Duncan v. McKenzie et al
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge George Levi Russell, III on 4/20/2016. (c/m 4/21/16)(krs, Deputy Clerk)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
OFFICER C. MCKENZIE, et al.,
Civil Action No. GLR-15-736
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendants’, Correctional
Officer Christopher McKenzie, Lieutenant Bradley Wilt, and Warden
Bobby Shearin (collectively, the “Corrections Defendants”), Motion
to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment
(“Wexford”), Motion to Dismiss and/or, in the Alternative, Motion
for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 22) and Motion to Quash (ECF No.
Also pending before the Court is pro se Plaintiff Bruce
Duncan’s Motion for Leave to Amend his Complaint (ECF No. 29).
The Motions are ripe for disposition.
briefs, finds no hearing necessary pursuant to Local Rule 105.6
For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant
Judgment, deny Duncan’s Motion for Leave to Amend his Complaint,
and deny as moot Wexford’s Motion to Quash.
At all times relevant to his Complaint, Duncan was an inmate
Warden Shearin were part of NBCI’s corrections staff.
provided health care services to NBCI inmates.
In September 2013, NBCI was on “lock-down,” meaning that the
privileges and movements of inmates within the institution were
restricted due to security concerns.
During this time, inmates
personnel would pass food trays through a security slot (also
known as a “feed up slot”), which is a rectangular opening in the
doors to the prison cells.
NBCI personnel can open, close, and
lock the security slot from outside the cell, but inmates can
prevent the slot from being closed by sticking an arm or other
appendage through the opening.
On September 13, 2013, Officer McKenzie was responsible for
collecting food trays from the inmates in Housing Unit 3, where
Duncan was housed.
While Officer McKenzie was collecting the
trays, Duncan was inside his cell speaking with his tier officer
(Compl. at 4, ECF No. 1).
Duncan alleges that because he was “not
getting anywhere with the tier officer,” he asked to speak with a
The parties offer competing accounts of what
ensued (the “Incident”).
cell and without saying anything, sprayed his entire can of mace
in Duncan’s face, eyes, and mouth while yelling racial epithets at
According to Officer McKenzie, when he attempted to close
the security slot to Duncan’s cell after collecting Duncan’s food
Officer McKenzie asked Duncan to remove his
arm, but Duncan refused.
Officer McKenzie then advised Plaintiff
that refusing to remove his arm would result in force being used,
including using pepper spray1 to gain compliance.
Officer McKenzie then gave Duncan a direct order to
remove his arm from the security slot, but Duncan remained defiant
and used profane language.
Officer McKenzie proceeded to disperse
a “short burst” of pepper spray in Duncan’s facial area.
McKenzie Decl. ¶ 7, ECF No. 20-2).
Duncan’s cellmate received
secondary exposure to the pepper spray.
Duncan refers to the chemical substance sprayed in his face
The Corrections Defendants contend that the NBCI
corrections staff discontinued the use of mace approximately ten
(Lieutenant Wilt Decl. ¶ 5, ECF No. 20-3). The
Corrections Defendants maintain that Officer McKenzie used pepper
spray in the Incident. (Id.).
medical room in Housing Unit 3 where they could be treated.
explained that although she would not personally wash the pepper
spray off of Duncan, he would receive a decontamination shower.
Duncan then received his decontamination shower, but he alleges
that the water was “boiling and sc[a]lding hot” and his request to
adjust the water temperature was denied.
(Compl. at 6).
shoes, soap, a washcloth, and a clean set of clothes to wear after
his decontamination shower, Duncan was denied all of these items.
Later that day, Duncan talked to Lieutenant Wilt about the
that Lieutenant Wilt told him to “deal with it” because it was
Duncan’s fault that he was exposed to pepper spray.
Duncan then requested that
(Id. at 7).
Wilt provide him a cold
shower, but Lieutenant Wilt refused.
In March 2014—approximately six months after the Incident—
Duncan began complaining about eye irritation purportedly related
to the Incident.
Duncan asserts that instead of applying a saline
solution to his eyes, Wexford employees provided him contact lens
substances only exacerbated his eye irritation and disrupted his
Duncan initiated this action on March 16, 2015, raising 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) claims for excessive use of force and failure
to provide medical care associated with the Incident.
Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Motions for Summary Judgment on
September 1 and September 4, 2015, respectively.
(ECF Nos. 20,
Duncan filed Oppositions on September 23, 2015 (ECF Nos. 26,
27), and Wexford submitted a Reply on October 13, 2015 (ECF No.
On October 30, 2015, Duncan filed a Motion for Leave to
Amend his Complaint (ECF No. 29), requesting leave to add Nurse
Schultz as a defendant; it is unopposed.
On the same date, Duncan
filed two requests for documents from NBCI and Wexford.
Information Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 552 et seq. (2012) and the Maryland
Public Information Act, Md.Code Ann., State Gov’t §§ 10-612 et
seq. (West 2015).
On November 11, 2015, Wexford filed a Motion to
Quash these requests (ECF No. 32); it is unopposed.
A. Motions to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Motions for Summary
Standard of Review
Defendants style their Motions as motions to dismiss under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) or, in the alternative,
for summary judgment under Rule 56.
A motion styled in this
manner implicates the Court’s discretion under Rule 12(d).
Kensington Vol. Fire Dept., Inc. v. Montgomery Cty., 788 F.Supp.2d
431, 436–37 (D.Md. 2011), aff’d sub nom., Kensington Volunteer
Fire Dep’t, Inc. v. Montgomery Cty., Md., 684 F.3d 462 (4th Cir.
pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the
[Rule 12(b)(6)] motion must be treated as one for summary judgment
under Rule 56.”
The Court “has ‘complete discretion to determine whether or
not to accept the submission of any material beyond the pleadings
that is offered in conjunction with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion and
rely on it, thereby converting the motion, or to reject it or
simply not consider it.’”
Wells-Bey v. Kopp, No. ELH-12-2319,
2013 WL 1700927, at *5 (D.Md. Apr. 16, 2013) (quoting 5C Wright &
Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1366, at 159 (3d ed. 2004,
“This discretion ‘should be exercised with great
caution and attention to the parties’ procedural rights.’”
facilitate the disposition of the action,’ and ‘whether discovery
prior to the utilization of the summary judgment procedure’ is
necessary.” Id. (quoting Federal Practice & Procedure § 1366, at
Other than these factors, the Court is guided by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit’s two-part
test for proper conversion of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to a Rule 56
indication by the court that it is treating the 12(b)(6) motion as
a motion for summary judgment” and “the parties [must] first ‘be
afforded a reasonable opportunity for discovery.’”
Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. v. Mayor of Balt., 721 F.3d 264,
281 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Gay v. Wall, 761 F.2d 175, 177 (4th
outside the pleadings for the court’s consideration, the parties
are deemed to be on notice that conversion under Rule 12(d) may
See Moret v. Harvey, 381 F.Supp.2d 458, 464 (D.Md. 2005).
summary judgment was granted without discovery unless that party
has made an attempt to oppose the motion on the grounds that more
time was needed for discovery.’”
Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet
Domain Names, 302 F.3d 214, 244 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting Evans v.
Rule 56(d) provides that the Court may deny or continue a
motion for summary judgment “[i]f a nonmovant shows by affidavit
facts essential to justify its opposition.”
The Court should deny
a non-moving party’s Rule 56(d) request for additional discovery
when “the additional evidence sought for discovery would not have
by itself created a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to
F.Supp.2d 331, 342 (D.Md. 2011) (quoting Strag v. Bd. of Trs.,
Craven Cmty. Coll., 55 F.3d 943, 953 (4th Cir. 1995)).
Here, Defendants caption their Motions in the alternative for
summary judgment and attach matters beyond Duncan’s Complaint for
the Court’s consideration.
Duncan, in addition to submitting his
own exhibits to oppose summary judgment, has filed two requests
Duncan requests that Defendants provide copies
chemicals NBCI procured in 2012–2014 and a copy of the written
procedure for decontaminating an inmate following an incident of
Duncan also requests a variety of statistics.
Considering his pro se status and the prohibition against exalting
Duncan’s requests as Rule 56(d) discovery requests.
Defendants used excessive force or failed to provide medical care
in this case, however, the
Court will deny Duncan’s requests.
Thus, the Court will construe Defendants’ Motions as motions for
In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the Court views
the facts in a light most favorable to the nonmovant, drawing all
justifiable inferences in that party’s favor.
Ricci v. DeStefano,
557 U.S. 557, 586 (2009); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 255 (1986) (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S.
144, 158–59 (1970)).
Summary judgment is proper when the movant
“there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P.
Once a motion for summary judgment is properly
made and supported, the opposing party has the burden of showing
that a genuine dispute of material fact exists.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87 (1986).
There is a genuine dispute of material fact when the evidence is
sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict in the
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
The Corrections Defendants first argue that Duncan failed to
exhaust his administrative remedies.
The Court will deny the
affirmative defense because they fail to demonstrate that Duncan’s
appeal to the Inmate Grievance Office (“IGO”) was procedurally
“[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions
under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a
facility until such administrative remedies as are available are
42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2012).
The PLRA’s exhaustion
until they receive a final denial of the claims, appealing through
all available stages in the administrative process.
Peay, 286 F.Supp.2d 523, 530 (D.Md. 2003), aff’d, 98 F.App’x 253
(4th Cir. 2004).
Administrative exhaustion under § 1997e(a) is
not a jurisdictional requirement, however, and does not impose a
heightened pleading requirement on the prisoner.
Anderson v. XYZ
Corr. Health Servs., Inc., 407 F.3d 674, 678, 681 (4th Cir. 2005).
Rather, an inmate’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies is
an affirmative defense that the defendant must plead and prove.
Id. at 681.
Maryland has established an Administrative Remedy Procedure
conditions of confinement.
Blake v. Ross, 787 F.3d 693, 697 (4th
Cir.), cert. granted, 136 S.Ct. 614 (2015); see Md.Code Regs. §
“The ARP involves a three-step process: the
inmate files a request for remedy with the warden, then appeals a
denial to the Commissioner of Corrections, and finally appeals any
subsequent denial to the [IGO].”
Blake, 787 F.3d at 697.
satisfy the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement, an inmate must pursue
his complaint through all three steps.
See Chase v. Peay, 286
F.Supp.2d 523, 530 (D.Md. 2003), aff’d, 98 F.App’x 253 (4th Cir.
Mot. to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 3,
at 10–11, ECF No. 20-4).
On October 8, 2013, Warden Shearin
dismissed ARP-NBCI-2998-13, concluding that Duncan’s allegations
were “without merit.”
(Id. at 9).
A week later, Duncan appealed
to the Commissioner of Corrections.
(ECF No. 26-1 at 9).
December 30, 2013, Duncan filed an appeal with the IGO.
The Corrections Defendants attempt to demonstrate that Duncan
did not exhaust administrative remedies because his IGO appeal was
They submit a declaration from Scott S.
Oakley, the Executive Director of the IGO, in which Oakley details
Oakley states that the IGO dismissed the appeal related to ARPNBCI-2998-13 on April 25, 2014 because Duncan did not provide the
(Id. ¶ 3a).
When discussing ARP-NBCI-2998-
Duncan’s complaint “about limitations imposed by NBCI officials on
It appears that the ARP request to which
Consequently, the Court finds that the Corrections Defendants have
failed to show that Duncan’s IGO appeal concerning ARP-NBCI-2998-
13 was procedurally defective and that Duncan failed to exhaust
Supervisory Liability Defense
The Corrections Defendants next contend that even accepting
constitutional rights, Warden Shearin cannot be vicariously liable
for this misconduct.
The Court agrees and will grant summary
judgment for Warden Shearin on all claims.
There is no respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. §
Love–Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766, 782 (4th Cir. 2004).
Thus, “for an individual to be liable under § 1983, it must be
‘affirmatively shown that the official charged acted personally in
the deprivation of the plaintiff’s rights.’”
Garraghty v. Com. of
Va., Dep’t of Corr., 52 F.3d 1274, 1280 (4th Cir. 1995) (quoting
Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 850 (4th Cir. 1985)).
liable in certain circumstances for the constitutional injuries
inflicted by their subordinates.”
Baynard v. Malone, 268 F.3d
228, 235 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 798
(4th Cir. 1994)).
To establish supervisory liability, a plaintiff
constructive knowledge that his subordinate
was engaged in conduct that posed a pervasive
and unreasonable risk of constitutional injury
to citizens like the plaintiff; (2) that the
supervisor’s response to that knowledge was so
inadequate as to show deliberate indifference
to or tacit authorization of the alleged
offensive practices [ ]; and (3) that there
was an affirmative causal link between the
Id. (quoting Shaw, 13 F.3d at 799).
Duncan does not present any evidence that would permit a
supervisory liability are present in this case.
iii. Claim for Excessive Use of Force
Duncan complains that Officer McKenzie used excessive force
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as to this claim because
Officer McKenzie’s use of force does not satisfy the objective or
subjective components of an Eighth Amendment claim.
Claims that prison officials used excessive force implicate
the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Johnson, 527 F.App’x 269, 272 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Williams v.
Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 761 (4th Cir. 1996)).
Williams, 77 F.3d at 761.
The Eighth Amendment
To determine whether
inmate was sufficiently serious.”
“An injury is sufficiently
Amendment excessive force claim as long as it rises above the
level of de minimus harm.”
Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 238 (4th
Cir. 2008) (citing Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1992)).
that the force used be ‘nontrivial.’”
Evans v. Martin, No. 2:12(S.D.W.Va.
(quoting Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 39 (2010)).
“whether the prison official acted with a sufficiently culpable
state of mind.”
Williams, 77 F.3d at 761.
infliction of pain.’”
Iko, 535 F.3d at 239 (quoting Whitley v.
Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 322 (1986)).
“The state of mind
The Court may consider four
acted with wantonness:
(1) “the need for the application of force”;
(2) “the relationship between the need and the
amount of force that was used”; (3) the extent
of any reasonably perceived threat that the
application of force was intended to quell;
and (4) “any efforts made to
severity of a forceful response.”
Id. (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321).
The Court should also
consider “whether force was applied in a good faith effort to
maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for
the very purpose of causing harm.”
Miller v. Leathers, 913 F.2d
1085, 1087 (4th Cir. 1990) (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320–21).
Force is applied in a good faith effort to restore order and
discipline when a corrections officer administers a single burst
See Trusell v. Bailey, No. 5:09CV101-RJC, 2011 WL 972571,
at *7 (W.D.N.C. Mar. 15, 2011).
violation of the Eighth Amendment for prison officials to use
mace, tear gas or other chemical agents in quantities greater than
Williams, 77 F.3d at 763 (quoting Soto v. Dickey, 744 F.2d 1260,
however, “in small quantities . . . to control a ‘recalcitrant
Id. (quoting Landman v. Peyton, 370 F.2d 135, 138 & n.2
(4th Cir. 1966).
Nurse Schultz physically examined Duncan shortly after the
In her physical examination report, Nurse Schultz did
(Corrections Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Mot.
for Summ. J. Ex. 1 [“Officer McKenzie Decl. with Attachs.”], at 7,
ECF No. 20-2).
Instead, Nurse Schultz indicated that Duncan was
merely experiencing an “alteration in comfort” from the pepper
spray exposure and that he was given a decontamination shower.
(Id. at 7, 8).
Duncan had subsequent medical appointments on
October 16, 23, and 30, 2013; November 1 and 9, 2013; and February
(Def. Wexford’s Mot. to Dismiss or, in the Alternative,
Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. A, at 5, 7, 9, 11, 12, 17, ECF No. 22-4).
reflect that Duncan complained of any pain, discomfort, or other
complications from the pepper spray exposure.
presents no evidence to dispute these medical reports.
greater than de minimus harm from the pepper spray exposure, the
Court finds that Officer McKenzie’s use of force does not satisfy
the objective component of an Eight Amendment claim.
Even assuming that the objective component is satisfied, the
Court also finds that the subjective component is not satisfied.
Following the incident, Officer McKenzie prepared a Use of Force
(Officer McKenzie Decl. with Attachs. at 5).
his report, Officer McKenzie states that after collecting Duncan’s
food tray, Duncan thrust his arm out of the security slot.
Officer McKenzie continues that after making several requests that
Duncan remove his arm from the slot, including one direct order,
Duncan refused to comply and shouted defiant, vulgar epithets.
Officer McKenzie then states that he “dispersed a short
burst of pepper spray to . . . Duncan’s facial area.”
Officer McKenzie echoed this statement of facts in his August 19,
(Officer McKenzie Decl. ¶¶ 1–9).
McKenzie’s version of the facts.
Attachs. at 5, 6).
(Officer McKenzie Decl. with
Officer McKenzie also issued Duncan a Notice
Lieutenant Wilt and Officer McKenzie’s Shift Commander approved.
(Id. at 3–4).
In the Notice, Officer McKenzie and Lieutenant Wilt
security equipment; Rule 312, interfering with or resisting the
performance of staff duties; Rule 400, disobeying an order; and
Rule 405, demonstrating disrespect or using vulgar language.
On October 3, 2013, NBCI personnel held an adjustment
hearing to adjudicate the rule violations for which Duncan was
Alternative, Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 3, at 3, ECF No. 20-4).
pleaded guilty to all charges.
Based on these undisputed facts, the Court concludes that
Officer McKenzie’s use of force does not satisfy the subjective
component of an Eighth Amendment claim. First, Officer McKenzie
used a small amount of pepper spray to control a recalcitrant
Second, the force was necessary and Officer McKenzie used
Third, because Officer McKenzie dispersed only one short burst of
pepper spray, the force was not greater than necessary and Officer
McKenzie made an effort to temper his use of force.
In sum, Officer McKenzie’s use of force satisfies neither the
objective nor subjective components of an Eighth Amendment claim.
Motion for Summary Judgment on Duncan’s claim for excessive use of
Claim for Failure to Provide Medical Care
Duncan asserts that the Corrections Defendants violated his
Eighth Amendment rights when they failed to provide medical care
Defendants did not exhibit deliberate indifference.
To prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim for denial of medical
care, a prisoner must demonstrate that the action or inaction of
See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).
Deliberate indifference to a serious medical need requires proof
that the prisoner was objectively suffering from a serious medical
need and the prison staff was subjectively aware of the need, but
failed to either provide medical attention or ensure that it was
See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). The
See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992).
satisfy the subjective component of deliberate indifference, the
prisoner must show recklessness, which “requires knowledge both of
the general risk, and also that the conduct is inappropriate in
light of that risk.”
Rich v. Bruce, 129 F.3d 336, 340 n.2 (4th
Here, instead of forcing Duncan to remain in his cell and
risk continued exposure to residual pepper spray, NBCI corrections
staff removed Duncan from his cell shortly after the Incident.
(See Officer McKenzie Decl. with Attachs. at 5, 7) (reflecting
that the Incident occurred at 11:15 a.m. and Duncan was present in
the medical room at 11:36 a.m.).
After removing Duncan from his
medical room in Housing Unit 3 where he could receive medical
determining that he had no physical injuries, but was experiencing
an “alteration in comfort” from the pepper spray exposure.
at 7, 8).
After Nurse Schultz’s examination, NBCI corrections
staff provided Duncan a shower.
(Id. at 6).
Although the water
in the shower may have been hot, there is no evidence that Duncan
was unable to use some of the water to wash himself or that NBCI
corrections staff had any control over the temperature.2
the shower, NBCI corrections staff did not return Duncan to his
instead transferring him to the segregated housing unit.
Corrections Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Mot.
for Summ. J. Ex. 2, at 3, ECF No. 20-3) (showing transfer from
Housing Unit 3 to Housing Unit 1 on September 13, 2013).
Based on these undisputed facts, the Court finds that the
Corrections Defendants did not exhibit deliberate indifference and
will grant the Corrections Defendants’ Motion as to Duncan’s claim
for failure to provide medical care.
Wexford’s Motion for Summary Judgment
Duncan also brings a claim against Wexford for failure to
provide medical care.
Specifically, Duncan alleges that Wexford
violated his Eighth Amendment rights when its employees provided
him contact lens solution and artificial tears to manage his eye
irritation instead of a saline solution.
The Court will grant
As for Duncan’s complaint that he did not receive shower
shoes, soap, and other accoutrements before his decontamination
shower, the Court notes that “conditions that are merely
restrictive or even harsh, ‘are part of the penalty that criminal
offenders pay for their offenses against society.’”
Warden, No. CIV.A. ELH-12-1354, 2012 WL 5839870, at *6 (D.Md. Nov.
16, 2012) (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)).
assuming Wexford could be vicariously liable under § 1983 for the
acts of its employees,3 “[a]n inmate’s mere disagreement with the
course of treatment provided by medical officers will not support
a valid Eighth Amendment claim.”
Jackson v. Sampson, 536 F.App’x
356, 357 (4th Cir. 2013) (citing Russell v. Sheffer, 528 F.2d 318,
319 (4th Cir. 1975)).
To the extent Duncan alleges that Wexford
complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or
Duncan has also filed a Motion for Leave to add Wexford
employee Nurse Schultz as a defendant.
(ECF No. 29).
asserts that Nurse Schultz failed to provide him medical care when
she refused to personally flush his eyes out after the Incident.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) provides that a party
may amend its pleading once as a matter of course within twentyone days after service of a motion under Rule 12(b).
Duncan did not meet this deadline, the Court may grant him leave
to amend his Complaint if “justice so requires.”
The Court should deny leave to amend when leave to
amend would be futile.
Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 426 (4th
Leave to amend would be futile when an amended
complaint could not survive a motion to dismiss.
United States, 55 F.3d 910, 917 (4th Cir. 1995 (first citing Glick
v. Koenig, 766 F.2d 265, 268–69 (7th Cir. 1985); then citing 6
Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 1487 n.26 (2d ed. 1990)).
Here, the Court finds leave to amend would be futile.
Because Duncan concedes that he received a decontamination shower,
albeit one with hot water, any allegations by Duncan against Nurse
Schultz would fail to state a plausible claim for deliberate
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(explaining that “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” (quoting
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007))). The Court
will, therefore, deny Duncan’s Motion.
medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment.”
U.S. at 106.
Thus, the Court will grant Wexford’s Motion.4
Based on the foregoing reasons, the Corrections Defendants’
and Wexford’s Motions for Summary Judgment (ECF Nos. 20, 22) are
Duncan’s Motion for Leave to Amend (ECF No. 29) is
DENIED and Wexford’s Motion to Quash (ECF No. 32) is DENIED AS
A separate Order follows.
Entered this 20th day of April, 2016
Very truly yours,
George L. Russell, III
United States District Judge
Because the Court will grant summary judgment for all
Defendants on all claims, the Court will deny as moot Wexford’s
Motion to Quash (ECF No. 32).
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