Evans et al v. Arizona Cardinals Football Club, LLC et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM. Signed by Judge William M Nickerson on 2/25/2016. (nd2s, Deputy Clerk)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
ETOPIA EVANS et al.
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v.
ARIZONA CARDINALS FOOTBALL
CLUB, LLC et al.
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Civil Action No. WMN-15-1457
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MEMORANDUM
Before the Court is Defendants’ motion to transfer this
action to the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California.
ECF No. 23.
Also pending is
Defendants’ motion to dismiss this action on the grounds that
Plaintiffs’ claims are preempted under Section 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (Section 301), or, in
the alternative, are barred under the applicable statute of
limitations.
ECF No. 24.
Both motions are ripe.
Upon review
of the parties’ submissions and the applicable law, the Court
determines that no hearing is necessary, Local Rule 105.6, and
that the motion to transfer should be granted and the motion to
dismiss held for resolution by the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs in this action are 12 former players in the
National Football League (NFL) and the estate of one other
former NFL player.
Named as Defendants are the 32 member clubs
of the NFL (Clubs).
As summarized by the Plaintiffs in their
Opposition to the Motion to Transfer, they bring this action
against the Clubs
for conspiring to illegally dole out extraordinary
quantities of medications to players without
prescriptions, supervision, or informed consent and
often through unlicensed individuals, all in violation
of the Controlled Substances Act, the Food, Drug, &
Cosmetic Act, and analogous state laws. Defendants
did so to keep players on the field and maximize their
profit without any consideration of the lifelong costs
that Plaintiffs and the putative class would bear.
ECF No. 27 at 2.
They bring this action as a putative class
action composed of all retired NFL players similarly harmed.
On or about May 20, 2014, the same counsel representing
Plaintiffs in this action brought a similar action on behalf of
the same proposed plaintiff class in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of California.
Dent v. Nat’l
Football League, No. C 14-02324 WHA (N.D. Cal.).
Dent was
brought, not against the Clubs, but against the NFL.
As
summarized by Judge William Alsup, the district judge to whom
that case was assigned:
Here is the nub of it. Since 1969, doctors and
trainers from the individual clubs have allegedly
supplied players with a consistent string of pain
medications – including opioids, Toradol and other
non-steroidal anti-inflammatory medications, local
anesthetics, and combinations thereof – all in an
effort to return players to the game, rather than
allow them to rest and heal properly from serious,
2
football-related injuries. The medications “were
often administered without a prescription and with
little regard for a player's medical history or
potentially-fatal interactions with other
medications,” and were distributed in ways that
violated federal laws (both criminal and civil) as
well as the American Medical Association's Code of
Ethics.
Dent, 2014 WL 7205048, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2014).
As have
the Clubs in the instant case, the NFL filed a motion to dismiss
on the ground that the plaintiffs’ claims were preempted under
Section 301.
The NFL also filed a separate motion to dismiss on
statute of limitations and other grounds.
After extensive
initial briefing, oral argument, followed by additional briefing
submitted at Judge Alsup’s request, Judge Alsup dismissed the
case as preempted under Section 301 and denied the second motion
to dismiss as moot.
Id. at *12.
In the memorandum and order granting the motion to dismiss
on preemption grounds, Judge Alsup gave the plaintiffs until
December 30, 2014, to file a motion for leave to file an amended
complaint.
Id. at 13.
When they did not do so, Judge Alsup
entered final judgment on December 31, 2014.
The plaintiffs in
Dent filed a notice of appeal on January 27, 2015, and filed
their initial appellate brief on or about October 9, 2015, after
requesting and receiving lengthy extensions of time from the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
That appeal remains pending.
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In the meantime, Plaintiffs filed this action on May 21,
2015.
When filing this suit, Plaintiffs, with appropriate
candor, indicated that Dent was a “related case” to this case.
Civil Cover Sheet, ECF No. 1-2.
In moving to transfer the case
to the Northern District of California under 28 U.S.C. § 1404,
the Clubs contend that the interest of justice would best be
served by that transfer, noting that the case would then be
assigned to Judge Alsup under that court’s “Related Cases” rule,
even though Dent has been dismissed and is currently on appeal.1
The Clubs suggest that because Judge Alsup is already familiar
with the facts and applicable law, transfer would best serve the
interests of judicial economy and transfer would also avoid the
possibility of inconsistent judgments.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Section 1404(a) provides that “[f]or the convenience of
parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district
1
The Northern District’s Local Rule 3-12(a) provides that “[a]n
action is related to another when: (1) The actions concern
substantially the same parties, property, transaction or event;
and (2) It appears likely that there will be an unduly
burdensome duplication of labor and expense or conflicting
results if the cases are conducted before different Judges.”
Local Rule 3-12(b) provides that, “[w]henever a party knows or
learns that an action, filed in or removed to this district is
(or the party believes that the action may be) related to an
action which is or was pending in this District as defined in
Civil L.R. 3-12(a), the party must promptly file in the lowestnumbered case an Administrative Motion to Consider Whether Cases
Should be Related, pursuant to Civil L.R. 7-11.” (emphasis
added).
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court may transfer any civil action to any other district or
division where it might have been brought.”
Thus, on a motion
to transfer, the Court must first determine whether the action
could have been brought in the transferee district.
If it could
have been so brought, the Court then considers and balances the
following factors: (1) the weight accorded to the plaintiff's
choice of venue, (2) witness convenience and access, (3)
convenience of the parties, and (4) the interest of justice.
TECH USA, Inc. v. Evans, 592 F. Supp. 2d 852, 857 (D. Md. 2009).
“[T]he statute provides no guidance as to the weight given . . .
[to] . . . the factors[.]”
Byerson v. Equifax Info. Servs.,
LLC, 467 F. Supp. 2d 627, 632 (E.D. Va. 2006); See 15 Wright,
Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3847 at 98
(2005) (noting that “the statute gives no hint about how these
broad categories are to be weighed against each other” and
collecting cases).
Some courts consider convenience the most
important factor; others have stated that “[t]he interest of
justice may be decisive . . . even though the convenience of the
parties and witnesses point in a different direction.”
467 F. Supp. 2d at 635.
Byerson,
The Court's decision “necessarily must
turn on the particular facts of the case,” and it “must consider
all the relevant factors to determine whether . . . on balance
the litigation would more conveniently proceed and the interests
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of justice be better served by transfer to a different forum.”
Id. at 632.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Case Could Have Been Brought in Transferee District
In that Plaintiffs’ counsel has already brought a similar
suit in the Northern District of California, Plaintiffs concede,
as they must, that this case could have been brought in that
district.
ECF No. 27 at 3.
There is no dispute that that court
has personal jurisdiction over the Clubs in that that Clubs do
business in that district; derive substantial revenue from their
contacts with that district; and two of the Clubs - the Oakland
Raiders and San Francisco 49ers - operate within that district.
Thus, the requirements of federal due process would readily be
satisfied in a suit in that district.
B. The Weight Given Plaintiffs’ Choice of Forum
In class actions, “‘the named plaintiff's choice of forum
is afforded little weight because in such a case, there will be
numerous potential plaintiffs, each possibly able to make a
showing that a particular forum is best suited for the
adjudication of the class' claim.’”
Byerson, 467 F. Supp. 2d at
633 (quoting Eichenholtz v. Brennan, 677 F. Supp. 198, 202
(S.D.N.Y. 1988), which cited, Koster v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty
Co., 330 U.S. 518, 524 (1947)).
Here, the weight of Plaintiffs’
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choice of forum is further lessened in that none of the Named
Plaintiffs resides in Maryland.2
C. Convenience of Witnesses and Parties
The factors of the convenience of witnesses and the
convenience of the parties perhaps tip slightly towards
Maryland.
Plaintiffs represent that only 5 of the 32 teams in
the NFL are within 1000 miles of San Francisco, whereas 20 of
the teams are within that distance of Baltimore.
See ECF No.
27-2 (chart showing distances between NFL stadiums).
Presumably, team trainers and physicians who would be potential
witnesses live near the city in which the team is located.
Potential class members may also reside near the city in which
they formerly played, although that is somewhat speculative.
Thus, it would appear that the travel burden might be greater
were the Court to transfer this case to Northern California.
This Court notes, however, that this is a burden that
Plaintiffs’ counsel apparently found inconsequential to the
potential class when filing Dent in that jurisdiction.
D. Interest of Justice
As Judge Alsup’s memorandum opinion in Dent clearly
evinces, he is well familiar with the factual allegations and
2
The deceased former NFL player, on behalf of whose estate one
of the Plaintiffs is suing, was a resident of Maryland at the
time of his death. ECF No. 1 ¶ 14. That particular Plaintiff,
however, is a resident of Louisiana. Id.
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the potentially dispositive legal issues in this litigation.
In
reaching his preemption decision, he reviewed a lengthy,
detailed, and extensive history of negotiations between the
Clubs and the players union concerning the medical rights and
medical care of players, as set out in numerous collective
bargaining agreements (CBAs), which span decades.
7205048 at *4-6.
Dent, 2014 WL
He committed substantial judicial resources
analyzing the scope of Section 301 preemption, particularly in
the context of the NFL, its Clubs, and its players.
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Id. at *8-
This Court has previously found that a transferee judge’s
“experience with the parties and his knowledge of the facts and
law . . .
weighs very strongly in favor of transferring” and
would “promote judicial economy and avoid the possibility of
inconsisten[cy].”
D2L Ltd. v. Blackboard, Inc., 671 F. Supp. 2d
768, 784 (D. Md. 2009), see also U.S. Ship Mgmt., Inc. v. Maersk
Line, Ltd., 357 F. Supp. 2d 924, 938 (E.D. Va. 2005) (observing
that “where a party has previously litigated a case involving
similar issues and facts, ‘a court in that district will likely
be familiar with the facts of the case.
As a matter of judicial
economy, such familiarity is highly desirable.’”)(quoting LG
Elec., Inc. v. Advance Creative Comput. Corp., 131 F. Supp. 2d
804, 815 (E.D. Va. 2001)).
In opposing transfer, Plaintiffs note that the named
plaintiffs in Dent were all different than Named Plaintiffs in
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this case and that the allegations are not precisely the same in
both cases.
As to the identification of the named plaintiffs,
because both groups purport to represent essentially the same
class, that becomes a distinction without a difference.
Furthermore, as clearly demonstrated by the comparison of the
crux of instant claims, as summarized by Plaintiffs themselves,
with “the nub” of the Dent claims, as summarized by Judge Alsup,
see supra, the gravamen of both suits is quite similar,3
rendering transfer in the best interest of justice.
See
Byerson, 467 F. Supp. 2d at 636 (“Transfer of this class action
. . . would promote judicial economy and consistency of results.
The class complaints are quite similar, involving . . . the same
basic conduct by the same [] defendants.
To be sure, there are
differences between this action and those pending [], but the
similarities are more significant than are the differences.”).
Plaintiffs also suggest that transfer is inappropriate
because Dent was filed against the NFL, where this case is filed
against the Clubs.
This Court notes that Plaintiffs make no
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Plaintiffs’ identification of this suit as a “related case”
further belies any claim that the suits are so dissimilar that
judicial economy would not be best served by transfer. Under
Local Rule 103(1)(b)(1), the designation of a case as “related”
reflects the belief that the related cases “arise from the same
or identical transactions, happenings, or events; involve the
identical parties or property; . . . [and/]or . . . would
entail substantial duplication of labor if heard by different
judges.”
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argument that Judge Alsup’s preemption analysis would be
substantially different as applied to the Clubs than as applied
to the NFL.4
They simply argue that Judge Alsup got it wrong.
See ECF No. 28, Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss at 7 (“[Defendants’
preemption] argument assumes that Dent got it right.
. . . .”).
It did not
Where, as here, “[t]he same counsel, seeking to
represent a nearly identical class, filed an earlier lawsuit
premised on the same allegedly unlawful activity in [another
district] . . . and receiv[ed] unfavorable rulings from that
Court,” and then filed suit in another district, a court “can
reasonably draw an inference from such conduct that Plaintiffs’
counsel are engaged in forum shopping.”
Madani v. Shell Oil
Co., Civ. No. C 07-04296 MJJ, 2008 WL 268986, at *3 (N.D. Cal.
Jan. 30, 2008).
“[E]vidence of plaintiff's attempt to avoid a
particular precedent from a particular judge weighs heavily in
the context of [the interest of justice] prong and would often
make the transfer of venue proper.”
Wireless Consumers All.,
Inc. v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. C 03-3711 MHP, 2003 WL 22387598,
at *5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2016).
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To the contrary, the plaintiffs’ counsel’s arguments in Dent at
least implicitly concede that the preemption defense is actually
more compelling for claims against the Clubs than for claims
against the NFL. See Dent, 2014 WL 7205048 at *7 (the
plaintiffs argued that they were suing the NFL, and not the
Clubs, and “thus interpretation of CBA provisions relating to
the individual clubs are completely unnecessary . . . .”).
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IV. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Court finds that the interest of
justice factor favoring transfer outweighs any minor increase in
the inconvenience to witnesses and parties that might be brought
about by such a transfer.
Accordingly Defendants’ Motion to
Transfer will be granted and this case will be transferred to
the United States District Court for the Northern District of
California.
A separate order will issue.
_______________/s/________________
William M. Nickerson
Senior United States District Judge
February 25, 2016
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