2015).
Section
5-522
of
the
Courts
and
Judicial
Proceedings
Article of the Maryland Code provides that state personnel are
immune
from
suit
and
from
liability
for
tortious
conduct
committed within the scope of their public duties and without
malice or gross negligence.
“The ‘MTCA does not distinguish
between constitutional torts and common law torts.’”
McDaniel
v. Arnold, 898 F.Supp.2d 809, 849 (D.Md. 2012) (quoting Newell
v. Runnels, 967 A.2d 729, 766 n.28 (Md. 2009)); accord Lee v.
Cline,
863
A.2d
297,
310
(Md.
2004)
(“[W]e
hold
that
the
immunity under the [MTCA], if otherwise applicable, encompasses
constitutional torts and intentional torts.”).
“Under
Maryland
law,
the
malice
necessary
to
defeat
immunity under section 5-522 is what is often referred to as
‘actual malice’—that is, conduct ‘motivated by ill will, by an
improper motive, or by an affirmative intent to injure.’”
Young
v. City of Mount Ranier, 238 F.3d 567, 578 (4th Cir. 2001)
(quoting Shoemaker
v.
Smith,
725
A.2d
549,
560
(Md.
1999)).
Gross negligence occurs when the defendant acts “with wanton or
reckless
disregard
for
the
safety
18
of
others.”
Id.
(quoting
Boyer v. State, 594 A.2d 121, 132 (Md. 1991)).
Actual malice cannot be inferred from allegations of a lack
of probable cause, but it “‘can be inferred from an arrest that
was so lacking in probable cause and legal justification as to
render [the arresting officer’s] stated belief in its existence
unreasonable and lacking in credibility,’ when all of the facts
are
considered
in
context.”
McDaniel,
898
F.Supp.2d
at
850
(quoting Thacker v. City of Hyattsville, 762 A.2d 172, 193–94
(Md.Ct.Spec.App. 2000)); accord DiPino v. Davis, 729 A.2d 354,
374
(Md.
1999)).
insufficient
to
Also,
mere
establish
allegations
actual
malice
of
or
negligence
gross
are
negligence.
Young, 238 F.3d at 579.
Construing
the
Complaint
liberally,
Ealy
alleges
Toey
maliciously and negligently arrested him without probable cause.
Toey demonstrates that he had probable cause to believe that
Ealy was committing a felony——i.e., driving a stolen vehicle——
and placed Ealy under arrest.
Though the charges against Ealy
were later nol-prossed, Ealy has not presented any evidence to
demonstrate
that
the
entry
absence of probable cause.
1058
(Md.
2004)
(“The
of
nolle
prosequi
constitutes
an
See Hines v. French, 852 A.2d 1047,
effect
of
the
entry
of
a
nol
pros,
however, is not crystalline and ‘the court must look at the
circumstances
determine
surrounding
whether
there
the
was
an
19
State’s
decision
absence
of
so
probable
as
to
cause.’”
(quoting
Allen v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 547 A.2d 1105, 1110
(Md.Ct.Spec.App. 1988))).
Furthermore, Ealy has not presented
any facts to give rise to an inference of gross negligence or
actual malice.
The Court, therefore, finds Toey is protected by
section 5-522 from the state law claims asserted against him and
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
will
grant
Toey’s
Motion
as
to
the
Accordingly, the Court
state
constitutional
and
common law claims. 9
III.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Toey’s Motions (ECF Nos. 17, 23)
are GRANTED, Cumberland’s first Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 18)
is GRANTED, and Cumberland’s second Motion to Dismiss (ECF No.
24) is DENIED AS MOOT.
is STRICKEN.
The First Amended Complaint (ECF No. 22)
The Complaint (ECF No. 1) is DISMISSED.
The Clerk
will be directed to CLOSE this case. A separate Order follows.
Entered this 18th day of March, 2016
/s/
_____________________________
George L. Russell, III
United States District Judge
9
The Court notes that qualified immunity is not a defense
to claims brought under the Maryland Declaration of Rights.
Wallace v. Poulos, No. DKC 2008-0251, 2009 WL 3216622, at *15
(D.Md. Sept. 29, 2009) (citing Okwa v. Harper, 757 A.2d 118 (Md.
2000)).
20
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