Harwart v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 21

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER denying 15 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 19 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephanie A Gallagher on 10/14/2016. (hmls, Deputy Clerk)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
CHAMBERS OF
STEPHANIE A. GALLAGHER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

101 WEST LOMBARD STREET
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21201
[phone]
Fax [phone]

October 14, 2016
LETTER TO COUNSEL
RE:

Edward Harwart v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration;
Civil No. SAG-15-3516

Dear Counsel:
On November 19, 2015, Plaintiff Edward Harwart petitioned this Court to review the
Social Security Administration’s final decision to deny his claims for Disability Insurance
Benefits and Supplemental Security Income. (ECF No. 1). I have considered the parties’ crossmotions for summary judgment, as well as Mr. Harwart’s reply. (ECF Nos. 15, 19, 20). I find
that no hearing is necessary. See Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2016). This Court must uphold the
decision of the Agency if it is supported by substantial evidence and if the Agency employed
proper legal standards. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3); Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589
(4th Cir. 1996). Under that standard, I will deny Plaintiff’s motion, grant the Commissioner’s
motion, and affirm the Commissioner’s judgment pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405.
This letter explains my rationale.
Mr. Harwart filed claims for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental
Security Income (“SSI”) on July 31, 2012. (Tr. 272-87). He alleged a disability onset date of
April 1, 2012. Id. His claims were denied initially and on reconsideration. (Tr. 198-205, 20811). A hearing was held on August 4, 2014, before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). (Tr.
112-39). Following the hearing, the ALJ determined that Mr. Harwart was not disabled within
the meaning of the Social Security Act during the relevant time frame. (Tr. 94-111). The
Appeals Council denied Mr. Harwart’s request for review, (Tr. 1-7), so the ALJ’s decision
constitutes the final, reviewable decision of the Agency.
The ALJ found that Mr. Harwart suffered from the severe impairments of “chronic
obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), osteoarthritis and allied disorders, and obesity.” (Tr.
99). Despite these impairments, the ALJ determined that Mr. Harwart retained the residual
functional capacity (“RFC”) to:
perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except he
can constantly push or pull at the light exertional level, he can occasionally climb
stairs, ramps, ropes, ladders, or scaffolds, he can frequently balance, he can
occasionally stoop, kneel, crouch, or crawl, and he can occasionally be exposed to
pulmonary irritants or temperature extremes. Nonexertionally, he can understand,
remember, and carry out short simple instructions and can have frequent contact
with supervisors, coworkers, and the public.

Edward Harwart v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration
Civil No. SAG-15-3516
October 14, 2016
(Tr. 101). After considering the testimony of a vocational expert (“VE”), the ALJ determined
that Mr. Harwart could perform jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy and
that, therefore, he was not disabled. (Tr. 104).
Mr. Harwart raises two primary arguments on appeal: (1) that the ALJ erroneously
assessed his RFC; and (2) that the ALJ assigned inadequate weight to the opinion of the treating
physician, Dr. Richter. Each argument lacks merit and is addressed below.
First, Mr. Harwart contends that the ALJ erroneously assessed his RFC. Pl. Mot. 16-19;
Pl. Rep. 2-3. Specifically, he argues that the ALJ failed to consider Mr. Harwart’s need for a
cane in his RFC assessment. Id. To support his assertion, Mr. Harwart cites testimony and
written statements noting that he was prescribed a cane and uses it to walk. Pl. Mot. 17 (citing
(Tr. 117, 132, 304, 340, 373, 408, 868)). Contrary to Mr. Harwart’s assertion, the ALJ properly
assessed Mr. Harwart’s RFC. Most significantly, the ALJ noted that “[Mr. Harwart’s] testimony
and written statements regarding his symptoms and related limitations are out of proportion to
the medical evidence,” (Tr. 102), and “inconsistent with severe pain and other symptoms
precluding all work related activity,” (Tr. 103). To be sure, the ALJ noted Mr. Harwart’s
testimony “that he has been using a cane for the past six months,” “has pain in his back [and]
knees,” and “has to elevate his legs 15 minutes five to six times a day” due to swollen ankles.
(Tr. 102). However, the ALJ also found that “he could walk on his heels and toes, his balance
and coordination were intact, and his gait was normal.” Id. In addition, the ALJ noted that
“findings on diagnostic tests were generally mild,” id., “[s]traight leg raises were negative,” id.,
and “treatment records reflect that he denied swelling in his joints and repeatedly noted that he
had no edema in his extremities,” (Tr. 102-03); see (Tr. 618-22, 637-44, 653-755, 868-99, 91325). Critically, the ALJ also noted that although Mr. Harwart “recently presented with a cane, []
there is no evidence that it was prescribed for him or that he requires it for ambulation.” (Tr.
102). Indeed, Mr. Harwart’s written statements contradict his testimony that he was ever
prescribed a cane. (Tr. 408). Moreover, Mr. Harwart’s written statements concede that he does
not always rely on use of a cane, but rather only “when [his] knee gives out.” Id. Importantly,
this Court’s role is not to reweigh the evidence or to substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ,
but simply to adjudicate whether the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence. See
Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990). Where conflicting evidence allows
reasonable minds to differ as to whether a claimant is disabled, the responsibility for that
decision falls to the ALJ. Mastro v. Apfel, 270 F.3d 171, 179 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Walker v.
Bowen, 834 F.2d 635, 640 (7th Cir. 1987)). Considering the entirety of the ALJ’s RFC analysis,
I find that the ALJ properly assessed Mr. Harwart’s RFC, and supported his findings with
substantial evidence.
Second, Mr. Harwart argues that the ALJ assigned inadequate weight to the opinion of
the treating physician, Dr. Richter. Pl. Mot. 3-15; Pl. Rep. 4-6. A treating physician’s opinion is
given controlling weight when two conditions are met: 1) it is well-supported by medically
acceptable clinical laboratory diagnostic techniques; and 2) it is consistent with other substantial
evidence in the record. See Craig, 76 F.3d 585 (4th Cir. 1996); see also 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1527(d)(2), 416.927(d)(2). However, where a treating source’s opinion is not supported by
2

Edward Harwart v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration
Civil No. SAG-15-3516
October 14, 2016
clinical evidence or is inconsistent with other substantial evidence, it should be accorded
significantly less weight. Craig, 76 F.3d at 590. If the ALJ does not give a treating source’s
opinion controlling weight, the ALJ will assign weight after applying several factors, such as, the
length and nature of the treatment relationship, the degree to which the opinion is supported by
the record as a whole, and any other factors that support or contradict the opinion. 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1527(c)(1)-(6), 416.927(c)(1)-(6). The Commissioner must also consider, and is entitled to
rely on, opinions from non-treating doctors. See SSR 96-6p, at *3 (“In appropriate
circumstances, opinions from State agency medical and psychological consultants and other
program physicians and psychologists may be entitled to greater weight than the opinions of
treating or examining sources.”).
Contrary to Mr. Harwart’s assertion, the ALJ properly evaluated Dr. Richter’s opinion.
The ALJ assigned Dr. Richter’s opinion “limited weight” because it was inconsistent with the
medical evidence and unsupported by the objective record. (Tr. 103-04). Notably, Dr. Richter
opined that Mr. Harwart “should never climb stairs, ladders, or crouch, and [that] he had
limitations with reaching and…could only occasionally twist due to back pain syndrome.” (Tr.
103-04). Additionally, Dr. Richter opined that Mr. Harwart’s “symptoms constantly interfere
with attention and concentration and that he would miss more than four days of work per
month.” (Tr. 104). Accordingly, the ALJ assigned Dr. Richter’s opinion “limited weight” and
noted that “[t]he weight given is reflected in the residual functional capacity for no more than
occasional climbing and other postural activities.” Id.
To support his assertion, the ALJ found that “Dr. Richter’s opinion…is inconsistent with
the generally normal objective findings on examinations and [Mr. Harwart’s] admitted daily
activities[.]” (Tr. 104). Specifically, the ALJ noted that “neither the objective findings
nor…admitted activities support problems with reaching or [Dr. Richter’s] speculation with
regard to missing work.” In addition, the ALJ noted that Dr. Richter’s “opinion with regard to
attention and concentration is inconsistent with [Mr. Harwart’s] description of his ability to
sustain attention, follow instructions, and complete tasks[.]” (Tr. 104); see (Tr. 102). Moreover,
substantial evidence elsewhere in the record, including the “generally normal objective findings
on examinations and the generally mild to moderate findings on diagnostic tests,” further belies
Dr. Richter’s opinion. (Tr. 103). Furthermore, the ALJ noted the consultative examiner’s
determination that “[Mr. Harwart] could perform the requirements of light work with postural
limitations with bending, stooping, kneeling, and crouching,” (Tr. 103, 618-22), and cited the
State medical consultant’s corroboration of Mr. Harwart’s light RFC, (Tr. 104, 172-91). These
inconsistencies, in addition to others cited by the ALJ, provide sufficient justification for the
ALJ’s decision to accord only “limited weight” to Dr. Richter’s opinion.
Mr. Harwart also contends that the ALJ failed to consider the factors outlined in 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(1)-(6), 416.927(1)-(6), when assigning weight to Dr. Richter’s
opinion. The regulations require an ALJ to assess several factors when determining what weight
to assign to the medical opinions presented. 20 CFR §§ 404.1527(d), 416.927(d). These factors
include: the examining relationship between the physician and the claimant; the treatment
relationship between the physician and the claimant; the specialization of the physician; the
consistency of a medical opinion with the record as a whole; and the extent to which a medical
3

Edward Harwart v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration
Civil No. SAG-15-3516
October 14, 2016
opinion is supported by evidence. 20 CFR §§ 404.1527(d)(1)-(5), 416.927(d)(1)-(5). Upon
review of the record, I find that the ALJ cited each factor required under the
regulations. Specifically, the ALJ noted that Dr. Richter examined Mr. Harwart and performed a
physical RFC assessment. (Tr. 103-04, 865-66). The ALJ also adduced Dr. Richter’s opinion,
and cited his Medical Source Statement, which contains Dr. Richter’s original notes and denotes
his status as Mr. Harwart’s primary physician. Id. The ALJ then found, as noted above, that Dr.
Richter’s opinion was “inconsistent” and unsupported by the objective evidence. (Tr. 103-04).
Considering the entirety of the ALJ’s RFC analysis, I find that the ALJ properly applied the
regulations in assigning weight to Dr. Richter’s opinion, and that his findings are supported by
substantial evidence.
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Harwart’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No.
15) is DENIED and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 19) is
GRANTED. The clerk is directed to CLOSE this case.
Despite the informal nature of this letter, it should be flagged as an opinion and docketed
as an order.
Sincerely yours,
/s/
Stephanie A. Gallagher
United States Magistrate Judge

4