CDS Family Trust, et al. v. Ernest R. Martin, et al.

Filing 202

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Magistrate Judge J. Mark Coulson on 4/11/2019. (jnls, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
CDS FAMILY TRUST, et al,

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Plaintiff,

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v.

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ERNEST R. MARTIN, et al,

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Defendants.
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Civil Case No. 1:15–cv–02584–JMC

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MEMORANDUM OPINION ADDRESSING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO COUNT SEVEN AGAINST MR. JEFFREY ROSE
At its core, this case involves an allegation that Defendants wrongfully mined coal from an
area where they did not own the necessary mineral rights. The case is before me for all proceedings
by the consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Now pending before this Court are
four motions for summary judgment (ECF Nos. 125, 126, 127, and the remainder of 130) by
various plaintiffs and defendants. This memorandum concerns ECF No. 126, Plaintiffs’ Motion
for Summary Judgment as to Count 7 against Defendant Mr. Jeffrey Rose. The Court also
reviewed Mr. Rose’s opposition. (ECF Nos. 145 and 159). No reply was filed, and no hearing is
necessary. For the reasons below, Plaintiffs’ motion, (ECF No. 126), is DENIED.
I.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs’ count 7 is labelled “CDS and Jeffrey Rose” and stems from events between
Plaintiffs, Mr. Rose, and WPO, Inc. (“WPO”) that occurred before the alleged incidents which
form the basis of the other six counts. (ECF No. 80 at 13). Despite not advancing a specific claim,
the Court interprets the count as one for breach of contract.1 Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Rose

Plaintiffs’ motion quotes law concerning the intentional tort of conversion within their argument. (ECF No. 126-1
at 3). Plaintiffs asserts that Mr. Rose removed the coal and admits it, but then argues that Mr. Rose agreed to
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trespassed on Plaintiff’s property and removed substantial quantities of coal between March and
October of 2011. (Id. at ¶ 66). On September 3, 2014, Mr. Rose allegedly agreed that the trespass
occurred and to pay Plaintiff CDS Family Trust, LLC (“CDS”) $22,976.40 in compensation for
removed coal. (Id. at ¶ 67). $7,500 of the total was paid and the remainder ($15,476.40) plus
interest was to be paid in the future. (Id. at ¶ 67). Plaintiff CDS’s count 7 demands payment of the
outstanding balance plus interest and costs associated with the count. (Id. at ¶ 68).
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) requires the Court to “grant summary judgment if
the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.” The moving party can do so by demonstrating the absence of any
genuine dispute of material fact or by showing an absence of evidence to support the non-moving
party’s case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-25 (1986). A dispute as to a material
fact “is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party.” J.E. Dunn Const. Co. v. S.R.P. Dev. Ltd. P’ship, 115 F.Supp.35 593, 600 (D.
Md. 2015) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).
A nonmoving party “opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment ‘may
not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [his] pleadings,’ but rather must ‘set forth specific
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens Football Club,
Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 522 (4th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). The court is “required to view the facts
and draw reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to” the nonmoving party. Iko v. Shreve,
535 F.3d 225, 230 (4th Cir. 2008) (citing Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 377 (2007)). However,

compensate Plaintiff CDS for any harm. Plaintiffs’ count 7 asks this Court to enforce the agreed upon compensation
of $15,478.40, plus 5% interest beginning to accrue on June 7, 2013. To do so would be to enforce a contract, not to
award damages for conversion. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s count 7 will be treated as one for breach of contract.

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the Court must also “abide by the ‘affirmative obligation of the trial judge to prevent factually
unsupported claims and defenses from proceeding to trial.’” Heckman v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc.,
962 F.Supp.2d 792, 799–800 (D. Md. 2013) (quoting Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 778–79 (4th
Cir. 1993)). Consequently, a party cannot create a genuine dispute of material fact through mere
speculation or compilation of inferences. See Deans v. CSX Transp., Inc., 152 F.3d 326, 330-31
(4th Cir. 1998).
III.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff CDS argues that Mr. Rose agreed to pay for wrongfully removing coal, Mr. Rose
has yet to do so, therefore the Court should order payment plus interest and costs. This argument
is buttressed by occasions where Mr. Rose admitted that a debt is owed to CDS such as in an email
dated August 1, 2013 where he stated, “Should have payment August 30,” (ECF No. 126-2 at ¶ 8),
and during his deposition. (ECF No. 126-3 at 89:12-90:2, 90:6-10, 91:2-3).
In opposition, Mr. Rose admits that a debt exists but argues that it is between CDS and
WPO, not Mr. Rose personally. (ECF No. 157-2 at 1-2). Mr. Rose asserts that at all relevant times
he was an employee of WPO and that WPO was the permittee, operator of the mining, and holder
of the lease agreements. (ECF No. 157-3). Notably, Mr. Rose supplies six leases concerning the
subject property and the mining permit, all of which have been executed in WPO’s name. (ECF
No. 157-4 through 157-9). Among the leases, some are indeed executed by Mr. Rose, but in his
capacity as either Vice President or President of WPO. (See e.g., ECF No. 157-4 at 4; ECF No.
157-5 at 4, 5, 10, 11, and 15; ECF No. 157-6 at 4). Mr. Rose further affirms that his dealing
concerning coal and CDS were in his professional capacity, not personal. (ECF No. 157-3).
The existence of a debt is undisputed. A question, however, remains as to the proper
debtor. CDS argues that Mr. Rose is personally liable, and Mr. Rose argues that WPO is liable.

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With the record as is, this question cannot be answered. The Court cannot determine whether the
contract was written or oral, the terms, how the parties came to an agreement, and whether Mr.
Rose’s agreement included a personal guarantee. Nevertheless, none of this information is before
the Court. As such, Plaintiff has failed to meet its burden and summary judgment is inappropriate
due to the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Mr. Rose is personally
liable personally as advanced by count 7.
IV.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ motion, (ECF No. 126), is DENIED. A separate
order follows.

Dated: April 11, 2019

/s/
J. Mark Coulson
United States Magistrate Judge

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