Davis v. Colvin

Filing 20

ORDER denying 14 Motion for Summary Judgment; denying 19 Motion for Summary Judgment; reversing the Commissioner's judgment; remanding case for further proceedings; directing the Clerk to close this case. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephanie A Gallagher on 7/12/2016. (ca2s, Deputy Clerk)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
CHAMBERS OF
STEPHANIE A. GALLAGHER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

101 WEST LOMBARD STREET
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21201
[phone]
Fax [phone]

July 12, 2016
LETTER TO COUNSEL
RE:

Joseph Bernard Davis v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration;
Civil No. SAG-15-2699

Dear Counsel:
On September 14, 2015, Plaintiff Joseph Bernard Davis petitioned this Court to review
the Social Security Administration’s final decision to deny his claim for Supplemental Security
Income (“SSI”). (ECF No. 1). I have considered the parties’ cross-motions for summary
judgment. (ECF Nos. 14, 19). I find that no hearing is necessary. See Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md.
2014). This Court must uphold the decision of the Agency if it is supported by substantial
evidence and if the Agency employed proper legal standards. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g),
1383(c)(3); Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996). Under that standard, I will deny
both parties’ motions, reverse the Commissioner’s judgment, and remand the case to the
Commissioner for further consideration pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). This
letter explains my rationale.
Mr. Davis filed a claim for SSI benefits on May 2, 2013, alleging a disability onset date
of March 25, 2013.1 (Tr. 161-66). His claim was denied initially and on reconsideration. (Tr.
64-71, 73-82). A hearing was held on April 16, 2015, before an Administrative Law Judge
(“ALJ”). (Tr. 33-63). Following the hearing, the ALJ determined that Mr. Davis was not
disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act during the relevant time frame. (Tr. 1526). The Appeals Council denied Mr. Davis’s request for review. (Tr. 1-6). Thus, the ALJ’s
decision constitutes the final, reviewable decision of the Agency.
The ALJ found that Mr. Davis suffered from the severe impairments of status-post
gunshot wounds to the right lower leg and left hip, status-post arthroscopy and partial medial
meniscectomy of the left knee, status-post cholecystectomy, hypertension, obesity, diabetes,
ventral hernia, status-post umbilical hernia repair, intermittent explosive disorder, major
depression, and anxiety. (Tr. 17). Despite these impairments, the ALJ determined that Mr.
Davis retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to:
perform sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(a) except he can
occasionally operate foot controls with both feet. He can occasionally climb
1

Mr. Davis also filed a claim for Disability Insurance Benefits on that same date, which was denied due
to his lack of work credits. (Tr. 85). That claim is not relevant to this appeal.

Davis v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration
Civil No. SAG-15-2699
July 12, 2016
Page 2
ramps and stairs, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. He can never climb
ladders, ropes and scaffolds. He would need to avoid concentrated exposure to
extreme cold, extreme heat, excessive vibration, hazardous moving machinery
and unprotected heights. He can perform simple, routine and repetitive tasks in a
low stress work environment. Low stress work environment is defined as no strict
production quotas. He can occasionally interact with the public, coworkers and
supervisors.
(Tr. 20). After considering the testimony of a vocational expert (“VE”), the ALJ determined that
Mr. Davis could perform jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy and that,
therefore, he was not disabled. (Tr. 25-26).
On appeal, Mr. Davis raised several arguments pertaining to the assignments of weight to
various medical sources, and further argued that the ALJ’s analysis did not comport with Mascio
v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632 (4th Cir. 2015). I disagree with Mr. Davis’s Mascio argument, but I
agree that remand is warranted as a result of numerous errors in the evaluations of the medical
opinions. In so holding, I express no opinion as to whether the ALJ’s ultimate determination that
Mr. Davis was not entitled to benefits was correct or incorrect.
Beginning with the unsuccessful argument, the ALJ’s opinion comports with the
requirements of Mascio. The Fourth Circuit remanded that case, in relevant part, because the
hypothetical the ALJ posed to the VE—and the corresponding RFC assessment—did not include
any mental limitations other than unskilled work, despite the fact that, at step three of the
sequential evaluation, the ALJ determined that the claimant had moderate difficulties in
maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace. Mascio, 780 F.3d at 637-38. The Fourth Circuit
specifically held that it “agree[s] with other circuits that an ALJ does not account for a claimant’s
limitations in concentration, persistence, and pace by restricting the hypothetical question to
simple, routine tasks or unskilled work.” Id. at 638 (quoting Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
631 F.3d 1176, 1180 (11th Cir. 2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In so holding, the
Fourth Circuit emphasized the distinction between the ability to perform simple tasks and the
ability to stay on task, stating that “[o]nly the latter limitation would account for a claimant’s
limitation in concentration, persistence, or pace.” Id. Here, the ALJ expressly limited Mr.
Davis to a “low stress work environment” defined as “no strict production quotas.” (Tr. 20).
That limitation addresses Mr. Davis’s limitation in staying on task, and thus there is no Mascio
error.
In contrast, however, the ALJ’s evaluation of medical opinions is rife with errors, largely
due to the ALJ’s repeated confusion of Mr. Davis’s treating physician, Dr. Nathan Scott, with
Mr. Davis’s treating psychiatrist, Dr. Nicholas Scotto. For example, the ALJ states that Dr.
Scotto “carried out several physical examinations from November 21, 2013 to February 2,
2015,” when in fact Dr. Scotto, the psychiatrist, was assessing Mr. Davis’s mental state. (Tr.
353-92). Although there are some incidental references to Mr. Davis’s physical health in those
reports, Dr. Scotto did not perform physical examinations of Mr. Davis and was not focused on
his physical health in writing his reports. The ALJ then attributes Dr. Scotto’s mental health

Davis v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration
Civil No. SAG-15-2699
July 12, 2016
Page 3
opinion to Dr. Scott, (Tr. 23), and assigns it “modest weight” in part because “Dr. Scott never
performed a mental status examination of the claimant and in his treatment notes he never
reported any abnormal mental clinical signs.” (Tr. 23-24). In contrast, Dr. Scotto performed
regular mental status examinations of Mr. Davis, and found abnormal mental clinical signs
including depression and rage issues. See, e.g., Tr. 356 (“Patient had another episode of near
rage, fortunately there was no one present when he got agry [sic]. In the past he has had
numerous episodes of uncontrolled violent acting out, much of wheich [sic] he has no
recollection for.”); Tr. 367 (“Affect: on edge very tense congruent to mood.”); Tr. 359
(“Depression only mildly improved multiple medical problems noted patient better but still
residual depression and anxiety.”). The ALJ thus misstates the evidence in asserting that Dr.
Scotto’s notes “revealed normal findings except for a depressed effect.” (Tr. 23).
In light of this confusion, the ALJ’s evaluation of medical evidence defies appellate
review, and remand is appropriate to allow the ALJ to provide an accurate assessment of the
reasons for assigning weight to each physician’s opinion. Moreover, on remand, the ALJ should
make an express assignment of weight to each of the opinions written by Dr. Scott, and should
acknowledge that Mr. Davis’s case manager, Ms. Megan Reeves, is not an acceptable medical
source when determining the amount of weight to be assigned to her opinion.
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Davis’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No.
14) is DENIED and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 19) is DENIED.
Pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the Commissioner’s judgment is REVERSED
IN PART due to inadequate analysis. The case is REMANDED for further proceedings in
accordance with this opinion. The Clerk is directed to CLOSE this case.
Despite the informal nature of this letter, it should be flagged as an opinion and docketed
as an order.
Sincerely yours,
/s/
Stephanie A. Gallagher
United States Magistrate Judge