Laskey v. Saul Kerpelman & Associates et al

Filing 7

MEMORANDUM Signed by Judge Ellen L. Hollander on 9/17/2015. (c/m 9/17/15 bas, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
HOWARD LEIGHTON LASKEY,

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Plaintiff,
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v
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Civil Action No. ELH-15-2428
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SAUL KERPELMAN & ASSOCIATES,
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WILLIAM J. WARREN,
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APRIL WARREN,
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Defendants.
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MEMORANDUM
Pending are Howard Leighton Laskey’s complaint and motion to proceed in forma
pauperis. ECF 1; ECF 2. Laskey indicates that he is also known as “Howard L. Laskey, II.”
ECF 1 at 3. The docket shall be amended accordingly.
Laskey’s application to proceed without prepayment of fees shows his sole income
source is a monthly payment of $733.00 in Supplemental Security Income. ECF 2; ECF 2-1.
Laskey states he has little savings. The court will grant him leave to proceed in forma pauperis
because he qualifies for indigent status.
BACKGROUND
Laskey, who is self-represented, has sued a law firm, Saul Kerpelman & Associates, and
two people who appear to be clients of the law firm, William J. Warren and April Warren, for
“mail fraud, wire fraud, complicity to commit mail fraud and wire fraud, attempted extortion,
[and] illegal attempt at search and seizure by perjury with malice and forethought.” ECF 1.
Laskey has submitted additional filings that he titles “Further Evidence to Support Fraud.” See
ECF 3; ECF 4; ECF 5; ECF 6.

Laskey faults defendants April and William Warren for acting in “complicity” with the
law firm of Saul Kerpelman and Associates by filing suit against him on June 25, 2015, in case
24-C15-003310, pending in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, and for sending the “lawsuit
and statement of facts” to him through the United States Postal Service and the internet to
“extort” $ 75, 000 from him. ECF 1. The case type is shown on the state docket as a lead paint
action. ECF 1-1 at 11.
Laskey avers that he has never rented nor allowed William J. Warren or April Warren to
reside at his property located at 527 Baltic Avenue in Brooklyn, Maryland. ECF 1 at 1. As
redress, Laskey requests $1 million in damages and revocation of “Saul Kerpelman & Associates
license to practice law in Maryland.” Id. The State’s electronic docket indicates that a motion
hearing is scheduled in the circuit court on October 2, 2015. See http://casesearch.
courts.state.md.us/ casesearch/inquiryByCaseNum.jis.
DISCUSSION
“Under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915(e), which governs [in forma pauperis] filings ..., a district
court must dismiss an action that the court finds to be frivolous or malicious or that fails to state
a claim.” Michau v. Charleston Cnty., S.C., 434 F.3d 725, 728 (4th Cir. 2006). Although a selfrepresented plaintiff's pleadings are liberally construed to allow the development of a potentially
meritorious case, Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978), the complaint must,
articulate facts that, when accepted as true, demonstrate a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. for City of Balt., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990)
(dismissing pro se complaint that failed to allege any factual basis for the claims); see also
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 685 (2009) (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for “all civil actions”). A claim is facially plausible “when the

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plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007).
Moreover, Laskey does not state a jurisdictional basis for his claims and none is apparent.
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332. Laskey neither identifies a federal law nor a constitutional right
purportedly abridged by defendant, and he also fails to provide a basis for jurisdiction on the
grounds of diversity of citizenship of the parties.
Federal district courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v.
Allapattach Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 552 (2005); United States ex rel. Voyyuru v. Jadhav, 555
F.3d 337, 347 (4th Cir. 2009). “They possess only the jurisdiction authorized them by the United
States Constitution and by federal statute.” Jadhav, 555 F.3d at 347 (citing Bowles v. Russell,
551 U.S. 205 (2007)).
“It is well established that before a federal court can decide the merits of a claim, the
claim must invoke the jurisdiction of the court.” Miller v. Brown, 462 F.3d 312, 316 (4th Cir.
2006). Moreover, a district court has “an independent obligation to determine whether subjectmatter jurisdiction exists, even when no party challenges it.” Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77,
94 (2010). Of import here, “[s]ubject matter jurisdiction cannot be forfeited or waived, and can
be raised by a party, or by the court sua sponte, at any time prior to final judgment.” In re
Kirkland, 600 F.3d 310, 314 (4th Cir. 2010); see McCulloch v. Vélez, 364 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.
2004) (“It is black-letter law that a federal court has an obligation to inquire sua sponte into its
own subject matter jurisdiction.”) ; see also Snead v. Board of Educ. of Prince George’s County,
815 F. Supp. 2d 889, 893-94 (D. Md. 2011).

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Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3), “the court must dismiss the action” if it determines
that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See also Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 506-07
(2006).1 This is because “jurisdiction goes to the very power of the court to act.” Ellenburg v.
Spartan Motors Chassis, Inc., 519 F.3d 192, 196 (4th Cir. 2008).
The complaint is also deficient because it fails to allege well-pleaded facts related to the
defendants. Laskey’s claims of fraud, extortion, illegal attempt at search and seizure, perjury,
and conspiracy are unsupported by factual averments. Laskey provides no facts to support his
allegation that defendants used the U.S. Postal service or the internet with intent to defraud or
other illegal purpose. The complaint is subject to dismissal on this basis.
Moreover, to the extent the complaint asks the court to intervene in a pending state case,
it runs afoul of the abstention doctrine announced in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971).
In most cases, “national policy [forbids] federal courts to stay or enjoin pending state court
proceedings,” so as to allow state courts to determine matters of state law, vindicate important
state interests, and address constitutional concerns without interference from federal courts,
except when plainly necessary to address a situation of immediate and irreparable injury. Id; see
also Marietta Corp. v. Maryland Comm'n on Human Relations, 38 F.3d 1392, 1396 (4th Cir.
1994) (stating abstention is appropriate when: “(1) there are ongoing state judicial proceedings;
(2) the proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) there is an adequate opportunity to
raise federal claims in the state proceedings”). Laskey does not claim, nor does the complaint
suggest, this standard is satisfied.
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A court also has the inherent power to dismiss, sua-sponte, frivolous or malicious
actions and motions. See Ross v. Baron, 493 F. App’x 405, 406 (4th Cir. 2012) (per curiam)
(citations omitted); cf. Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for S. Dist. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 308 (1989);
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f) (“The court may strike from a pleading any redundant, immaterial,
impertinent, or scandalous matter. The court may act: (1) on its own . . . .”).
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The underlying lead paint case is the subject of pending litigation in State court. If, as
plaintiff claims, the Warrens never resided at plaintiff’s property, then the Circuit Court for
Baltimore City would be in a position to resolve that contention.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the court will dismiss the complaint, without prejudice, and by separate
order to follow.

September 17, 2015
Date

_______/s/____________________
Ellen L. Hollander
United States District Judge

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