Tarpley v. Moyer et al
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge George Levi Russell, III on 9/21/2016. (c/m 9/21/2016)(ko, Deputy Clerk)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
STEVEN E. TARPLEY,
STEPHEN T. MOYER, et al.,
Civil Action No. GLR-15-1132
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendants’, Frank B. Bishop, Jr, Brian W. Custer,
Cory A. Dolley, Wendell M. France, Robert M. Friend, Zachery D. Gentzler, Walter E. Iser, Jr.,
Richard S. Miller, Steven J. Miller, Jr, Stephen T. Moyer, Carroll A. Parrish, Richard S. Roderick,
Bobby P. Shearin, Nicholas J. Soltas, Ronald R. Stottler, J. Michael Stouffer, and Bradley A. Wilt,
Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 22) 1 and Plaintiff
Steven Tarpley’s Amended Motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) in response to
Defendants’ Motion (ECF No. 27). The Motions are ripe for disposition. Having reviewed the
Motions and supporting documents, the Court finds no hearing necessary. See Local Rule 105.6
(D.Md. 2016). For the reasons outlined below, the Court will grant Defendants’ Motion and deny
Plaintiff Steven Tarpley is a prisoner confined to North Branch Correctional Institution
(“NBCI”) and claims that he is “an inmate advocate/representative” who provides assistance to any
other inmates with administrative or criminal proceedings.
(Compl. at 6).
He states that on
November 1, 2012, he was summoned to the Sergeant’s office in Housing Unit 3 where he met with
Defendants also filed a Motion for Extension of Time (ECF No. 21) which shall be granted.
Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are taken from the Complaint. The facts are
viewed in a light most favorable to Plaintiff.
Sgt. Brian Custer and Sgt. Leah Youngblood and three unknown correctional officers. Id. Custer
was holding a copy of a notice Tarpley had put up advising other inmates to contact the U.S.
Department of Justice with any serious complaints concerning NBCI staff and offering assistance in
doing so. Id. Tarpley states that Custer and an unknown male officer verbally threatened him for
posting the notice. Id.
On November 7, 2012, Tarpley states that Officer Jennifer Robertson served a Notice of
Infraction on him, but would not allow Tarpley to read the report before signing for service. (Compl.
at 7). Tarpley explains he needed to read the report to learn the facts and list any relevant witnesses
or other evidence he wanted to present at the disciplinary hearing at the time of service. Id. Tarpley
admits that Robertson told him he was charged with refusing to lock in to his cell after receiving
morning medication. Id. Tarpley learned, however, that the Notice of Infraction alleged the incident
occurred on the date he moved to the new cell and that it was written by Sgt. Youngblood. (Compl.
On December 18, 2012, Tarpley alleges a falsified report was written by Officer Dale
Troutman charging Tarpley with interfering with an officer in the performance of his duties, inciting
a riot or disturbance, and committing acts of disrespect. Id. The report was based on an incident
where Tarpley refused to sit at a table with three gang members. Id. Following a brief interview
with Troutman, Tarpley claims that Officer Daniel Robertson told Troutman he had heard enough
and handcuffed Tarpley. Id. Robertson then escorted Tarpley to housing unit one where he was left
in a strip cage. Id. Tarpley asserts his repeated requests to be taken to a holding cell to use the toilet
were ignored and that he defecated in the strip cage. Id. He was then removed from the strip cage at
approximately 9:30 p.m., without being allowed to wash the feces off of himself. Id.
On December 24, 2012, Tarpley had a fight with his cellmate. (Compl. at 9). He claims his
cellmate, Vincent, was a newly indoctrinated member of the Aryan Brotherhood who was angry with
Tarpley for refusing to join the group and continuing to associate with people of color.
Following the fight, Tarpley was taken to a contingency cell. Id. He claims he was deprived of all
his property except a mattress which was provided the following morning. Id. On March 4, 2013,
Tarpley prevailed on a Motion for Preliminary Injunction seeking an order from the Circuit Court for
Allegany County to enjoin Warden Shearin from obstructing his access to the library. Id. On March
7, 2013, Tarpley and his cellmate were stopped by Defendants Dolley and Gentzler as they were
attempting to go to lunch. (Compl. at 10). A cell search was performed on Tarpley’s cell and a
razorblade was discovered. Id. Tarpley was handcuffed and escorted to a different housing unit. Id.
Tarpley adds he was denied lunch. Id.
On August 14, 2013, Tarpley claims that Defendant Nicholas J. Soltas said, “You know all of
your ARPs and lawsuits really don’t do anything. I just had to go and sign for counsel again, what
do you think it is, the squeaky wheel gets the oil? Well I’ve got news for you, the squeaky wheel
gets bumped around a lot here.” (Compl. at 12). Soltas then left claiming to resume checking
Tarpley’s property, and upon return, he told Tarpley he had found a note that contained a threat to
another inmate. (Compl. at 12–13). Soltas informed Tarpley he was charging him with a rule
violation. (Compl. at 13). Soltas refused to return Tarpley’s property, even though he informed
Soltas that he had pleadings due in court by August 24, 2013, but Soltas still refused. Id. Tarpley
claims that in the days to follow, staff repeatedly refused to return his property. Id.
On August 18, 2013, Tarpley states his cellmate, Richard Owens, put his arm out of the slot
in the cell door to prevent it from being closed in an effort to bring a Sergeant to the cell and inform
him that the officers were unreasonably refusing to return Tarpley’s property. Id. Tarpley claims the
usual practice when this occurs is for correctional officers to place a shield across the cell door and to
notify the unit manager. Id. Instead, Officer Steven Miller sprayed both Owens and Tarpley with
pepper spray and charged both men with violation of “various conduct rule[s].” Id. Tarpley states
that Owens was provided with a decontamination shower, but he was not. Id.
On September 19, 2013, Hearing Officer Jon Sandstrom dismissed all charges concerning the
alleged threatening note Soltas found in Tarpley’s property. (Compl. at 14). Despite dismissal of the
charges against Tarpley, he was not removed from segregation status. Id. Instead, Tarpley was
served with a Notice of Assignment to administrative segregation and “idle status” for more than four
months. Id. Tarpley claims that from August 2013 through March 2014, Defendants engaged in an
arbitrary practice of transferring him from one cell to another, housing him with inmates who were
members of prison gangs. (Compl. at 14–15). Tarpley alleges this was purposefully done in order to
provoke him into either fighting the other inmate or refusing a housing assignment, either of which
would result in administrative penalties. (Compl. at 15).
On April 16, 2015, Tarpley initiated this action claiming Defendants’ conduct violate his
rights under the Eighth Amendment and Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. (ECF No. 1). As relief, Tarpley seeks monetary damages as well as declaratory and
injunctive relief. (Compl. at 21). On February 16, 2016, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss or, in
the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 22). On May 25, 2016, Tarpley filed an
Opposition to the Motion. (ECF No. 27).
A. Standard of Review
A complaint fails to state a claim if it does not contain “a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), or does not state “a
plausible claim for relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
Though the plaintiff is not required to forecast evidence to prove the elements of the claim, the
complaint must allege sufficient facts to establish each element. Goss v. Bank of Am., N.A., 917
F.Supp.2d 445, 449 (D.Md. 2013) (quoting Walters v. McMahen, 684 F.3d 435, 439 (4th Cir. 2012))
(internal quotation marks omitted), aff’d sub nom., Goss v. Bank of Am., NA, 546 F.App’x 165 (4th
Pro se pleadings, however, are liberally construed and held to a less stringent standard than
pleadings drafted by lawyers. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citing Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)); accord Brown v. N.C. Dep’t of Corr., 612 F.3d 720, 722 (4th Cir. 2010).
In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must construe the complaint in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, read the complaint as a whole, and take the facts asserted therein as true.
See Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 783 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing Mylan
Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993)).
In this case, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, for Summary
Judgment. (ECF No. 22). A motion styled as a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary
judgment implicates the Court’s discretion under Rule 12(d). See Kensington Vol. Fire Dept., Inc. v.
Montgomery Cty., 788 F.Supp.2d 431, 436–37 (D.Md. 2011), aff’d sub nom. Kensington Volunteer
Fire Dep’t, Inc. v. Montgomery Cty., 684 F.3d 462 (4th Cir. 2012). In the Court’s discretion, it will
not convert Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss into a Motion for Summary Judgment. Accordingly, the
Court will not consider any extra pleading materials outside of Tarpley’s Complaint.
1. Retaliation Claim
Tarpley’s Complaint largely alleges that Defendants unlawfully retaliated against him. In
order to prevail on a claim of retaliation, Tarpley must first allege “the retaliatory act was taken in
response to the exercise of a constitutionally protected right.” Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 75 (4th
Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1022 (1995). Second, Tarpley must demonstrate he suffered some
adverse impact or actual injury. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Md., Inc. v. Wicomico Cty., 999 F.2d
780, 785 (4th Cir. 1993) (citing Huang v. Board of Governors of Univ. of North Carolina, 902 F.2d
1134, 1140 (4th Cir. 1990)). Third, Tarpley must allege “that but for the retaliatory motive the
complained of incident[s] . . . would not have occurred.” Scott v. Kelly, 107 F. Supp. 2d 706, 711
(E.D. Va. 2000), aff'd sub nom. Scott v. Moore, 6 F. App'x 187 (4th Cir. 2001). Additionally, “[i]n
the prison context, we treat such claims with skepticism because ‘[e]very act of discipline by prison
officials is by definition ‘retaliatory’ in the sense that it responds directly to prisoner misconduct.’”
Cochran v. Morris, 73 F.3d 1310, 1317 (4th Cir. 1996) (quoting Adams, 40 F.3d 72, 74 (4th Cir.
Here, Tarpley premises his retaliation claim mostly on Defendants allegedly retaliating
against him for “providing legal assistance” to other inmates at NBCI, filing ARP complaints against
Defendants, and prevailing in an NBCI disciplinary hearing. (Compl. at 17–19). Tarpley does not
have a constitutionally protected right to provide assistance to other inmates on legal matters,
however. Thaddeaus–X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing Gibbs v. Hopkins, 10 F.3d
373, 378 (6th Cir. 1993)); Munz v. Nix, 908 F.2d 267, 269 (8th Cir. 1990); see also, e.g., McCoy v.
Stouffer, No. WDQ-10-1583, 2013 WL 4451079, at *18 (D.Md. Aug. 15, 2013) (granting motion for
summary judgment in favor of prison staff because, inter alia, there is no constitutional protection for
serving as a “jailhouse lawyer”). Nor does Tarpley have a constitutionally protected right in this
Circuit to participate in an administrative remedy or other grievance process voluntarily established
by the state. Adams, 40 F.3d at 75. Accordingly, the Court finds that Tarpley fails to state a
retaliation claim to the extent he bases it on providing assistance on legal matters, filing ARP
complaints, or prevailing in a disciplinary hearing.
Tarpley also premises his retaliation claim on Defendants allegedly retaliating against him for
succeeding in a motion for preliminary injunction against Warden Shearin. (Compl. at 16, 17).3
Specifically, Tarpley alleges that in retaliation for prevailing over Warden Shearin in a motion for
preliminary injunction, Defendants Dolley and Gentzler planted a razorblade in his cell and then
Tarpley alleges the motion was filed in a case before the Circuit Court for Allegany
County, Case No. 01-C-11-036008.
wrote a report falsely accusing him of possessing a weapon in violation of NBCI rules. (Compl. at
10, 16, 18). Tarpley further alleges that the discovery of the razorblade caused officers to refuse him
lunch that day and transfer him to the Special Housing Unit, NBCI’s segregation unit. (Compl. at
18). Tarpley further states that in a separate incident in August 2013, Defendant Soltas threatened
him for filing lawsuits by saying “the squeaky wheel gets bumped around a lot here.” (Compl. at
12). Soltas also refused to return Tarpley’s property after discovering a threatening note allegedly
planted by Soltas, even though some of the property related to Tarpley’s pleadings due in ten days.
(Compl. at 12–13, 19).
An inmate has no general constitutional right to be free from being falsely accused in a
misbehavior report. See Freeman v. Rideout, 808 F.2d 949, 951 (2nd Cir. 1986). But unlike
participation in an administrative remedy procedure, the “filing of a lawsuit carries significant
constitutional protections, implicating the First Amendment right to petition the government for
redress of grievances, and the right of access to courts.” Am. Civil Liberties Union of Md., 999 F.2d
at 785 (quoting Hoeber on Behalf of NLRB v. Local 30, 939 F.2d 118, 126 (3rd Cir. 1991)). In order
to state a retaliation claim, Tarpley is required to show that NBCI’s actions “adversely impacted
these First Amendment rights.” Id. (emphasis added). Thus, if NBCI’s actions did not “chill, impair,
or deny [Tarpley]’s right to exercise his constitutional right, the allegations fail to state a retaliation
claim cognizable under § 1983.” Oliver v. Powell, 250 F.Supp.2d 593, 600 (E.D.Va. 2002) (quoting
Ballance v. Young, 130 F.Supp.2d 762 (W.D.Va. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, to the extent Tarpley premises his retaliation claim on alleged conduct that occurred
after he prevailed on his motion for preliminary injunction, he fails to state a claim. Nowhere does
Tarpley allege any adverse impact on his ability to prosecute his civil action before the Circuit Court
of Allegany County or any other civil action. Tarpley never states that any of the harms he alleged—
refusing him lunch, transferring him to the Special Housing Unit, verbal threats, or confiscating his
property—chilled, impaired, or denied him his right to prosecute any litigation.4 See Oliver, 250 F.
Supp. 2d at 600 (granting summary judgment in favor of prison employees on inmate’s retaliation
claim because inmate never alleged the false, retaliatory disciplinary charges harmed his litigation).
Accordingly, the Court finds that Tarpley fails to state a claim for retaliation.
2. Eighth Amendment Claim
Tarpley alleges an Eighth Amendment claim of failure to protect from violence. In order to
prevail, Tarpley must establish that Defendants exhibited deliberate or callous indifference to a
specific known risk of harm. See Pressly v. Hutto, 816 F.2d 977, 979 (4th Cir. 1987) (citing Davis v.
Zahradnick, 600 F.2d 458, 460 (4th Cir. 1979)).
Prison conditions may be restrictive and even harsh, but gratuitously
allowing the beating or rape of one prisoner by another serves no
legitimate penologicial objective, any more than it squares with
evolving standards of decency. Being violently assaulted in prison is
simply not part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their
offenses against society.
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833–34 (1994) (citations omitted). For a prison official to be
found liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement,
“the official [must know] of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate . . . safety; the official must
both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious
harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837; see also Rich v. Bruce, 129 F.3d 336,
338 (4th Cir. 1997). A two-part inquiry that includes both an objective and a subjective component
must be satisfied before liability is established. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, 837.
Tarpley did state that while in a contingency cell after fighting one of his cellmates, he was
denied his welfare commissary, which included a writing pad, envelopes, pens, and other items
“important and necessary” for his case before the Circuit Court for Allegeny County. (Compl. at 9).
He alleged, however, that this occurred on December 24th, 2012, before Tarpley prevailed on his
motion for preliminary injunction on March 4, 2013. Id. Nowhere did Tarpley allege that the denial
of his commissary hurt his litigation at any point in that case.
Objectively, the prisoner “must establish a serious deprivation of his rights in the form of a
‘serious or significant physical or emotional injury’ or substantial risk to either injury.” Danser v.
Stansberry, 772 F.3d 340, 346–47 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). The objective
inquiry requires this Court to “assess whether society considers the risk that the prisoner complains
of to be so grave that it violates contemporary standards of decency to expose anyone unwillingly to
such a risk.” Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 36 (1993). Subjectively, a plaintiff must establish
that the prison official involved had “a sufficiently culpable state of mind” amounting to “deliberate
indifference to inmate health or safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (citations omitted). Evidence
establishing a culpable state of mind requires actual knowledge of an excessive risk to the prisoner’s
safety or proof that prison officials were aware of facts from which an inference could be drawn that
a substantial risk of serious harm exists and that the inference was drawn. Id. at 837. Where prison
officials responded reasonably to a risk, they may be found free of liability. Id. at 844.
Here, Tarpley alleges Defendants Miller and Iser “deliberately and maliciously” placed him
in cells with inmates affiliated with gangs Tarpley has fought against.
(Compl. at 20).
allegations fail to meet the objective component of Eighth Amendment liability.
accompanying injuries Tarpley states are the administrative penalties resulting from his refusal of the
housing assignments. (Compl. at 14–15). These administrative penalties demonstrate neither a
serious physical injury nor a serious emotional injury, nor do they put Tarpley at a substantial risk to
either injury. See Danser, 772 F.3d at 346–47 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). Accordingly, the
Court finds that Tarpley fails to state an Eighth Amendment claim of failure to protect from violence.
Tarpley also alleges an Eighth Amendment claim of excessive force for Miller’s use of
pepper spray and Iser’s subsequent denial of a decontamination shower. Whether force used by
prison officials was excessive is determined by inquiring if “force was applied in a good-faith effort
to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.”
McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6–7 (1992). This Court must look at the need for application of force; the
relationship between that need and the amount of force applied; the extent of the injury inflicted; the
extent of the threat to the safety of staff and inmates as reasonably perceived by prison officials; and
any efforts made to temper the severity of the response. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321
(1986). The absence of significant injury, alone, is not dispositive of a claim of excessive force.
Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 34 (2010). The extent of injury incurred is one factor indicative of
whether the force used was necessary in a particular situation, but if force is applied maliciously and
sadistically, liability is not avoided simply because the prisoner had the good fortune to escape
serious harm. Id. at 38.
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756 (4th Cir. 1996), provides
additional guidance for courts when considering claims relating to the use of mace, tear gas, or other
like substances. These additional considerations inform the second and fourth prongs of the Whitley
test, as “it is generally recognized that ‘it is a violation of the Eighth Amendment for prison officials
to use mace, tear gas or other chemical agents in quantities greater than necessary for the sole
purpose of infliction of pain.’” Williams, 77 F.3d at 763 (quoting Soto v. Dickey, 744 F.2d 1260,
1270 (7th Cir. 1984)). Thus, in this Circuit the use of pepper spray or tear gas in correctional
facilities is carefully scrutinized because of their “inherently dangerous characteristics capable of
causing serious and perhaps irreparable injury to the victim.” Id.
When reviewing a claim that the use of pepper spray or mace constituted excessive force, “it
is necessary to examine the totality of the circumstances, including provocation, the amount of gas
used, and the purpose for which the gas is used to determine the validity of the use of tear gas in the
prison environment.” Id. (quoting Slackan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 372 (4th Cir. 1984)). Pepper
spray or mace is constitutionally permitted in small quantities to “control a recalcitrant inmate.” Id.
(quoting Landman v. Peyton, 370 F.2d 135, 138 & n.2 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 920
(1967)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Because “limited use” of pepper spray or mace
“constitutes a relatively ‘mild’ response compared to other forms of force, the initial application of
mace indicates a ‘tempered’ response by the prison officials.” Id.
Here, Tarpley alleges his cellmate, Richard Owens, put his arm through the slot in their cell
door to keep their cell door open and that in response, Defendant Miller used pepper spray on
Tarpley and Owens, allegedly departing from the normal response of getting a Sergeant to talk to
Owens. (Compl. at 13). Tarpley admits Owens was holding the slot open on Tarpley’s behalf. See
id. (“Owens elected to put his arm out . . . so [the Sergeant] may be informed of his officer[‘]s
unreasonable refusal to return Plaintiff’s property.”). Tarpley states him and Owens were charged
with NBCI rule violations for their conduct. Id. Tarpley further states that while Iser provided
Owens with a shower after the incident, he did not provide Tarpley with one. (Compl. at 13, 19).
Tarpley fails to state an Eighth Amendment claim of excessive force for Miller’s use of
Tarpley admits in his Complaint that he and Owens were working together to
purposefully break NBCI rules in order to gain an officer’s attention. (Compl. at 13). Applying the
Whitley factors, Owens and Tarpley provoked Miller to use the pepper spray when Owens stuck his
arm out their cell door slot, which the Fourth Circuit has recognized “pos[es] a danger to officers
who might walk by [their] cell.” Grayson v. Peed, 195 F.3d 692, 696 (4th Cir. 1999). By working
together to break NBCI rules, Tarpley and Owens were admittedly “recalcitrant inmate[s],”
permitting Miller to use pepper spray in small quantities under the Constitution. Williams, 77 F.3d at
763. Tarpley does not allege that the amount of gas was excessive; he simply objects to Miller’s use
of the gas at all, rather than getting a Sergeant. (Compl. at 13). Miller’s use of pepper spray
indicates a “mild” and “tempered” response to the rule violation, however. Williams, 77 F.3d at 763.
And while not dispositive, Tarpley’s failure to plead any injury associated with Miller pepper
spraying him indicates Miller’s use of force was necessary in this situation. Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 38.
Accordingly, the Court finds that Tarpley fails to state an Eighth Amendment claim of excessive
force for Miller’s use of pepper spray. Because Tarpley also fails to allege any injury associated with
Iser’s denial of a decontamination shower, the Court likewise finds that Tarpley fails to state an
Eighth Amendment claim premised on Iser’s denial.
Even when the facts are viewed in the light most favorable to Tarpley, the Court concludes
that Tarpley fails to state an Eighth Amendment claim. To the extent Tarpley states a claim under
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, it likewise fails. See Brown v. Harris, 240
F.3d 383, 388 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding the standard of deliberate indifference is the same under the
Eighth Amendment and Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
The Court will,
therefore, grant Defendants’ Motion.
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Motion for
Summary Judgment (ECF. No. 22) and Motion for Extension of Time (ECF. No. 21) are
GRANTED. Plaintiff’s Motion to Service Process on Defendants (ECF No. 10) is DENIED. The
Complaint (ECF No. 1) is DISMISSED. The Clerk shall CLOSE this case.
A separate Order follows.5
Entered this 21st day of September, 2016
George L. Russell, III
United States District Judge
Having found no constitutional violation, the Court need not address Defendants’ argument
of qualified immunity. Additionally, to the extent the Complaint can be construed as raising state
law claims, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3)
(2012); United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?