Randall v. Commissioner of the Social Security Administration

Filing 23

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER GRANTING 21 Motion for Summary Judgment; AFFIRMING Commissioner's judgment. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephanie A Gallagher on 7/1/2016. (hmls, Deputy Clerk)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
CHAMBERS OF
STEPHANIE A. GALLAGHER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

101 WEST LOMBARD STREET
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21201
[phone]
Fax [phone]

July 1, 2016
LETTER TO COUNSEL
RE:

Ti-shika Randall v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration;
Civil No. SAG-15-976

Dear Counsel:
On April 4, 2015, Ti-shika Randall petitioned this Court to review the Social Security
Administration’s final decision to deny her claims for Disability Insurance Benefits and
Supplemental Security Income. (ECF No. 1). I have considered the Commissioner’s motion for
summary judgment and Plaintiff’s response. (ECF Nos. 21, 22). I find that no hearing is
necessary. See Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2014). This Court must uphold the decision of the Agency
if it is supported by substantial evidence and if the Agency employed proper legal standards. See
42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g); 1383(c)(3); Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996). Under that
standard, I will grant the Commissioner’s motion pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. §
405(g). This letter explains my rationale.
Ms. Randall filed claims for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental
Security Income (“SSI”) on July 25, 2011. (Tr. 240-48). She alleged a disability onset date of
August 28, 2008. (Tr. 240, 242). Her claims were denied initially and on reconsideration. (Tr.
129-33, 139-42). A hearing was held on August 8, 2013, before an Administrative Law Judge
(“ALJ”). (Tr. 26-68). Following the hearing, the ALJ determined that Ms. Randall was not
disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act during the relevant time frame. (Tr. 8-25).
The Appeals Council denied Ms. Randall’s request for review, (Tr. 1-6), so the ALJ’s decision
constitutes the final, reviewable decision of the Agency.
The ALJ found that Ms. Randall suffered from the severe impairments of obesity, alcohol
dependence, major depression, and personality disorder. (Tr. 13). Despite these impairments,
the ALJ determined that Ms. Randall retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to:
perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except the
claimant can frequently push or pull with the left upper extremity; occasionally
climb ramps and stairs, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch and crawl; never climb
ladders, ropes, and scaffolds; and frequently handle and finger with the left hand.
The claimant must avoid concentrated exposure to extreme cold, extreme heat,
excessive vibration and hazardous moving machinery and unprotected heights.
The claimant can only perform simple routine, repetitive tasks in a low-stress

Ti-shika Randall v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration
Civil No. SAG-15-976
July 1, 2016
Page 2
work environment with no strict production quotas; and can only occasionally and
superficially interact with the public, co-workers and supervisors.
(Tr. 15). After considering the testimony of a vocational expert (“VE”), the ALJ determined that
Ms. Randall could perform jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy and that,
therefore, she was not disabled. (Tr. 19-20).
The Commissioner argues that the ALJ’s opinion was supported by substantial evidence
at each step of the sequential evaluation. Ms. Randall raises one primary argument in response:
the ALJ erroneously found, in the RFC analysis, that Ms. Randall can “frequently push or pull
with the left upper extremity” and can “frequently handle or finger with the left hand,” which led
to the ALJ accepting the VE’s testimony that she could perform jobs existing in significant
numbers in the national economy. This argument lacks merit and is addressed below.
At the first step of the Agency’s five-step sequential evaluation process for determining
whether an individual is disabled, the ALJ ruled in Ms. Randall’s favor and determined that she
has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since her alleged onset date. (Tr. 13). The ALJ
then considered, at step two, the severity of the impairments Ms. Randall claimed prevented her
from working. Step two is a threshold determination of whether a claimant is suffering from a
severe impairment or combination of impairments. See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 147-48
(1987) (upholding the severity threshold because, “if a claimant is unable to show that he has a
medically severe impairment . . . there is no reason for the Secretary to consider the claimant’s
age, education, and work experience”). If a claimant is not suffering from any severe
impairment(s), she is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). If a
claimant is found to be suffering from any severe impairment(s), the analysis simply proceeds to
the next step. Id. At step two, the claimant bears the burden of production and proof. Hancock v.
Astrue, 667 F.3d 470, 472 (4th Cir. 2012) (citing Hunter v. Sullivan, 993 F.2d 31, 35 (4th Cir.
1992)). The ALJ did not address whether Ms. Randall’s left hand/wrist could be considered a
severe impairment under step two of this evaluation. However, the ALJ later determined in the
RFC analysis that Ms. Randall “does not have a clear, medically determinable impairment of the
left upper extremity.” (Tr. 18). The failure to address Ms. Randall’s left hand/wrist impairment
did not prevent the ALJ from continuing to the next step of the disability evaluation process, and
any error was harmless.
At step three of the sequential evaluation, the ALJ determined that Ms. Randall’s
impairments, considered singly and in combination, did not meet or medically equal the criteria
of Listings 12.04, 12.08, and 12.09. (Tr. 14). Accordingly, before proceeding to steps four and
five of the sequential evaluation, the ALJ assessed Ms. Randall’s RFC. See 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520, 416.920. A claimant’s RFC is the most she can still do in a work setting, despite the
functional limitations caused by her impairments. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.945(a)(1), 416.945(a)(1);
SSR 96-98p. At the hearing level, the ALJ is responsible for assessing a claimant’s RFC.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.946(c) 416.946(c). An ALJ may properly base his RFC determination on a
claimant’s “subjective complaints, the objective medical evidence, and the opinions of treating,
examining, and non-examining physicians.” Felton-Miller v. Astrue, 459 F. App’x 226, 231 (4th
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Ti-shika Randall v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration
Civil No. SAG-15-976
July 1, 2016
Page 3
Cir. 2011); see also Colvard v. Chater, 59 F.3d 165 (4th Cir. 1995) (“The determination of a
claimant’s [RFC] lies with the ALJ, not a physician, and is based upon all relevant evidence.”).
In assessing Ms. Randall’s RFC, the ALJ first evaluated the credibility of her subjective
complaints. The Fourth Circuit has developed a two-part test for conducting that evaluation.
Craig, 76 F.3d at 594. First, there must be objective medical evidence of a medical impairment
reasonably likely to cause the symptoms alleged by the claimant. Id. After the claimant meets
this threshold obligation, the ALJ must evaluate “the intensity and persistence of the claimant’s
[symptoms], and the extent to which it affects her ability to work.” Id. at 595. In this case, the
ALJ found that although Ms. Randall’s impairments could reasonably be expected to cause her
alleged symptoms, her statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of
those symptoms were not entirely credible. (Tr. 22).
Ms. Randall challenges the ALJ’s finding in the RFC analysis that she can “frequently
push or pull with the left upper extremity” and can “frequently handle or finger with the left
hand.” (Tr. 15). Ms. Randall testified that she has trouble pulling or pushing objects due to pain
that shoots up her arm. (Tr. 41). Ms. Randall also testified that she has trouble using her left
hand because her fingers become stiff. (Tr. 42). Based on the extensive medical evidence, the
ALJ found that Ms. Randall’s statements lacked credibility. Specifically, the ALJ noted that in
September of 2008, Dr. Marcel Reischer saw Ms. Randall for left hand pain, tingling, and
numbness, but findings from an EMG/NCV of the upper extremities were within normal limits.
(Tr. 16) (citing Tr. 351, 353-54). Dr. Reischer also noted normal findings on examination other
than minimal tenderness. (Tr. 16) (citing Tr. 351). In October of 2010, Dr. Robert Macht saw
Ms. Randall who reported moderate to severe wrist pain. (Tr. 16) (citing Tr. 355). Dr. Macht
found that Ms. Randall had mild crepitation in the left wrist, decreased sensation to light touch,
and two point discrimination about her left little, ring, and middle fingers, with negative Tinel’s
Sign at the elbow and wrist. (Tr. 16) (citing Tr. 355). Also, Ms. Randall had only mild weakness
in left hand grip. (Tr. 16) (citing Tr. 355). EMG, MRI, and x-rays of Ms. Randall’s left wrist and
hand were within normal limits. (Tr. 16) (citing Tr. 356). Dr. Macht concluded that the claimant
had a 10% impairment to the left wrist, 10% impairment to the left arm, and 25% permanent
partial impairment of the left upper extremity. (Tr. 16) (citing 356). The ALJ assigned
substantial weight to this finding in determining Ms. Randall’s RFC, because it was consistent
with the claimant’s clinical signs. (Tr. 16). Additionally, the ALJ noted that during this time
period Ms. Randall remained able to do activities consistent with light work, such as riding the
bus, shopping, cleaning the house, and doing household chores. (Tr. 16) (citing Tr. 40-41).
Based on the medical evidence, findings of credibility, and daily activities of Ms.
Randall, the ALJ assigned Ms. Randall a light RFC. In making this finding, the ALJ gave Ms.
Randall the “benefit of the doubt” due to her other impairments, namely positive clinical signs
and obesity. (Tr. 18). Consequently, based on the ALJ’s comprehensive RFC analysis, he
presented a proper hypothetical to the VE when he included the limitations that Ms. Randall can
“frequently push or pull with the left upper extremity” and can “frequently handle or finger with
the left hand.” (Tr. 15). The ALJ is afforded “great latitude in posing hypothetical questions,”
Koonce v. Apfel, 166 F.3d 1209, No. 98–1144, 1999 WL 7864, at *5 (4th Cir. Jan. 11, 1999)
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Ti-shika Randall v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration
Civil No. SAG-15-976
July 1, 2016
Page 4
(unpublished opinion), and need only pose those that are based on substantial evidence and
accurately reflect a claimant’s limitations. See Copeland v. Bowen, 861 F.2d 536, 540-41 (9th
Cir. 1988). As set forth above, substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s assessment of Ms.
Randall’s RFC. As a result, his hypothetical question to the VE was permissible.
For the reasons set forth herein, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No.
21) is GRANTED. The Commissioner’s judgment is AFFIRMED pursuant to sentence four of
42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Clerk is directed to CLOSE this case.
Despite the informal nature of this letter, it should be flagged as an opinion and docketed
as an order.
Sincerely yours,
/s/
Stephanie A. Gallagher
United States Magistrate Judge

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