Clayton v. Baltimore City Police Department et al

Filing 15

MEMORANDUM. Signed by Judge Ellen L. Hollander on 6/22/2015. (hmls, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
JOSEPH CLAYTON,
Plaintiff,
v.
BALTIMORE
CITY
DEPARTMENT, et al.

Civil Action No. ELH-15-01626
POLICE

Defendants.
MEMORANDUM
In April 2015, plaintiff Joseph Clayton filed suit in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City,
against the Baltimore City Police Department (“BCPD”), Police Commissioner Anthony W.
Batts, and police officers Timothy T. Spearman and Charles S. Jones, defendants. See ECF 2
(Complaint). On June 4, 2015, defendant BCPD removed the action to this Court, pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1441(c), alleging that this Court had subject matter jurisdiction based on federal
questions in the Complaint. ECF 1 (Notice of Removal) ¶ 7.1
In his Complaint, Clayton alleged ten counts in total: two for violations of the U.S.
Constitution, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; three for violations of the Maryland Declaration of
Rights; and five claims based on Maryland torts. See ECF 2. On June 11, 2015, before
defendants filed a responsive pleading, Clayton filed an Amended Complaint, pursuant to Fed.
R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). See ECF 8. Plaintiff filed a corrected version on June 17, 2015. See ECF
13.

In his Amended Complaint, Clayton abandoned his federal allegations and claims.
1

On June 8, 2015, defendants Spearman and Jones filed a separate notice of removal in
the State case, resulting in the initiation of a duplicate action in this District, which was assigned
to Judge Nickerson. See Clayton v. Baltimore City Police Dep’t, et al., 15-cv-01663. Because
the federal cases are in fact the same case, Judge Nickerson’s case was reassigned to me. See id.

Therefore, the Amended Complaint alleges only violations of Maryland law, including three
counts for violation of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, as well as claims for negligence,
gross negligence, battery, false arrest, false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress. Id.
Clayton also filed a Motion to Remand, ECF 10 (“Motion”), as well as a Memorandum
of Law. ECF 10-1. He argues that, as to the remaining State claims, this Court should exercise
its discretion in favor of a remand to State court. On June 22, 2015, BCPD filed a response (ECF
14), in which they state: “Defendants do not contest the absence of subject matter jurisdiction in
light of Plaintiff abandoning his § 1983 claims.” Id. at 2.2
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), a district court may “decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction” over state claims if, inter alia, the court “has dismissed all claims over which it has
original jurisdiction,” or, “in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for
declining jurisdiction.” The court has discretion to decline to exercise jurisdiction regardless of
whether the action was originally filed in federal court or state court. See, e.g., Carnegie-Mellon
Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 357 (1988).

2

In its response, BCPD also asked this Court to order that “Plaintiff is estopped from
asserting any claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 at a later stage in this litigation,” and “that
Defendants are not required to pay any fees or costs in connection with the removal of the abovecaptioned action or the related matter … .” ECF 14 at 2. Spearman and Jones made the same
request. See 15-1663, ECF 13 at 2. Defendants rely on one case in support of their requests:
Bell v. Baltimore City Police Dep’t, JFM-13-00982 (D. Md. 2013). See ECF 14 at 3.
I have reviewed the Memorandum (ECF 27) and Order (ECF 28) in Bell, as well as the
underlying submissions. I see no reason to grant defendants’ requests. With respect to the
estoppel request, the circumstances on removal are quite different here, and such an order
appears needless and premature. With respect to fees and costs, the plaintiff in Bell sought them,
but Clayton does not seek costs or attorney’s fees. Thus, there is no need to deny relief that was
not requested.
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In Carnegie-Mellon, 484 U.S. at 350, the Supreme Court directed district courts to
“consider and weigh in each case, and at every stage of the litigation, the values of judicial
economy, convenience, fairness, and comity in order to decide whether to exercise jurisdiction
over a case brought in that court involving pendent state-law claims.” It said: “When the
balance of these factors indicates that a case properly belongs in state court, as when the federallaw claims have dropped out of the lawsuit in its early stages and only state-law claims remain,[ ]
the federal court should decline the exercise of jurisdiction … .” Id.
More recently, in Farlow v. Wachovia Bank of N.C., N.A., 259 F.3d 309, 316 (4th Cir.
2001), the Fourth Circuit said: “[T]he Court decided in Carnegie-Mellon … that, in a case in
which the federal claims had been deleted from the complaint by the plaintiff, before trial,
following a removal from a state court, the district court had the discretion to remand the pendent
state-law claims to the state court.” See also Shilling v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 423 F.
Supp. 2d 513 (D. Md. 2006).
Pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 1367(c), and the factors set forth in Carnegie-Mellon, 484 U.S. at
350, I decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the claims in the Amended Complaint.
The case has been in this Court since June 4, 2015, has not progressed in any way, and now
alleges only violations of the Maryland Declaration of Rights and Maryland common law. There
is no reason for this case to be heard in federal court, rather than in the Circuit Court for
Baltimore City. See, e.g., Medina v. L & M Const., Inc., RWT-14-00329, 2014 WL 1658874, at
*2 (D. Md. Apr. 23, 2014) (quoting United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726
(1966)) (“Finally, as a matter of comity, this Court will remand Medina’s state law claims back
to state court, as ‘[n]eedless decisions of state law [by federal courts] should be avoided both as a
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matter of comity and to promote justice between the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed
reading of applicable law.’”) (alteration in Medina).
Accordingly, I will grant the Motion. An Order follows.

Date: June 22, 2015

/s/
Ellen Lipton Hollander
United States District Judge

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