Wikimedia Foundation et al v. National Security Agency/Central Security Service et al

Filing 1

COMPLAINT for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief against All Defendants ( Filing fee $ 400 receipt number 0416-5260730.), filed by The Nation Magazine, Human Rights Watch, The Rutherford Institute, National Association of Criminal Defense Attorneys, Washington Office on Latin America, Pen American Center, Wikimedia Foundation, Global Fund for Women, Amnesty International USA. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet, # 2 Summonses)(Jeon, Deborah)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
WIKIMEDIA FOUNDATION
149 New Montgomery Street, 6th Floor
San Francisco, CA 94105;
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CRIMINAL
DEFENSE LAWYERS
1660 L Street, NW, 12th Floor
Washington, DC 20036;
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
350 Fifth Avenue, 34th Floor
New York, NY 10118;
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL USA
5 Pennsylvania Plaza, 16th Floor
New York, NY 10001;

COMPLAINT FOR
DECLARATORY AND
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

PEN AMERICAN CENTER
588 Broadway, Suite 303
New York, NY 10012;

Civil Action No. ________________

GLOBAL FUND FOR WOMEN
222 Sutter Street, Suite 500
San Francisco, CA 94108;
THE NATION MAGAZINE
33 Irving Place, 8th Floor
New York, NY 10003;
THE RUTHERFORD INSTITUTE
P.O. Box 7482
Charlottesville, VA 22906;
WASHINGTON OFFICE ON LATIN AMERICA
1666 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 400
Washington, DC 20009,
Plaintiffs,
v.
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY / CENTRAL
SECURITY SERVICE

Hon. ________________

9800 Savage Road
Fort Meade, Anne Arundel County, MD 20755;
ADM. MICHAEL S. ROGERS, in his official
capacity as Director of the National Security
Agency and Chief of the Central Security Service,
National Security Agency / Central Security
Service
9800 Savage Road
Fort Meade, Anne Arundel County, MD 20755;
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE
Washington, DC 20511;
JAMES R. CLAPPER, in his official capacity as
Director of National Intelligence,
Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Washington, DC 20511;
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20530;
ERIC H. HOLDER, in his official capacity as
Attorney General of the United States,
Department of Justice
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20530,
Defendants.
Deborah A. Jeon
(Bar No. 06905)
[e-mail]
David R. Rocah
(Bar No. 27315)
[e-mail]
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
FOUNDATION OF MARYLAND
3600 Clipper Mill Rd., #350
Baltimore, MD 21211
Phone: [phone]
Fax: [phone]

Patrick Toomey
(admission pro hac vice pending)
[e-mail]
Jameel Jaffer
(admission pro hac vice pending)
[e-mail]
Alex Abdo
(admission pro hac vice pending)
[e-mail]
Ashley Gorski
(admission pro hac vice pending)
[e-mail]
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
FOUNDATION

125 Broad Street, 18th Floor
New York, NY 10004
Phone: [phone]
Fax: [phone]
Charles S. Sims
(admission pro hac vice pending)
[e-mail]
David A. Munkittrick
(admission pro hac vice pending)
[e-mail]
John M. Browning
(admission pro hac vice pending)
[e-mail]
PROSKAUER ROSE LLP
Eleven Times Square
New York, NY 10036
Phone: [phone]
Fax: [phone]
March 10, 2015

COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
1.

This lawsuit challenges the suspicionless seizure and searching of internet traffic

by the National Security Agency (“NSA”) on U.S. soil. The NSA conducts this surveillance,
called “Upstream” surveillance, by tapping directly into the internet backbone inside the United
States—the network of high-capacity cables, switches, and routers that today carry vast
numbers of Americans’ communications with each other and with the rest of the world. In the
course of this surveillance, the NSA is seizing Americans’ communications en masse while
they are in transit, and it is searching the contents of substantially all international text-based
communications—and many domestic communications as well—for tens of thousands of
search terms. The surveillance exceeds the scope of the authority that Congress provided in the
FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (“FAA”) and violates the First and Fourth Amendments.
Because it is predicated on programmatic surveillance orders issued by the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court (“FISC”) in the absence of any case or controversy, the surveillance also
violates Article III of the Constitution.
2.

Plaintiffs are educational, legal, human rights, and media organizations that

collectively engage in hundreds of billions of sensitive international communications over the
internet each year. Plaintiffs communicate with, among many others, journalists, clients,
experts, attorneys, civil society organizations, foreign government officials, and victims of
human rights abuses. Plaintiff Wikimedia Foundation communicates with the hundreds of
millions of individuals who visit Wikipedia webpages to read or contribute to the vast
repository of human knowledge that Wikimedia maintains online. The ability to exchange
information in confidence, free from warrantless government monitoring, is essential to each of

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the Plaintiffs’ work. The challenged surveillance violates Plaintiffs’ privacy and undermines
their ability to carry out activities crucial to their missions.
3.

Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court declare the government’s Upstream

surveillance to be unlawful; enjoin the government from continuing to conduct Upstream
surveillance of Plaintiffs’ communications; and require the government to purge from its
databases all of Plaintiffs’ communications that Upstream surveillance has already allowed the
government to obtain.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
4.

This case arises under the Constitution and the laws of the United States and

presents a federal question within this Court’s jurisdiction under Article III of the Constitution
and 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The Court also has jurisdiction under the Administrative Procedure Act,
5 U.S.C. § 702. The Court has authority to grant declaratory relief pursuant to the Declaratory
Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201–2202. The Court has authority to award costs and attorneys’
fees under 28 U.S.C. § 2412.
5.

Venue is proper in this district under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2), (e)(1).
PLAINTIFFS

6.

Wikimedia Foundation (“Wikimedia”) is a non-profit organization based in San

Francisco, California, that operates twelve free-knowledge projects on the internet.
Wikimedia’s mission is to empower people around the world to collect and develop free
educational content. Wikimedia does this by developing and maintaining “wiki”-based projects,
and by providing the full contents of those projects to individuals around the world free of
charge. Wikimedia sues on its own behalf and on behalf of its staff and users.

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7.

The National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (“NACDL”) is a

membership organization based in Washington, D.C. NACDL advocates for rational and
humane criminal justice policies at all levels of federal, state, and local government, and seeks
to foster the integrity, independence, and expertise of the criminal defense profession. NACDL
sues on its own behalf and on behalf of its members.
8.

Human Rights Watch (“HRW”) is a non-profit, non-governmental human rights

organization headquartered in New York City with offices around the world. It reports on
abuses in all regions of the globe and advocates for the protection of human rights. HRW
researchers conduct fact-finding investigations into human rights abuses in over 90 countries
and publish their findings in hundreds of reports, multi-media products, and other documents
every year, as well as through social media accounts. HRW sues on its own behalf and on
behalf of its staff.
9.

Amnesty International USA (“AIUSA”), headquartered in New York City, is the

largest country section of Amnesty International, with hundreds of thousands of members and
other supporters who work for human rights, including through national online networks, high
schools, colleges, and community groups. AIUSA sues on its own behalf and on behalf of its
staff and members.
10.

PEN American Center (“PEN”) is a human rights and literary association based

in New York City. Committed to the advancement of literature and the unimpeded flow of
ideas and information, PEN fights for freedom of expression; advocates on behalf of writers
harassed, imprisoned, and sometimes killed for their views; and fosters international exchanges,
dialogues, discussions, and debates. PEN sues on its own behalf and on behalf of its staff and
members.
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11.

Global Fund for Women (“GFW”) is a non-profit grantmaking foundation based

in San Francisco, California, and New York City. GFW advances women’s human rights
worldwide by providing funds to women-led organizations that promote the economic security,
health, safety, education, and leadership of women and girls. GFW sues on its own behalf and
on behalf of its staff.
12.

The Nation Magazine (“The Nation”), which is published by The Nation

Company, LLC, and based in New York City, is America’s oldest weekly magazine of opinion,
news, and culture. It serves as a critical, independent voice in American journalism, exposing
abuses of power through its investigative reporting, analysis, and commentary. In recent years,
The Nation’s journalists have reported on a wide range of issues relating to international
affairs, including the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Israel–Palestine conflict, protest
activities in China and elsewhere in East Asia, and conflicts in Africa and Latin America. The
Nation sues on behalf of itself, its staff, and certain of its contributing journalists.
13.

The Rutherford Institute (“Rutherford”) is a civil liberties organization based in

Charlottesville, Virginia, committed to protecting the constitutional freedoms of Americans and
the human rights of all people. Rutherford provides free legal services in defense of civil
liberties and educates the public about constitutional and human rights issues. It also advocates
on behalf of individuals abroad whose rights are threatened by foreign governments.
Rutherford sues on its own behalf and on behalf of its staff.
14.

The Washington Office on Latin America (“WOLA”) is a non-profit, non-

governmental organization based in Washington, D.C., that conducts research, advocacy, and
education designed to promote human rights, democracy, and social justice in Latin America.
WOLA sues on its own behalf and on behalf of its staff.
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DEFENDANTS
15.

Defendant National Security Agency / Central Security Service (“NSA”),

headquartered in Fort Meade, Maryland, is the agency of the United States government
responsible for conducting the surveillance challenged in this case.
16.

Defendant Adm. Michael S. Rogers is the Director of the NSA and the Chief of

the Central Security Service. Defendant Rogers is sued in his official capacity.
17.

Defendant Office of the Director of National Intelligence (“ODNI”) is the

agency of the United States government responsible for directing and coordinating the activities
of the intelligence community, including the NSA.
18.

Defendant James R. Clapper is the Director of National Intelligence (“DNI”).

Together with the Attorney General, the DNI authorizes warrantless surveillance of U.S.
citizens’ and residents’ international communications under the FAA, including Upstream
surveillance. Defendant Clapper is sued in his official capacity.
19.

Defendant Department of Justice (“DOJ”) is one of the agencies of the United

States government responsible for authorizing and overseeing surveillance conducted pursuant
to the FAA, including Upstream surveillance.
20.

Defendant Eric H. Holder is the Attorney General of the United States. Together

with the DNI, the Attorney General authorizes warrantless surveillance of U.S. citizens’ and
residents’ international communications under the FAA, including Upstream surveillance.
Defendant Holder is sued in his official capacity.

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LEGAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
21.

In 1978, Congress enacted the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”) to

govern surveillance conducted for foreign intelligence purposes. The statute created the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court (“FISC”) and empowered the court to grant or deny
government applications for surveillance orders in certain foreign intelligence investigations.
22.

Congress enacted FISA after years of in-depth congressional investigation by

the committees chaired by Senator Frank Church and Representative Otis Pike, which revealed
that the Executive Branch had engaged in widespread warrantless surveillance of United States
citizens—including journalists, activists, and members of Congress—“who engaged in no
criminal activity and who posed no genuine threat to the national security.”
23.

Congress has amended FISA multiple times since 1978.

24.

Prior to 2007, FISA generally required the government to obtain an

individualized order from the FISC before conducting electronic surveillance on U.S. soil. To
obtain a traditional FISA order, the government was required to make a detailed factual
showing with respect to both the target of the surveillance and the specific communications
facility—often a telephone line or email account—to be monitored. The government was also
required to certify that a “significant purpose” of the surveillance was to obtain foreign
intelligence information. 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(6)(B).
25.

The FISC could issue such an order only if it found, among other things, that

there was probable cause to believe that “the target of the electronic surveillance is a foreign
power or an agent of a foreign power,” and that “each of the facilities or places at which the

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electronic surveillance is directed is being used, or is about to be used, by a foreign power or an
agent of a foreign power.” Id. § 1805(a)(2)(A)–(B).
26.

The framework established by FISA remains in effect today, but it has been

modified by the FAA to permit the acquisition of U.S. citizens’ and residents’ international
communications without probable cause or individualized suspicion, as described below.
The Warrantless Wiretapping Program
27.

On October 4, 2001, President George W. Bush secretly authorized the NSA to

conduct a program of warrantless electronic surveillance inside the United States. This
program, which was known as the President’s Surveillance Program (“PSP”), was reauthorized
repeatedly by President Bush between 2001 and 2007.
28.

According to public statements by senior government officials, the PSP involved

the warrantless interception of emails and telephone calls that originated or terminated inside
the U.S. According to then-Attorney General Alberto Gonzales and then-NSA Director General
Michael Hayden, NSA “shift supervisors” initiated surveillance when in their judgment there
was a “reasonable basis to conclude that one party to the communication [was] a member of al
Qaeda, affiliated with al Qaeda, or a member of an organization affiliated with al Qaeda, or
working in support of al Qaeda.”
29.

On January 17, 2007, then-Attorney General Alberto Gonzales publicly

announced that a judge of the FISC had “issued orders authorizing the Government to target for
collection international communications into or out of the United States where there [was]
probable cause to believe that one of the communicants [was] a member or agent of al Qaeda or
an associated terrorist organization.” The Attorney General further stated that “[a]s a result of

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these orders, any electronic surveillance that was occurring” as part of the PSP would thereafter
“be conducted subject to the approval of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.”
30.

In April 2007, when the government sought reauthorization of the FISC’s

previous orders, a different judge of the FISC determined that key elements of the
government’s request were incompatible with FISA. Following the FISC’s refusal to renew
certain portions of its January 2007 orders, executive-branch officials appealed to Congress to
amend the statute.
The Protect America Act
31.

Congress enacted the Protect America Act (“PAA”) in August 2007. The PAA

expanded the executive’s surveillance authority and provided legislative sanction for
surveillance that the President had previously been conducting under the PSP. Because of a
“sunset” provision, the amendments to FISA made by the PAA expired on February 17, 2008.
The FISA Amendments Act
32.

President Bush signed the FISA Amendments Act (“FAA”) into law on July 10,

2008. The FAA radically revised the FISA regime that had been in place since 1978 by
authorizing the acquisition without individualized suspicion of a wide swath of
communications, including U.S. persons’ international communications, from companies inside
the United States.1
33.

In particular, the FAA allows the Attorney General and Director of National

Intelligence to “authorize jointly, for a period of up to 1 year . . . the targeting of persons
reasonably believed to be located outside the United States to acquire foreign intelligence
1

Plaintiffs use the term “international” to describe communications that either originate or
terminate outside the United States, but not both—i.e., communications that are foreign at one
end.
8

information.” 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(a). The statute requires the Attorney General, in consultation
with the Director of National Intelligence, to adopt “targeting procedures” and “minimization
procedures,” id. § 1881a(d)–(e), that govern who may be targeted for surveillance by executivebranch employees and how communications are to be handled once intercepted.
34.

The FISC’s role in overseeing the government’s surveillance under the statute

consists principally of reviewing these general procedures. The FISC never reviews or
approves the government’s individual surveillance targets or the facilities it intends to monitor.
Rather, when the government wishes to conduct surveillance under the statute, it must certify to
the FISC that the court has approved its targeting and minimization procedures or that it will
shortly submit such procedures for the FISC’s approval. See id. § 1881a(g), (i). If the
government so certifies, the FISC authorizes the government’s surveillance for up to a year at a
time. A single such order may result in the acquisition of the communications of thousands of
individuals.
35.

The effect of the FAA is to give the government sweeping authority to conduct

warrantless surveillance of U.S. persons’ international communications. While the statute
prohibits the government from intentionally targeting U.S. persons, it authorizes the
government to acquire U.S. persons’ communications with the foreigners whom the NSA
chooses to target. Moreover the statute does not meaningfully restrict which foreigners the
government may target. The statute does not require the government to make any finding—let
alone demonstrate probable cause to the FISC—that its surveillance targets are foreign agents,
engaged in criminal activity, or connected even remotely with terrorism. The government may
target any person for surveillance if it has a reasonable belief that she is a foreigner outside the
United States who is likely to communicate “foreign intelligence information”—a term that is
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defined so broadly as to encompass virtually any information relating to the foreign affairs of
the United States. Id. §§ 1881a(a), 1801(e). The government may target corporations and
associations under the same standard.
36.

Thus, though the FAA is nominally concerned with the surveillance of

individuals and groups outside the United States, it has far-reaching implications for U.S.
persons’ privacy. The targets of FAA surveillance may include journalists, academic
researchers, human rights defenders, aid workers, business persons, and others who are not
suspected of any wrongdoing. In the course of FAA surveillance, the government may acquire
the communications of U.S. citizens and residents with all these persons.
THE GOVERNMENT’S IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FAA
37.

The government has implemented the FAA expansively, with significant

consequences for Americans’ privacy. The Director of National Intelligence has reported that,
in 2013, the government relied on the FAA to target 89,138 individuals, groups, or
organizations for surveillance under a single court order. According to the FISC, the
government gathered 250 million internet communications under the FAA in 2011 alone—at a
time when the NSA had far fewer targets than it has today. Intelligence officials have declined
to determine, or even estimate, how many of the communications intercepted under the FAA
are to, from, or about U.S. citizens or residents. However, opinions issued by the FISC, reports
by the President’s Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies and the
Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, and media accounts indicate that FAA
surveillance results in the wide-ranging and persistent interception of U.S. persons’
communications.

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38.

In at least one respect, the government has engaged in surveillance that exceeds

even the broad authority that Congress granted in the FAA. As described below, the
government has interpreted the FAA to allow it to intercept, copy, and review essentially
everyone’s internet communications in order to search for identifiers associated with its targets.
This intrusive and far-reaching practice has no basis in the statute. The statute authorizes
surveillance only of targets’ communications; it does not authorize surveillance of everyone.
Upstream Surveillance
39.

The government conducts at least two kinds of surveillance under the FAA.

Under a program called “PRISM,” the government obtains stored and real-time
communications directly from U.S. companies—such as Google, Yahoo, Facebook, and
Microsoft—that provide communications services to targeted accounts.
40.

This case concerns a second form of surveillance, called Upstream. Upstream

surveillance involves the NSA’s seizing and searching the internet communications of U.S.
citizens and residents en masse as those communications travel across the internet “backbone”
in the United States. The internet backbone is the network of high-capacity cables, switches,
and routers that facilitates both domestic and international communication via the internet.
41.

The NSA conducts Upstream surveillance by connecting surveillance devices to

multiple major internet cables, switches, and routers inside the United States. These access
points are controlled by the country’s largest telecommunications providers, including Verizon
Communications, Inc. and AT&T, Inc. In some or all instances, aspects of Upstream
surveillance may be conducted by the telecommunications providers on the government’s
behalf.

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42.

Upstream surveillance is intended to enable the comprehensive monitoring of

international internet traffic. With the assistance of telecommunications providers, the NSA
intercepts a wide variety of internet communications, including emails, instant messages,
webpages, voice calls, and video chats. It copies and reviews substantially all international
emails and other “text-based” communications—i.e., those whose content includes searchable
text.
43.

More specifically, Upstream surveillance encompasses the following processes,

some of which are implemented by telecommunications providers acting at the NSA’s
direction:
•

Copying. Using surveillance devices installed at key access points, the NSA makes a
copy of substantially all international text-based communications—and many domestic
ones—flowing across certain high-capacity cables, switches, and routers. The copied
traffic includes email, internet-messaging communications, web-browsing content, and
search-engine queries.

•

Filtering. The NSA attempts to filter out and discard some wholly domestic
communications from the stream of internet data, while preserving international
communications. The NSA’s filtering out of domestic communications is incomplete,
however, for multiple reasons. Among them, the NSA does not eliminate bundles of
domestic and international communications that transit the internet backbone together.
Nor does it eliminate domestic communications that happen to be routed abroad.

•

Content Review. The NSA reviews the copied communications—including their full
content—for instances of its search terms. The search terms, called “selectors,” include
email addresses, phone numbers, internet protocol (“IP”) addresses, and other
identifiers that NSA analysts believe to be associated with foreign intelligence targets.
Again, the NSA’s targets are not limited to suspected foreign agents and terrorists, nor
are its selectors limited to individual email addresses. The NSA may monitor or “task”
selectors used by large groups of people who are not suspected of any wrongdoing—
such as the IP addresses of computer servers used by hundreds of different people.

•

Retention and Use. The NSA retains all communications that contain selectors
associated with its targets, as well as those that happened to be bundled with them in
transit. As discussed further below, NSA analysts may read, query, data-mine, and
analyze these communications with few restrictions, and they may share the results of
those efforts with the FBI, including in aid of criminal investigations.

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44.

One aspect of the processes outlined above bears emphasis: Upstream

surveillance is not limited to communications sent or received by the NSA’s targets. Rather, it
involves the surveillance of essentially everyone’s communications. The NSA systematically
examines the full content of substantially all international text-based communications (and
many domestic ones) for references to its search terms. In other words, the NSA copies and
reviews the communications of millions of innocent people to determine whether they are
discussing or reading anything containing the NSA’s search terms. The NSA’s practice of
reviewing the content of communications for selectors is sometimes called “about”
surveillance. This is because its purpose is to identify not just communications that are to or
from the NSA’s targets but also those that are merely “about” its targets. Although it could do
so, the government makes no meaningful effort to avoid the interception of communications
that are merely “about” its targets; nor does it later purge those communications.
Targeting and Minimization Procedures
45.

As indicated above, the FAA requires the government to adopt targeting and

minimization procedures that govern who may be targeted for surveillance by executive-branch
employees and how communications are to be handled once intercepted. These procedures are
extremely permissive, and to the extent they impose limitations, those restrictions are riddled
with exceptions.
46.

Nothing in the targeting procedures meaningfully constrains the government’s

selection of foreign targets. Nor do the targeting procedures require the government to take
measures to avoid intercepting U.S. persons’ international communications. The targeting
procedures expressly contemplate “about” surveillance, and thus the interception and review of
communications between non-targets.
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47.

The minimization procedures are equally feeble. They impose no affirmative

obligation on the NSA to promptly identify and purge U.S. persons’ communications once they
have been obtained. Rather, they allow the NSA to retain communications gathered via
Upstream surveillance for as long as three years by default. It can retain those communications
indefinitely if the communications are encrypted; if they are found to contain foreign
intelligence information (again, defined broadly); or if they appear to be evidence of a crime.
Indeed, the NSA may even retain and share wholly domestic communications obtained through
the accidental targeting of U.S. persons if the NSA determines that the communications contain
“significant foreign intelligence information” or evidence of a crime. The minimization
procedures also expressly contemplate that the NSA will intercept, retain, and disseminate
attorney-client privileged communications. The minimization procedures bar the NSA from
querying Upstream data using identifiers associated with specific U.S. persons, but they do not
otherwise prohibit the NSA from conducting queries designed to reveal information to, from, or
about U.S. persons.
The Surveillance of Plaintiffs
48.

Plaintiffs are educational, legal, human rights, and media organizations. Their

work requires them to engage in sensitive and sometimes privileged communications, both
international and domestic, with journalists, clients, experts, attorneys, civil society
organizations, foreign government officials, and victims of human rights abuses, among others.
49.

By intercepting, copying, and reviewing substantially all international text-based

communications—and many domestic communications as well—as they transit
telecommunications networks inside the United States, the government is seizing and searching
Plaintiffs’ communications in violation of the FAA and the Constitution.
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50.

The interception, copying, and review of Plaintiffs’ communications while in

transit is a violation of Plaintiffs’ reasonable expectation of privacy in those communications. It
is also a violation of Plaintiffs’ right to control those communications and the information they
reveal and contain.
51.

Furthermore, because of the nature of their communications, and the location

and identities of the individuals and groups with whom and about whom they communicate,
there is a substantial likelihood that Plaintiffs’ communications intercepted by the NSA through
Upstream surveillance are retained, read, and disseminated.
52.

The retention, reading, and dissemination of Plaintiffs’ communications is a

further, discrete violation of Plaintiffs’ reasonable expectation of privacy in those
communications. It is also a further, discrete violation of Plaintiffs’ right to control those
communications and the information they reveal and contain.
53.

Plaintiffs, in connection with constitutionally protected activities, communicate

with people whom the government is likely to target when conducting Upstream surveillance,
including foreign government officials, journalists, experts, human rights defenders, victims of
human rights abuses, and individuals believed to have information relevant to counterterrorism
efforts.
54.

A significant amount of the information that Plaintiffs exchange over the

internet is “foreign intelligence information” within the meaning of the FAA.
55.

Because of ongoing government surveillance, including Upstream surveillance,

Plaintiffs have had to take burdensome and sometimes costly measures to minimize the chance
that the confidentiality of their sensitive information will be compromised. Plaintiffs have
variously had to develop new protocols for transmitting sensitive information, to travel long
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distances to collect information that could otherwise have been shared electronically, and in
some circumstances to forgo particularly sensitive communications altogether.
56.

Because of ongoing government surveillance, including Upstream surveillance,

Plaintiffs are not able to gather and relay information, represent their clients, and engage in
domestic and international advocacy as they would in the absence of the surveillance. Upstream
surveillance reduces the likelihood that clients, users, journalists, witnesses, experts, civil
society organizations, foreign government officials, victims of human rights abuses, and other
individuals will share sensitive information with Plaintiffs.
57.

Upstream surveillance is inhibiting the constitutionally protected

communications and activities of Plaintiffs and others not before the Court.
Wikimedia Foundation
58.

Wikimedia is a non-profit organization dedicated to encouraging the growth,

development, and distribution of free, multilingual, educational content. In this effort, it
develops and maintains “wiki”-based projects, and provides the full contents of those projects
to individuals around the world free of charge. At present, Wikimedia operates twelve freeknowledge projects (“Projects”) as well as other related websites and pages on the internet.
59.

The best-known of Wikimedia’s Projects is Wikipedia—a free internet

encyclopedia that is one of the top ten most-visited websites in the world and one of the largest
collections of shared knowledge in human history. In 2014, Wikipedia contained more than 33
million articles in over 275 languages, and Wikimedia sites received between 412 and 495
million monthly visitors. On average, Wikimedia users visited Wikimedia “pages” or entries
over 16 billion times each month during 2014. Wikipedia’s content is collaboratively
researched and written by millions of volunteers, many of whom choose not to identify
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themselves, and is in most instances open to editing by anyone. Volunteers also use Wikipedia
discussion forums or “discussion pages” to debate the editorial policies and decisions required
for reliable and neutral content.
60.

Other Projects include Wikimedia Commons, an online repository of free

images, sound, and other media files; and Wikibooks, a platform for the creation of free
textbooks and annotated texts that anyone can edit consistent with the policies of the site.
61.

Wikimedia provides the technical infrastructure for the Projects, much of which

is hosted on Wikimedia’s servers in Virginia, Texas, and California. In addition, Wikimedia
develops software and provides tools for others to develop software platforms; develops mobile
phone applications and enters into partnerships; administers grants to support activity that
benefits the Wikimedia movement; provides administrative support to grantees; organizes
conferences and community-outreach events globally; and engages in advocacy on issues that
affect the Wikimedia community—which, at its broadest level, consists of individuals who read
or contribute to the work of the twelve Projects.
62.

Upstream surveillance implicates at least two categories of Wikimedia

communications: (i) Wikimedia communications related to the activities of its users, who read
and edit Wikimedia’s Projects and webpages, and who use them to interact with each other; and
(ii) communications by Wikimedia staff.
63.

As the operator of one of the most-visited websites in the world, Wikimedia

engages in an extraordinarily high volume of internet communications. From October 2013 to
October 2014, Wikimedia websites received over 248 billion page requests. Over the lifespan
of the Wikimedia Projects, Wikimedia’s users have edited its pages more than 2.3 billion times.
More than 89 million registered and unregistered users have edited a Wikimedia page. Each of
17

these activities involves internet communications between Wikimedia and its users—the
majority of whom are located abroad.
64.

Indeed, Wikimedia engages in hundreds of billions of international

communications each year. For a user to view, edit, or contribute to a Wikimedia Project
webpage, the user’s device must send at least one HTTP or HTTPS “request” to a Wikimedia
server. “HTTP” and “HTTPS” are common protocols for transmitting data via the internet,
including the content of many webpages. The number of requests required for a user to access a
particular webpage depends on the number of graphics, videos, and other specialized
components featured on the page. After receiving such a user request, the Wikimedia server
transmits the content of the requested webpage component to the user’s device, where it is
rendered and displayed to the user. In January 2015, Wikimedia’s U.S.-based servers received
and responded to over 62 billion HTTP or HTTPS requests from outside the United States.
65.

Wikimedia also frequently engages in communications that permit its users to

interact more directly, including one-on-one. For example, a registered user of Wikimedia may
send an email via Wikimedia to another registered user, so long as both have enabled email
communications on their Wikimedia accounts. Similarly, Wikimedia engages in
communications that allow users to interact in small or limited groups—including over wikis
that only certain users, such as user-community leaders, have access to, and mailing lists with
restricted membership.
66.

Wikimedia’s communications related to its users’ activities are often sensitive

and private. These communications reveal a detailed picture of the everyday concerns and
reading habits of Wikimedia’s users, and often constitute a record of their political, religious,
sexual, medical, and expressive interests.
18

67.

Seizing and searching Wikimedia’s communications is akin to seizing and

searching the patron records of the largest library in the world—except that Wikimedia’s
communications provide a more comprehensive and detailed picture of its users’ interests than
any previous set of library records ever could have offered.
68.

Because of the sensitivity of this information, Wikimedia seeks to collect as

little of it as possible. Where it does collect user information, Wikimedia strives to keep it for
only a limited amount of time, consistent with the maintenance, understanding, and
improvement of the Projects and with Wikimedia’s legal obligations. Still, Wikimedia
possesses a large volume of sensitive information about its users, and it transmits a large
volume of sensitive information about those users every day.
69.

In addition to Wikimedia’s communications related to its users’ activities, as

described above, Wikimedia engages in a second category of sensitive communications.
Certain members of Wikimedia’s staff routinely engage in sensitive, confidential, and
privileged internet communications with non-U.S. persons located abroad in carrying out
Wikimedia’s work.
70.

Wikimedia’s communications—both communications related to the activities of

Wikimedia’s users and the communications of its staff members—are intercepted, copied, and
reviewed in the course of Upstream surveillance. This surveillance invades the privacy of
Wikimedia, its staff, and its users, and it violates their right to control those communications
and the information they contain.
71.

Furthermore, there is a substantial likelihood that the NSA retains, reads, and

disseminates Wikimedia’s international communications because Wikimedia is communicating
with or about persons the government has targeted for Upstream surveillance. Wikimedia’s
19

international contacts include foreign telecommunications companies, foreign government
officials, Wikimedia users and their legal counsel, Wikimedia trustees and international
contractors, Wikimedia’s international outside legal counsel, project partners, grantees, and
volunteers—some of whom are likely targets. Wikimedia’s communications with these
contacts sometimes concern topics that fall within the FAA’s expansive definition of “foreign
intelligence information.” Wikimedia communicates both with and about these likely targets.
Wikimedia’s international communications contain, among other things, information about its
foreign contacts, including the email addresses, phone numbers, and website addresses of
foreign individuals and organizations relevant to Wikimedia’s work.
72.

Moreover, hundreds of billions of Wikimedia’s international communications—

its HTTP and HTTPS transmissions as well as its internal logs of user activity—contain details
such as website addresses and IP addresses. For example, some Wikipedia pages contain the
website addresses and domain names of foreign companies and organizations likely targeted for
Upstream surveillance. Whenever a Wikimedia user abroad edits or contributes to a Project
webpage that happens to reference one of the NSA’s selectors, Wikimedia engages in an
international communication containing that selector. The same is often true when a Wikimedia
user abroad simply reads such a Project webpage. Some of these communications are likely
retained, read, and disseminated in the course of Upstream surveillance.
73.

The NSA has expressed interest in surveilling Wikimedia’s communications. An

NSA slide disclosed by the media asks, “Why are we interested in HTTP?” It then answers its
own question: “Because nearly everything a typical user does on the Internet uses HTTP.” This
statement is surrounded by the logos of major internet companies and websites, including
Facebook, Yahoo, Twitter, CNN.com, and Wikipedia. The slide indicates that, by monitoring
20

HTTP communications, the NSA can observe “nearly everything a typical user does” online—
including individuals’ online reading habits and other internet activities. This information is
queried and reviewed by analysts using a search tool that allows NSA analysts to examine data
intercepted pursuant to the FAA and other authorities.

74.

Upstream surveillance undermines Wikimedia’s ability to conduct its work.

Wikimedia depends on its ability to ensure anonymity for individuals abroad who view, edit, or
otherwise use Wikimedia Projects and related webpages. The ability to read, research, and
write anonymously is essential to the freedoms of expression and inquiry. In addition,
Wikimedia’s staff depend on the confidentiality of their communications, including in some
cases their ability to ensure that their contacts’ identities will not be revealed. Because of these
twin needs for anonymity and confidentiality, Upstream surveillance harms the ability of
21

Wikimedia’s staff to engage in communications essential to their work and compromises
Wikimedia’s organizational mission by making online access to knowledge a vehicle for U.S.
government monitoring.
75.

Due in part to NSA surveillance, including Upstream surveillance, Wikimedia

has undertaken burdensome and costly measures to protect its communications, including
adopting more secure methods of electronic communication, and in some instances avoiding
sensitive topics or forgoing communications altogether.
76.

Despite these precautions, Wikimedia believes that Upstream surveillance has

resulted and will result in some foreign readers, editors, contributors, and volunteers being less
willing to read, contribute to, or otherwise engage with Wikimedia’s Projects. The loss of these
foreign users is a direct detriment to Wikimedia, its ability to receive information, and its
organizational goal of increasing global access to knowledge. It also harms Wikimedia’s
domestic users, who do not have access to information and opinions that Wikipedia’s foreign
contributors would otherwise have provided. Similarly, Wikimedia believes that Upstream
surveillance reduces the likelihood that Wikimedia’s foreign volunteers, grantees, and other
contacts will communicate with staff members, because they fear that their communications
will be intercepted by the U.S. government and also shared with the other governments,
intelligence services, and organizations with which the U.S. government cooperates.
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers
77.

The National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (“NACDL”) is a

membership organization based in Washington, D.C. NACDL’s mission is to foster the
integrity, independence, and expertise of the criminal defense profession, and to promote the

22

proper and fair administration of justice. NACDL has approximately 9,200 members as well as
90 local, state, and international affiliate organizations with approximately 40,000 members.
78.

As defense attorneys, NACDL’s members engage in international and domestic

internet communications that are essential to the effective representation of their clients.
Among other things, NACDL’s members routinely engage in sensitive, confidential, and
privileged internet communications with non-U.S. persons located abroad as part of their
representations.
79.

The communications of NACDL’s members are intercepted, copied, and

reviewed in the course of Upstream surveillance. This surveillance invades the privacy of
members’ communications and it violates their right to control their communications and the
information they contain.
80.

Furthermore, there is a substantial likelihood that the NSA retains, reads, and

disseminates international communications of NACDL’s members because they are
communicating with or about persons the government has targeted for Upstream surveillance.
In the course of their representations, NACDL members communicate internationally with
clients, clients’ families, witnesses, journalists, human rights organizations, experts,
investigators, and foreign government officials, some of whom are likely targets. Their
communications with these contacts frequently concern topics that fall within the FAA’s
expansive definition of “foreign intelligence information.” NACDL members communicate
both with and about these likely targets. Members’ international communications contain,
among other things, details about their foreign contacts and other important sources of
information—details such as the email addresses, phone numbers, and website addresses of
foreign individuals and organizations relevant to their work.
23

81.

One group of NACDL members is especially likely to have their

communications retained, read, and disseminated in the course of Upstream surveillance:
defense attorneys who represent individuals in criminal prosecutions in which the government
has acknowledged its use FAA surveillance. In these cases, the government’s prosecution of
the defendant is based on evidence obtained from an FAA target. As a result, defense attorneys
are especially likely to engage in communications to, from, or about FAA targets in the course
of investigating the government’s allegations, contacting witnesses, and collecting their own
evidence. Indeed, in several of these cases, the targeted selector—e.g., the targeted email
address—has been identified in press reports or may be gleaned from court filings. NACDL
defense attorneys who communicate internationally with or about that targeted selector will
have their communications retained by the government, much as their clients’ communications
were warrantlessly intercepted and retained.
82.

NACDL members have an ethical obligation to protect the confidentiality of

their clients’ information, including information covered by the attorney-client privilege.
83.

Upstream surveillance compromises NACDL members’ ability to comply with

their ethical obligations and undermines their effective representation of their clients.
Members’ defense work depends on the confidentiality of their communications, including
their ability to assure contacts that their communications—and, in some cases, even their
identities—will not be revealed. Due in part to NSA surveillance, including Upstream
surveillance, NACDL’s members have undertaken burdensome and costly measures to protect
their communications, including adopting more secure methods of electronic communication,
traveling to conduct in-person meetings, and in some instances avoiding sensitive topics or
forgoing communications altogether. Despite these precautions, NACDL believes that
24

Upstream surveillance reduces the likelihood that potential sources, witnesses, experts, and
foreign government officials will share sensitive information with NACDL’s members, because
those contacts fear that their communications will be intercepted by the U.S. government and
also shared with the other governments, intelligence services, and organizations with which the
U.S. government cooperates.
Human Rights Watch
84.

HRW is a non-profit, non-governmental human rights organization based in

New York City. It employs approximately 400 staff members located across offices around the
world. Formed in 1978, HRW’s mission is to defend the rights of people worldwide. HRW
conducts fact-finding investigations into human rights abuses by governments and non-state
actors in all regions of the world.
85.

HRW engages in international and domestic internet communications that are

essential to its mission. Among other things, HRW’s U.S.-based staff routinely engage in
sensitive and confidential internet communications with non-U.S. persons located abroad in
carrying out HRW’s research, reporting, and advocacy work.
86.

HRW’s communications are intercepted, copied, and reviewed in the course of

Upstream surveillance. This surveillance invades the privacy of HRW’s communications and it
violates HRW’s right to control those communications and the information they contain.
87.

Furthermore, there is a substantial likelihood that the NSA retains, reads, and

disseminates HRW’s international communications because HRW is communicating with or
about persons the government has targeted for Upstream surveillance. HRW’s international
contacts include foreign government officials, humanitarian agencies, think tanks, military
officials, human rights defenders, politicians, dissidents, victims of human rights abuses,
25

perpetrators of human rights abuses, religious groups, media, and scholars, some of whom are
likely targets. HRW’s communications with these contacts frequently concern topics that fall
within the FAA’s expansive definition of “foreign intelligence information.” HRW
communicates both with and about these likely targets. HRW’s international communications
contain, among other things, details about its foreign contacts and other important sources of
information—details such as the email addresses, phone numbers, and website addresses of
foreign individuals and organizations relevant to HRW’s work.
88.

Upstream surveillance undermines HRW’s ability to conduct its work. HRW’s

research, reporting, and advocacy depend on the confidentiality of its communications,
including its ability to assure its contacts that their communications—and, in some cases, even
their identities—will not be revealed. Due in part to NSA surveillance, including Upstream
surveillance, HRW has undertaken burdensome and costly measures to secure and protect its
communications, including adopting more secure methods of electronic communication,
traveling to conduct in-person meetings, and in some instances avoiding sensitive topics or
forgoing communications altogether. Despite these precautions, HRW believes that Upstream
surveillance reduces the likelihood that sources, witnesses, experts, foreign government
officials, and victims of human rights abuses will share sensitive information with HRW’s
staff, because they fear that their communications will be intercepted by the U.S. government
and also shared with the other governments, intelligence services, and organizations with which
the U.S. government cooperates.
Amnesty International USA
89.

AIUSA, headquartered in New York City, is one of Amnesty International’s

largest national sections, with hundreds of thousands of members and supporters. Through its
26

advocacy campaigns, AIUSA seeks to expose and stop human rights abuses in the United
States and throughout the world.
90.

AIUSA engages in international and domestic internet communications that are

essential to its mission. Among other things, some of AIUSA’s U.S.-based staff—as well as
some AIUSA members who serve as volunteer specialists on particular countries and thematic
issues—routinely engage in sensitive and confidential internet communications with non-U.S.
persons located abroad in carrying out AIUSA’s reporting and advocacy work.
91.

AIUSA’s communications are intercepted, copied, and reviewed in the course of

Upstream surveillance. This surveillance invades the privacy of AIUSA’s communications and
it violates AIUSA’s right to control those communications and the information they contain.
92.

Furthermore, there is a substantial likelihood that the NSA retains, reads, and

disseminates AIUSA’s international communications because AIUSA is communicating with
or about persons the government has targeted for Upstream surveillance. AIUSA’s international
contacts include Amnesty International researchers who are documenting and witnessing
human rights violations in the field, human rights defenders, victims of violations and their
families, eyewitnesses to violations, political dissidents, government officials, journalists, and
lawyers, some of whom are likely targets. AIUSA’s communications with these contacts
frequently concern topics that fall within the FAA’s expansive definition of “foreign
intelligence information.” AIUSA communicates both with and about these likely targets.
AIUSA’s international communications contain, among other things, details about its foreign
contacts and other important sources of information—details such as the email addresses,
phone numbers, and website addresses of foreign individuals and organizations relevant to
AIUSA’s work.
27

93.

Upstream surveillance undermines AIUSA’s ability to conduct its work.

AIUSA’s reporting and advocacy depends on the confidentiality of its communications,
including its ability to assure its contacts that their communications—and, in some cases, even
their identities—will not be revealed. Due in part to NSA surveillance, including Upstream
surveillance, some AIUSA staff strive to communicate particularly sensitive matters in-person,
and must sometimes avoid sensitive topics or forgo exchanging information about these matters
altogether. Despite these precautions, AIUSA believes that Upstream surveillance reduces the
likelihood that sources, witnesses, experts, foreign government officials, and victims of human
rights abuses will share sensitive information with AIUSA’s staff and members, because they
fear that their communications will be intercepted by the U.S. government and also shared with
the other governments, intelligence services, and organizations with which the U.S.
government cooperates.
PEN American Center
94.

PEN is an association based in New York City of approximately 4,000 novelists,

journalists, editors, poets, essayists, playwrights, publishers, translators, agents, and other
professionals, and an even larger network of readers and supporters. It is the largest of the
organizations within PEN International. For the last 90 years, PEN has worked to ensure that
people all over the world are at liberty to create literature, to convey ideas freely, and to express
their views unimpeded. One of PEN’s core projects is to advocate on behalf of persecuted
writers across the globe, so that they might be free to write and to express their ideas.
95.

PEN engages in international and domestic internet communications that are

essential to its mission. Among other things, PEN’s U.S.-based staff routinely engage in

28

sensitive and confidential internet communications with non-U.S. persons located abroad in
carrying out PEN’s research and advocacy work.
96.

PEN’s communications are intercepted, copied, and reviewed in the course of

Upstream surveillance. This surveillance invades the privacy of PEN’s communications and it
violates PEN’s right to control those communications and the information they contain.
97.

Furthermore, there is a substantial likelihood that the NSA retains, reads, and

disseminates PEN’s international communications because PEN is communicating with or
about persons the government has targeted for Upstream surveillance. PEN’s international
contacts include writers whose work and experiences relate to political upheavals, human rights
violations, freedom of the press, and government surveillance; those writers’ families and legal
representatives; human rights defenders; and other PEN partners in countries such as Syria,
Cuba, China, Iran, and Ethiopia—some of whom are likely targets. PEN’s communications
with these contacts frequently concern topics that fall within the FAA’s expansive definition of
“foreign intelligence information.” PEN communicates both with and about these likely targets.
PEN’s international communications contain, among other things, details about its foreign
contacts and other important sources of information—details such as the email addresses,
phone numbers, and website addresses of foreign individuals and organizations relevant to
PEN’s work.
98.

Upstream surveillance undermines PEN’s ability to conduct its work. PEN’s

research and advocacy depend on the confidentiality of its communications, including its
ability to assure its contacts that their communications—and, in some cases, even their
identities—will not be revealed. Due in part to NSA surveillance, including Upstream
surveillance, PEN staff have undertaken burdensome measures to secure and protect their
29

communications, including adopting more secure methods of electronic communication, and in
some instances avoiding sensitive topics or forgoing communications altogether. Despite these
precautions, PEN believes that Upstream surveillance reduces the likelihood that foreign
writers and other contacts will share sensitive information with PEN’s staff, because they fear
that their communications will be intercepted by the U.S. government and also shared with the
other governments, intelligence services, and organizations with which the U.S. government
cooperates.
Global Fund for Women
99.

GFW, based in San Francisco and New York City, is a grant-maker and a global

advocate for women’s human rights. GFW advances the movement for women’s human rights
by directing resources to and raising the voices of women worldwide. GFW invests in local,
courageous women and women-led organizations, and creates digital advocacy campaigns on
critical global issues for women and girls. Since its inception in 1986, GFW has awarded 9,921
grants totaling $120 million to 4,759 organizations in 175 countries.
100.

GFW engages in international and domestic internet communications that are

essential to its mission. Among other things, GFW’s U.S.-based staff routinely engage in
sensitive, confidential, and privileged internet communications with non-U.S. persons located
abroad in carrying out GFW’s grant-making and advocacy work.
101.

GFW’s communications are intercepted, copied, and reviewed in the course of

Upstream surveillance. This surveillance invades the privacy of GFW’s communications and it
violates GFW’s right to control those communications and the information they contain.
102.

Furthermore, there is a substantial likelihood that the NSA retains, reads, and

disseminates GFW’s international communications because GFW is communicating with or
30

about persons the government has targeted for Upstream surveillance. GFW’s international
contacts include foreign banks, foreign government agencies, funders, attorneys, and grantee
and partner organizations working in conflict zones or on politically sensitive issues abroad,
some of whom are likely targets. GFW’s communications with these contacts frequently
concern topics that fall within the FAA’s expansive definition of “foreign intelligence
information.” GFW communicates both with and about these likely targets.
 GFW’s
international communications contain, among other things, details about its foreign contacts
and other important sources of information—details such as the email addresses, phone
numbers, and website addresses of foreign individuals and organizations relevant to GFW’s
work.
103.

Upstream surveillance undermines GFW’s ability to conduct its work. GFW’s

grant-making depends on the confidentiality of its communications, including its ability to
assure its contacts that their communications—and, in some cases, even their identities—will
not be revealed. Due in part to NSA surveillance, including Upstream surveillance, GFW’s
staff must exercise extreme caution when engaging in certain international communications,
and in some instances avoid sensitive topics or forgo communications altogether. Some of
GFW’s international contacts will communicate with the organization only by phone or Skype,
rather than email, because they believe that email is a less secure means of communication.
Other of GFW’s international contacts will communicate via email, but only if staff avoid using
certain words in their communications that may result in further government scrutiny. Despite
these precautions, GFW believes that Upstream surveillance reduces the likelihood that current
and prospective grantees will share sensitive information with GFW’s staff, because they fear
that their communications will be intercepted by the U.S. government and also shared with the
31

other governments, intelligence services, and organizations with which the U.S. government
cooperates.
The Nation Magazine
104.

The Nation is America’s oldest weekly magazine of opinion, news, and culture.

The Nation is also a digital media company, reporting daily on politics, social issues, and the
arts. Its journalists report on a wide range of issues relating to international affairs, including
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Israel–Palestine conflict, protest activities and politics in
China and elsewhere in East Asia, and civil wars and other conflicts in Africa and Latin
America.
105.

The Nation engages in international and domestic internet communications that

are essential to its mission. Among other things, The Nation’s staff and contributing writers
routinely engage in sensitive and confidential internet communications with non-U.S. persons
located abroad in carrying out The Nation’s research, reporting, and editing.
106.

The Nation’s communications are intercepted, copied, and reviewed in the

course of Upstream surveillance. This surveillance invades the privacy of The Nation’s
communications and it violates The Nation’s right to control those communications and the
information they contain.
107.

Furthermore, there is a substantial likelihood that the NSA retains, reads, and

disseminates The Nation’s international communications because The Nation is communicating
with or about persons the government has targeted for Upstream surveillance. The Nation’s
international contacts include foreign journalists in conflict zones, foreign government officials,
political dissidents, human rights activists, and members of guerrilla and insurgency
movements, some of whom are likely targets. The Nation’s communications with these
32

contacts frequently concern topics that fall within the FAA’s expansive definition of “foreign
intelligence information.” The Nation communicates both with and about these likely targets.
The Nation’s international communications contain, among other things, details about its
foreign contacts and other important sources of information—details such as the email
addresses, phone numbers, and website addresses of foreign individuals and organizations
relevant to The Nation’s work.
108.

Upstream surveillance undermines The Nation’s ability to conduct its work. The

Nation’s research and reporting depends on the confidentiality of its communications, including
its ability to assure its contacts that their communications—and, in some cases, even their
identities—will not be revealed. Due in part to NSA surveillance, including Upstream
surveillance, The Nation has undertaken burdensome and costly measures to protect its
communications, including adopting more secure methods of electronic communication, and in
some instances avoiding sensitive topics or forgoing communications altogether. Despite these
precautions, The Nation believes that Upstream surveillance reduces the likelihood that foreign
journalists and sources will share sensitive information with The Nation, because they fear that
their communications will be intercepted by the U.S. government and also shared with the other
governments, intelligence services, and organizations with which the U.S. government
cooperates.
The Rutherford Institute
109.

The Rutherford Institute, founded in 1982 and based in Virginia, is a civil

liberties organization committed to protecting the constitutional freedoms of Americans and the
human rights of all people. Rutherford provides free legal services in defense of civil liberties

33

and educates the public about constitutional and human rights issues. It also advocates on
behalf of individuals abroad whose rights are threatened by foreign governments.
110.

Rutherford engages in international and domestic internet communications that

are essential to its mission. Among other things, Rutherford’s staff, who are based in the U.S.,
routinely engage in sensitive and confidential internet communications with non-U.S. persons
located abroad in carrying out Rutherford’s advocacy, legal, and educational activities.
111.

Rutherford’s communications are intercepted, copied, and reviewed in the

course of Upstream surveillance. This surveillance invades the privacy of Rutherford’s
communications, and it violates Rutherford’s right to control those communications and the
information they contain.
112.

Furthermore, there is a substantial likelihood that the NSA retains, reads, and

disseminates Rutherford’s international communications because Rutherford is communicating
with or about persons the government has targeted for Upstream surveillance. Rutherford’s
international contacts include human rights and civil liberties advocates, foreign government
officials, and individuals whose rights are threatened by the U.S. or foreign governments, some
of whom are likely targets. Rutherford’s communications with these contacts frequently
concern topics that fall within the FAA’s expansive definition of “foreign intelligence
information.” Rutherford communicates both with and about these likely targets. Rutherford’s
international communications, among other things, contain details about its foreign contacts
and other important sources of information—details such as the email addresses, phone
numbers, and website addresses of foreign individuals and organizations relevant to
Rutherford’s work.

34

113.

Upstream surveillance undermines Rutherford’s ability to conduct its work.

Rutherford’s advocacy depends on its ability to assure its contacts that their communications—
and, in some cases, even their identities—will not be revealed. Due in part to NSA surveillance,
including Upstream surveillance, Rutherford in some instances avoids sensitive topics or
forgoes communications altogether. Rutherford believes that Upstream surveillance reduces the
likelihood that victims of human rights abuses, witnesses, foreign government officials, and
other contacts will share sensitive information with Rutherford, because they fear that their
communications will be intercepted by the U.S. government and also shared with the other
governments, intelligence services, and organizations with which the U.S. government
cooperates.
The Washington Office on Latin America
114.

WOLA is a non-profit, non-governmental organization based in Washington

D.C. WOLA promotes human rights, democracy, and social justice by working with partners in
Latin America and the Caribbean to shape policies in the United States and abroad. WOLA is
regularly called upon for its research and analysis by policymakers, the media, and academics
in the U.S. and Latin America. To further this work, WOLA gathers and publishes information
about U.S. policies concerning Latin America, U.S. assistance (military or otherwise) to Latin
American countries, and U.S. immigration practices, among other things.
115.

WOLA engages in international and domestic internet communications that are

essential to its mission. Among other things, WOLA’s U.S.-based staff routinely engage in
sensitive and confidential internet communications with non-U.S. persons located abroad in
carrying out WOLA’s research, policy, and advocacy work.

35

116.

WOLA’s communications are intercepted, copied, and reviewed in the course of

Upstream surveillance. This surveillance invades the privacy of WOLA’s communications and
it violates WOLA’s right to control those communications and the information they contain.
117.

Furthermore, there is a substantial likelihood that the NSA retains, reads, and

disseminates WOLA’s international communications because WOLA is communicating with
or about persons the government has targeted for Upstream surveillance. For instance, WOLA
communicates with foreign government officials located abroad—including at times presidents
and foreign ministers. Similarly, it communicates with policymakers, academics, journalists,
human rights defenders, victims of human rights abuses, and staff from multilateral institutions,
such as the Organization of American States, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the
United Nations, some of whom are also likely targets. WOLA’s communications with these
contacts frequently concern topics that fall within the FAA’s expansive definition of “foreign
intelligence information.” WOLA communicates both with and about these likely targets.
WOLA’s international communications contain, among other things, details about its foreign
contacts and other important sources of information—details such as the email addresses,
phone numbers, and website addresses of foreign individuals and organizations relevant to
WOLA’s work.
118.

Upstream surveillance undermines WOLA’s ability to conduct its work.

WOLA’s research and advocacy depend on the confidentiality of its communications, including
its ability to assure its contacts that their communications—and, in some cases, even their
identities—will not be revealed. Due in part to NSA surveillance, including Upstream
surveillance, WOLA has undertaken burdensome and costly measures to secure and protect its
communications, including adopting more secure methods of electronic communication,
36

traveling to conduct in-person meetings, and in some instances avoiding sensitive topics or
forgoing communications altogether. Despite these precautions, WOLA believes that Upstream
surveillance reduces the likelihood that policymakers, foreign government officials, experts,
witnesses, and victims of human rights abuses will share sensitive information with WOLA’s
staff, because they fear that their communications will be intercepted by the U.S. government
and also shared with the other governments, intelligence services, and organizations with which
the U.S. government cooperates.
CAUSES OF ACTION
119.

Upstream surveillance exceeds the authority granted by 50 U.S.C. § 1881a, and

therefore violates 5 U.S.C. § 706.
120.

Upstream surveillance violates the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution.

121.

Upstream surveillance violates the First Amendment to the Constitution.

122.

Upstream surveillance violates Article III of the Constitution.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court:
1.

Exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ Complaint;

2.

Declare that Upstream surveillance violates 50 U.S.C. § 1881a and 5 U.S.C.

3.

Declare that Upstream surveillance is unconstitutional under the First and

§ 706;

Fourth Amendments, and under Article III;
4.

Permanently enjoin Defendants from continuing Upstream surveillance;

5.

Order Defendants to purge all records of Plaintiffs’ communications in their

possession obtained pursuant to Upstream surveillance;
37

6.

Award Plaintiffs fees and costs pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412;

7.

Grant such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.

Dated: March 10, 2015
Baltimore, Maryland

Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Deborah A. Jeon
Deborah A. Jeon
(Bar No. 06905)
[e-mail]
David R. Rocah
(Bar No. 27315)
[e-mail]
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
FOUNDATION OF MARYLAND
3600 Clipper Mill Rd., #350
BaltImore, MD 21211
Phone: [phone]
Fax: [phone]
Patrick Toomey
(admission pro hac vice pending)
[e-mail]
Jameel Jaffer
(admission pro hac vice pending)
[e-mail]
Alex Abdo
(admission pro hac vice pending)
[e-mail]
Ashley Gorski
(admission pro hac vice pending)
[e-mail]
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
FOUNDATION
125 Broad Street, 18th Floor
New York, NY 10004
Phone: [phone]
Fax: [phone]
Charles S. Sims
(admission pro hac vice pending)
[e-mail]
David A. Munkittrick
(admission pro hac vice pending)
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[e-mail]
John M. Browning
(admission pro hac vice pending)
[e-mail]
PROSKAUER ROSE LLP
Eleven Times Square
New York, NY 10036
Phone: [phone]
Fax: [phone]

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