Randolph v. US Attorney of Maryland et al

Filing 5

MEMORANDUM. Signed by Judge J. Frederick Motz on 4/30/2015. (c/m 5/1/2015 nd2s, Deputy Clerk)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

CA THERlNE DENISE RANDOLPH
Plaintiff,
v.

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U.S. ATTORNEY OF MARYLAND
ROD ROSENSTEIN, et al.
UNKNOWN DEFENDANTS
Defendants.

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CIVIL ACTION NO. JFM-15-ll37

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*****
MEMORANDUM

Catherine Denise Randolph ("Randolph"),

a resident of 4232 Shamrock Avenue in

Baltimore, Maryland, filed this self-represented action on April 21, 2015, naming her unknown
next-door neighbors and Rod Rosenstein, the current United States Attorney for the District of
Maryland, as defendants.

She bases her case on federal question jurisdiction and asks that "real

parties at 4234 Shamrock Avenue be prosecuted for "prohibited wiretap, eavesdropping
recording devices."
In her statement of facts she states:
"J am Catherine Denise Randolph making a statement of claim for the court to
redress my constitutional rights - Ist, 4th, 5th, 7th, 8th, and 9th Amendment for good
cause. J need my dignity, privacy and respect restored from social media thieves
(identity theft). J am deprived of my life 9 (loss time [and] loss wages) years ongoing
intentional disclosure with public court record - Circuit Court for Baltimore City
both criminal cases #506069025 & 506069026. No convictions pending untimely 6
years. Also currently, 1 am being misappropriated of character by my unknown
neighbors['] unlawful possession of government devices 24/7 intentional disclosure
at their home office address: 4234 Shamrock Avenue, Baltimore, Maryland 21206.
Please grant my relief good cause: recovery of civil damages - intentional disclosure
9 years dignity, harm, punitive damages, statutory damages, injunction relief and
declaratory relief to help restore my constitutional rights. Jury demand $3 billion
dollars."

[and]

ECF No. I at pg. 2.1

Randolph seeks a hearing, relief to "uphold Federal Rule 65," a

preliminary injunction with restraining orders, and 3 Billion dollars in damages.

ECF No. I at

pg. 3 & civil cover sheet.
Randolph has moved to proceed in forma pauperis. ECF NO.2.
2015, she filed a motion to amend. ECF NO.3.

In addition, on April 23,

Because she appears indigent, her motion to

proceed without the prepayment of the civil filing fee shall be granted.

Randolph's

complaint

shall, however, be summarily dismissed and her motion to amend shall be denied as moot.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

S

1915, courts are required to screen a plaintiffs

complaint when

in forma pauperis status has been granted. Therefore, pursuant to this statute, numerous courts
. have performed a preliminary screening of non-prisoner complaints.
Cnty.,

s.c.,

See Michau v. Charleston

434 F.3d 725, 727 (4th Cir. 2006) (applying 28 U.S.c.

S

1915(e)(2)(B)

preliminary screen a non-prisoner complaint); Troville v. Venz, 303 F.3d 1256, 1260 (lith
2002) (applying

S 1915(e)

W.Va. 2013) (28 U.S.c.

S

to
Cir.

to non-prisoner actions); Evans v. Albaugh, 2013 WL 5375781 (N. D.
1915(e) authorizes dismissal of complaints filed in forma pauperis).2

A complaint is frivolous if it is without "an arguable basis in law or fact."
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). In this case plaintiff is self-represented.

Neitzke v.

When reviewing a

Randolph cites to Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 15, 17 and 65and makes a conclusory reference to
18 U.S.C. ~~ ~ 2513, 2520, & 3771. ECF No. I at pg. 2. Further, her complaint was accompanied by a
questionnaire and photocopies of various federal rules. ld. at attachment.
2

Title 28 U.S.c. Section 1915(e)(2)(B) provides:

(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the
court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that(B) the action or appeal(i) is frivolous or malicious;
(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or
(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.
2

,.

self-represented

complaint, courts hold it "to less stringent standards than formal pleadings

drafted by lawyers ... " Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).

A court, however, may

dismiss a claim as frivolous if "the facts alleged are 'clearly baseless.'"

Denton v. Hernandez,

504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992) (citing Neitzke, 404 U.S. at 327).
Under 28 U.S.C.

S

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), the court must also dismiss plaintiffs

fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.
pleadings are to be liberally construed, plaintiffs

complaint ifit

Although a self-represented

plaintiffs

complaint must contain factual allegations

sufficient "to raise a right to relief above the speculative level" and that "state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007).

It is

axiomatic that "the requirements for pleading a proper complaint are substantially aimed at
assuring that the defendant be given adequate notice of the nature of a claim being made against
him ...." Francis v. Giacomelli. 588 F.3d 186, 192 (4th Cir. 2009). In addition, Supreme Court
precedent leaves no doubt that the factual allegations in a complaint "must be enough to raise a
right to relief above the speculative level," Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, and "must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,"
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
Although the plausibility standard is not akin to a "probability requirement," it asks for "more
than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. Thus, when a complaint
pleads facts that are "merely consistent with a defendant's

liability, it stops short of the line

between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief." !d.

This "plausibility standard

requires a plaintiff to demonstrate more than 'a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully.'''

See Francis, 588 FJd at 193 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

3

Sections 2513 and 2520 of Title 18 of the U.S. Code are criminal statutes and do not
provide a basis to impose civil liability. Flowers v. Tandy Corp., 773 F.2d 585, 588-89 (4th Cir.
1985). Moreover, to the extent that Randolph asserts she is a crime victim, this court has no
authority to initiate criminal charges. The decision whether or not to prosecute, and for what
offense, rests with the prosecution. See, e.g., Borderkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978).
The Supreme Court said in Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973): "[I]n American
jurisprudence at least, a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or
nonprosecution

of another." See also Banks v. Buchanan, 336 Fed. Appx. 122, 123 (3d Cir.

2009); Sargeant v. Dixon, 130 F.3d 1067, 1069 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Sibley v. Obama, 866 F. Supp.
2d 17, 22 (D. D.C. 2012). If Randolph seeks to pursue criminal charges, she must bring her
allegations to the attention oflaw enforcement authorities.
Moreover, Randolph has failed to set out any particular claims against the named
defendant, the United States Attorney for the District of Maryland.

Further, the factual

assertions and legal conclusions raised in the document regarding Randolph's unidentified nextdoor neighbors amount to rambling statements of blanket criminal and civil rights violations.
The allegations are "so confused, ambiguous, vague, or otherwise unintelligible

that its true

substance, if any, is well disguised," and thus may be dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P l2(b)(I).
Cir. 1988).

See Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40,42 (2d

The document contains no allegations of legal significance, fails to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted, and must be dismissed.
Moreover, the court observes that since August 25,2014, Randolph has filed eleven prior
cases regarding alleged wiretapping and interception of communications by her neighbor at 4234

4

Shamrock Avenue. J

The complaints were accompanied by various motions.

summarily dismissed and appeals ensued.

They were all

Given the summary dismissal of the complaint,

however, the court does not believe that the imposition of a filing injunction is necessary.
Randolph is placed on notice, however, that if she attempts to file another frivolous complaint
alleging that defendants are using devices to invade her privacy, such an action would constitute
an abuse of the judicial process.

District courts have "inherent power to control the judicial

process and litigation" when necessary to address conduct that abuses the judicial process.
v. General

Silvestri

Motors

Corp.,

271 F.3d 583, 590 (4th Cir. 2001).

This court has an

obligation to protect the public and the efficient administration of justice from individuals who
have a history of litigation involving vexation, harassment, and needless expense to other parties
and an unnecessary burden on the courts and their supporting personnel.

See Safir v. United

States Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 19,24 (2d Cir. 1986); Cromer v. Kraft Foods N Am., Inc., 390 F.3d

812,818 (4th Cir. 2004). Randolph is forewarned that filing similar actions will not be tolerated.
She is placed on notice that if she persists in filing such complaints, the court may require that
she show cause why leave of the court should not be sought before she submits such filings or
why sanctions should not be imposed against her under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.4 A separate Order

See Randolph v. State of Maryland, Civil Action No. GLR-14-2713 (D. Md.); Randolph
v. New Technology, Civil Action No. ELH-14-3068 (D. Md.); Randolph v. Baltimore City States
Attorney, Civil Action No. WDQ-14-3176 (D. Md.); Randolph v. Us. Attorney General, Civil Action No.
GLR-14-3298 (D. Md.); Randolph v. United States, et 01., Civil Action No. JFM-14-3609 (D. Md.);
Randolph v. Us. Attorney, Civil Action No. CCB-15-9 (D. Md.); Randolph v. Holder, Civil Action No.
JKB-15-314 (D. Md.); Randolph v. Holder, et 01., Civil Action No. JFM-15-552 (D. Md.); Randolph v.
Us. Attorney General, Civil Action No. CCB-15-785 (D. Md.); Randolph v. Us. Attorney General, Civil
Action No. ELH-15-916 (D. Md.); and Randolph v. Us. Attorney General. Civil Action No. ELH-15-982
(D. Md.).
4

For example, the court may impose a pre-filing sanction such as that imposed in
McMahon v. F & M Bank-Winchester, 45 F.3d 426 (4'h Cir. 1994) (vexatious litigant barred from filing
any civil action in any federal court without leave of court and requires litigant to certifY in application for

5

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shall be entered reflecting the rulings entered herein.

Date: AprilJ -;"2015
ederick Motz
ited States District Judge

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