Catlin v. Colvin

Filing 12

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS re 10 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Mary Louise Catlin, 11 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Carolyn W. Colvin. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephanie A Gallagher on 12/10/2015. (ca2s, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
MARY LOUISE CATLIN

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v.
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COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL SECURITY
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Civil Case No. RDB-15-929

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Pursuant to Standing Order 2014–01, the above-captioned case has been referred to me to
review the parties’ dispositive motions and to make recommendations pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 301.5(b)(ix). I have considered both parties’ dispositive motions.
[ECF Nos. 10, 11]. I find that no hearing is necessary. See Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2014). This
Court must uphold the decision of the Agency if it is supported by substantial evidence and if the
Agency employed proper legal standards. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3); Craig v. Chater, 76
F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996); Coffman v. Bowen, 829 F.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir. 1987). For the
reasons set forth below, I recommend that Ms. Catlin’s motion be denied, that the
Commissioner’s motion be granted, and that the Commissioner’s judgment be affirmed pursuant
to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Ms. Catlin filed applications for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental
Security Income (“SSI”), alleging that she became disabled on September 13, 2011. (Tr. 17289). Her applications were denied initially and on reconsideration. (Tr. 82-92, 94-105, 107-19).
An Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) held a hearing on February 14, 2014. (Tr. 41-81).
Following the hearing, the ALJ determined that Ms. Catlin was not disabled within the meaning
of the Social Security Act during the relevant time frame. (Tr. 19-40). The Appeals Council

denied Ms. Catlin’s request for review, (Tr. 1-5), so the ALJ’s decision constitutes the final,
reviewable decision of the Agency.
The ALJ found that, during the relevant period, Ms. Catlin suffered from the severe
impairments of ischemic heart disease, peripheral vascular (arterial) disease, restless leg
syndrome, degenerative disc disease, status post lumbar fusion, tobacco abuse, substance abuse,
depression, and anxiety. (Tr. 24).

Despite these impairments, the ALJ determined that Ms.

Catlin retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to
perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b), except that
she could lift/carry 10 to 15 pounds occasionally and up to 10 pounds frequently,
could stand and walk three or more hours but less than six hours in a given
workday, requires a sit/stand option, could sit as much as six hours in a given
workday, and can stoop, crouch, crawl, kneel, squat, balance, and climb stairs no
more than occasionally. The claimant’s work should not require use of ladders,
dangerous heights, or dangerous machinery, nor that she have concentrated
exposure to heat or cold, dust, fumes, gases or vibrations. The claimant can
understand, remember, and carry out simple, SVP 1 or SVP 2 level instructions.
The claimant is able to perform within a schedule, be on time, produce an
adequate amount of work, and limit breaks to times permitted. She can sustain as
much as occasional interaction with supervisors and the general public.
(Tr. 27). After considering the testimony of a vocational expert (“VE”), the ALJ determined that
Ms. Catlin could perform several representative light jobs existing in significant numbers in the
national economy. (Tr. 34). Therefore, the ALJ concluded, Ms. Catlin was not disabled. Id.
Ms. Catlin disagrees. She raises two primary arguments on appeal: (1) that the ALJ
erred in assigning weight to the opinions of medical sources; and (2) that the ALJ erred in
assessing her credibility. Each argument lacks merit.
Ms. Catlin argues that the ALJ did not assign sufficient weight to the opinion of her
treating physician, Dr. Walsh, and to the opinion of an examining physician, Dr. Barrish. Pl.
Mot. 12-13. Dr. Walsh saw Ms. Catlin on just three occasions after the alleged disability onset
date. (Tr. 473-75). The treatment notes from each of those visits indicates that Ms. Catlin’s
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physical examinations were entirely within normal limits. Id. Those treatment notes therefore
stand in stark contrast to Dr. Walsh’s opinion that Ms. Catlin was entirely unable to return to
work in any capacity, can never lift or carry anything, and can only sit and stand, respectively,
for 0-1 hours in an eight hour workday. (Tr. 464-71). Nothing in the remainder of Ms. Catlin’s
medical records serves to corroborate such a restrictive assessment of Ms. Catlin’s physical
capabilities. Thus, the ALJ appropriately assigned supported his assignment of “little weight” to
Dr. Walsh’s opinion. (Tr. 32).
Ms. Catlin further contends that the ALJ should have credited the opinion of the
consultative examiner, Dr. Barrish, who found her to be capable of performing sedentary work.1
Dr. Barrish’s opinion differs from the RFC assessment determined by the ALJ in two primary
respects.

First, Dr. Barrish believed that Ms. Catlin could sit for 6-8 hours per day and

stand/walk for 0-1 hours, while the ALJ found her to be capable of standing and walking 3-6
hours.

Compare (Tr. 27) with (Tr. 458).

In the end, however, because the ALJ’s RFC

assessment included an option to sit or stand at will, that discrepancy is immaterial. Second, Dr.
Barrish stated that Ms. Catlin could lift and carry no weight frequently and up to 5 pounds
occasionally, while the ALJ determined that she could lift/carry 10 to 15 pounds occasionally
and up to 10 pounds frequently. Id. In rejecting that portion of Dr. Barrish’s opinion, the ALJ
noted that Dr. Barrish’s “opinion and findings conflict with the clinical findings reported by the
claimant’s treating physicians over a longitudinal period.” (Tr. 33). Specifically, throughout the
opinion, the ALJ relied upon (1) Dr. Crouch’s treatment notes including normal physical
examination (except for knee swelling and back tenderness) (Tr. 28); (2) Dr. Walsh’s normal
physical examinations (Tr. 30); (3) relatively unremarkable findings on objective testing (Tr. 28Ms. Catlin’s suggestion that Dr. Barrish “agreed with the limitations described by the treating doctor” is
unfounded. Pl. Mot. 13. Dr. Barrish believed Ms. Catlin to be capable of sedentary work, with certain
limitations, while Dr. Walsh rendered a more extreme opinion suggestion that she could not work at all.
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32); and (4) the fact that Ms. Catlin engaged in heavy yard work during the period she alleged
disability. (Tr. 29).
Ms. Catlin also references the fact that the ALJ did not accept the opinions of two nonexamining doctors who, like Dr. Barrish, believed Ms. Catlin to be capable of only sedentary
work. Pl. Mot. 13-14. In this case, the ALJ did not adopt the entirety of the opinion of any
medical source. Instead, the ALJ assigned “little” or “partial” weight to each source, and used
evidence of record to explain findings that are more restrictive than some of the sources’
opinions and less restrictive than others. While there is evidence in the record that could be
marshaled to support a finding of disability (or at least a finding that a sedentary RFC would be
appropriate), this Court’s role is not to reweigh the evidence or to substitute its judgment for that
of the ALJ, but simply to adjudicate whether the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial
evidence. See Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990).

The ALJ’s extensive

analysis in this case provides ample basis for that finding.
Finally, Ms. Catlin contests the ALJ’s adverse credibility finding. Pl. Mot. 15-16. The
ALJ cited numerous examples to support her assessment that Ms. Catlin was not fully credible,
including (1) the fact that Ms. Catlin testified that she was “up for a pacemaker” where her
physician’s notes stated that a pacemaker was not indicated; (2) that Ms. Catlin testified at the
hearing that she only used cocaine one time in 2009, where a 2010 toxicology screen was
positive for cocaine; and (3) the fact that Ms. Catlin started smoking after her heart attack, and
continues to smoke marijuana regularly, against the advice of her physicians. (Tr. 28). The
credibility determination made by an ALJ warrants substantial deference, and should not be
disturbed absent “exceptional circumstances.” Bishop v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 583 Fed. App’x
65, 68 (4th Cir. 2014) (citing Eldeco, Inc. v. NLRB, 132 F.3d 1007, 1011 (4th Cir. 1997)). Such

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circumstances included cases where the credibility determination “is unreasonable, contradicts
other findings of fact, or is based on an inadequate reason or no reason at all.” Eldeco, 132 F.3d
at 1011 (internal quotations omitted). While Ms. Catlin appropriately notes that the pacemaker
testimony could possibly be attributed to a misunderstanding, the remaining reasons are valid
and are documented in the medical record. Thus, I find no exceptional circumstances, and
recommend that the ALJ’s credibility determination be accepted.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, I respectfully recommend that:
1.

The Court DENY Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 10];

2.

the Court GRANT Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 11];

3. the Court AFFIRM the Commissioner’s judgment pursuant to sentence four of 42
U.S.C. § 405(g); and
4. the Court close this case.
Any objections to this Report and Recommendations must be served and filed within
fourteen (14) days, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b) and Local Rule 301.5(b).

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NOTICE TO PARTIES
Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and
recommendations of the Magistrate Judge contained in the foregoing report within fourteen (14)
days after being served with a copy of this report may result in the waiver of any right to a de
novo review of the determinations contained in the report and such failure shall bar you from
challenging on appeal the findings and conclusions accepted and adopted by the District Judge,
except upon grounds of plain error.

Dated: December 10, 2015

/s/
Stephanie A. Gallagher
United States Magistrate Judge

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