Maynard v. St. Stephens Reformed Episcopal Church

Filing 23

MEMORANDUM. Signed by Judge William M Nickerson on 5/12/2016. (c/m 5/12/16 bmhs, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
DOREEN MAYNARD
Plaintiff
v.
ST. STEPHEN’S REFORMED
EPISCOPAL CHURCH

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Defendant
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Civil Action No. WMN-15-3532

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MEMORANDUM
On November 20, 2015, Plaintiff Doreen Maynard, acting pro
se, filed a Complaint against Defendant St. Stephen’s Reformed
Episcopal Church, her former employer.

ECF No. 1.

Plaintiff’s

Complaint was drafted on a form template provided by this Court
titled “Complaint for Employment Discrimination.”

Id.

Under

“[t]his action is brought pursuant to (check all that apply)”
Plaintiff checked the following two boxes:
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq., for employment
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as
amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621, et seq., for employment
discrimination on the basis of age.
Id.

Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss all

claims purporting to arise under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA).

ECF No. 9.

Defendant does not, at this

time, seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims brought under Title

VII of the Civil Rights Act (Title VII).

Id.

Upon review of

the parties’ submissions and the applicable case law, the Court
determines that no hearing is necessary, Local Rule 105.6, and
that Defendant’s motion will be granted.
Plaintiff contracted to work as a full time teacher at St.
Stephen’s Classical Christian Academy for the September 2014May 2015 school year.

It appears Plaintiff’s troubles began

when two superiors at the school, Headmaster John Dykes and
Special Education Director Johanna Judy, modified the terms of
her contract, allegedly without her consent.

On October 9,

2014, Plaintiff filed an internal discrimination complaint with
Reverend Eric Jorgensen concerning the actions of Dykes and
Judy.

Later that same day, Jorgensen requested that Plaintiff

take leave with pay while her complaint was being investigated.
Three days later, on October 12, 2014, Jorgensen terminated
Plaintiff’s employment with the school, reasoning that
Plaintiff’s grievance caused a “spiritually unhealthy work
environment.”

ECF No. 1-13.

On November 14, 2014, Plaintiff

filed a Charge of Discrimination, 12F-2015-00061, with the
Maryland Commission on Civil Rights (MCCR) alleging
discrimination based on retaliation in regards to her suspension
and discharge.

ECF No. 9-1 at 2.

On the charge sheet, under

“the particulars are,” Plaintiff stated:

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I believe that I was retaliated against for opposing a
discriminatory activity in the workplace, because:
I began my employment with Respondent in September
2013 as a Teacher. My immediate supervisor was
Johanna Judy. My work performance was satisfactory
and I had no disciplinary actions.
On October 9, 2014, I filed an internal discrimination
complaint against Ms. Judy and John Dykes, Headmaster
on the basis of my age and sex. Later that same day,
during a conference call with Eric Jorgensen, Pastor,
and Mr. Frye, Board Member, to discuss my complaint,
Mr. Jorgensen requested that I take leave with pay
pending investigation because my complaint caused
“tension” in school.
On October 12, 2014, Mr. Jorgensen terminated my
employment allegedly because I had caused tension
within the workplace due to filing a complaint. I
believe that I was suspended and discharged in
retaliation for opposing a discriminatory activity in
the workplace.
Id.
After Plaintiff’s employment with Defendant was terminated,
she interviewed for a position with Mt. Airy Bible Church as an
After School Coordinator.

During the hiring process, Plaintiff

was informed that Mt. Airy Bible Church received an unsolicited
and unfavorable reference from Pastor Jorgensen which the church
planned to investigate in order “to make an informed decision.”
ECF No. 1-17.

Subsequently, on December 17, 2014, Plaintiff was

notified that the position would be filled by another candidate.
On January 15, 2015, Plaintiff filed a second Charge of
Discrimination, 12F-2015-00174, with the MCCR based on

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retaliation related to Jorgensen’s unsolicited reference.
No. 9-1 at 3.

ECF

Under “the particulars are,” Plaintiff stated:

I believe that I was discriminated against in
retaliation for opposing a discriminatory activity in
the workplace because:
On November 7, 2014, I filed a complaint of
discrimination against Respondent with the Maryland
Commission on Civil Rights (MCCR #1411-0448).
On December 8, 2014, I was hired at Mt. Airy Bible
Church as an After School Coordinator. Although I had
not used Respondent as a reference, on December 12,
2014, I was notified by Rory Rice, Principle at Mt.
Airy Bible Church, that he had received an unsolicited
and unfavorable reference from Pastor Jorgensen at
Respondent’s schools.
I immediately explained my situation with Respondent
regarding the complaint of discrimination that I filed
against them. On December 17, 2014, my employment
offer was rescinded. I believe that Respondent
provided an unfavorable reference in retaliation for
opposing a discriminatory activity in the workplace.
Id.
After investigation, the MCCR concluded that there was no
probable cause to believe that Defendant retaliated against
Plaintiff on either charge.

ECF Nos. 13-3, 13-4.

On October

27, 2015, the EEOC issued Plaintiff a Notice of Right to Sue for
each charge.

ECF No. 1 at 11-12.

November 20, 2015.

Plaintiff filed this case on

Plaintiff’s Complaint contains three claims,

each relating to a particular action taken by Defendant, rather
than a cause of action.

All claims were brought pursuant to

both the ADEA and Title VII.

Defendant moves to dismiss “all
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claims of [Plaintiff] purporting to arise under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act” on the ground that Plaintiff
failed to exhaust administrative remedies under the ADEA.
No. 9 at 1.

ECF

Defendant incorrectly cites to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) as the basis for its motion.
Importantly, a plaintiff’s failure to exhaust administrative
remedies concerning a Title VII or ADEA claim deprives the
federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction over that claim.
Davis v. North Carolina Dep't of Corr., 48 F.3d 134, 140 (4th
Cir. 1995); 29 U.S.C. § 626(d).

Thus the basis for Defendant’s

Motion to Dismiss is Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).
Before a plaintiff may file suit under Title VII or the
ADEA, she is required to file a charge of discrimination with
the EEOC or an equivalent state agency.
5(f)(1); 29 U.S.C. § 626(d).

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-

Once a plaintiff files an

administrative charge, that charge “plays a substantial role in
focusing the formal litigation it precedes.”

Chacko v. Patuxent

Inst., 429 F.3d 505, 509 (4th Cir. 2005); see also Bryant v.
Bell Atl. Maryland, Inc., 288 F.3d 124, 132 (4th Cir. 2002)
(“The EEOC charge defines the scope of the plaintiff's right to
institute a civil suit.”).

“Only those discrimination claims

stated in the initial charge, those reasonably related to the
original complaint [of discrimination in the charge], and those
developed by reasonable investigation of the original complaint
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[of discrimination in the charge] may be maintained in a
subsequent [employment discrimination] lawsuit.”

Evans v.

Technologies Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 963 (4th
Cir. 1996).

When determining the nature of the claims included

in the charge, a court “may look only to the charge filed with
[the administrative agency].”

Balas v. Huntington Ingalls

Indus., Inc., 711 F.3d 401, 408 (4th Cir. 2013).
This Court finds that the scope of Plaintiff’s Complaint
exceeds the limits set by her administrative charges.
Plaintiff’s administrative charges were not brought pursuant to
the ADEA, and further, age discrimination is not reasonably
related to the context of those charges.

The only reference to

age came in Plaintiff’s first charge, which states “I filed an
internal discrimination complaint against Ms. Judy and John
Dykes, Headmaster on the basis of my age and sex.”
at 2.

ECF No. 9-1

This reference refers to the internal complaint Plaintiff

filed with Jorgensen based on the conduct of Judy and Dykes.
The MCCR charges, however, were not related to Judy and Dykes’
conduct, but rather to Jorgensen’s conduct in suspending and
then terminating Plaintiff, as well as his subsequent
unsolicited reference.

See id. (“I believe that I was suspended

and discharged in retaliation for opposing a discriminatory
activity in the workplace.”); see also id. at 3 (“I believe that
Respondent provided an unfavorable reference in retaliation for
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opposing a discriminatory activity in the workplace.”).

The

mere mention of the word age in Plaintiff’s first charge,
without more, is not enough to give Defendant adequate notice
that Plaintiff might, at a later date, assert claims under the
ADEA.

Defendant’s lack of notice is evidenced by the EEOC

Notice of Charge of Discrimination, ECF No. 13-1, which informed
Defendant at the outset that Plaintiff’s first charge was solely
filed under Title VII.
Moreover, Plaintiff was required to check the box next to
each unlawful basis on which she believed she was discriminated
against, and on both charge sheets, she checked only
“retaliation,” leaving blank the box next to “age.”
at 2-3.

ECF No. 9-1

In a similar case before the Fourth Circuit, the Court

found that the “[a]dministrative investigation of retaliation,
and color and sex discrimination, [] could not reasonably be
expected to occur in light of [the plaintiff’s] sole charge of
race discrimination.”

Bryant, 288 F.3d at 133.

Similarly here,

Defendant could not reasonably expect that Plaintiff’s grievance
was based on age discrimination when her sole charge was
retaliation and the explanation of that charge emphasized that
Defendant’s acts surrounding her suspension and discharge were
retaliatory.

In the MCCR’s written findings, there is no

indication that the commission developed, through reasonable
investigation, any allegation of age discrimination, rather,
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both investigative reports concern Defendant’s alleged
retaliation based on Plaintiff’s opposition to a discriminatory
workplace activity.

ECF Nos. 13-3, 13-4.

In both of

Plaintiff’s administrative actions, the EEOC issued a Notice of
Right to Sue under “Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), or the Genetic
Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA).”

ECF No. 1 at 11-12.

On these notices, the boxes pertaining to a right to sue under
the ADEA were left blank.

Id.

Although far from clear for pro se litigants, “Title VII
and ADEA claims arise from completely distinct statutory
schemes.”

Evans, 80 F.3d at 963.

Plaintiff’s misunderstanding

concerning this distinction is evidenced by her statement that
“[i]t was also my understanding as a Pro Se Representative that
filing my charges in this Court is like starting my case all
over with a fresh slate, and that checking the ADEA box along
with the Title VII retaliation box was acceptable.”
at 7.

ECF No. 11

Unfortunately for Plaintiff, filing an employment

discrimination case in federal court is not a fresh start, but
rather, a final chance to examine only those claims brought
before an administrative agency.

The Court concludes that the

administrative charges filed by Plaintiff against Defendant
concern only allegations of retaliation under Title VII,
therefore, the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff’s
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claims brought pursuant to the ADEA.

For the above-stated

reasons, the Court will grant Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.
separate order will issue.

____________/s/___________________
William M. Nickerson
Senior United States District Judge

DATED: May 12, 2016

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A