Aurel v. Rose

Filing 14

MEMORANDUM. Signed by Judge Ellen L. Hollander on 6/16/2016. (c/m 6/17/16)(krs, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

MICH AUREL, #317239
Plaintiff,
v.

*

M.J. ROSE

*

*

CIVIL ACTION NO. ELH-15-2604

Defendant.
*****
MEMORANDUM
Mich Aurel,1 the self-represented plaintiff, filed suit against defendant M. J. Rose, an
office clerk assigned to the mailroom at the North Branch Correctional Institution (“NBCI”),
where Aurel is an inmate. Rose has filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary
judgment. ECF 11. It is supported by a memorandum (ECF 11-1) (collectively, the “Motion”),
and several exhibits. No opposition has been filed to the Motion, and the time to do so has
expired.2 In ECF 13, Rose has also moved for reconsideration (“Motion to Reconsider”) of the
Court’s Order (ECF 6) granting in forma pauperis status to plaintiff.
The court finds a hearing in this matter unnecessary. See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md.
2014). For the reasons that follow, defendant’s Motion (ECF 11), construed as a motion for
1

The Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services (“DPSCS”) lists
plaintiff as Mich Aurel on its “inmate locator” website. Although plaintiff was prosecuted as
Aurel Mich in the Maryland courts, I will use the DPSCS designation of Mich Aurel.
2

Pursuant to the dictates of Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309, 310 (4th Cir. 1975), on
February 4, 2016, Aurel was notified that defendant had filed a dispositive motion, the granting
of which could result in the dismissal of his case. ECF 12. He was also informed that he was
entitled to file an opposition to the motion within seventeen days from the date of that letter, as
well as exhibits, and that his failure to file a timely response could result in the dismissal of his
case or the entry of judgment against him, without further notice of the court. Id.

summary judgment, shall be granted. But, I shall deny defendant’s Motion to Reconsider (ECF
13).
I. Background
Aurel, a NBCI inmate, alleges that throughout 2015 his mail to courts, out-of-state and
overseas family and friends, the media, legislators, lawyers, foreign embassies, and state
agencies and administrators was “destroyed” by defendant. Aurel seeks $1,000,000,000 in
damages. ECF 1 at 3-5.3
In response to the Complaint, defendant maintains that all incoming and outgoing mail is
processed in accordance with approved policies and directives of the Maryland Department of
Public Safety and Correctional Services (“DPSCS”). Rose asserts that at no time has she
withheld, delayed, destroyed or failed to process Aurel’s mail and that legal mail is logged for
record-keeping purposes. ECF 11-3, Rose Decl.
Defendant also alleges that there is no record that Aurel filed a grievance through the
administrative remedy procedure (“ARP”) regarding his mail, nor did he appeal an ARP decision
to the Inmate Grievance Office (“IGO”). ECF 11-6, Ripps Decl.; ECF 11-7, Neverdon Decl. In
particular, Christina Ripps, a Correctional Case Manager Specialist, explains that an inmate’s
appeal of the disposition of a grievance is sent to DPSCS headquarters. She has not located any
appeal by Aurel for the year 2015. ECF 11-6 at 1. Moreover, Russell Neverdon, Sr., Executive
Director of the Inmate Grievance Office, reviewed IGO records and located two grievance

3

All docket references are made to the electronic pagination.

2

appeals filed by Aurel concerning the mail, but both were filed in 2014. ECF 11-7 at 1-2. As
noted, this case concerns the handling of Aurel’s mail in 2015. See ECF 1 at 3-4.
Defendant also provided an “Individual ARP Index Report” for Aurel (ECF 11-5), which
indicates that from January through November of 2015, Aurel filed 31 ARPs. But, not one of
these grievances concerned Aurel’s mail. Id. Therefore, defendant argues that Aurel’s claims
are barred for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
II. Standard of Review
Defendant’s motion is styled as a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) or, in
the alternative, for summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. ECF No. 12. A motion styled in
this manner implicates the court’s discretion under Rule 12(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. See Kensington Vol. Fire Dept., Inc. v. Montgomery County, 788 F. Supp. 2d 431,
436-37 (D. Md. 2011). Ordinarily, a court “is not to consider matters outside the pleadings or
resolve factual disputes when ruling on a motion to dismiss.” Bosiger v. U.S. Airways, 510 F.3d
442, 450 (4th Cir. 2007). However, under Rule 12(b)(6), a court, in its discretion, may consider
matters outside of the pleadings, pursuant to Rule 12(d). If the court does so, “the motion must
be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56,” and “[a]ll parties must be given a
reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(d). When, as here, the movant expressly captions its motion “in the alternative,” as one to
dismiss or for summary judgment, and submits matters outside the pleadings for the court’s
consideration, the parties are deemed to be on notice that conversion under Rule 12(d) may

3

occur; the court “does not have an obligation to notify parties of the obvious.” Laughlin v.
Metro. Wash. Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253, 261 (4th Cir. 1998).4
A district judge has “complete discretion to determine whether or not to accept the
submission of any material beyond the pleadings that is offered in conjunction with a Rule
12(b)(6) motion and rely on it, thereby converting the motion, or to reject it or simply not
consider it.” 5C WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1366, at 159 (3d ed.
2004, 2011 Supp.). This discretion “should be exercised with great caution and attention to the
parties’ procedural rights.” Id. at 149. In general, courts are guided by whether consideration of
extraneous material “is likely to facilitate the disposition of the action,” and “whether discovery
prior to the utilization of the summary judgment procedure” is necessary. Id. at 165-67.
Ordinarily, summary judgment is inappropriate “where the parties have not had an
opportunity for reasonable discovery.” E.I. du Pont De Nemours and Co. v. Kolon Industries,
Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 448-49 (4th Cir. 2011). However, “the party opposing summary judgment
‘cannot complain that summary judgment was granted without discovery unless that party has
made an attempt to oppose the motion on the grounds that more time was needed for
discovery.’” Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302 F.3d 214, 244 (4th Cir. 2002)
(quoting Evans v. Techs. Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 961 (4th Cir. 1996)). To raise

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In contrast, a court may not convert a motion to dismiss to one for summary judgment
sua sponte, unless it gives notice to the parties that it will do so. See Laughlin, 149 F.3d at 261
(stating that a district court “clearly has an obligation to notify parties regarding any courtinstituted changes” in the posture of a motion, including conversion under Rule 12(d)); Finley
Lines Joint Protective Bd. Unit 200 v. Norfolk So. Corp., 109 F.3d 993, 997 (4th Cir. 1997) (“[A]
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss supported by extraneous materials cannot be regarded as one for
summary judgment until the district court acts to convert the motion by indicating that it will not
exclude from its consideration of the motion the supporting extraneous materials.”).
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adequately the issue that discovery is needed, the non-movant typically must file an affidavit or
declaration pursuant to Rule 56(d) (formerly Rule 56(f)), explaining why, “for specified reasons,
it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition,” without needed discovery. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(d); see Harrods, 302 F.3d at 244-45 (discussing affidavit requirement of former Rule
56(f))
“[T]o justify a denial of summary judgment on the grounds that additional discovery is
necessary, the facts identified in a Rule 56 affidavit must be ‘essential to [the] opposition.’” Scott
v. Nuvell Fin. Servs., LLC, 789 F. Supp. 2d 637, 641 (D. Md. 2011) (alteration in original)
(citation omitted). A non-moving party’s Rule 56(d) request for additional discovery is properly
denied “where the additional evidence sought for discovery would not have by itself created a
genuine issue of material fact sufficient to defeat summary judgment.” Strag v. Bd. of Trs.,
Craven Cmty. Coll., 55 F.3d 943, 954 (4th Cir. 1995); see Amirmokri v. Abraham, 437 F. Supp.
2d 414, 420 (D. Md. 2006), aff’d, 266 F. App’x. 274 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 885
(2008).
If a non-moving party believes that further discovery is necessary before consideration of
summary judgment, the party fails to file a Rule 56(d) affidavit at his peril, because “‘the failure
to file an affidavit …is itself sufficient grounds to reject a claim that the opportunity for
discovery was inadequate.’” Harrods, 302 F.3d at 244 (citations omitted). But, the non-moving
party’s failure to file a Rule 56(d) affidavit cannot obligate a court to issue a summary judgment
ruling that is obviously premature. Although the Fourth Circuit has placed “‘great weight’” on
the Rule 56(d) affidavit, and has said that a mere “‘reference to Rule 56(f) [now Rule 56(d)] and
the need for additional discovery in a memorandum of law in opposition to a motion for

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summary judgment is not an adequate substitute for [an] affidavit,’” the appellate court has “not
always insisted” on a Rule 56(d) affidavit. Id. (internal citations omitted). According to the
Fourth Circuit, failure to file an affidavit may be excused “if the nonmoving party has adequately
informed the district court that the motion is premature and that more discovery is necessary,”
and the “nonmoving party’s objections before the district court ‘served as the functional
equivalent of an affidavit.’” Id. at 244-45 (internal citations omitted).
Plaintiff has not filed an affidavit under Rule 56(d). In light of the foregoing, I am
satisfied that it is appropriate to address the defendant’s Motion as one for summary judgment, as
this will facilitate resolution of the case.
Summary judgment is governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), which provides, in part: “The
court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to
any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” The Supreme Court
has clarified that this does not mean that any factual dispute will defeat the motion: “By its very
terms, this standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the
parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the
requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U. S. 242, 247-48 (1986) (emphasis in original).
“The party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment ‘may not rest
upon the mere allegations or denials of [his] pleadings,’ but rather must ‘set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens Football Club,
Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 525 (4th Cir. 2003) (alteration in original) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)),
cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1042 (2004). The court should “view the evidence in the light most

6

favorable to . . . the nonmovant, and draw all inferences in her favor without weighing the
evidence or assessing the witness’ credibility.” Dennis v. Columbia Colleton Med. Ctr., Inc., 290
F.3d 639, 644-45 (4th Cir. 2002); see FDIC v. Cashion, 720 F.3d 169, 173 (4th Cir. 2013).
The district court’s “function” is not “to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of
the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.
Moreover, the trial court may not make credibility determinations on summary judgment. Jacobs
v. N.C. Administrative Office of the Courts, 780 F.3d 562, 569 (4th Cir. 2015); Mercantile
Peninsula Bank v. French, 499 F.3d 345, 352 (4th Cir. 2007); Black &. Decker Corp. v. United
States, 436 F.3d 431, 442 (4th Cir. 2006); Dennis, 290 F.3d at 644-45. Therefore, in the face of
conflicting evidence, such as competing affidavits, summary judgment is generally not
appropriate, because it is the function of the fact-finder to resolve factual disputes, including
matters of witness credibility.
Nevertheless, to defeat summary judgment, conflicting evidence, if any, must give rise to
a genuine dispute of material fact. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48. If “the evidence is such
that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party,” then a dispute of material
fact precludes summary judgment. Id. at 248; see Libertarian Party of Va. v. Judd, 718 F.3d 308,
313 (4th Cir. 2013). On the other hand, summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence “is so
one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Id. at 252. And, “the mere existence of
a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff’s position will be insufficient; there must be
evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Id.
Because plaintiff is self-represented, his submissions are liberally construed. See
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). But, the court must also abide by the “‘affirmative

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obligation of the trial judge to prevent factually unsupported claims and defenses from
proceeding to trial.’” Bouchat, 346 F.3d at 526 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 778–79 (4th Cir. 1993), and citing Celotex Corporation v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323–24 (1986)).
III. Discussion
Defendant argues that Aurel’s claim must be dismissed because he has failed to exhaust
available administrative remedies, as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995
(“PLRA”), 110 Stat. 1321-71, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Exhaustion of administrative
remedies is an affirmative defense, which is most properly considered on a motion for summary
judgment. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007).
The Prisoner Litigation Reform Act provides, in pertinent part:
(a) Applicability of administrative remedies
No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of
this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or
other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are
exhausted.
42 U.S.C. '1997e.
For purposes of the PLRA, “the term ‘prisoner’ means any person incarcerated or
detained in any facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent
for, violations of criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release,
or diversionary program.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(h). The phrase Aprison conditions@ encompasses
Aall inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular
episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong.@ Porter v. Nussle, 534
U.S. 516, 532 (2002).

8

Notably, administrative exhaustion under § 1997e(a) is not a jurisdictional requirement
and does not impose a heightened pleading requirement on the prisoner. Rather, the failure to
exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense to be pleaded and proven by
defendants. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. at 215-216; Anderson v. XYZ Correctional Health
Services, Inc., 407 F.2d 674, 682 (4th Cir. 2005).
The PLRA=s exhaustion requirement serves several purposes. These include “allowing a
prison to address complaints about the program it administers before being subjected to suit,
reducing litigation to the extent complaints are satisfactorily resolved, and improving litigation
that does occur by leading to the preparation of a useful record.” Jones, 549 U.S. at 219; see
Moore, 517 F. 3d at 725 (exhaustion means providing prison officials with the opportunity to
respond to a complaint through proper use of administrative remedies). It is designed so that
prisoners pursue administrative grievances until they receive a final denial of the claims,
appealing through all available stages in the administrative process.

Chase v. Peay, 286

F.Supp.2d 523, 530 (D. Md. 2003), aff’d 98 Fed. Appx. 253 (4th Cir,. 2004); Gibbs v. Bureau of
Prisons, 986 F.Supp. 941, 943-44 (D. Md. 1997) (dismissing a federal prisoner=s lawsuit for
failure to exhaust, where plaintiff did not appeal his administrative claim through all four stages
of the BOP=s grievance process); see also Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 735 (2001) (affirming
dismissal of prisoner=s claim for failure to exhaust where he Anever sought intermediate or full
administrative review after prison authority denied relief@); Thomas v. Woolum, 337 F.3d 720,
726 (6th Cir. 2003) (noting that a prisoner must appeal administrative rulings Ato the highest
possible administrative level@); Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1024 (7th Cir. 2002)

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(prisoner must follow all administrative steps to meet the exhaustion requirement, but need not
seek judicial review).
Ordinarily, an inmate must follow the required procedural steps in order to exhaust his
administrative remedies. Moore v. Bennette, 517 F.3d 717, 725, 729 (4th Cir. 2008); see
Langford v. Couch, 50 F.Supp.2d 544, 548 (E.D. Va. 1999) (“[T]he PLRA amendment made
clear that exhaustion is now mandatory.”). But, this court is “obligated to ensure that any defects
in administrative exhaustion were not procured from the action or inaction of prison officials.”
Aquilar-Avellaveda v. Terrell, 478 F.3d 1223, 1225 (10th Cir. 2007); see Kaba v. Stepp, 458
F.3d 678, 684 (7th Cir. 2006).
An inmate need only exhaust “available” remedies. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). In Ross v.
Blake, ____ U.S. ____, 2016 WL 3128839 (June 6, 2016), the Supreme Court rejected a
“freewheeling approach to exhaustion as inconsistent with the PLRA.” Id. at *3. In particular, it
rejected a “special circumstances” exception to the exhaustion requirement. Id. at *5. But, it
reiterated that “[a] prisoner need not exhaust remedies if they are not ‘available.’” Id. at *3.
The Fourth Circuit has addressed the meaning of Aavailable@ remedies in Moore v.
Bennette, 517 F. 3d at 725, stating:
[A]n administrative remedy is not considered to have been available if a prisoner,
through no fault of his own, was prevented from availing himself of it. See
Aquilar-Avellaveda v. Terrell, 478 F. 3d 1223, 1225 (10th Cir. 2007); Kaba v.
Stepp, 458 F. 3d 678, 684 (7th Cir. 2006). Conversely, a prisoner does not exhaust
all available remedies simply by failing to follow the required steps so that
remedies that once were available to him no longer are. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548
U.S. 81, 89 (2006). Rather, to be entitled to bring suit in federal court, a prisoner
must have utilized all available remedies Ain accordance with the applicable
procedural rules,@ so that prison officials have been given an opportunity to
address the claims administratively. Id. at 87. Having done that, a prisoner has

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exhausted his available remedies, even if prison employees do not respond. See
Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804, 809 (7th Cir. 2006).
More recently, in Ross v. Blake, the Supreme Court stated that an administrative remedy
is available if it is “‘capable of use’ to obtain ‘some relief for the action complained of.’” Ross v.
Blake, supra, 2016 WL 3218839, at *7 (June 6, 2016) (quoting Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731,
738 (2001)). An administrative remedy is not available “if a prisoner, through no fault of his
own, was prevented from availing himself of it.” Moore v. Bennette, 517 F.3d at 725. Thus, an
inmate must complete the prison’s internal appeals process, if possible, before bringing suit.
Chase v. Peay, 286 F. Supp. 2d 523, 529-30 (D. Md. 2003), aff'd, 98 F. App’x 253 (4th Cir.
2004) (requiring that Maryland prisoners appeal up to the Inmate Grievance Office).
The Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services has made an
“administrative remedy procedure” available to Maryland State prisoners, within the meaning of
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), for the submission of “grievance[s] against . . . official[s] or employee[s]
of the Division of Correction.” Md. Code, Correctional Services Article (“C.S.”) § 10-206(a);
see generally C.S. §§ 10-201 et seq.; Code of Maryland Regulations (“COMAR”)
12.07.01.01(B)(1) (defining ARP).

Regulations promulgated by DPSCS concerning the

administrative remedy procedure define a “grievance’ to include a “complaint of any individual
in the custody of the [DOC] . . . against any officials or employees of the [DOC] . . . arising from
the circumstances of custody or confinement.” COMAR 12.07.01.01B(8).5 An inmate “must

5

Maryland appellate case law indicates that the administrative grievance procedure does
not encompass “‘every kind of civil matter that could be brought by a DOC inmate.’” Massey v.
Galley, 392 Md. 634, 646, 898 A.2d 951, 958 (2006) (citation omitted). Rather, it applies only
to matters that “relate to or involve a prisoner’s ‘conditions of confinement.’” Id. at 651, 898
A.2d at 960 (citation omitted). Thus, the grievance procedure does not apply to requests for
11

exhaust” the ARP process as a condition precedent to further review of the inmate’s grievance.
See C.S. § 10-206(b); see also COMAR 12.07.01.02.D; DCD 185-002 (effective August 27,
2008). Exhaustion requires completion of “the administrative review process in accordance with
the applicable procedural rules, including deadlines.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 88, 93
(2006).
In Maryland, filing a request for administrative remedy with the warden of the prison is
the first of three steps in the ARP process. See COMAR 12.07.01.04. The ARP request must be
filed within 30 days of the date on which the incident occurred, or within 30 days of the date the
inmate first gained knowledge of the incident or injury giving rise to the complaint, whichever is
later. COMAR 12.07.01.05A. If the request is denied, a prisoner has 30 calendar days to file an
appeal with the Commissioner of Correction. COMAR 12.07.01.05C. If the appeal is denied, the
prisoner has 30 days to file a grievance with the Inmate Grievance Office. See C.S. §§ 10-206,
10-210; COMAR 12 07.01.03; COMAR 12.07.01.05B.

See also Division of Correction

Directive 185-002, § VI.NI.
public information under the Maryland Public Information Act, see id., nor does it apply to
medical malpractice claims against private medical service providers who treat inmates under
contract with the DOC. See Abramson v. Correctional Med. Servs., Inc., 359 Md. 238, 753 A.2d
501 (2000).
Moreover, the administrative grievance procedure does not apply to claims for
compensation for disabilities resulting from “personal injury arising out of and in the course of
[an inmate’s] work for which wages or a stipulated sum of money was paid by a correctional
facility,” C.S. § 10-304, for which a claim to a different administrative body, the Sundry Claims
Board, is the exclusive remedy. See Dixon v. DPSCS, 175 Md. App. 384, 927 A.2d 445 (2007).
On the other hand, the grievance process does apply to a wide variety of claims that arise out of
the conditions of confinement, even if the grievance process cannot provide a comprehensive
remedy for such claims, such as tort claims of assault and battery against prison officers. See
McCullough v. Wittner, 314 Md. 602, 552 A.2d 881 (1989).

12

Complaints are reviewed preliminarily by the IGO.

See C.S. § 10-207; COMAR

12.07.01.06A. If the complaint is determined to be “wholly lacking in merit on its face,” the IGO
may dismiss it without a hearing. C.S. § 10-207(b)(1); see COMAR 12.07.01.07B. The order of
dismissal constitutes the final decision of the Secretary of DPSCS for purposes of judicial
review. C.S. § 10-207(b)(2)(ii). However, if a hearing is deemed necessary by the IGO, the
hearing is conducted by an administrative law judge with the Maryland Office of Administrative
Hearings. See C.J. § 10-208(c); COMAR 12.07.01.07-.08. The conduct of such hearings is
governed by statute. C.S. § 10-208.
A decision of the administrative law judge denying all relief to the inmate is considered a
final agency determination. However, a decision concluding that the inmate’s complaint is
wholly or partly meritorious constitutes a recommendation to the Secretary of DPSCS, who must
make a final agency determination within fifteen days after receipt of the proposed decision of
the administrative law judge. See C.S. § 10-209(b)-(c).
The final agency determination is subject to judicial review in Maryland State court, so
long as the claimant has exhausted his/her remedies. See C.S. § 10-210. But, an inmate need not
seek judicial review in State court in order to satisfy the PLRA’s administrative exhaustion
requirement. See, e.g., Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1024 (7th Cir.) (“[A] prisoner who
uses all administrative options that the state offers need not also pursue judicial review in state
court.”), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 949 (2002).
Aurel’s Complaint lists approximately forty instances in which he claims that his
outgoing mail was destroyed or mishandled in 2015. He also states that his grievance was
destroyed by a correctional officer. ECF 1 at 2. Even assuming this to be true, he does not

13

refute the uncontroverted record: he filed over thirty ARPs throughout the course of 2015, and
he did not grieve the claims raised here at the institution or appeal levels. ECF 11-5; 11-6, and
11-7. As such, the allegations raised in this Complaint may not proceed, as Aurel has plainly
failed to exhaust administrative remedies as to those issues. Aurel’s claims against the defendant
are therefore dismissed.
As noted, Rose has also filed a Motion to Reconsider this Court’s decision to grant
Aurel’s indigency motion. ECF 13. To be sure, Aurel has had three cases dismissed under 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e). See Mich v. Nice, et al., Civil Action No. JKB-14-1397 (D. Md.); Aurel v.
Gainer, et al., ELH-15-1750 (D. Md.); and Aurel v. Jones, et al., ELH-15-1928 (D. Md.).
Nonetheless, I shall deny the Motion to Reconsider and shall dismiss the case for the reasons set
forth above.
A separate Order follows.

Date: June 16, 2016_____

_________/s/_____________
Ellen L. Hollander
United States District Judge

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