CX Reinsurance Company Limited v. Homewood Realty Inc. et al

Filing 162

ORDER GRANTING 160 Correspondence re: Requesting Court to Stay Discovery. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephanie A Gallagher on 9/27/2018. (hmls, Deputy Clerk)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
CHAMBERS OF
STEPHANIE A. GALLAGHER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

101 WEST LOMBARD STREET
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21201
[phone]
Fax [phone]

September 27, 2018
LETTER TO COUNSEL
RE:

CX Reinsurance Company Limited v. Homewood Realty Inc., et al.,
Civil No. JKB-15-3136

Dear Counsel:
I am in receipt of the September 26, 2018 letter written by counsel for Plaintiff CX
Reinsurance Company (“CX Re”). [ECF No. 160]. On September 25, 2018, CX Re moved for
voluntary dismissal of this action, with prejudice, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
41(a)(2). [ECF No. 159]. On September 26, 2018, counsel for Intervenor Defendants Chauncey
Lyles (“Lyles”) and Shyliyah Streeter (“Streeter”) advised the Court that they were evaluating
Plaintiff’s Motion to Dismiss, and intended to submit a written response within the time
permitted by the Local Rules. [ECF No. 161]. CX Re now seeks to stay discovery pending the
resolution of its dismissal motion. No hearing is deemed necessary. See Local Rule 105.6 (D.
Md. 2016). For the reasons stated below, I will grant CX Re’s request to stay discovery.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 provides that documents are only discoverable if they
are “relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case,
considering…the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or
expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Rule
26 also provides that “[t]he court may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person
from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including…forbidding
the disclosure or discovery.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1)(A). To establish “good cause,” the
moving party “must present a ‘particular and specific demonstration of fact’ as to why a
protective order [staying discovery] should issue.” Wymes v. Lustbader, No. WDQ-10-1629,
2012 WL 1819836, at *3 (quoting Baron Fin. Corp. v. Natanzon, 240 F.R.D. 200, 202 (D. Md.
2006)). The moving party must make “a specific factual showing that the interest of justice and
considerations of prejudice and undue burden to the parties require a protective order and that the
benefits of a stay outweigh the cost of delay.” Id. (citations omitted). “It is not uncommon for
courts to stay discovery pending resolution of dispositive motions.” Id. at *4 (citing Thigpen v.
United States, 800 F.2d 393, 396-97 (4th Cir. 1986)).
Staying discovery in this case would save both parties potentially unnecessary expenses,
and outweighs any benefit gained from producing documents that may no longer be relevant.
Accordingly, I find it appropriate to stay discovery pending Judge Bredar’s resolution of CX

Re’s Motion to Dismiss. Should the Motion to Dismiss be denied, I will impose new deadlines
for the filings required in my September 17, 2018 letter. [ECF No. 155].
Despite the informal nature of this letter, it should be flagged as an opinion and docketed
as an order.
Sincerely yours,
/s/
Stephanie A. Gallagher
United States Magistrate Judge

2