Goffe v. Johns Hopkins Health System Corporation

Filing 16

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge George Levi Russell, III on 6/2/2015. (dass, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
PAULA GOFFE,

:

Plaintiff,

:

v.

:

JOHNS HOPKINS HEALTH SYSTEM
CORPORATION,

:

Civil Action No. GLR-15-695

:
Defendant.
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendant’s, Johns Hopkins
Health System Corporation (“JHHSC”), Motion to Dismiss.
6).

(ECF No.

Plaintiff Paula Goffe brings this action against her former

employer, JHHSC, alleging employment discrimination based on her
race, religion, and “health status” and hostile work environment in
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title
VII”), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (2012) (Count I),
wrongful

termination

(Count

II),

emotional distress (Count III).
for

disposition.

Having

and

intentional

(ECF No. 2).

considered

the

of

The Motion is ripe

Motion

documents, the Court finds no hearing necessary.
105.6 (D.Md. 2014).

infliction

and

supporting

See Local Rule

For the reasons outlined below, JHHSC’s Motion

will be granted in part and denied in part.

I.

BACKGROUND 1

Goffe, a resident of Maryland, is formerly an employee of
JHHSC, a Maryland corporation.

On February 26, 2013, Goffe filed a

worker’s compensation claim for an unspecified injury and was on
leave from that date until May 28, 2013.

When Goffe returned to

work on May 29, 2013, Goffe found that her direct manager was Jeff
Ostrow.

Goffe is a Seventh-Day Adventist and did not drink alcohol

or go to bars with her co-workers.

Ostrow made comments that he

was “God,” teased her for listening to gospel music, and stated
there would be no more worker’s compensation claims.

Goffe was

required to move to a new office isolated from the co-workers in
her department and used as a storage area for chairs and trash
cans.

While she was moving her items in a cart to the new office,

Ostrow said she might be homeless.
workers

who

documented

alleges

these

events

her

arrival

occurred

She was followed by her coand

because

departure
she

filed

times.
a

She

worker’s

compensation claim.
On February 21, 2014, Goffe met with Ostrow for a performance
evaluation.

During the evaluation, Ostrow informed Goffe that she

needed improvement in several areas.

Goffe alleges that her white

co-workers were not given similar evaluations when they failed to
perform their duties.

When Goffe challenged the evaluation, Ostrow

tore it up and stated he would redo it.

1

Since Goffe could not sign

Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are alleged in
the Complaint (ECF No. 2).

2

the

evaluation,

Evaluation

or

she
be

was

told

terminated

to

submit

to

a

immediately.

Fitness
To

for

Duty

complete

the

evaluation, Goffe states she scheduled several appointments and met
with several evaluators.

It is unclear from the Complaint whether

Goffe completed the Fitness for Duty Evaluation.

Goffe alleges

that her white co-workers were not required to complete a Fitness
for Duty Evaluation.
of

discrimination

At an unspecified time, Goffe filed a charge
with

the

United

States

Equal

Employment

Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and received a right to sue notice.
On

February

15,

2015,

Goffe

initiated

Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Maryland.

this

action

(ECF No. 2).

in

the

On March

12, 2015, JHHSC removed the action to this Court based on federal
question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012).

(ECF No. 1).

On March 19, 2015, JHHSC filed a Motion to Dismiss.

(ECF No. 6).

On March 23, 2015, Goffe filed a response to the Motion. 2
8).

(ECF No.

On April 9, 2015, JHHSC filed a reply to Goffe’s response.

(ECF No. 11).

2

Goffe attached an amended complaint to her response (ECF No.
8-2), which altered Count I by replacing the reference to Title VII
with a reference to Md. Code Ann., State Gov’t § 20-602 (West
2015), in an attempt to remove this Court’s federal question
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and supplemental jurisdiction
over the state law claims under § 1367.
Most courts have found
that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) cannot be used to defeat
federal jurisdiction. Faye v. High’s of Balt., 541 F.Supp.2d 752,
758 (D.Md. 2008) (citing cases).
The Court will, therefore, deny
Goffe’s request to amend her complaint and sua sponte strike the
amended complaint attached to the Response (ECF No. 8-2).

3

II.

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review
A complaint fails to state a claim if it does not contain “a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), or does not state “a
plausible claim for relief.”
(2009)

(citing

(2007)).

Bell

Atl.

“Threadbare

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

Corp.

v.

recitals

of

Twombly,
the

550

elements

U.S.
of

a

544,

555

cause

of

action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”
Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
Though the plaintiff is not required to forecast evidence to
prove

the

elements

of

the

claim,

the

complaint

sufficient facts to establish each element.
N.A.,

917

F.Supp.2d

445,

449

(D.Md.

must

allege

Goss v. Bank of Am.,

2013)

(quoting

Walters

v.

McMahen, 684 F.3d 435, 439 (4th Cir. 2012)) (internal quotation
marks

omitted),

F.App’x

165

aff’d

(4th

Cir.

sub

nom.,

2013).

Goss
In

v.

Bank

of

Am.,

NA,

546

considering

a

Rule

12(b)(6)

motion, the court must construe the complaint in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, read the complaint as a whole, and take
the facts asserted therein as true.

See Harrison v. Westinghouse

Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 783 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing Mylan
Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993)).

4

B. Analysis
1. Employment Discrimination
The Court will grant the Motion to Dismiss regarding Goffe’s
claim for employment discrimination.

Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964 provides that “[i]t shall be an unlawful employment
practice for an employer . . . to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because

of

such

national origin.”

individual’s

race,

color,

religion,

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012).

sex,

or

To survive a

motion to dismiss a claim for discrimination, Goffe must allege
that

she

was

terminated

or

otherwise

“because of” her race or religion. 3
Here,

Goffe

alleges

she

treated

less

favorably

See § 2000e-2(a).

was

treated

differently

by

being

assigned to a new office that was separate from her department and
used to store chairs and trash cans, and followed by her co-workers
who

documented

her

arrival

and

departure

times.

She

alleges,

however, she was treated differently in retaliation for filing a

3

“Courts have recognized that employees may utilize [a
disparate treatment theory] in asserting religious discrimination
claims.”
Chalmers v. Tulon Co. of Richmond, 101 F.3d 1012, 1017
(4th Cir. 1996).
To prove a claim of disparate treatment, an
employee must first allege that the employer treated her
differently than other employees because of her religious beliefs.
Id.
Thus, the complainant must put forth “a set of facts which
would enable the fact-finder to conclude, in the absence of any
further explanation, that it is more likely than not that the
adverse employment action was the product of discrimination.”
Ennis v. Nat’l Ass’n of Bus. & Educ. Radio, Inc., 53 F.3d 55, 58
(4th Cir. 1995).

5

worker’s compensation claim. 4
the

Motion

that

JHHSC

She also states in her Response to

“acted

in

retaliation

for

her

Workers Compensation claim” when she was terminated.
Additionally
terminated
contract

in

her

her
based

between

Response,
upon

the

her

she

states

illness

parties,”

and

thereby

“wrongfully

violation

conceding

termination was not based on her race or religion.

a

(ECF No. 8).

JHHSC
in

filing

that

of

a

her

(Id.).

Further, Goffe alleges her performance evaluation inaccurately
stated she needed improvement and she was required to complete a
Fitness of Duty Evaluation.

Goffe also alleges white employees

were not given poor performance evaluations or required to complete
a Fitness of Duty Evaluation.

“[A] poor performance evaluation ‘is

actionable only where the employer subsequently uses the evaluation
as a basis to detrimentally alter the terms or conditions of the
recipient’s employment.’”

James v. Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc.,

368 F.3d 371, 377 (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting Spears v. Mo. Dep’t of
Corr. & Human Res., 210 F.3d 850, 854 (8th Cir. 2000)).

Goffe’s

poor performance evaluation was destroyed and her supervisor stated
he would recomplete it.

Because she did not have an evaluation to

4

To state a Title VII claim for retaliation, Goffe must
allege that: “(1) [s]he engaged in protected activity; (2) an
adverse employment action was taken against [her]; and (3) there
was a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse
action.” Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 432 (4th Cir. 2006). The
plain language of Title VII limits “protected activities” to a
distinct few activities: opposing an unlawful employment practice;
making a charge; and testifying, assisting, or participating in a
Title VII investigation. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a).
Filing a
worker’s compensation claim is not a protected activity under Title
VII.

6

sign, she was required to complete the Fitness of Duty Evaluation.
Based on Goffe’s allegations, her evaluation was not used to alter
the terms and conditions of her employment.
The Court, therefore, finds Goffe fails to state a claim under
Title VII for employment discrimination.

Accordingly, the Court

will grant the Motion as to Count I regarding Goffe’s employment
discrimination claim.
2. Hostile Work Environment
The Court will grant the Motion to Dismiss regarding Goffe’s
claim for race-based hostile work environment, but will deny the
Motion as to her religion-based hostile work environment claim.

To

state a claim for a hostile work environment, a plaintiff must
plead that there is “(1) unwelcome conduct; (2) that is based on
the

plaintiff’s

severe

or

race

pervasive

[or

religion];

(3)

to

alter

plaintiff’s

the

which

is

sufficiently

conditions

of

employment and to create an abusive work environment; and (4) which
is

imputable

to

the

employer.”

Boyer-Liberto

v.

Fontainebleau

Corp., No. 13-1473, 2015 WL 2116849, at *9 (4th Cir. May 7, 2015)
(quoting
2011)).

Okoli

v.

City

of

Balt.,

648

F.3d

216,

220

(4th

Cir.

Determining whether the environment is objectively hostile

or abusive requires the Court to look at all the circumstances,
including

“the

frequency

of

the

discriminatory

conduct;

its

severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a
mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes

7

with

an

employee’s

work

performance.”

Id.

(quoting

Harris

v.

Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993)).
“[S]imple teasing, off-hand comments, and isolated incidents
(unless

extremely

serious)

will

not

amount

to

discriminatory

changes in the terms and conditions of employment.”
City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998).

Faragher v.

An isolated incident

can be extremely serious if it amounts “to discriminatory changes
in the terms and conditions of employment.”

Id.

In measuring the

severity of harassing conduct, the status of the harasser as a
supervisor may be significant because a “supervisor’s power and
authority invests his or her harassing conduct with a particular
threatening character.”

Boyer-Liberto, 2015 WL 2116849, at *10

(quoting Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 763
(1998)).

Also, the harasser’s status as a supervisor may cause the

employer to be held strictly liable for the harasser’s behavior.
Id.

“The status of the harasser is also relevant to element four

of a hostile work environment claim, which necessitates proof that
the harassment is imputable to the employer.”
Goffe

does

not

allege

any

harassment

Id.
based

on

her

race,

however she does allege that her supervisor made comments that he
was “God” and teased her for listening to gospel music.

At this

stage of the litigation, the Court finds Goffe has sufficiently
alleged

a

hostile

work

environment

based

on

her

religion.

Accordingly, the Court will deny the Motion to Dismiss with regard
to Goffe’s claim for a religion-based hostile work environment.

8

3. Wrongful Termination
The Court will dismiss Goffe’s claim for wrongful termination.
Under the Maryland worker’s compensation statute, an employer may
not

discharge

an

employee

solely

workers compensation claim.
1105(a) (West 2015).

because

the

employee

files

a

Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. § 9-

To sustain a wrongful discharge action under

the statute, an employee must allege that he or she was discharged
solely

and

directly

because

she

filed

for

benefits

under

statute or her termination violated a recognized rule of law.

the
Kern

v. S. Balt. Gen. Hosp., 504 A.2d 1154, 1159 (Md.Ct.Spec.App. 1986)
(emphasis added).
Though

Goffe’s

constructively
compensation

Complaint

discharged

claim,

she

in

inartfully
retaliation

attached

a

pleads
for

letter

that

filing
from

a

JHHSC

she

was

worker’s
to

her

Response to the Motion stating she was actually terminated on March
11, 2015, because she could not return to work.

(ECF No. 8-3).

While arguing that JHHSC terminated her in retaliation for filing a
worker’s compensation claim, she also argues she was terminated
based on her illness.

(ECF No. 8).

Thus, Goffe concedes that her

discharge was not based solely on filing the worker’s compensation
claim.

Further, Goffe has failed to allege that her termination

violated a recognized rule of law.
Goffe

has

failed

to

state

a

claim

The Court, therefore, finds
for

wrongful

termination.

Accordingly, the Court will grant the Motion to Dismiss as to Count
II of the Complaint.

9

4. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
The

Court

will

dismiss

Goffe’s

infliction of emotional distress.

claim

for

intentional

To state a claim for intentional

infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”), a plaintiff must show
four elements:

(1) intentional or reckless conduct; (2) extreme

and

conduct;

outrageous

wrongful

conduct

and

emotional distress.

(3)

the

a

causal

emotional

connection

distress;

between

and

(4)

the

severe

Harris v. Jones, 380 A.2d 611, 614 (Md. 1977);

Arbabi v. Fred Meyers, Inc., 205 F.Supp.2d 462, 466 (D.Md. 2002).
Because IIED claims are “rarely viable,” they are subject to a
heightened

pleading

standard.

Bagwell

v.

Peninsula

Reg’l

Med.

Ctr., 665 A.2d 297, 319 (Md.Ct.Spec.App. 1995); see also Kentucky
Fried Chicken Nat’l Mgmt. Co. v. Weathersby, 607 A.2d 8, 11 (Md.
1992) (“[T]he tort is to be used sparingly and only for opprobrious
behavior that includes truly outrageous conduct.”).

JHHSC argues

Goffe fails to plead this claim with sufficient specificity.

Goffe

alleges JHHSC’s employees’ conduct, including the handling of her
worker’s

compensation

intentional,
Goffe,

and

however,

behavior,

nor

has

claim,
caused

alleges
any

alleged behavior.

was

her

neither

emotional

to

malicious,
suffer

specific

distress

willful,

emotional

extreme

suffered

or

due

and

distress.
outrageous

to

JHHSC’s

The Court will, therefore, grant the Motion to

Dismiss regarding Count III.

10

III.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will GRANT JHHSC’s Motion
to Dismiss (ECF No. 6) in part and DENY it in part.

Count I

regarding Goffe’s claim for employment discrimination and Counts II
and

III

are

dismissed.

Count

I

regarding

Goffe’s

religion-based hostile work environment shall remain.

claim

A separate

Order follows.
Entered this 2nd day of June, 2015
/s/
_____________________________
George L. Russell, III
United States District Judge

11

for