Hall v. Stouffer

Filing 48

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge George Levi Russell, III on 9/25/18. (krs, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
DAVID WAYNE HALL,

:

Plaintiff,

:

v.

:

J. MICHAEL STOUFFER, et al.,

:

Defendants.

Civil Action No. GLR-15-1008

:
MEMORANDUM OPINION

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendants J. Michael Stouffer and
Dayena M. Corcoran’s Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Motion for Summary
Judgment (ECF No. 33). Also pending before the Court is Plaintiff David Wayne Hall’s
Motion for Leave to File Surreply in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or, in
the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 42). In this 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(2018) action, Hall, a Maryland inmate housed in Virginia, alleges that he has been
deprived of access to Maryland courts because he cannot obtain Maryland legal materials
or legal assistance. The Motions are ripe for disposition, and no hearing is necessary.
See Local Rule 105.6 (D.Md. 2016). For the reasons that follow, the Court will deny in
part and deny without prejudice in part Defendants’ Motion and grant in part and deny in
part Hall’s Motion for Leave to File Surreply.

I.
A.

BACKGROUND1

Factual Background
1.

Hall’s Criminal Case

In March 1992, the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, Maryland sentenced Hall
to a term of life imprisonment plus fifteen years for committing several felonies. (1st
Am. Compl. ¶ 9, ECF No. 25). In August 1996, Hall agreed to be a cooperating witness
in two state-court first-degree murder cases. (Id. ¶ 10). In exchange for his testimony,
the State agreed to several conditions, including receiving a letter from an Anne Arundel
County State’s Attorney regarding Hall’s cooperation, which was to be placed in his
parole file. (Id.). The State’s Attorney wrote the letter. (Id. ¶ 11).
In June 2006, Hall had his first parole hearing. (Id. ¶ 15). The Parole Board did
not consider that he was a cooperating witness.

(Id.).

The Parole Board did not

recommend Hall for parole. (Id. ¶ 16). The Parole Board again did not recommend Hall
for parole in 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, and 2016. (Id.).
2.

Attempts to Obtain Maryland Legal Materials

On October 22, 1999, pursuant to the Interstate Corrections Compact (“ICC”), the
State of Maryland involuntarily transferred Hall to the Virginia state prison system.
(Id. ¶ 12). Hall is currently incarcerated at Augusta Correctional Center in Craigsville,

1

Unless otherwise noted, the facts outlined here are set forth in Hall’s First
Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial (“First Amended Complaint”) (ECF No.
25). To the extent the Court discusses facts that Hall does not allege in his First
Amended Complaint, they are uncontroverted and the Court views them in the light most
favorable to Hall. The Court will address additional facts when discussing applicable
law.
2

Virginia. (Id. ¶ 6). The ICC requires the State to ensure that inmates like Hall receive
the same access to legal materials that inmates housed in Maryland receive.

(Hall

Decl. ¶ 12, ECF No. 36-1).2 The Maryland Division of Correction (“DOC”) publishes a
handbook for inmates that contains information regarding requests for legal materials: the
“Handbook for Maryland Inmates Housed Out of State Under Interstate Corrections
Compact and Intergovernmental Agreements” (the “Handbook”). (Mem. Supp. Mot.
Dismiss Summ. J. [“Stouffer’s Mot.”] Ex. 1 at 15–20 [“Handbook”], ECF No. 4-2). The
Handbook also contains a Library Assistance to State Institutions (“LASI”) form, which
inmates use to request legal materials. (Id. at 20; May 18, 2015 Henson-Smith Decl. ¶ 3,
Stouffer’s Mot. Ex. 1 at 5–8, ECF No. 4-2). Hall did not receive the Handbook or the
LASI request form.3 (Hall Decl. ¶ 2).
In January 2008, Hall filed an Informal Complaint with the Virginia Department
of Corrections (“VDOC”), requesting access to Maryland legal materials.

(Hall

Decl. ¶ 6; Pl.’s Resp. Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss Summ. J. [“Pl.’s Opp’n”] Ex. A1 [“Jan. 22,
2008 Inf. Compl.”], ECF No. 36-2).

In response, VDOC told Hall to contact the

Maryland ICC Coordinator, Yuvonka Jenkins.

2

(Hall Decl. ¶ 7; Jan. 22, 2008 Inf.

Under the ICC, the state receiving a transferred inmate acts “solely as agent” for
the sending state, the inmate “shall at all times be subject to the jurisdiction of the
sending state,” and the inmate shall have all “legal rights which the inmate would have
had if confined in an appropriate institution of the sending state.” Md. Code Ann., Corr.
Servs. § 8-605(a), (c), (e) (West 2018).
3
Defendants contend that Hall received a copy of the Handbook when Stouffer
filed his Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment. Hall,
however, avers that he has not received a copy of the Handbook. (Hall Decl. ¶ 2, ECF
No. 36-1). Accordingly, there exists a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether
Hall received the Handbook and, if so, when and how.
3

Compl.). On February 8, 2008, Hall wrote to Jenkins and requested Maryland legal
materials, including the Maryland Constitution, Maryland Code Annotated, and Maryland
Rules, as well as the ICC contract between Maryland and Virginia.4 (Hall Decl. ¶¶ 7, 8;
Pl.’s Opp’n Ex. A2 at 2 [“Feb. 8, 2008 Hall Ltr.”], ECF No. 36-3).5 Eight months later,
on October 22, 2008, Jenkins responded to Hall, stating that he needed to send a check
for $1.20 to obtain a copy of Maryland and Virginia’s ICC Contract; Jenkins did not
address Hall’s other requests for Maryland legal materials. (Hall Decl. ¶ 9; Pl.’s Opp’n
Ex. A3, ECF No. 36-4).
On September 5, 2008, before he received a response from Jenkins, Hall wrote
Sandy Cole at the Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services
(“DPSCS”). (Hall Decl. ¶ 13; Pl.’s Opp’n Ex. A7 [“Sept. 5, 2008 Hall Ltr.”], ECF No.
36-8). Hall stated that he sent Jenkins a letter requesting a copy of the ICC Contract and
had not received a response. (Sept. 5, 2008 Hall Ltr. at 1). Hall also informed Cole that
he sent the Maryland Attorney General a request for a copy of the ICC Contract, and that
an Assistant Attorney General responded, letting him know that she had forwarded his
letter to Cole. (Id.). Hall indicated that he had not yet received a response from Cole and
requested a copy of the ICC Contract. (Id. at 1–2).

4

On February 22, 2008, Hall contacted LexisNexis requesting compact discs with
Maryland legal materials. (Hall Decl. ¶ 10; Pl.’s Opp’n Ex. A4, ECF No. 36-5). On
March 10, 2008, LexisNexis responded to Hall, informing him that he should contact the
ICC Department. (Hall Decl. ¶ 12; Pl.’s Opp’n Ex. A6, ECF No. 36-7).
5
Hall copied the Maryland and Virginia Departments of Corrections and each
State’s Attorney General on his February 8, 2008 letter. (Feb. 8, 2008 Hall Ltr. at 2).
4

On February 11, 2009, Hall wrote Stouffer to inform him that he did not have
access to Maryland legal materials and to request that Stouffer provide them for Hall.
(Hall Decl. ¶ 14; Pl.’s Opp’n Ex. A8 [“Feb, 11, 2009 Hall Ltr.”] at 1–2, ECF No. 36-9;
Miller Decl. ¶ 2, ECF No. 41-8). Hall detailed his attempts to obtain Maryland legal
materials, including contacting LexisNexis and Virginia’s Institutional Attorney. (Feb.
11, 2009 Hall Ltr. at 2). Hall complained that he had “no access to the [f]ederal and
[s]tate [c]ourts because I have NO Maryland legal books, NO Maryland law on disk, NO
Maryland Institutional Attorney, or Maryland law library.”

(Id.).

Hall further

complained that he had “NO Maryland law at all” and that he was “being totally
deprived” of his access to the courts. (Id.).
On March 17, 2009, Kendall Gifford, DOC Director of Case Management,
responded to Hall’s letter on Stouffer’s behalf. (Hall Decl. ¶ 15; Pl.’s Opp’n Ex. A9
[“Mar. 17, 2009 Gifford Ltr.”], ECF No. 36-10; Miller Decl. ¶ 2). Gifford instructed Hall
to send his requests for Maryland legal materials to LASI. (Mar. 17, 2009 Gifford Ltr.).
She also told Hall to contact Becky Johnson at DOC Headquarters, Case Management
Unit, for further assistance. (Id.).6

6

On April 9, 2009, Hall wrote Johnson requesting her assistance in receiving
copies of the ICC Contract that he had paid for. (Hall Decl. ¶ 16; Pl.’s Opp’n Ex. A10,
ECF No. 36-11). Likewise, on May 23, 2011, Hall wrote Charvette Henson, DOC Case
Manager, requesting a copy of the ICC Contract between Maryland and Virginia. (Hall
Decl. ¶ 21; Pl.’s Opp’n Ex. A15 [“May 23, 2011 Hall Ltr.”] at 1, ECF No. 36-16). Hall
indicated that he did not have access to “Maryland laws, codes, statutes, etc.” and that he
wanted to be transferred back to Maryland. (May 23, 2011 Hall Ltr. at 3).
5

On an unspecified date, Hall requested from LASI Maryland Rules 2-231 through
2-241, 2-501 through 2-551, 2-601 through 2-652, and 3-401 through 3-431.7 (See Hall
Decl. ¶ 17; Pl.’s Opp’n Ex. A11 [“Nov. 9, 2010 LASI Ltr.”], ECF No. 36-12). On
November 9, 2010, LASI provided an unsigned, one-sentence reply to Hall’s request,
stating “we cannot violate copyright laws by photocopying the entire book for you.”
(Nov. 9, 2010 LASI Ltr.). The November 9, 2010 letter is on Department of Labor
Licensing and Regulation (“DLLR”) letterhead, but it indicates that it is “From: LASI.” 8
(Id.). In response, on December 24, 2010, Hall wrote the DLLR and reiterated his
request for the Maryland Rules listed above. (Hall Decl. ¶ 18; Pl.’s Opp’n Ex. A12
[“Dec. 24, 2010 Hall Ltr.”] at 1, ECF No. 36-13). He also suggested that LASI send
books or computer disks containing the requested legal materials to avoid violating
copyright laws. (Decl. 24, 2010 Hall Ltr. at 1). Hall copied Stouffer, among others, on
this letter. (Id. at 2). Hall never received a response. (Hall Decl. ¶ 18).
On April 4, 2011, Hall wrote the Maryland Attorney General, informing him that
LASI would not provide him with copies of Maryland legal materials because his
requests would violate copyright laws. (Hall Decl. ¶ 19; Pl.’s Opp’n Ex. A13 [“Apr. 4,
2011 Hall Ltr.”], ECF No. 36-14). Hall also requested certain Maryland Rules. (Apr. 4,
2011 Hall Ltr.). On April 15, 2011, the Office of the Attorney General responded, stating
that although it could not provide copies of the Maryland Rules Hall requested, Hall
7

These Maryland Rules govern certain aspects of Maryland Circuit Court and
District Court procedure.
8
The November 9, 2010 letter also includes a subheading “Division of Workforce
Development and Adult Learning Correctional Education Libraries.” (Nov. 9, 2010
LASI Ltr.).
6

could access them on the internet. (Hall Decl. ¶ 20; Pl.’s Opp’n Ex. A14, ECF No. 3615). Hall does not, however, have access to the internet. (Hall Decl. ¶ 20).
On March 28, 2013, Hall sent Stouffer a Maryland Public Information Act
(“MPIA”) request. (Hall Decl. ¶ 22; Pl.’s Opp’n Ex. A16 [“MPIA Req.”], ECF No. 3617). Hall requested, among other things, “the law, manuals, policies or procedures
governing the difference between a ‘Life’ Sentence and ‘The Balance of Natural Life’
Sentence.”9 (MPIA Req. at 11). On November 15, 2013, Hall filed a lawsuit in the
Circuit Court for Baltimore County, Maryland because Stouffer and others had failed to
respond to his MPIA request. (Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss Summ. J. [“Defs.’ Mot.”] Ex. 7, ECF
No. 33-11). Nearly a year and a half after filing his MPIA request, on August 8, 2014,
Renata Seergae of DPSCS responded. (Hall Decl. ¶ 23; Pl.’s Opp’n Ex. A17 [“Aug. 8,
2014 Seergae Ltr.”], ECF No. 36-18). She indicated that DOC did not have a record of
receiving Hall’s March 28, 2013 MPIA request until July 17, 2014. (Aug. 8, 2014
Seergae Ltr. at 1). DOC documentation reflects, however, that Stouffer’s administrative
staff processed Hall’s MPIA request on November 15, 2013. (Mekiliesky Decl. ¶¶ 2–3,
ECF No. 45-1).10

Seergae informed Hall that his request “calls for the production of

9

On October 30, 2013, Stouffer took a voluntary demotion to become a Warden at
Roxbury Correctional Institution. (Janifer Decl. at 1, ECF No. 33-10; Defs.’ Reply at 4,
ECF No. 41-3). Corcoran was DOC’s Acting Commissioner of Correction between April
8, 2016 and May 16, 2016, and starting on May 17, 2016, became DOC’s current
Commissioner of Correction. (Janifer Decl. at 2). There is no evidence in the record
about who was the Commissioner of Correction between November 1, 2013 and April 7,
2016.
10
On January 1, 2018, Defendants filed a Supplement to their Motion. (ECF No.
45). In the Supplement, they indicate that their attorney “recently learned that documents
7

hundreds of documents,” and that it would cost $655.92 to collect and copy the
documents. (Aug. 8, 2014 Seergae Ltr. at 1–2). Seergae further informed Hall that if he
paid that amount, she would continue to work on fulfilling his MPIA request. (Id. at 2).11
On June 5, 2014, Hall wrote the Institutional Attorney for Augusta Correctional
Center, William Little, Esq. (Hall Decl. ¶ 30; Pl.’s Opp’n Ex. A20, [“June 5, 2014 Hall
Ltr.”], ECF No. 36-21). In his letter, Hall states that he is “trying to challenge my
Maryland criminal convictions and fight the Maryland Parole Board. But every time I
write to Maryland officials, they either give me the runaround or tell me to get the legal
material from you, the Institutional Attorney.” (June 5, 2014 Hall Ltr.). Hall indicates
that this is his “third request for legal material,” but Little has not responded. (Id.). Hall
also proposes that instead of meeting with him, Little could send him the Maryland Rules
for filing state petitions for habeas corpus and “Maryland parole procedures and laws to
challenge the procedures.” (Id.). Little never met with Hall or responded to his letter.
(Hall Decl. ¶ 30).
3.

Correspondence with the Maryland Office of the Public Defender

While Hall was attempting to obtain access to Maryland legal materials as
described above, he was also corresponding with the Maryland Office of the Public
Defender (“OPD”).

Hall first wrote Scott Whitney, then-Chief Attorney of OPD’s

Collateral Review Division. (Hall Decl. ¶ 31; Pl.’s Opp’n Ex. A21 [“Mar. 18, 2008 Hall
exist which suggest that DOC had a copy of P’s MPIA request in November 2013.”
(Suppl. at 1, ECF No. 45).
11
Hall also contacted the Maryland Court of Special Appeals in September 2013
about filing a complaint regarding his MPIA request and expungement of his criminal
conviction. (Hall Decl. ¶ 25).
8

Ltr.”], ECF No. 36-22). He told Whitney that “[i]t has been some time since I have heard
anything from you, or your office.” (Mar. 18, 2008 Hall Ltr. at 1). Hall also detailed his
issues with the Parole Board and his attempts to obtain Maryland legal materials. (Id. at
1–2). Whitney responded to Hall on June 6, 2008. (Hall Decl. ¶ 32; Pl.’s Opp’n Ex. A22
[“June 6, 2008 Whitney Ltr.”], ECF No. 36-23). Whitney acknowledged that it had been
“quite some time” since he had contact with Hall. (June 6, 2008 Whitney Ltr. at 1).
Whitney told Hall that due to his caseload, he would be “transferring [Hall’s] case to
another attorney who would be in a better position to review the transcript that has been
provided to [him] by [Hall’s] parents” and that the new attorney “will contact [Hall] once
he or she takes physical possession of [Hall’s] file.” (Id.).
Also on June 6, 2008, Norman Handwerger, Deputy Chief of OPD’s Collateral
Review Division, sent Hall a letter advising him that Handwerger or another attorney
from the Collateral Review Division would visit him “as soon as [they] can” but “it could
be awhile before [they] can actually see” Hall. (Hall Decl. ¶ 33; Pl.’s Opp’n Ex. A23
[“June 6, 2008 Handwerger Ltr.”], ECF No. 36-24). Handwerger advised Hall of the tenyear deadline for filing a petition for post-conviction relief in state court and gave Hall
instructions for filing his own petition if he chose to do so. (June 6, 2008 Handwerger
Ltr. at 1). Handwerger told Hall that he was “enclosing a copy of Maryland Rule 4-402,
which outlines the specific information you must include in your [p]etition.” (Id. at 2).
Handwerger did not, however, include a copy of Maryland Rule 4-402. (Hall Decl. ¶ 33).
On September 11, 2008, Handwerger responded to correspondence from Hall,
informing him that he could not give him an estimate as to when he would visit Hall or
9

file a petition for post-conviction relief on Hall’s behalf. (Hall Decl. ¶ 34; Pl.’s Opp’n
Ex. A24 [“Sept. 11, 2008 Handwerger Ltr.”], ECF No. 36-25). Handwerger reassured
Hall, however, that his case “is very important” to OPD and that OPD was “doing
everything [they] can to move it along as quickly as possible.”

(Sept. 11, 2008

Handwerger Ltr.). Then, on March 5, 2009, Handwerger responded to a letter Hall wrote
to OPD’s Administrative Services Division regarding a $50.00 outstanding debt. (Hall
Decl. ¶ 36; Pl.’s Opp’n Ex. A26, [“Mar. 5, 2009 Handwerger Ltr.”], ECF No. 36-27).
Handwerger told Hall that “Administrative Fee Agreement money should not come to
[his] office directly,” and that OPD was “still in the process of trying to obtain transcripts
of your trial.” (Mar. 5, 2009 Handwerger Ltr.).
On November 2, 2010, Hall wrote OPD. (Hall Decl. ¶ 37; Pl.’s Opp’n Ex. A27
[“Nov. 2, 2010 Hall Ltr.”], ECF No. 36-28). This time, he requested Maryland legal
materials, including copies of the Maryland Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, the
affidavit for seeking in forma pauperis status, and Maryland laws governing state
petitions for writ of habeas corpus. (Nov. 2, 2010 Hall Ltr.). In response, Brian Saccenti,
Deputy Chief Attorney of OPD’s Appellate Division, informed Hall that OPD “does not
provide legal advice to inmates unless we are currently representing them, and we do not
provide forms for inmates to use in representing themselves.” (Hall Decl. ¶ 38; Pl.’s
Opp’n Ex. A28 [“Nov. 6, 2010 Saccenti Ltr.”], ECF No. 36-29). Saccenti told Hall to
write Whitney and request representation if he believed that he may “have an issue that
could be raised in a post-conviction proceeding.” (Nov. 6, 2010 Saccenti Ltr.). Hall then
wrote Whitney requesting the same Maryland legal materials he requested in his
10

November 2, 2010 letter to OPD. (Hall Decl. ¶ 39; Compare Pl.’s Opp’n Ex. A29, ECF
No. 36-30, with Nov. 2, 2010 Hall Ltr.). On December 14, 2010, Handwerger, the OPD
attorney assigned to Hall’s post-conviction case, responded, stating that OPD “is not
equipped to provide the services” Hall requested. (Hall Decl. ¶ 40; Pl.’s Opp’n Ex. A30
[“Dec. 14, 2010 Handwerger Ltr.”], ECF No. 36-31).

Handwerger then listed the

Maryland Code provisions and Maryland Rules that govern habeas corpus petitions and
explained the difference between habeas proceedings and post-conviction proceedings,
which are governed by the Post Conviction Procedure Act (“PPA”). (Dec. 14, 2010
Handwerger Ltr. at 1). Handwerger stated that he had “enclosed a copy of the current
parole eligibility statute.” (Id. at 2). Handwerger did not, however, enclose a copy of
that statute or any of the other Maryland laws he cited. (Hall Decl. ¶ 40).
Hall again wrote Whitney on December 30, 2010. (Hall Decl. ¶ 41; Pl.’s Opp’n
Ex. A31, [“Dec. 30, 2010 Hall Ltr.”], ECF No. 36-32). Hall explained that Handwerger
told him that OPD’s Collateral Review Division was “not equipped to provide” Hall with
copies of Maryland legal materials. (Dec. 30, 2010 Hall Ltr.). Hall also informed
Whitney that although OPD had assigned attorneys to work on his case in 2007–2008, he
had “not received any communications” from them. (Id.). Hall requested, among other
things, copies of the Maryland Rules and statutes governing habeas corpus petitions and
the PPA. (Id.). Hall did not receive a response or any other correspondence from OPD
until 2017. (Hall Decl. ¶ 42).

11

Nearly seven years later, on September 17, 2017, Handwerger wrote Hall
informing him that he had “completed his review” of Hall’s trial court transcripts.12 (Hall
Decl. ¶ 42; Pl.’s Opp’n Ex. A32 [“Sept. 13, 2017 Handwerger Ltr.”], ECF No. 36-33).
Handwerger acknowledged that he was aware Hall had “filed a law suit in federal court
claiming that Maryland is depriving [him] of access to the courts,” and that because
Handwerger’s name is “mentioned in the pleadings,” Hall may want to consult with his
attorney first to determine “if [Hall] can or should talk to [Handwerger] about [his] postconviction case.” (Sept. 13, 2017 Handwerger Ltr.). Handwerger emphasized that he did
“not intend to talk to [Hall] about any aspect of [Hall’s] pending law suit in federal
court.” (Id.). Rather, he only wanted “to talk about [Hall’s] post conviction case.” (Id.).
B.

Procedural Background
On April 9, 2015, Hall sued Stouffer, alleging that Stouffer had violated Hall’s

right of access to Maryland courts by failing to provide him with Maryland legal
materials. (ECF No. 1). On February 4, 2016, the Court entered an Order denying
without prejudice Defendant Stouffer’s first Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative,
Motion for Summary Judgment.

(ECF No. 8).

The Court requested that Stouffer

supplement his Motion with information regarding, in relevant part: (1) whether Hall
actually received the Handbook; (2) any documentation indicating that Hall received the

12

Handwerger sent his September 13, 2017 letter to Hall after Hall filed an
Amended Complaint in this case on August 14, 2017.
12

Handbook; and (3) all records pertaining to Hall’s LASI requests and any responses.13
(Feb. 4, 2016 Order at 3, ECF No. 8).
On February 16, 2017, the Court denied Stouffer’s Motion to Renew Motion for
Summary Judgment and appointed counsel for Hall.

(ECF No. 17).

The Court

concluded that Stouffer’s supplemented Motion was “still insufficient” to support the
entry of summary judgment because there remained significant disputes of material fact.
(Feb. 16, 2017 Mem. Op. at 3, ECF No. 17).

The Court noted that Stouffer

“acknowledges that no documentation has been located” to show that Hall received the
Handbook, and “[d]espite that acknowledgement, Defendant continues to point to the
[H]andbook to support the argument that [Hall] was aware of and understood the process
for obtaining access to Maryland legal materials.” (Id.) (citation omitted). In addition,
Stouffer was “unable to locate any LASI requests submitted by Hall or any response
thereto.” (Id.) (citation omitted). The Court further noted that “[w]hile Hall contacted
the Office of the Public Defender and received assurances that it would provide him
assistance, the record does not demonstrate that any actual assistance was given.” (Id. at
4). The Court ultimately found that the “[r]esponses to Hall’s requests for legal materials
that are in the record demonstrate a lack of any real assistance.” (Id.). Because Hall “is

13

The Court also requested information regarding whether Hall’s efforts to grieve
his lack of legal materials through Virginia satisfied the exhaustion requirement. (Feb. 4,
2016 Order at 3, ECF No. 8). The evidence as to Hall’s exhaustion of administrative
remedies demonstrated that although Maryland DOC officials told Hall to utilize
Virginia’s grievance process, “Hall submitted grievances through several levels of the
Virginia grievance procedures and, at each level, was told to contact Maryland.” (Feb.
16, 2017 Mem. Op. at 4–5, ECF No. 17). The Court subsequently concluded that Hall
had exhausted his available administrative remedies. (Id. at 5).
13

hampered in articulating the underlying challenges he would mount because of his lack of
access to Maryland legal materials,” the Court appointed counsel for Hall. (Id. at 5).
On August 14, 2017, Hall filed a First Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury
Trial (“First Amended Complaint”). (ECF No. 25). In his First Amended Complaint,
Hall added Corcoran as a Defendant. (1st Am. Compl. ¶ 8). Hall brings a single Count
against Stouffer and Corcoran under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his First and
Fourteenth Amendment Right of Access to the Courts. (Id. ¶¶ 78–85). Hall sues Stouffer
in his individual capacity and Corcoran in her official capacity. (Id. ¶¶ 79–80).14 He
seeks declaratory relief as to both Defendants, monetary damages from Stouffer, and
injunctive relief from Corcoran. (Id. a–f).
On September 18, 2017, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss or, in the
Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 33). Hall filed an Opposition on
October 12, 2017. (ECF No. 36). On November 9, 2017, Defendants filed a Reply.
(ECF No. 41).

Hall filed a Motion for Leave to File Surreply in Opposition to

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment on
November 29, 2017.

(ECF No. 42). On December 13, 2017, Defendants filed an

Opposition. (ECF No. 44). To date, the Court has no record that Hall filed a Reply.

14

Though Hall initially brought suit against Corcoran in her individual capacity, in
his Opposition, he voluntarily dismisses his claims against Corcoran in her individual
capacity, with leave to amend to add the individual capacity claim against Corcoran back
if discovery uncovers information that warrants it. (Pl.’s Opp’n at 28 n.12).
Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Hall’s claims against Corcoran in her individual
capacity.
14

II.
A.

DISCUSSION

Motion for Leave to File Surreply
Hall seeks leave of the Court to file a Surreply that addresses the facts presented in

the Stouffer Declaration, which is attached to Defendants’ Reply. Hall also moves to
strike the Declaration because it is procedurally improper. Defendants do not oppose
Hall filing a surreply. They do, however, oppose Hall’s request to strike the Stouffer
Declaration. The Court, therefore, only addresses the request to strike.
Hall asserts that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(c)(2) requires that “[a]ny
affidavit supporting a motion must be served with the motion.”15 As a result, the Court
should disregard the Stouffer Declaration. The Court disagrees.
Although the plain language of Rule 6(c)(2) appears to support Hall’s argument,
courts applying this Rule have adopted a more lenient interpretation. As this Court has
noted, nothing in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure precludes a movant from
submitting affidavits and other evidence that support a reply brief in response to
arguments raised in an opposition. See, e.g., Allen v. Enabling Techs. Corp., No. WMN14-4033, 2016 WL 4240074, at *4 (D.Md. Aug. 11, 2016); Robinson v. Empire Equity
Grp., Inc., No. WDQ-09-1603, 2009 WL 4018560, at *2 (D.Md. Nov. 18, 2009). Here,
the Stouffer Declaration details the procedures Stouffer’s administrative staff followed
for processing his mail. The information in the Stouffer Declaration responds to at least
two of Hall’s Opposition arguments: that there are disputes of material fact regarding
whether Stouffer’s conduct violated Hall’s First and Fourteenth Amendment rights; and
15

Hall mistakenly cites Rule 56(c)(2).
15

whether Stouffer’s deliberate indifference allowed Hall’s constitutional rights to be
violated. Admittedly, however, the Stouffer Declaration provides new evidence to which
Hall should be permitted to respond—and he does so in his proposed Surreply.
The Court will, therefore, deny Hall’s request to strike the Stouffer Declaration
and grant his Motion for Leave to File Surreply.
B.

Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative for Summary
1.

Conversion of Defendants’ Motion

Defendants style their Motion as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) or, in the
alternative, for summary judgment under Rule 56. A motion styled in this manner
implicates the Court’s discretion under Rule 12(d).

See Kensington Volunteer Fire

Dep’t, Inc. v. Montgomery Cty., 788 F.Supp.2d 431, 436–37 (D.Md. 2011), aff’d, 684
F.3d 462 (4th Cir. 2012). This Rule provides that when “matters outside the pleadings
are presented to and not excluded by the court, the [Rule 12(b)(6)] motion must be treated
as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d). The Court “has
‘complete discretion to determine whether or not to accept the submission of any material
beyond the pleadings that is offered in conjunction with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion and rely
on it, thereby converting the motion, or to reject it or simply not consider it.’” Wells-Bey
v. Kopp, No. ELH-12-2319, 2013 WL 1700927, at *5 (D.Md. Apr. 16, 2013) (quoting 5C
Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1366, at 159 (3d ed. 2004, 2012
Supp.)).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has articulated two
requirements for proper conversion of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to a Rule 56 motion: notice
16

and a reasonable opportunity for discovery.

See Greater Balt. Ctr. for Pregnancy

Concerns, Inc. v. Mayor of Balt., 721 F.3d 264, 281 (4th Cir. 2013). When the movant
expressly captions its motion “in the alternative” as one for summary judgment and
submits matters outside the pleadings for the court’s consideration, the parties are
deemed to be on notice that conversion under Rule 12(d) may occur. See Moret v.
Harvey, 381 F.Supp.2d 458, 464 (D.Md. 2005). The Court “does not have an obligation
to notify parties of the obvious.” Laughlin v. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253,
261 (4th Cir. 1998).
Ordinarily, summary judgment is inappropriate when “the parties have not had an
opportunity for reasonable discovery.” E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus.,
Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 448 (4th Cir. 2011). Yet, “the party opposing summary judgment
‘cannot complain that summary judgment was granted without discovery unless that
party had made an attempt to oppose the motion on the grounds that more time was
needed for discovery.’” Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302 F.3d 214,
244 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting Evans v. Techs. Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 961
(4th Cir. 1996)). To raise sufficiently the issue that more discovery is needed, the nonmovant must typically file an affidavit or declaration under Rule 56(d), explaining the
“specified reasons” why “it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(d). A Rule 56(d) affidavit is inadequate if it simply demands “discovery
for the sake of discovery.” Hamilton v. Mayor of Balt., 807 F.Supp.2d 331, 342 (D.Md.
2011) (citation omitted). A Rule 56(d) request for discovery is properly denied when
“the additional evidence sought for discovery would not have by itself created a genuine
17

issue of material fact sufficient to defeat summary judgment.” Ingle ex rel. Estate of
Ingle v. Yelton, 439 F.3d 191, 195 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting Strag v. Bd. of Trs., Craven
Cmty. Coll., 55 F.3d 943, 953 (4th Cir. 1995)).
Here, both parties present evidence outside of the First Amended Complaint and
Hall did not submit a Rule 56(d) affidavit or otherwise oppose converting Defendants’
Motion. Furthermore, the Court will consider the matters outside of the pleadings in
ruling on Defendants’ Motion. Accordingly, the Court will construe Defendants’ Motion
as one for summary judgment.
2.

Rule 56 Standard of Review

In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the Court views the facts in a light
most favorable to the nonmovant, drawing all justifiable inferences in that party’s favor.
Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 586 (2009); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 255 (1986) (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158–59 (1970)).
Summary judgment is proper when the movant demonstrates, through “particular parts of
materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored
information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations . . . admissions, interrogatory answers,
or other materials,” that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a), (c)(1)(A).
Significantly, a party must be able to present the materials it cites in “a form that would
be admissible in evidence,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(2), and supporting affidavits and
declarations “must be made on personal knowledge” and “set out facts that would be
admissible in evidence,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(4).
18

Once a motion for summary judgment is properly made and supported, the burden
shifts to the nonmovant to identify evidence showing there is genuine dispute of material
fact. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87
(1986). The nonmovant cannot create a genuine dispute of material fact “through mere
speculation or the building of one inference upon another.” Othentec Ltd. v. Phelan, 526
F.3d 135, 141 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Beale v. Hardy, 769 F.2d 213, 214 (4th Cir.
1985)).
A “material fact” is one that might affect the outcome of a party’s case. Anderson,
477 U.S. at 248; see also JKC Holding Co. v. Wash. Sports Ventures, Inc., 264 F.3d 459,
465 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing Hooven-Lewis v. Caldera, 249 F.3d 259, 265 (4th Cir. 2001)).
Whether a fact is considered to be “material” is determined by the substantive law, and
“[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing
law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248;
accord Hooven-Lewis, 249 F.3d at 265. A “genuine” dispute concerning a “material”
fact arises when the evidence is sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict in
the nonmoving party’s favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. If the nonmovant has failed to
make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case where she has the burden
of proof, “there can be ‘no genuine [dispute] as to any material fact,’ since a complete
failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case
necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
322–23 (1986).

19

3.

Analysis

Defendants advance four principal arguments as to why judgment should be
entered in their favor: (1) Eleventh Amendment immunity; (2) the statute of limitations
bars Hall’s claims based on events that occurred before April 9, 2012; (3) there is no
dispute of material fact that Hall had and continues to have access to the courts; and (4)
qualified immunity. The Court addresses Defendants’ arguments in turn.16
a.

Eleventh Amendment Immunity

Defendants maintain that Corcoran is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity
for Hall’s claims against her in her official capacity for both money damages and
injunctive relief. The Court agrees that Corcoran is immune from suit for monetary
damages for the claims against her in her official capacity. Corcoran is not, however,
immune from suit in her official capacity for prospective injunctive relief.
The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “[t]he
Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another
State.” U.S. Const. amend. XI. Notwithstanding the Eleventh Amendment’s explicit
mention of only “Citizens of another State,” id., the Supreme Court of the United States

16

Defendants also argue that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes Hall from relitigating his MPIA claim. Defendants’ argument is misplaced. Under the RookerFeldman doctrine, federal district courts generally do not have jurisdiction to review
state-court decisions. Allstate Ins. Co. v. W. Va. State Bar, 233 F.3d 813, 816 (4th Cir.
2000) (quoting Plyler v. Moore, 129 F.3d 728, 731 (4th Cir. 1997)). Here, Hall does not
ask this Court to review his state-court MPIA claim. Rather, he uses his MPIA request
and related lawsuit as evidence of his inability to access Maryland legal materials. Thus,
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply.
20

has construed the Eleventh Amendment as also protecting states from federal court suits
brought by the state’s own citizens. Lee-Thomas v. Prince George’s Cty. Pub. Sch., 666
F.3d 244, 248 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495
U.S. 299, 304 (1990)). The States’ immunity extends to “state agents and state
instrumentalities.” Id. (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429
(1997)). This immunity is not absolute, however, as Congress and state legislatures may
waive it. Id. at 249 (quoting Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356,
363, (2001); Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 535 U.S. 613, 618 (2002)).
Under the Eleventh Amendment, “a suit against a state official in his or her
official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s
office. As such, it is no different from a suit against the State itself.” Will v. Mich. Dep’t
of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (internal citation omitted). The State of Maryland
has waived its sovereign immunity for certain types of cases brought in state
courts. See Md. Code Ann., State Gov’t, § 12–201 (West 2018). It has not, however,
waived its immunity under the Eleventh Amendment to a suit of this kind. Officialcapacity claims, therefore, are subject to Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Kentucky
v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 (1985). Under the Ex parte Young doctrine, however,
the Eleventh Amendment does not prevent private individuals from suing state officials
under § 1983 for prospective injunctive relief to prevent ongoing violations of federal
law. McBurney v. Cuccinelli, 616 F.3d 393, 399 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing Ex parte Young,
209 U.S. 123, 159–60 (1908)).

21

Here, Hall brings suit against Corcoran in her official capacity and seeks
prospective injunctive relief; Hall does not seek money damages. Specifically, Hall
requests access to Maryland law materials to aid preparation of his state habeas corpus
petition, his post-conviction petition, and lawsuits challenging Maryland’s parole
procedures and the legality of his incarceration in Virginia.

The Court, therefore,

concludes that Corcoran is not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.
Consequently, the Court will not grant summary judgment in Corcoran’s favor on this
ground.
b.

Statute of Limitations

Defendants contend that the applicable statute of limitations bars Hall’s claims for
money damages prior to April 9, 2012. Hall counters that he submitted his MPIA request
to Stouffer on March 28, 2013—within the statute of limitations period—and because
this action falls within the statute of limitations, the continuing violation doctrine permits
Hall to assert claims that accrued outside of the applicable statute of limitations. The
Court finds Hall’s argument persuasive.
“Section 1983 contains no statute of limitations and, consequently, it has been held
that the most analogous state statute of limitations would apply.” Duggan v. Town of
Ocean City, 516 F.Supp. 1081, 1083 (D.Md. 1981).

In Maryland, that statute of

limitations is three years. Id. (citing Davidson v. Koerber, 454 F.Supp. 1256 (D.Md.
1978); and then citing McIver v. Russell, 264 F.Supp. 22 (D.Md. 1967)).

While

Maryland’s three-year statute of limitations applies to § 1983 claims, “federal law
controls when the statute of limitations [begins] to run.” Maisha v. Univ. of N. Carolina,
22

641 F.App’x 246, 249 (4th Cir. 2016) (citing A Soc’y Without a Name v. Virginia, 655
F.3d 342, 348 (4th Cir. 2011)). The tort principle of “continuing violation,” also known
as the “continuing violation doctrine,” “is a general principle of federal common law.”
DePaola v. Clarke, 884 F.3d 481, 486 (4th Cir. 2018).
The continuing violation doctrine holds that “when a harm has occurred more than
once in a continuing series of acts or omissions, a plaintiff under certain circumstances
may allege a ‘continuing violation’ for which the statute of limitations runs anew with
each violation.” DePaola, 884 F.3d at 486; see Heard v. Sheahan, 253 F.3d 316, 318 (7th
Cir. 2001) (stating that every day prison officials failed to treat inmate’s medical
condition “marked a fresh infliction of punishment that caused the statute of limitations
to start running anew”).

“A violation is called ‘continuing’ . . . when it would be

unreasonable to require or even permit [the plaintiff] to sue separately over every incident
of the defendant’s unlawful conduct.” Tarpley v. Hogan, No. GLR-15-735, 2016 WL
4888914, at *7 (D.Md. Sept. 15, 2016) (alteration in original) (quoting Heard, 253 F.3d at
319), appeal dismissed, No. 16-7379, 2016 WL 9818272 (4th Cir. Dec. 8, 2016). As a
result, the statute of limitations begins to run “from the date of the last incidence of that
violation, not the first.” Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 722 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting
Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 651 (7th Cir. 2013)).
Defendants maintain that Stouffer’s response to Hall’s 2009 letter and Stouffer’s
2014 response to Hall’s MPIA request are separate events, and therefore, the continuing
violation doctrine does not apply. The Court finds Defendants’ attempts to portray these
events as separate and distinct unpersuasive.
23

The Fourth Circuit recently held in DePaola that a prisoner may assert a
continuing violation under § 1983 for claims of deliberate difference to a serious,
ongoing medical need. DePaola, 884 F.3d at 487. In DePaola, a prisoner alleged that
prison officials and employees “have (and continue to) violate[ ]” his constitutional rights
by acting with deliberate indifference to his physical health needs . . . and his mental
health conditions.” Id. at 485. Specifically, the prisoner alleged that “he notified several
prison officials of his mental illnesses but has received no treatment,” that he “has
repeatedly attempted to obtain help from” the defendants, and that he “has never received
any mental health treatment” while incarcerated. Id. The Fourth Circuit concluded that a
prisoner’s claim of a continuing violation of his Eighth Amendment rights “may extend
back to the time at which the prison officials first learned of the serious medical need and
unreasonably failed to act.” Id. at 487. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit set forth a twoprong test for establishing a § 1983 Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim
under the continuing violation doctrine. Id. The plaintiff must: “(1) identify a series of
acts or omissions that demonstrate deliberate indifference to his serious medical need(s);
and (2) place one or more of these acts or omissions within the applicable statute of
limitations for personal injury.” Id.
Although the Fourth Circuit has not applied the continuing violation doctrine to an
access to courts claim, the reasoning in DePaola is analogous to this case. Here, Hall has
produced evidence of a series of acts or omissions that establish that Stouffer was aware
of or should have been aware of Hall’s lack of access to Maryland legal materials in 2009
or, at least as early as, 2010. Hall first contacted Stouffer regarding his lack of access to
24

Maryland legal materials on February 11, 2009. (Hall Decl. ¶ 14; Feb. 11, 2009 Hall
Ltr.). Gifford responded on Stouffer’s behalf, advising Hall to contact LASI. (Hall Decl.
¶ 15; Mar. 17, 2009 Gifford Ltr.). After receiving a one-sentence response from LASI
regarding his request for Maryland legal materials, Hall contacted DLLR, under which
LASI operates, and copied Stouffer on the letter detailing the lack of response from LASI
and again requesting Maryland legal materials. (Hall Decl. ¶ 18; Decl. 24, 2010 Hall
Ltr.). Hall never received a response from Stouffer, nor is there evidence in the record
that Stouffer took any other action to address Hall’s lack of access to Maryland legal
materials.
Hall has also produced evidence that at least one act or omission falls within the
limitations period. On March 28, 2013, Hall filed an MPIA request, addressed to
Stouffer, again requesting Maryland legal materials. (Hall Decl. ¶ 22; MPIA Req.).
Defendants contend that because Stouffer became Warden at Roxbury Correctional
Institution (“Roxbury”) on October 30, 2013, and there is no record that he received
Hall’s MPIA request before he left, the MPIA request falls outside of the limitation
period. That there is no record that Stouffer received Hall’s MPIA request in March 2013
does not rebut Hall’s evidence that he submitted one at that time. In fact, Defendants
originally maintained that they did not have a record of receiving Hall’s MPIA request
until July 17, 2014. (Aug. 8, 2014 Seergae Ltr. at 1). Defendants subsequently notified
the Court that DOC records reflect that Stouffer received Hall’s MPIA request on
November 15, 2013—after Stouffer became Warden at Roxbury. (Mekiliesky Decl. ¶¶
2–3).
25

Further, Hall’s ongoing injuries of the inability to file a post-conviction petition, a
state habeas petition, or civil rights actions are not readily divisible into separate lawsuits.
It would, therefore, be “unreasonable” to require Hall to sue Stouffer separately for the
2009, 2010, and 2013 failures to address Hall’s requests for Maryland legal materials.
See Tarpley, 2016 WL 4888914, at *7 (quoting Heard, 253 F.3d at 319).
Defendants alternatively maintain that even if Gifford’s 2009 response to Hall and
2010 lack of response to Hall’s letter in which he copied Stouffer are violations of Hall’s
First Amendment rights, the continuing violation doctrine does not apply to these acts
because no acts attributable to Stouffer occurred during the limitations period.
Defendants ignore the fact that the Hall’s 2009 letter was addressed to Stouffer and that
Gifford responded to it “on his behalf,” (Mar. 17, 2009 Gifford Ltr.; Miller Decl. ¶ 2)
(emphasis added), making it an act attributable to Stouffer. As to Hall’s 2010 letter,
Defendants overlook the fact that the continuing violation doctrine encompasses acts or
omissions, i.e., failures to act. See DePaola, 884 F.3d at 487. Hall copied Stouffer on
his 2010 letter to DLLR about his continued lack of access to legal materials, despite
contacting LASI for those materials as Stouffer’s staff member directed. (Dec. 24, 2010
Hall Ltr. at 2). Stouffer’s failure to respond to the letter, have one of his staff respond on
his behalf, or otherwise take action to ensure that Hall had access to adequate Maryland
legal materials may be characterized as an omission attributable to Stouffer.
In short, the Court concludes that Hall has put forth sufficient evidence to establish
a continuing violation.

As a result, the Court further concludes that the statute of

limitations does not bar Hall’s claims for monetary relief based on Stouffer’s acts or
26

omissions prior to April 9, 2012. Accordingly, the Court will deny Defendants’ Motion
on this ground. The Court next addresses the substance of Hall’s access to the courts
claim.
c.

First and Fourteenth Amendment Access to the Courts Claim

Defendants raise two main arguments for entering judgment in their favor on
Hall’s access to courts claim. First, Defendants argue that Hall fails to establish that he
has been denied and is being denied access to the courts. Second, Defendants maintain
that Hall fails to establish Stouffer’s supervisory liability.
i.

Denial of Access to the Courts

Under the First Amendment and Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, prisoners have a right of access to the
courts. See Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 305 (4th Cir. 2008). To ensure this
right is not violated, states must “furnish ‘adequate law libraries or adequate assistance
from persons trained in the law.’” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 356 (1996) (quoting
Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977)). “[M]eaningful access to the courts is
the touchstone” of this right. Id. at 351 (emphasis added) (quoting Bounds, 430 U.S. at
823). To establish a constitutional claim for denial of access to the courts, a prisoner
must show that the deficiencies in a prison’s law library or legal assistance program: (1)
hindered his efforts to pursue a nonfrivolous legal claim; and (2) actual injury. Id. at 349,
351.

27

The Court first addresses whether there are deficiencies in the law library and
legal assistance provided to Hall, and then addresses whether Hall establishes a lack of
access to courts claim under the two-prong test.
aa.

Legal materials and legal assistance

Defendants first maintain that Hall had access to Maryland legal materials through
either LASI or Prisoner Rights Information System of Maryland, Inc. (“PRISM”) and that
he was assigned an OPD attorney. As a result, Defendants contend, there were no
deficiencies in Maryland’s law library or legal assistance program.

Defendants

mistakenly focus on Maryland’s provision of legal materials and assistance generally,
instead of focusing on the specific facts of Hall’s case.
Here, Defendants fail to produce evidence that Hall received a copy of the
Handbook or the LASI request form contained therein, despite specific requests from the
Court to do so. The evidence in the record reflects that Hall requested legal materials
from LASI, and received an unsigned, one-sentence letter in response denying his request
because it would violate copyright laws. The letter did not inform Hall of the proper
procedures for or scope of LASI requests, and Hall never received the materials he
requested. As for PRISM, Defendants aver that PRISM received correspondence from
Hall in 2009 and 2015. (Meehan Decl. ¶ 2, ECF No. 41-11). Defendants do not,
however, provide copies of Hall’s correspondence or PRISM’s responses, if any. Thus,
the Court cannot assess whether the information Hall received from PRISM, if any,
satisfied Defendants’ obligation to provide Hall an adequate law library.

28

Finally, while it is true that as early as 2008 Hall was assigned an OPD attorney to
aid him in pursuing post-conviction relief, the evidence in the record demonstrates that he
did not, and is not, receiving meaningful assistance from his assigned attorney. Indeed,
Hall did not receive any correspondence from his attorney for over seven years. Only
when Hall filed this case did Handwerger contact him regarding potentially filing a
petition for post-conviction relief. (Hall Decl. ¶ 42; Sept. 13, 2017 Handwerger Ltr.).
Since Handwerger’s September 2017 letter, there is no evidence in the record that
Handwerger met with Hall to discuss his post-conviction case, or filed a petition for postconviction relief on Hall’s behalf. Thus, the Court cannot say, based on the record before
it, that Hall had or presently has meaningful access to the courts. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351
(quoting Bounds, 430 U.S. at 823).
bb.

Hindered efforts to pursue legal claims

The universe of nonfrivolous legal claims encompasses direct appeals from
convictions for which an inmate is incarcerated, habeas petitions, and civil rights actions
under § 1983. Id. at 354. Here, Hall’s lack of access to Maryland legal materials or legal
assistance has resulted in his inability to file a petition for post-conviction relief, a
petition for state habeas corpus, or civil rights lawsuits—i.e., nonfrivolous legal claims.
Nevertheless, Defendants argue that because Hall: (1) has not filed a petition for postconviction relief; (2) could file a state habeas petition; and (3) does not allege that he has
been denied access to materials regarding federal habeas relief, or that he is time-barred
from seeking federal habeas relief, he fails to establish a genuine dispute of material fact

29

regarding a violation of his constitutional right of access to the courts. The Court rejects
Defendants’ arguments for at least two reasons.
First, Hall not filing a petition for post-conviction relief in his criminal case or a
state habeas petition supports his allegations that he has been hindered in pursuing his
legal claims. Indeed, the evidence in the record demonstrates that Hall has repeatedly
contacted Maryland and Virginia prison officials and Maryland state agencies seeking the
laws and statutes governing post-conviction relief and state habeas petitions, but has
received either nothing in response or no response at all. Second, that Hall has does not
assert that he cannot file a federal habeas petition does not change the fact that he has
been hindered in his efforts to pursue post-conviction and habeas relief in state court. In
fact, before pursuing a petition for federal habeas corpus, an individual that is
incarcerated as a result of a state-court conviction must exhaust all available state
remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (b)(1)(A) (2018). Hall, therefore, cannot pursue federal
habeas relief until he fully exhausts avenues for state habeas relief. Thus, Hall’s failure
to establish that he does not have access to legal materials concerning federal habeas is of
no consequence.
In short, Hall has created a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether his lack
of access to Maryland legal materials or legal assistance has hindered his ability to pursue
nonfrivolous legal claims.
cc.

Actual injury

To make a showing of actual injury, the prisoner must demonstrate that “the
alleged shortcomings in the library or legal assistance program hindered his efforts to
30

pursue a legal claim.” Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351. A prisoner can establish actual injury by,
for example, showing that “he had suffered arguably actionable harm that he wished to
bring before the courts, but was so stymied by inadequacies of the law library that he was
unable even to file a complaint.” Id. Put another way, if an inmate establishes that a
nonfrivolous legal claim that he wished to pursue has been “lost or rejected,” or that “the
presentation of such a claim is currently being prevented,” because of inadequacies in a
law library and legal assistance, he sufficiently demonstrates actual injury. Id. at 356
(quoting Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828).
The Fourth Circuit has stated, in dicta, that “injury may be presumed where a total
denial of access to a law library or legal assistance is alleged.” Strickler v. Waters, 989
F.2d 1375, 1385 n.16 (4th Cir. 1993) (listing cases); see also DeMallory v. Cullen, 855
F.2d 442, 449 (7th Cir. 1988) (“In essence, when an inmate complains of prison rules that
substantially and continuously limit his or her access to legal materials and counseling,
the complaint carries an inherent allegation of prejudice.”); Harris v. Young, 718 F.2d
620, 622 (4th Cir. 1983) (“Because an inmate is unable to discover his rights when
library access or other access is denied him, any complaint rightly alleging a present
denial of access to a library or other assistance states a valid claim for equitable relief.”).
Here, based on the record before the Court, it is clear that a genuine dispute of
material fact exists regarding whether Hall has suffered prejudice as a result of his lack of
access to Maryland legal materials or legal assistance. Although the Court does not need
to presume prejudice in this case, the Court may nonetheless do so as Hall presently does
not have access to Maryland legal materials or legal assistance. See Harris, 718 F.2d at
31

622. In addition, Hall creates a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether he has
suffered actual prejudice. Hall has put forth evidence that due to his complete lack of
access to Maryland legal materials or legal assistance, he has been prevented and is
currently being prevented from filing a post-conviction petition, a state habeas petition,
and civil rights actions. The Court acknowledges that Hall recently received
correspondence from the OPD attorney assigned to his post-conviction case, but there is
no evidence in the record that Handwerger met with Hall to discuss his case or otherwise
advised him regarding post-conviction relief. In short, Hall still does not have legal
assistance or legal materials to pursue his nonfrivolous post-conviction petition. Thus,
there exists a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Hall has suffered actual
prejudice.
ii.

Supervisory Liability

There is no respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Love-Lane v.
Martin, 355 F.3d 766, 782 (4th Cir. 2004).

Thus, “for an individual to be liable

under § 1983, it must be affirmatively shown that the official charged acted personally in
the deprivation of the plaintiff’s rights.” Makdessi v. Fields, 789 F.3d 126, 144 (4th Cir.
2015) (quoting Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 850 (4th Cir. 1985)). It is well-settled,
however, that “supervisory officials may be held liable in certain circumstances for the
constitutional injuries inflicted by their subordinates.” Baynard v. Malone, 268 F.3d 228,
235 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 798 (4th Cir. 1994)).
Supervisory liability “is not based on ordinary principles of respondeat superior, but
rather is premised on ‘a recognition that supervisory indifference or tacit authorization of
32

subordinates’ misconduct may be a causative factor in the constitutional injuries they
inflict on those committed to their care.’” Id. (quoting Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368,
372 (4th Cir. 1984)). To establish supervisory liability, a plaintiff must demonstrate:
(1) that the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge
that his subordinate was engaged in conduct that posed a
pervasive and unreasonable risk of constitutional injury to
citizens like the plaintiff; (2) that the supervisor’s response to
that knowledge was so inadequate as to show deliberate
indifference to or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive
practices [ ]; and (3) that there was an affirmative causal link
between the supervisor’s inaction and the particular
constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff.
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Shaw, 13 F.3d at 799).
Defendants contend that Hall fails to establish the first element of supervisory
liability because he does not provide evidence that the risk of constitutional injury is
“widespread.” (Defs.’ Mot. at 28). While this is one way of establishing the knowledge
prong of the test, it is also sufficient to show that the conduct “at least has been used on
several different occasions.” Shaw, 13 F.3d at 799 (quoting Slakan, 737 F.2d at 373–74).
Defendants also maintain that Stouffer cannot be held liable because his administrative
staff handled all incoming inmate mail and he “did not encounter inmate mail unless a
response was prepared for his signature.” (Defs.’ Reply at 2–3, ECF No. 41).
Here, Hall has put forth evidence which establishes that on at least three occasions
he sent correspondence to or otherwise contacted Stouffer to inform him that he did not
have access to Maryland legal materials in Virginia, and to request such materials. In
each instance, either Stouffer did not respond, or his administrative staff responded, but
Hall never received any legal materials or assistance.
33

Gifford’s response in 2009,

Seergae’s response in 2014, and Stouffer’s failure to respond when made aware that Hall
still did not have access to Maryland legal materials in 2010 are sufficient to create a
genuine dispute of material fact that “on several different occasions” Stouffer’s responses
to Hall’s requests were inadequate. See Shaw, 13 F.3d at 799 (quoting Slakan, 737 F.2d
at 373–74).17
Further, that Stouffer did not review inmate mail unless a response was prepared
for him to sign supports a claim that he was deliberately indifferent to the risk of
violating Hall’s constitutional rights.

Stouffer attempts to shift the blame to his

administrative staff by asserting that they were responsible for preparing responses on his
behalf. The Court is not persuaded. Stouffer was responsible for ensuring Hall’s issues
were addressed, yet the evidence in the record indicates that he did nothing to ensure that
his administrative staff addressed them.

This may demonstrate either deliberate

indifference to or tacit authorization of his subordinates’ conduct. See Baynard, 268 F.3d
at 235 (quoting Shaw, 13 F.3d at 798).
In sum, the Court concludes that there are genuine disputes of material fact
regarding Hall’s access to the courts claim. Accordingly, the Court will deny
Defendants’ Motion on this ground.

17

Defendants assert that the Inmate Correspondence Manager Database, the
computer database in which Stouffer’s administrative staff logged all inmate
correspondence, does not contain an entry for Hall’s December 24, 2010 letter. (Miller
Decl. ¶ 2). Hall, however, avers that he sent the letter and produces a copy of the letter.
(Hall Decl. ¶ 18; Dec. 24, 2010 Hall Ltr.). Accordingly, viewing the evidence in a light
most favorable to Hall, the Court concludes that there exists a genuine dispute of material
fact regarding whether Stouffer indeed received a copy of the letter.
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d.

Qualified Immunity

The doctrine of qualified immunity shields government officials “from liability for
civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Harlow v.

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). There is a two-prong test for determining whether
a government official is protected by qualified immunity: (1) whether the facts that the
plaintiff has alleged or shown make out a violation of a constitutional right; and (2)
whether that right was “clearly established” at the time of the purported violation.
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009) (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201
(2001)). Courts have discretion to resolve these two prongs in whatever order they
consider appropriate based on the circumstances of the case at hand. Id. at 236. The
answers to both prongs must be in the affirmative for a plaintiff to defeat a motion for
summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. Batten v. Gomez, 324 F.3d 288,
293–94 (4th Cir. 2003). The plaintiff bears the burden of proof on the first prong, Bryant
v. Muth, 994 F.2d 1082, 1086 (4th Cir. 1993); the defendant on the second, Wilson v.
Kittoe, 337 F.3d 392, 397 (4th Cir. 2003).
Defendants maintain that they are entitled to qualified immunity for Hall’s claims
against them. At bottom, the Court concludes that Corcoran is not protected by qualified
immunity because Hall sues her in her official capacity. The Court also concludes that a
qualified immunity determination as to the claims against Stouffer would be premature at
this time. The Court considers each Defendant in turn.

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i.

Corcoran

A government official sued in her personal, or individual, capacity may invoke
qualified immunity. Ridpath v. Bd. of Governors Marshall Univ., 447 F.3d 292, 306 (4th
Cir. 2006). Qualified immunity “is not available in an official-capacity suit brought
against a government entity or a government officer as that entity’s agent.” Id. Here,
because Hall sues Corcoran only in her official capacity, she is not entitled to qualified
immunity. The Court will, therefore, deny Defendants’ Motion on this ground as to
Corcoran.
ii.

Stouffer

By contrast, Hall sues Stouffer in his individual capacity. Because the first prong
of the qualified immunity analysis is genuinely disputed, the Court proceeds to the
second prong. See Batten, 324 F.3d at 293–94. This prong comprises a three-step
process. First, the court identifies “the specific constitutional right allegedly violated.”
Collinson v. Gott, 895 F.2d 994, 998 (4th Cir. 1990). Second, the court inquires whether
at the time of the alleged violation, that right was “clearly established.” Id. Third, the
court inquires “whether a reasonable person in the official’s position would have known
that his conduct would violate that right.” Id.; see Cloaninger v. McDevitt, 555 F.3d 324,
331 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that a right is “clearly established” when “it would be
clear to a reasonable [official] that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he
confronted” (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202)).
The first two steps in this process present pure questions of law for the courts.
Collinson, 895 F.2d at 998.

The third step “may sometimes require factual
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determinations respecting a defendant’s conduct and its circumstances,” but the ultimate
application of the objective analysis in the third step “is also a matter of law for the
court.” Id.; see Willingham v. Crooke, 412 F.3d 553, 560 (4th Cir. 2005) (“[W]e hold
that the legal question of a defendant’s entitlement to qualified immunity under a
particular set of facts should be decided by the court, not by the jury.”).
The third step in this process, the “reasonableness inquiry,” “turns on the
‘objective legal reasonableness of the action, assessed in light of the legal rules that were
clearly established at the time it was taken.’” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 244 (quoting Wilson
v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614 (1999)). The operation of the reasonableness inquiry
“depends substantially upon the level of generality at which the relevant ‘legal rule’ is to
be identified.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987). The Supreme Court
has instructed that the right an official is alleged, or proven, to have violated must have
been “clearly established” in a highly particularized sense: “The contours of the right
must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is
doing violates that right.” Id. at 640. “This is not to say that an official action is
protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in question has previously been
held unlawful; but it is to say that in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must
be apparent.” Id. (internal citation omitted). Put another way, to be “clearly established”
“there is no need that ‘the very action in question [have] previously been held
unlawful.’”

Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 377 (2009)

(alteration in original) (quoting Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615 (1999)). Indeed,
“officials can still be on notice that their conduct violates established law . . . in novel
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factual circumstances.” Id. at 377–78 (alteration in original) (quoting Hope v.
Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002)).
Stouffer, in essence, argues that Hall fails to establish the second and third prongs.
The Court disagrees as to the second prong and concludes, based on the current record,
that it would be premature to determine whether Stouffer’s conduct was objectively
reasonable under the third prong.
With regard to the second prong, the right of prisoners’ access to the courts was
clearly established at the time Stouffer allegedly violated Hall’s rights in this regard. As
the Supreme Court explained in Lewis, “[t]he right that Bounds acknowledged was the
(already well-established) right of access to the courts.” 518 U.S. at 350 (emphasis in
original). At minimum, Bounds clearly established that a prisoner is entitled to a law
library or legal assistance, and the Supreme Court reiterated this right in Lewis. Indeed,
prior to Lewis, in Carter v. Kamka, this Court addressed whether the Maryland’s
Prisoners Assistance Project (“PAP”) satisfied Maryland inmates’ right of access to the
courts. 515 F.Supp. 825, 831 (D.Md. 1980). The Carter court explained that “the State
of Maryland has the alternative of providing such access to the courts by means of
‘adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law.’” Id.
(quoting Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828). At the very least, therefore, Hall was entitled to
either a law library with Maryland legal materials that would assist him in pursuing his
post nonfrivolous legal claims, or legal assistance that functioned in a similar manner. As
discussed above, on the present record before the Court, there is evidence of neither.

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With regard to the third prong, the evidence in the record regarding Stouffer’s role
in responding to Hall’s requests for Maryland legal materials is lacking. Stouffer points
to the fact that his employees handled all of his correspondence, and he only saw
responses to correspondence when they required his signature. But, as addressed above,
attempting to shift the blame to his subordinates for inadequately responding to Hall’s
requests—and in one instance, not responding at all—does not relieve Stouffer of the
responsibility of ensuring that inmates in DOC custody have access to the courts.
Likewise, Defendants first asserted that Stouffer’s administrative staff did not
receive Hall’s March 28, 2013 MPIA request until August 8, 2014. Defendants then filed
supplemental information with the Court—after their Motion was fully briefed—which
contained evidence that Stouffer’s administrative staff processed the letter on November
15, 2013. That Hall sent the letter in March 2013 and that there was no evidence that it
was processed until November 2013—nearly eight months later—at the very least
presents a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether this conduct was
objectively reasonable, especially in light of Hall’s previous correspondence requesting
Maryland legal materials. Further, Stouffer did not produce evidence regarding how his
administrative staff handled his mail until his Reply brief on his third Motion for
Summary Judgment, and presented further evidence of when he received Hall’s
correspondence after this Motion was fully briefed. Thus, further factual development of
the record would be helpful to establish the precise contours of Stouffer’s and his
administrative staff’s actions—or failures to act—to address Hall’s lack of access to the
Maryland legal materials or legal assistance. Thus, the Court concludes, based on the
39

present record, that there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Stouffer is
entitled to qualified immunity.
In sum, Corcoran cannot invoke qualified immunity because Hall sues her in her
official capacity, and the Court does not have sufficient information to determine whether
Stouffer is entitled to qualified immunity at this time. Accordingly, the Court will deny
Defendants’ Motion on this ground as to Corcoran and deny without prejudice
Defendants’ Motion on this ground as to Stouffer.18
III.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will deny in part and deny without prejudice
in part Stouffer and Corcoran’s Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Motion for
Summary Judgment (ECF No. 33), construed as a motion for summary judgment. The
Court will also grant in part and deny in part Hall’s Motion for Leave to File Surreply in

18

Defendants also maintain that Hall is not entitled to permanent injunctive relief.
While the Court is not determining the form the relief in this case will take, if any, at this
time, the Court does not find Defendants’ argument persuasive. Defendants assert
concerns over the Court interfering with “prison management” and “institutional
security” and invoke “legitimate penological concerns” for deferring to prison
managements’ decisions. (Defs.’ Mot. at 13). If the Court were to order permanent
injunctive relief, however, it could merely order Corcoran to follow the policies and
procedures that are already in place to ensure prisoners’ constitutional right of access to
the courts is not violated. Further, the Court is confident that it can fashion injunctive
relief that “extend[s] no further than necessary” to correct the purported violation as
required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) (2018).
40

Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Motion for Summary
Judgment (ECF No. 42). A separate order follows.
Entered this 25th day of September, 2018
/s/
George L. Russell, III
United States District Judge

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