Carpenter et al v. Brentwood BWI One, LLC, et al

Filing 9

MEMORANDUM. Signed by Judge Ellen L. Hollander on 5/29/2015. (bmhs, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
JANICE CARPENTER, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.

Civil Action No. ELH-15-01431

BRENTWOOD BWI ONE, LLC, et
al.
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM
On March 27, 2015, plaintiffs Janice Carpenter, Aziz A. Matar, Melody Isaac, Thomas V.
Jones, and Sarah Jones filed suit in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, Maryland,
against defendants Brentwood BWI One, LLC (“Brentwood”) and JMC Mechanical Services,
Inc. (“JMC”).

See ECF 2 (“Complaint”).

Plaintiffs seek to recover damages for injuries

allegedly sustained as a result of a carbon monoxide leak that occurred in February 2014 at the
Westin Hotel at Baltimore Washington International Airport, located in Linthicum Heights,
Maryland. Id. ¶ 1.
Plaintiffs are “residents” of Maryland and Michigan. ECF 1 ¶ 3 (“Notice of Removal”).
Brentwood is an LLC organized under the laws of Virginia, and JMC is a Maryland corporation.
Id. ¶¶ 4, 5. In particular, the Complaint includes four counts. Carpenter and Matar have sued
Brentwood for negligence (Count I); Carpenter and Matar have brought a respondeat superior
negligence claim against Brentwood (Count II); Carpenter, Matar, Isaac, and Thomas Jones have
sued JMC for negligence (Count III); and Sarah Jones has sued JMC for Loss of Consortium
(Count IV). Id. ¶¶ 53-85.
JMC removed the action to this Court on May 19, 2015. ECF 1. Removal is founded
solely on the basis of supplemental jurisdiction. Id. ¶¶ 9, 12. In particular, in the Notice of

Removal, JMC asserts that because the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over a pending
related case, McKisset v. Brentwood BWI One, LLC, et al., Case No. WDQ-14-1159, the Court
should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the case sub judice. ECF 1 ¶¶ 6, 12.
McKisset is a class action suit, and it arises from injuries sustained as a result of the same
carbon monoxide leak that is the subject of the litigation in this case. Id. ¶¶ 6, 7. According to
the Notice of Removal, McKisset was removed to federal court on the basis of diversity
jurisdiction. Id. ¶ 6. Moreover, McKisset involves the same two defendants named in this case.
Defendant thus asserts that McKisset “concern[s] the same operative facts and will require an
adjudication of the same liability issues” as the case at bar. Id. ¶ 8.1 In addition, JMC posits:
“Judicial economy requires that this Court exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the issues
contained herein.” Id. ¶ 16.
For the reasons that follow, I conclude there is no basis for subject matter jurisdiction in
the case at bar. Therefore, I must remand the case to the State court.
In Home Buyers Warranty Corp. v. Hanna, 750 F.3d 427, 432 (4th Cir. 2014), the Fourth
Circuit said: “Fundamental to our federal system is the principle that ‘[f]ederal courts are courts
of limited jurisdiction.’” (quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377
(1994)) (alteration in Hanna); see United States ex rel. Voyyuru v. Jadhov, 555 F.3d 337, 347 (4th
Cir. 2009). Thus, a federal district court may only adjudicate a case if it possesses the “power
authorized by Constitution and statute.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S.
546, 552 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205
(2007). If a party seeks to proceed in federal court, it “must allege and, when challenged, must
demonstrate the federal court’s jurisdiction over the matter.” Strawn v. AT & T Mobility LLC,
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Two third-party defendants have also been sued in McKisset. See WDQ-14-1159, ECF

41.
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530 F.3d 293, 296 (4th Cir. 2008). Indeed, “if Congress has not empowered the federal judiciary
to hear a matter, then the case must be dismissed.” Hanna, 750 F.3d at 432.
Notably, a federal court has “an independent obligation to determine whether subjectmatter jurisdiction exists, even when no party challenges it.” Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77,
94 (2010). Moreover, “[a] court is to presume . . . that a case lies outside its limited jurisdiction
unless and until jurisdiction has been shown to be proper.” United States v. Poole, 531 F.3d 263,
274 (4th Cir. 2008) (citing Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377). This is because “jurisdiction goes to the
very power of the court to act.” Ellenburg v. Spartan Motors Chassis, Inc., 519 F.3d 192, 196
(4th Cir. 2008). Therefore, “before a federal court can decide the merits of a claim, the claim
must invoke the jurisdiction of the court.” Miller v. Brown, 462 F.3d 312, 316 (4th Cir. 2006)
(citing Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990)).
Of import here, “[s]ubject matter jurisdiction cannot be forfeited or waived, and can be
raised by a party, or by the court sua sponte, at any time prior to final judgment.” In re Kirkland,
600 F.3d 310, 314 (4th Cir. 2010); see McCulloch v. Vélez, 364 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2004) (“It is
black-letter law that a federal court has an obligation to inquire sua sponte into its own subject
matter jurisdiction.”); see also Snead v. Board of Educ. of Prince George’s County, 815 F. Supp.
2d 889, 893-94 (D. Md. 2011). And, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3), “the court must
dismiss the action” if it determines that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See also
Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 506-07 (2006).
Section 1441(a) of Title 28 of the United States Code provides that removal is proper
only when the federal district court has “original jurisdiction” over the state court case. Congress
has conferred jurisdiction on the federal courts in several ways. To provide a federal forum for
plaintiffs who seek to vindicate federal rights, Congress has conferred on the district courts

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original jurisdiction over civil actions that arise under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States. Exxon Mobil Corp., 545 U.S. at 552; 28 U.S.C. § 1331; see also U.S. CONST. art.
III, § 2 (“The Judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made. . . .”) This ground does not apply
here.
In addition, “Congress . . . has granted district courts original jurisdiction in civil actions
between citizens of different States, between U.S. citizens and foreign citizens, or by foreign
states against U.S. citizens,” so long as the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. Exxon
Mobil Corp., 545 U.S. at 552; see 28 U.S.C. § 1332. This so-called diversity jurisdiction
“requires complete diversity among parties, meaning that the citizenship of every plaintiff must
be different from the citizenship of every defendant.” Cent. W. Virginia Energy Co., Inc. v.
Mountain State Carbon, LLC, 636 F.3d 101, 103 (4th Cir. 2011); see Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7
U.S. 267 (1806). Diversity jurisdiction is not satisfied here. This is because several plaintiffs
and one defendant are domiciled in Maryland.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), the court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over related
state law claims within an action. Section § 1367(a) provides (emphasis added):
[I]n any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the
district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so
related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part
of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States
Constitution.
According to the plain language of § 1367(a), in order for a court to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction, there must already be an independent basis for original jurisdiction
within the same action. In other words, “[s]upplemental jurisdiction is not a source of original
subject-matter jurisdiction, and a notice of removal may therefore not base subject-matter

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jurisdiction on supplemental jurisdiction, even if the action the defendant seeks to remove on that
basis is related to another action over which the federal district court already has subject-matter
jurisdiction, and even if removal would be efficient.” 29A KARL OAKES, FED. PROC., L. ED. §
69:19. Put another way, supplemental jurisdiction does not create an independent basis for
removal to federal court.

Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 34 (2002)

(“Ancillary jurisdiction . . . cannot provide the original jurisdiction that petitioners must show in
order to qualify for removal under § 1441.”); 1-8 MOORE’S MANUAL—FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 8.21 (“[R]emoval may not be based on a supplemental or ancillary claim alone.”).
Trexler v. Richland County Humane SPCA, No. 5:09-02173-RBH, 2009 WL 3446764
(D.S.C. Oct. 20, 2009), is edifying. In Trexler, plaintiffs filed suit in the South Carolina Court of
Common Pleas for Calhoun County. Id. at *1. The complaint lodged six state law claims
against the defendants. Id. In its notice of removal to federal court, the defendants argued that
the plaintiffs’ claims were removable pursuant to supplemental jurisdiction, because plaintiffs
had a related case pending in federal court pursuant to federal question jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1331.

Id.

In particular, defendants claimed that supplemental jurisdiction was

appropriate because the state court action arose out of “the same events and occurrences and is so
related to the claims of the plaintiffs’ pending federal action that they form part of the same case
or controversy.” Id. at *2.
Rejecting defendants’ argument, the Trexler Court explained, id. (citation omitted):
[S]upplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 is not an independent basis
for the removal of an action filed in state court that does not contain federal
claims . . . . For a court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law
claims, the claims within the original jurisdiction of the court must exist in the
same action as those state law claims. The defendants are attempting to append
state law claims from a separate state court action to an already pending federal
case in order to create subject matter jurisdiction for removal, a scenario not
contemplated by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1367 and 1441.
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In sum, the court concluded that the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in a related
case could not create a basis for removal in a separate case. Because the court in Trexler did not
find an independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction, the court remanded the case to the
South Carolina state court for disposition. Id. at *3.
Here, akin to Trexler, it is clear that the plaintiffs’ complaint does not arise under federal
law. And, in the Notice of Removal, JMC does not assert diversity jurisdiction. Instead, JMC
misapplies supplemental jurisdiction and relies on the diversity present in a wholly separate
action to suggest a basis for subject matter jurisdiction in this case. See ECF 1 ¶¶ 6, 12, Notice
of Removal.
To support its position that diversity in one case can create supplemental jurisdiction in a
related case, JMC relies on Rosmer v. Pfizer Inc., 263 F.3d 110 (4th Cir. 2001). ECF 1 ¶ 11,
Notice of Removal There, the Fourth Circuit stated: “Our view, respectfully, is that § 1367
confers supplemental jurisdiction in diversity class actions, so long as one named plaintiff has a
claim giving a federal court original jurisdiction.” Rosmer, 263 F.3d at 114. JMC’s reliance on
Rosmer is misplaced.
Rosmer concerned a class action law suit removed to federal court by the defendant
because a named member of the class, Louise Rosmer, satisfied the citizenship and amount-incontroversy requirements necessary to establish federal subject matter jurisdiction on the basis of
diversity. Rosmer, 263 F.3d at 122. The Fourth Circuit considered whether a district court could
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the claims of fellow class members within the action that
did not meet the amount-in-controversy requirement. Id. at 111, 122. The Rosmer Court
concluded: “Louise Rosmer is of diverse citizenship and her claim exceeds the amount in
controversy requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
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Consequently, federal courts have original

jurisdiction over it. Likewise, due to § 1367, federal courts have supplemental jurisdiction over
the claims of all class members whose claims do not exceed $75,000.” Id. at 122. Notably,
however, the holding in Rosmer concerned only related claims of fellow class members within
the particular diversity class action suit at issue.

It did not contemplate the exercise of

supplemental jurisdiction over claims in separate but related actions. Thus, Rosmer does not
establish a basis for supplemental jurisdiction in this case based on diversity in McKisset.
JMC also argues that “judicial economy” requires the exercise of supplemental
jurisdiction in view of the companion case pending before Judge Quarles. ECF 1 ¶ 16, Notice of
Removal. But, even if judicial economy were a ground to support removal, I would conclude
that removal would not further the interests of judicial economy. The McKisset case was filed
about a year before suit was filed in the case sub judice. Discovery in that case is nearing
completion. In this case, it does not appear that Brentwood has yet been served. Linking the
cases would inevitably delay the progress of McKisset.
For the reasons set forth herein, this case shall be remanded to the Circuit Court for Anne
Arundel County. An Order follows.

Date: May 29, 2015

/s/
Ellen L. Hollander
United States District Judge

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