Blevins et al v. Piatt et al

Filing 21

MEMORANDUM. Signed by Judge Ellen L. Hollander on 12/4/2015. (bmhs, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
DANA D. BLEVINS, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.

Civil Action No. ELH-15-1551

JACOB A. PIATT, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM
This case arises from a motor vehicle accident that occurred in Harford County,
Maryland on May 9, 2013.

Dana Blevins and Garrett Brackins, plaintiffs, have filed a

negligence suit against defendants Jacob Piatt; James White, Jr.; and Beatrice White, asserting
diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. ECF 1. They allege that, at the time of the
occurrence, Brackins was operating a 2005 Dodge Ram Truck in which Blevins and one other
person were passengers. According to plaintiffs, Piatt was operating a vehicle owned by James
and Beatrice White, when he struck the vehicle of a third party and then struck the Dodge truck
operated by Mr. Brackins. Id.
In particular, the Complaint contains three counts. In Count I, plaintiffs allege negligence
against Mr. Piatt. In Count II, plaintiffs allege negligent entrustment against the Whites. And, in
Count III, they assert a claim against the Whites for negligent hiring or retention. James and
Beatrice White subsequently filed a Suggestion of Bankruptcy on October 12, 2015. See ECF
19. Therefore, the suit is stayed as to them.
Now pending is a “Motion To Strike” (ECF 7) filed by Piatt, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(f), supported by a Memorandum (ECF 7-1) (collectively, “Motion”). Piatt seeks to strike all
or part of the allegations in paragraphs 14, 15, 16, and 20(e) of the Complaint, as immaterial,

impertinent, and scandalous. See ECF 7. Plaintiffs oppose the Motion. ECF 13, Opposition;
ECF 13-1, Memorandum (collectively, “Opposition”). Piatt has filed a Reply. ECF 18.
The Motion has been fully briefed, and no hearing is necessary to resolve it. See Local
Rule 105.6. For the reasons stated below, I shall grant the Motion in part and deny it in part.
I.

The Disputed Allegations

As noted, Piatt seeks to strike all or part of the allegations contained in paragraphs 14, 15,
16, and 20(e) of the Complaint. ECF 7-1 at 2. In his view, the disputed allegations “are
prejudicial and are improperly included solely to portray Mr. Piatt in a negative light.” Id.
The allegations at issue are set forth below, with the underlining of the portions sought to
be stricken (ECF 7-1 at 2–3):
14. The damage done to Mr. Brackins’ vehicle was substantial, resulting in a total
loss to the vehicle. As a result of the heavy impact, Mr. Brackins, Ms. Blevins
and Ms. Mahala, who were all wearing seatbelts were violently thrown about and
against the interior of the vehicle.
15. As a result of the subject incident, Mr. Piatt was charged with the following
violations of Maryland law: (1) [controlled dangerous substance (“CDS”)]
possession of Paraphernalia; (2) CDS Possession of Marijuana; (3) Failure to
Obey Traffic Control Device; (4) Driving in Excess of Reasonable and Prudent
Speed; and (5) Failure to Drive on Right Half of Road.
16. On or about November 18, 2013, in the District Court of Maryland for
Harford County, Mr. Piatt was found guilty and was granted probation before
judgment on the charge of CDS Possession of Marijuana; was found guilty of

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Failure to Obey Traffic Control Device, and was granted Stets on the remaining
three charges.
20. e. failing to obey the laws and statutes of the State of Maryland, including, but
not limited to: failing to yield the right of way, failing to obey a traffic control
device, failing to drive within the marked lanes on a highway, failing to drive on
the right half of the road, failing to control speed to avoid an accident, driving in
excess of reasonable and prudent speed, driving under the influence of drugs
and/or alcohol, possession of controlled dangerous substance paraphernalia, and
possession of marijuana.
II.

Discussion
A.

Rule 12(f) provides, in part: “The court may strike from a pleading an insufficient
defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” See, .e.g., Haley Paint
Co. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 279 F.R.D. 331, 335 (D. Md. 2012). In determining
whether to grant a motion to strike, the court “enjoys wide discretion . . . in order to minimize
delay, prejudice and confusion by narrowing the issues for discovery and trial.” Id. at 336.
“Rule 12(f) motions are generally viewed with disfavor because striking a portion of a
pleading is a drastic remedy and because it is often sought by the movant simply as a dilatory
tactic.” Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Gilmore, 252 F.3d 316, 347 (4th Cir. 2001) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Renaissance Greeting Cards, Inc. v. Dollar Tree Stores, 227
Fed. App’x 239, 247 (4th Cir. 2007). Therefore, “[w]hen reviewing a motion to strike, ‘the court
must view the pleading under attack in a light most favorable to the pleader.’” Piontek v. Serv.
Ctrs. Corp., PJM 10-1202, 2010 WL 4449419, at *8–9 (D. Md. Nov. 5, 2010) (citation omitted).

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Rule 12(f) motions ordinarily “will be denied unless the matter under challenge has ‘no
possible relation to the controversy and may prejudice the other party.’” U.S. ex rel. Ackley v.
Int’l Bus. Machines Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 395, 406 (D. Md. 2000) (quoting Steuart Inv. Co. v.
Bauer Dredging Constr. Co., 323 F. Supp. 907, 909 (D. Md. 1971)); accord Williams v. Kettler
Mgmt. Inc., CCB-12-1226, 2014 WL 509474 (D. Md. Feb. 5, 2014); E.E.O.C. v. Spoa, LLC,
CCB-13-1615, 2014 WL 47337 (D. Md. Jan. 3, 2014). In contrast, “‘the disfavored character of
Rule 12(f) is relaxed in the context of scandalous allegations, i.e., those that improperly cast a
derogatory light on someone.’” Asher & Simons, P.A. v. J2 Global Canada, Inc., 965 F. Supp. 2d
701, 702 (D. Md. 2013) (citation omitted), partial reconsideration on other grounds, 977 F.
Supp. 2d 544 (D. Md. 2013).
To illustrate, “‘a defense that might confuse the issues in the case and would not, under
the facts alleged, constitute a valid defense to the action can and should be deleted.’” Waste
Mgmt. Holdings, 252 F.3d at 347 (quoting 5AA CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1381, 665 (2d ed. 1990)). On the other hand, a motion to
strike a defense “should not be granted when the sufficiency of the defense depends upon
disputed issues of fact or unclear questions of law.” NCUA v. First Union Capital Mtks. Corp.,
189 F.R.D. 158, 163 (D. Md. 1999); see Federal Ins. Co. v. Edenbaum, JKS-12-410, 2012 WL
2803739, at *2 (D. Md. July 9, 2012). Logically, this rationale also applies to allegations in a
complaint. In other words, the relevance of allegations may turn on disputed issues of fact or
law, so as to render it premature to strike them.
B.
As to paragraph 14, concerning the “total loss to the vehicle,” defendant maintains that
the matter of the property damage has been resolved between the parties’ insurers. ECF 7-1 at 3.

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In addition, Piatt contends that, under Md. Code, Ins. § 12-306, a settlement made by an insurer
may not be construed as an admission of liability in connection with claims arising from an
accident. Id. Moreover, because no property claims are at issue, Piatt contends that the damage
to the vehicle “is not relevant to any issue to be determined at trial.” Id. at 4.
Plaintiffs counter that evidence of physical damage to a vehicle is relevant as it pertains
to the force of impact. ECF 13-1 at 8. Moreover, they maintain that defendants’ contentions
raise evidentiary issues, not pleading issues. Id.
In Reply, defendant asserts that “a post-accident determination by an insurance company
concerning whether a vehicle was a total loss” is not relevant. In his view, an insurance
company’s determination as to whether to declare a vehicle a total loss “does not inform the factfinder concerning the [force of the] accident but could be improperly used to suggest a
determination, bearing on liability for the accident . . . .” ECF 18 at 4.
In this case, the vehicular accident occurred in 2013. At the time, Mr. Brackins was
operating a 2005 Dodge Ram truck. The force of the impact is obviously relevant to the suit.
And, to the extent damage to the vehicle relates to the force of impact, there is no basis to strike
allegations concerning damage to the truck.
However, the fact that an insurance company declared the vehicle a total loss has no
bearing on the force of the impact. That is an economic decision.
In general, when a plaintiff’s personal property has been physically damaged due to a
defendant=s tortious conduct, there are two ways to measure damages. 3 DOBBS, THE LAW
TORTS (2011), § 481 at 20. Dobbs explains, id. (footnotes omitted):
The first rule is the diminished value rule. It gives the plaintiff the difference
between the value of the property immediately before harm was done and the
value immediately afterwards.[] This measures the loss in capital value of the land
or chattel. The second rule is the cost rule. It gives the plaintiff the cost of repair
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or replacement (subject to appropriate adjustments for salvage).[] This measures
the potential cash impact upon the plaintiff. When the property is either
converted or totally destroyed by negligence, a special version of the diminished
value rule applies; the plaintiff recovers the value of the property at the time it
was destroyed or converted,[] or, in the case of conversion, at a reasonable time
thereafter.[]
As Dobbs observes, however, “[n]either rule works well in all cases.” He states, id. at 20:
If the cost of repair is much higher than the diminished value, sometimes the
diminished value should impose a ceiling on recovery because if repair costs are
higher that will usually mean that repairs would be economically foolish.
To determine the amount of compensation for damage to a motor vehicle, “it is necessary
to know at least three facts: the cost of repairs, the value of the vehicle immediately before the
injury, and the value of the vehicle immediately after the injury.” Kruvant v. Dickerman, 18 Md.
App. 1, 3, 305 A.2d 227, 229 (1973).
In Taylor v. King, 241 Md. 50, 213 A.2d 504 (1965), the Maryland Court of Appeals
discussed the measure of damages pertaining to a vehicle that was damaged in a collision but not
completely destroyed. Id. at 54-55, 213 A.2d at 507. The Taylor Court said that it is “clear that
the rule in Maryland[] with respect to the measure of damages for injury to a motor vehicle,
which has not been completely destroyed, is the reasonable cost of the repairs necessary to
restore it to substantially the same condition that it was in before the injury, provided the cost of
repairs is less than the diminution in market value due to the injury.” Id. at 54-55, 213 A.2d at
507. Conversely, the Taylor Court stated that, “when the cost of restoring a motor vehicle to
substantially the same condition is greater than the diminution in market value, the measure of
damages is the difference between the market value immediately before and immediately after
the injury.” Id. at 55, 213 A.2d at 507.

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Fred Frederick Motors, Inc. v. Krause, 12 Md. App. 62, 277 A.2d 464 (1971), also
provides guidance. There, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals considered the determination
of damages for a motor vehicle. Notably, the Krause Court said, id. at 64-65, 277 A.2d at 466:
[T]he position to which the injured party should be restored is the same, i.e.,
complete compensation for the injury. If the vehicle is completely destroyed, the
plaintiff receives the market value. To be consistent, the plaintiff should be put in
the same position when his injured vehicle is repairable; he should have a vehicle
of the same market value. If the repaired vehicle does not have the same market
value, the plaintiff should receive additional damages. To do otherwise would put
the plaintiff in a different position depending on whether the vehicle was partially
or completely destroyed. If the vehicle were partially destroyed, plaintiff would
receive a repaired vehicle that looked and operated the same but was worth less. If
the car were completely destroyed, plaintiff would receive the market value. This
disparity is removed by putting the plaintiff in the same position whether the car
is completely or partially destroyed. To do otherwise would violate the basic
principle that the injured party should, insofar as possible, be restored to his
original position before the accident.
Moreover, the Krause Court said, id. at 66-67, 277 A.2d at 467:
[I]f the plaintiff can prove that after repairs his vehicle has a diminished market
value from being injured, then he can recover in addition to the cost of repairs the
diminution in market value, provided the two together do not exceed the
diminution in value prior to the repairs.
The cases cited above reflect that the calculation of monetary compensation for a motor
vehicle damaged in an accident is a matter of economics, and may have no relation to the force
of impact. A vehicle could be declared a total loss if the cost of repairs exceeds its fair market
value.
Therefore, I shall grant the Motion as to the allegation of total loss, because that
allegation is irrelevant in the context of this case. However, this does not preclude plaintiffs
from alleging facts concerning the nature and extent of damage to the vehicle, because this may
be pertinent to the force of the impact.

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C.
Defendant challenges the reference to seatbelts in paragraph 14 of the Complaint,
asserting that it is irrelevant and prejudicial. He relies, inter alia, on Md. Code, Transp. § 22412.3(h)(2). It provides that “a party, witness, or counsel may not make reference to a seatbelt
during a trial of a civil action that involves property damage, personal injury, or death if the
damage, injury, or death is not related to the design, manufacture, installation, supplying, or
repair of a seat belt.” ECF 7-1 at 4. In defendant’s view, plaintiffs’ “allegations concerning
seatbelts are prejudicial in that they attempt to make an impermissible implication concerning the
impact of or damages resulting” from the accident. Id.
Plaintiffs counter that, in effect, Piatt has filed a premature motion in limine, seeking a
“trial evidentiary ruling,” which is improper at this juncture. ECF 13-1 at 10. Further, they
maintain that questions as to the admissibility of evidence are procedural in nature and therefore
federal law, not State law, applies. Id. (citing Bryte v. American Household, Inc., 429 F.3d 469,
475-76 (4th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1129 (2006)). And, they observe that contributory
negligence “remains the law of Maryland.” Id. (citing Coleman v. Soccer Ass’n of Columbia,
432 Md. 679, 69 A.3d 1149 (2013)). Therefore, plaintiffs assert: “Plaintiffs are entitled to
defend themselves against any suggestion that they did not take care for their own safety.” Id.
Defendant cites Ramrattan v. Burger King Corp., 656 F. Supp. 522, 527 (D. Md. 1987),
to support his contention that this Court should strike the reference to the use of seatbelts because
this information would be inadmissible at trial. In Ramrattan, the defendant sought to present
evidence at trial that plaintiffs were not wearing seatbelts at the time of the accident and
plaintiffs moved to preclude such evidence. Id. at 527. Of relevance here, the matter was
addressed in the context of a motion in limine, not a motion to strike. Judge Joseph Young

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granted the motion to preclude defendants from presenting such evidence at trial because
seatbelt use was not relevant to issues of contributory negligence in the context of that case. Id.
As plaintiffs point out, in Maryland a plaintiff who is contributorily negligent is barred
from recovery. And, because there is nothing scandalous or prejudicial about the allegations as
to their use, there is no basis to strike from the Complaint the allegation that plaintiffs wore their
seatbelts.
D.
Defendant challenges portions of paragraphs 15, 16, and 20(e), pertaining to the criminal
charges lodged against Mr. Piatt as a result of the accident, the disposition of those charges, and
the allegation that Piatt was driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol. ECF 7-1 at 5.
Defendant has attached as an exhibit copies of the docket report with respect to the charges (see
ECF 7-2) and acknowledges that, for purposes of the Motion, the Court may take judicial notice
of the criminal charges filed against Mr. Piatt.

ECF 7-1 at 5 (citing Fed. R. Evid. 201).

However, defendant maintains that “evidence of a conviction is inadmissible as substantive proof
in a subsequent civil suit arising from the offense for which the person is convicted.” ECF 7-1 at
5-6 (citing Briggeman v. Albert, 322 Md. 133, 137, 586 A.2d 15, 17 (1991)). Moreover, he
asserts that “there is no factual basis that supports the allegation that Mr. Piatt was under the
influence of drugs or alcohol; he was not charged with any such offense.” ECF 7-1 at 6.
Therefore, he contends that these assertions are unfounded and thus “scandalous.” Id.; see also
ECF 18 at 3-7.
Mr. Piatt was charged with several traffic offenses and two CDS offenses. He contends
that he did not plead guilty to any charges. ECF 7-1 at 5. He was granted probation before
judgment on the charge of possession of marijuana and was found guilty of failure to obey a

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traffic control device. Id. at 5. Three remaining charges were placed on the stet docket. ECF 72.
Citing Crane v. Dunn, 382 Md. 83, 101-02, 854 A.2d 1180, 1191 (2004), plaintiffs
contend that a guilty plea in open court, even for a traffic violation, is admissible as an admission
of a party opponent. ECF 13-1 at 11. Moreover, plaintiffs assert that because suit was just filed,
and no discovery has taken place, they “do not yet know all the circumstances surrounding”
Piatt’s conviction. Id. They also dispute any potential prejudice to defendant, given the public
record of his criminal proceedings. ECF 13-1 at 12. And, they maintain that the matter of the
admissibility of a conviction at trial, including a finding of probation before judgment, is for this
Court to determine. They rely, inter alia, on Leitman v. McAusland, 934 F.2d 46, 50 (4th Cir.
1991), in which the Court said: “A State evidentiary rule . . . does not control admissibility of
evidence in federal proceedings.”
In Reply, defendant insists that assessment of prejudice is not determined by whether a
matter is in the public record. ECF 18 at 1-2. And, as to the probation before judgment on the
CDS charge, he asserts that it is not a conviction at all, and so it cannot be used against him at
trial. Id. at 2. He cites Molter v. State, 201 Md. App. 155, 171-75, 28 A.3d 797 (2011), and
Fed. Ins. Co. v. Edenbaum, supra, JKS-12-410, 2012 WL 2803739 at *3. In addition, Piatt
claims that the allegation as to driving under the influence is “premature.” ECF 18 at 4.
Although Piatt asserts that the allegations are prejudicial (ECF 18 at 3), “Piatt does not
dispute that whether he was under the influence of drugs or alcohol would be relevant to
Plaintiffs’ claims.” Id. Moreover, he concedes that whether he was “under the influence of
anything is appropriately a subject of discovery. . . .” ECF 18 at 4.

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In Eagan v. Calhoun, 347 Md. 72, 86, 698 A.2d 1097, 1104 (1997), the Maryland Court
of Appeals said: “A criminal conviction is not conclusive of the facts behind it in a subsequent
civil proceeding, and, indeed, the conviction is ordinarily not even admissible in the civil action
as evidence of the underlying facts.” On the other hand, the court recognized that a plea of guilty
constitutes a judicial admission in Maryland. Id. at 87, 698 A.2d at 1105; see also Edenbaum,
2012 WL 2803739 (concluding that the defendant’s guilty plea was admissible as an admission
of a party opponent under Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)).
Apparently, Piatt did not plead guilty. Nonetheless, review of the Complaint persuades
me that the disputed content is not “redundant, immaterial, impertinent, [] scandalous,” or
otherwise inappropriate. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f).
To be sure, the Complaint may contain some factual details beyond those necessary to
meet the pleading standards of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). But, the inclusion of more facts than needed
to state a claim is not grounds to grant a motion to strike. See Fette v. ACell, Inc., Civ. No. ELH12-3733, 2013 WL 500497, at *1 (D. Md. Feb. 8, 2013). See generally Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2008) (“[A] plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his
entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions . . . . Factual allegations must be
enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”) (Internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
Although defendant asserts that the disputed allegations are prejudicial, he does not
articulate what prejudice he would sustain by having to respond to the portions of the Complaint
that allegedly do not comply with Rule 12(f). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(b) (providing that a motion
must “state with particularity the grounds for seeking the order”); see also Haley Paint Co., 279
F.R.D. at 337 (exercising discretion not to strike pleadings under Rule 12(f) where the movants

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“articulated no prejudice that would result from a denial of their motion”); U.S. ex rel. Ackley,
110 F. Supp. 2d at 406 (noting that Rule 12(f) motions “will be denied unless the matter under
challenge has no possible relation to the controversy and may prejudice the other party”)
(emphasis added; internal citations and quotations omitted). Moreover, it is evident that there
was a basis for plaintiffs to include the allegations, and to explore them in discovery. That Piatt
was not charged with a DUI offense does not mean he was not driving under the influence.
In general, Piatt seems to labor under the misconception that an allegation in a complaint
automatically renders the allegation admissible at trial. This is simply not so. As the Court said
in Md. State Conf. of NAACP Branches v. Md. Dep’t of State Police, 72 F. Supp. 2d 560, 569 (D.
Md. 1999), “inclusion of an event (such as settlement of a lawsuit) in the complaint does not
determine whether evidence of that event will be admissible or legally significant. Taking the
time to determine whether any particular sentence or paragraph has ‘no possible relation to the
controversy’. . . is not warranted.” (Internal citation omitted). At this juncture, it is premature to
resolve evidentiary disputes, including those relating to the disposition of the criminal charges
lodged against Mr. Piatt.
An Order follows.

Date: December 4, 2015

/s/
Ellen L. Hollander
United States District Judge

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